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ABSTRACT
In the contemporary era, the military forces of a state are important as an ingredient of a 
state’s power to defend itself or as the most significant instrument for achieving its 
foreign policy goals abroad. This thesis provides an account of the roles and functions 
of the American and Russian amphibious forces in the Asia-Pacific region. Historically, 
amphibious forces were, in some aspects, seen as an amalgamation of army and navy or 
air force, thus their status was threatened by the other services or politicians in the 
matter of the allocation of national resources. However, during the Cold War, the two 
cases examined in this thesis had enormously contributed to the promotion of their 
national power reflecting both the geographical realities and the two blocs’ strategic 
configurations as a means of deterrence or coercive diplomacy. In addition, the USMC 
has firmly occupied its status in the post-Cold War era as one of the most effective 
forces in achieving US foreign policy objectives.
This thesis tests the conditioning factors of amphibious force buildup using a total of 6 
variables at two levels: (1) general variables; international/ regional security 
environments and maritime dominion, (2) specific independents variables selected from 
the US national strategic directives; national interests/foreign policy, military 
strategy/policy and maritime strategy/policy. These variables are employed in order to 
explain how they affected the rise and fall of the two cases, and they provide the 
background of what kinds of roles and functions they demanded from the amphibious 
forces. On the bases of these explanations, this thesis sets out how the two amphibious 
forces contributed to obtaining their countries foreign policy objectives throughout three 
periods: until the end of the Vietnam War, until the end of the Cold War, and in the post-
Cold War era. With time and the transitions of the general and specific independent 
variables, the roles and functions of amphibious forces were enormously changed. For 
example, the USMC moved from being a means of deterrence against Soviet 
expansionism during the Cold War, to a trouble-shooter reacting to any kinds of 
international and regional conflicts in the post-Cold War era.
In the final chapter, the thesis evaluates the relationship between the examined variables 
and their effects on the rise and fall of amphibious forces after summarizing the worth 
of amphibious forces derived from their possession while waging a war. Even though 
there are some additional factors influencing the amphibious forces buildup, the 
direction of a national strategy has already included all environmental and constraining 
factors in the development of a policy decision-making system. Moreover, with the 
development of international and regional organisations, a state’s military forces 
buildup cannot help considering the others’ trends, particularly those of a potential 
enemy or alliance. Consequently, the decision for a state to build up its amphibious 
force mainly depends on the relevant state’s geo-strategic condition, i.e., a necessity to 
project military power across the sea.
Nowadays, the USMC is a shining example of how a state employs its amphibious force 
in achieving its national interest. In my view, the American legal protection regarding its 
size and organisation by the constitutional legislation of 1952 was one of the most 
important prime movers for the present development. In fact, what size of amphibious 
force a state possesses is a matter of how it allocates its national resources. However, 
once a state keeps its amphibious force, it is necessary to guarantee its status in order to 
maximize its usefulness.
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Chapter I. Introduction
1. Background and Purpose of Study
This study analyses the rationales for the United States and Soviet/ Russian amphibious 
forces with particular reference to the Pacific region. It seeks to locate these capabilities 
within the broader strategic and political circumstances which provided the framework 
for decisions concerning the size, equipment and deployment of amphibious forces. As 
a result, it necessarily adopts a ‘broad brush’ approach, in which the focus is on wider 
geopolitical arguments rather than narrower doctrinal or technological issues. It seeks to 
place the amphibious forces within a crucial strategic and historical context.
A. The Transitions of the Maritime Powershifts in the Pacific
(1) The General Security Environment Changes after WWII
The ferocious and complicated conflict of the Second World War produced a 
tremendous change in the whole situation of international political and military affairs. 
Among the most important consequences of WWII were the creation of the UN, 
substituting for the old League of Nations; the emergence of nuclear weapons and a new 
global order, the bipolar system dominated by the two superpowers, the US and USSR.1 
Firstly, the role of the UN was, in reality, passive during the Cold War era, because of
1 P.M.H. Bell, The World since 1945: An International History (London: Arnold, 2001), pp.31 - 41. With 
the end of WWII, the other European Powers, notably Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the Asian 
major powers, mainly China and Japan, were in decline and divided into two groups: the communist 
camp (Eastern side) led by the USSR and the capitalist camp (Western side) led by the US, according 
to ideology.
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the veto authority of the permanent members of the Security Council. Secondly, the 
Cold War was a great political and strategic struggle between the US and USSR. The 
main objective of US foreign policy was to stop the growth of the areas under the 
control of the Communist regimes over against the Soviet goal of expanding the area of 
Communist control. Finally, the nuclear weapons possessed by the two superpowers 
were regarded as a critical means of exercising their foreign policy, especially as a 
means of deterrence, in relation to other states. Hence nuclear weapons were taken for 
granted as the symbol of power politics.
From the above perspectives, as the optimists believed, it appeared that states 
possessing nuclear weapons (or that were effectively protected by the nuclear umbrella) 
no longer needed physical security . It appears that during the Cold War, nuclear 
weapons influenced the pursuit of national policy as well as the maintenance of 
international stability. They changed military and political relationships from the 
horizontal to the vertical between nuclear and non-nuclear states and widened the gap 
between the two superpowers and other major powers4.
However, after the first use of the nuclear weapons against Japan at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki by the US, the USSR effectively established mutual nuclear deterrence in 
1949 by the detonation of its first atomic bomb in the Ustyurt desert. After that, the 
policy makers of both sides realized that the nuclear war, though not nuclear weapons,
2 Regina Cowen Karp (ed.), Security without Nuclear Weapons? Different Perspectives on Non-nuclear 
Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 2.
3 Patrick J. Garrity and Steven A. Maaranen (eds.), Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World (New York: 
Plenum Press, 1992), p. 3.
4 Ciro Elliott Zoppo, “Nuclear Technology, Multi-polarity and International Stability,” World Politics, Vol. 
18, No. 4 (July 1966), pp. 579-581.
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could not be a rational instrument of state policy.5 In reality, as George H. Quester has 
analysed, after the success of the launch of the Soviet Sputnik at the end of the 1950s, 
US superiority was no longer guaranteed6. It meant that both sides could never be 
secured against each side’s retaliatory attack using atomic bombs or missiles (see Table 
1-1). On reflection, it seems likely that the pendulum had begun to fluctuate from one 
side to another. Put simply, the American ability to drop atomic bombs did not 
counterbalance the Soviet conventional military advantage. In this sense, the pessimists 
insist that such a fundamental transformation of international relationships may not have 
taken place, and therefore the effects of nuclear weapons in the bipolar context cannot 
be extrapolated.7 Put simply, the political effects of nuclear weapons were much 
smaller than the realists expected, and therefore nuclear weapons could not be employed 
as usable instruments of state policy.
Table 1-1: The Pendulum of Nuclear Superiority
Classification Seen in: Looking forward to:
US monopoly 1945 1955
US superiority 1949 1960s
Soviet superiority (bomber gap, missile gap) 1957 1959
US superiority? (Missile gap in reverse) 1961 1970
US superiority 1963 1970s
Parity 1968 1970s
Soviet superiority 1974 1980s
Source: George H. Quester, “The Impact of the Strategic Balance on Containment”, in Terry L. Deibel 
and John Lewis Gaddis (eds.), Containment Concept and Policy (Washington, DC: NDUP,
1986), p. 267.
To summarize, as Alvin Toffler described in his book ‘War and Antiwar’, nobody 
employed nuclear weapons to wage a war because of the potential disastrous effects. As 
such, it seems likely that nuclear weapons were a means of intimidation or blackmail 
rather than intended for real use on the battlefield in order to achieve a state’s foreign
5 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 316.
6 George H. Quester, “The Impact of the Strategic Balance on Containment”, in Terry L. Deibel and John 
Lewis Gaddis (eds.), Containment Concept and Policy (Washington DC: NDUP, 1986), pp. 265- 268.
7 Patrick J. Garrity and Steven A. Maaranen (1992), p. 3.
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and military policy goals. By and large, the political studies and considerations for 
making policy in association with nuclear weapons were also more focused on the 
political rather than the military aspects. Even so, it is clear that nuclear weapons have 
the effect of acting in a forceful way, and they exist as the most important strategic
o
element in human history. Consequently, in the nuclear strategy, the most significant 
concepts9 were (1) the credibility to employ it in the worst-case scenario and (2) a 
survival capability, the second strike not the first being the crucial element. All in all, it 
is undeniable that nuclear weapons have remained ever since at the heart of 
international relations.
(2) Maritime Powershifts in the Pacific
Given the end of WWII and the geo-international political transitions, there was an 
explosive fluctuation in the balance of maritime power in the Pacific area. Traditionally, 
the major maritime powers in Northeast Asia were China10, Japan and Russia, but the 
Japanese Navy defeated the Chinese and Russian Navies in the Sino-Japanese war in
11 to1895 and in the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 , respectively. Owing not only to the
8 Colin S. Gray, “To Confuse Ourselves: Nuclear Fallacies”, in John Baylis and Robert O’Neill (eds.), 
Alternative Nuclear Futures: The Role o f Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 4-7.
9 Lawrence Freedman, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists”, in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers 
o f Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 
750-755.
10 China is not well known as a maritime power. However, history indicates that Chinese ships had 
cruised the Indian Ocean and the coast o f Africa via South Asia from at least the 12th Century, and it 
was a great maritime power until the 15th Century. After that, with the development of industrialized 
armaments in Europe, its maritime power relatively diminished, but it had sufficient naval power to 
defend its homeland and to influence its surrounding countries as a regional maritime power. Refer, 
William H. McNeill, The Pursuit o f  Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 41-50 and 285-299.
11 This war was fought to gain influence in the Korean peninsula (Chosun dynasty). The defeat of China 
brought home the sad decline of the Ch’ing Dynasty as well as the Chinese navy, while giving Japan 
the possibility of the beginning of an empire in Northeast Asia. Edwin O. Reischauer, “China and 
Japan: Rivals or Allies?”, in Francis O. Wilcox (ed.), China and the Great Powers: Relations with the 
United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 31-32.
12 For the courses and results of this war, refer Donald W. Mitchell, A History o f Russian and Soviet Sea
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collapse of the Ch’ing Dynasty and Tsarist Russia initiated by the two wars, but also the 
withering of European influence in East Asia because of WWI, Japan became the 
paramount power in East Asia. As such, Japan was able to greatly expand through the 
annexations of Formosa (Taiwan) for maritime advantage in 1895 and of Korea for an 
Asian land route to Manchuria in 1910.
1 ^According to Hector C. Bywater’s research , Japan continuously increased its naval 
budget from an estimated £ 6,000,000 in 1906 to £ 32,000,000 in 1920. Despite the 
fact that this is an estimated amount, there is no doubt that the sum had been 
considerably increased. Along with this increase, the Japanese Navy had emerged as one 
of the major maritime powers in the world having a total strength of 12 battleships, 12 
battle-cruisers, 25 light-cruisers, 102 destroyers, 113 submarines in 1922. In addition to 
the above facts, Japan established an ongoing naval construction plan seen in the 
programmes of 1923-24 and 1927-28.14 On the basis of this kind of naval development, 
Japan expanded its influence throughout the Pacific area such as the Mariana Islands 
(occupied 1914, mandated 1922). At this stage, most of the Pacific area countries were 
occupied by the major powers, i.e., Britain (Hong Kong, Singapore), France (Indochina), 
and the US (the Philippines, Guam and Hawaii Islands).
An international turning point in naval power construction was the Washington 
Conference of 1921-22, which created a new order in the Pacific region. In this 
conference, the Four Major Powers agreed not only to recognize the status quo in the
Power (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1974), pp. 204-247.
13 For more details, refer Hector C. Bywater, Sea-power in the Pacific: A study o f the American-Japanese 
Naval Problem (New York: Amo Press, 1970), pp. 131-241.
14 Ibid., pp. 152-153.
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Pacific via the Four Power Treaty on Insular Possessions (December 13, 1921), but also 
to keep an international capital ship ratio (5, 5, 3, 1.75, for respectively the US, Britain, 
Japan, and France).15 As a result of this conference, the Japanese Imperial Navy 
obtained greater freedom in the Pacific, since they agreed not to build any new military 
base between Singapore and Hawaii16 in the Washington and the subsequent London 
treaties. It seems that American naval power together with the other major powers was 
insufficient to challenge Japanese predominance in East Asia as well as its naval 
expansion. Hence, the best way to prevent Japan from continuous expansion was to 
appease its ambitions by providing incentives like goods and loans needed for 
development due to the uncertainties of both the European Security environment, and
• 17the American domestic, international and military situation.
Most of the Japanese leaders, however, believed that “if Japan failed to be an empire, it 
could not survive as a nation.” Thus, the Japanese government’s slogan, “Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”, would inspire the Japanese thirst and craving for
151recognition throughout the world. Under these circumstances, despite the concessions 
of the other major powers, Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 with the justification of its 
national and economic interests there.19 With the occupation of Manchuria, Japan
15 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way o f  War (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 
244.
16 Here, the US made a concession that it could not fortify its bases in the Philippines or on Guam or 
Wake Island, since the Japanese were hesitant to accept the 5:5:3 ratios. Refer George W. Baer, One 
Hundred Years o f Sea Power (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 100.
17 One of the significant examples of these approaches is the secret agreement between the US and Japan 
on July 29, 1905, in which the US agreed to the establishment of Japan’s suzerainty over Korea in 
return for Japan’s disavowal of aggressive plans for the Philippines. John Edward Wilz, “Did the 
United States betray Korea in 1905?”, Pacific Historical Review, LIV (August, 1985), p. 252.
18 Thomas G. Paterson, et al., American Foreign Policy: A History/ 1900 to Present (Lexington: D.C. 
Heath and Company, 1991, 3rd ed.), p. 344.
19 In 1928, Japan joined fourteen other nations in signing the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which denounced 
“recourse to war for the solution of international controversies.” The Japanese pretext was based on 
this. However, the real reason was liable to be affected by ultra-nationalists, who were composed of
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paved the way for additional expansion by a land route. In addition to this effort, it 
continually attempted to build up a gigantic naval power in order to support the 
government slogan and to ensure its survival, because its natural resources were 
extremely limited. In order to do this, Japanese militarists were not eager to continue 
being involved in the disarmament pacts. Furthermore they wanted quantitative as well 
as qualitative parity in naval power, equal to the US and Britain, which meant that the 
5:5:3 ratio was no longer acceptable. It meant that Japan would be the major power in
the Pacific, because its naval power would be greater than the US and Britain, whose
• 00naval powers were divided geographically. As a result, the London Conference broke 
up without agreement and Japan announced its abrogation of the Washington and 
London treaties.
After that, Japan began to invade and expand its influence by occupying China from 
land and sea, i.e., Shanghai (1937) and Hainan (1939).21 Moreover, Japan joined the 
Axis alliance with Germany and Italy by signing the Tripartite Pact, and ratified the
Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact in April 1941. The goal of these military agreements
♦ ♦ 22was to re-divide the world, which policy was directed primarily against the US.
Consequently, on December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the US naval base at Pearl Harbor 
in the aftermath of not only the statement of Japanese Prime Minister, Gen. Hideki Tojo, 
in November 1941, that British and American influence must be eliminated from the 
Orient, but also the ratification of the Imperial Conference, December 1, 1941, to
navy and army officials, who prepared themselves for the defense of the budgets. Japan-diplomacy 
between the Wars, sourced by the US Library of Congress, <http://countrystudies.us/japan/30 and 
31 ,htm>. accessed: November 12, 2003.
20 Scot MacDonald, “Evolution of Aircraft Carriers: The Japanese Developments”, Naval Aviation News 
(October 1962), pp.41-41.
21 Thomas G. Paterson, et al. (1991), pp. 345 - 346.
22 The Rise of the Militarists between the Wars, sourced by the US Library of Congress. 
<http://countrvstudies.us/japan/32.htm> accessed: November 12, 2003.
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9^embark on a war of “self-defense and self-preservation”.
Thus conceived, the US also predicted that sometime it would engage with Japan in the 
Pacific area, even though its security environment, i.e., American weakness in Asia, 
forced it to establish close rapport with Japan by 1920. The first effort to prevent Japan 
from being the proprietor in the Pacific would be, as previously described, the 
successful negotiation of the Washington Conference, which was considered a prestige 
victory for the US administration in terms of the capital-ship parity with Britain.24 In 
truth, there were two very significant issues pointed out in Navy Secretary Denby’s 
Annual Report for 1922. On the one hand, on the matter of the enlargement of the naval 
force’s role, the US Navy should be maintained in sufficient strength to support its 
policies ...and to guard its continental and overseas possessions. On the other hand, on 
the matter of future construction, the US government should try to create, maintain, and 
operate a Navy second to none and in conformity with the ratios for capital ships.
In spite of the success in terms of definitive naval policy, the results of the Washington 
Naval Conference caused a few problems with the passage of time. As M. S. Koromhas
9 f\and Lt Col. J. Jones have noted in their report , the negotiations were undertaken by 
naval officers so that, in association with a future role and construction, there was a 
significant disconnection between the government agencies, i.e., the Departments of
23 For more details, see Akira Iriye, The Origins o f the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (Essex: 
Longman Group UK Limited, 1987), pp. 159-167.
24 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years o f  Sea Power (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 
104.
25 Edwin Denby, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” in Annual Reports o f  the Navy 
Department for the Fiscal Year 1922 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1923), pp. 1-2, quoted from George W. 
Baer (1994), p. 104.
26 M.S. Koromhas and Lt Col J. Jones, “American Naval Preparations for Pacific War 1931-1941: A 
Retrospective and Reappraisal”, CSC 1995, March.
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State and War. As a result, this disharmony resulted in both a disjointed and passive
« • 97foreign policy in the Pacific, and the failure of the planned naval build up . The second 
preparation was Plan Orange, which was the basic scheme of the US Navy for war 
against Japan for about twenty years. It had sound principles: move the fleet out to the 
Western Pacific, establish sea control, and defeat Japan through blockade, but it was 
impossible to execute it. Due to the distance and geography, the plan was divided into 
three phases; Phase I: Japanese Invasion, Phase II: The Counter-attack, Phase III: The
9ftCounter-Offensive . The fundamental issue of this plan was, however, unable to answer 
the basic questions of the Navy planners, “What is the political goal of the military 
action?” and “What are the interests of the US in the Far East?” Consequently, this 
was never enacted by Congress or signed by the President until after 1941.29
In the meantime, a gleam of hope was the emergence of the Roosevelt administration in 
early 1933, which did bring the Navy up to the strength permitted by the Washington 
and London conference treaties. The President pushed ahead with naval construction in 
such a way as to deter Japanese expansion in the Pacific area, and therefore he allocated
•  • infunds for thirty-two new vessels, including two aircraft carriers. Nonetheless, the US 
was unable to raise funds to build even up to the Treaty limits, and, as a consequence,
T1the US Navy possessed only 15 of its 18 authorized battleships by 1940. As a matter 
of fact, it was one of the main reasons that Japan seceded from the treaties in 1936, and
27 In reality, Japan built to the edge of treaty limits, in contrast, the US never built to this limit until the 
end of the treaty. Refer, George W. Baer (1994), pp. 104-145.
28 “War Plan Orange in USS Panay Sunk”, <http://home.sandiego.edu/~pbugler>. accessed: November 
14, 2003.
29 George W. Baer (1994), pp. 120-128.
30 Thomas G Paterson, et al. (1991), p. 344-345.
31 Despite the restrictions in the treaties, in terms of technology development, the US Navy improved its 
performance, i.e., battleship propulsion changed from coal to oil fired boilers, main battery elevation 
from 24 to 36 degrees. For the details, see Robert L. O’Connell, Sacred Vessels: The Cult o f  the 
Battleship and the Rise o f  the US Navy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
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it precipitated a vigorous naval arms race. With the development of Japanese influence 
in almost all the major Chinese seaports, the Roosevelt Administration cautiously 
moved to occupy several Pacific islands (e.g., Enderbury) as potential naval bases.
At this stage, several international factors impinged on Roosevelt’s foreign and naval 
policies towards Asia and the Pacific. The first and most important factor was the rise of 
Hitler’s Germany, particularly the declaration of rearmament in 1936. At several 
strategic meetings held between British and American leaders, they decided that 
Germany was the primary threat to Anglo-American security interests, which caused 
a major shift in American strategic thinking. As a result, the US strategy for WWII was 
Plan D among five Rainbow Plans, more specifically, a holding action in the Pacific 
against Japanese expansion and the offensive action in the Atlantic and in Europe to 
beat Germany, projected by army and navy war planners in 1939.34 Apart from the 
other reasons, the US Pacific fleet in Pearl Harbour came under a surprise attack from 
the Imperial Japanese Navy on December 7, 1941. In the light of this disaster, the US 
lost the initiative to Japan in the Western Pacific.
The outbreak of WWII was a striking opportunity for expansion by Japan, because the 
European powers, notably France and the Netherlands, invaded and occupied by 
Germany found it impossible to protect their colonies in the Pacific. Japan occupied
32 Thomas G. Paterson, et al. (1991), pp. 346-347.
33 James J. Herzog, Closing the Open Door: Japanese-American Diplomatic Negotiation 1936-1941 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973), p. 254.
34 For more details, see Steven T. Ross, American War Plans 1941-1945: The Test o f Battle (Portland: 
Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 1-20. The British and Americans agreed to the ‘Germany First concept’ as the 
broad strategic objective in the ABC1 Conference from January 29 to March 27 1941. Refer “US Serial 
011512-12(R)”, in <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/pt_l4/x15-049.html>. accessed: June 06, 2005.
35 Regarding the German help, see the Tripartite Pact at Basil Collier, The War in the Far East 1941- 
1945: A Military History (London: Morrison and Gibb Limited, 1969), pp. 480-481.
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French Indo-China using the opportunity of the defeat of France in 1940-41; destroyed 
the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour and drove out the Americans from the 
Philippines; captured Singapore and Burma from the British; and conquered the Dutch 
East Indies in March and April 1942.37 The Japanese expansion reached the peak of its 
success by occupying most of the key islands which served as advanced bases in the 
Pacific area (refer Figure 1-1: the Japanese expansion and the Allies’ counterattack).
After this, European colonial prestige in Asia and the Pacific area came to an end with
these defeats, although Hong Kong remained a British colony until 1997.
Figure 1-1: The Japanese Expansion and the Allies* Counterattack
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Sources: Thomas G. Paterson, et al., American Foreign History: A History/1900 to Present (Lexington:
D.C. Heath and Company, 1991, 3rd ed.), p. 398, etc.
36 For the reasons for the Pacific Fleet’s defeat, refer Thomas C. Hone, “The Destruction of the Battle 
Line at Pearl Harbor”, Proceedings, Vol. 103/12/898 (December 1977), pp. 49-59.
37 For the possessions of the major powers in the Pacific before 1939, see Bernard C. Nalty (ed.), War in 
the Pacific: Pearl Harbor to Tokyo (Norman: the University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), p. 14.
38 Of course, the Dutch and the French fought to regain control of the East Indies and Indo-China 
respectively after the end of WWII, but they failed.
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The Midway Battle, mainly from 4 to 7 of June 1942, was the foundation of the 
recovery of hegemony for the US in the Pacific. When the engagement ended, Japan 
had lost four carriers, a heavy cruiser and over 332 aircraft, which meant she had lost 
the ability to defeat the US . Furthermore, the successes of the US both at Midway and 
Guadalcanal (12-15 November 1942) became the turning point. As a consequence, 
maritime superiority shifted back to the US, who never thereafter lost it. The plans for 
the Allied counterattack were divided into two main streams: the South Pacific theatre 
of General MacArthur based on the Elkton and Reno plans, and the Central Pacific 
theater of Admiral Nimitz founded on the Granite Plan.40 These operational plans were 
successfully accomplished. The US captured the Solomon Is in 1943, Leyte and the 
Philippines in 1944-45, Iwo Jima in March and Okinawa in July 1945.41 Finally, it 
employed atomic bombs to avoid the invasion of Japan and suffering heavy casualties 
as at Iwo Jima and Okinawa (refer Figure 1-1). Following the dropping of the atomic 
bombs, the Japanese surrendered unconditionally on August 15, 1945, and were later 
incorporated into the Western Pact led by the US.
Meanwhile, the Soviets launched their attack against the Japanese in Manchuria on 
three fronts.42 One of these advanced from Vladivostok towards Korea, and the Soviets 
occupied the northern part of the Korean peninsula on August 20, whereas the southern
39 Gordon W. Prange, Miracle at Midway (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), pp. 393-397.
40 Steven T. Ross (1997), pp. 43-161.
41 For more details, refer Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two-Ocean War: A short History o f  the United 
States Navy in the Second World War (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), pp. 264-577. For the 
Japanese perspective, see Masanoro Ito, The End o f  the Imperial Japanese Navy, Andrew Y. Koroda 
(trans.), (New York: Norton & Company Inc, 1962), pp. 70-179.
42 Bernard C. Nalty (1999), p. 293. The Soviet Union declared war and started combat with Japan on 
August 9, 1945. When the Japanese surrendered on August 15 1945, it continuously pushed back the 
Japanese forces in the relevant areas until the end of August in order to seize the initiative.
339-  12
part was occupied by US forces.43 The other front was from the North towards South 
Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, and they were recaptured and occupied by the Soviet 
Pacific Fleet on August 25, 1945.44 Furthermore, the victory of the Communist Party in 
mainland China in 1949 was perhaps one of the major factors in the transition of the 
maritime security environment. Given their natural hostility and the numerous territorial 
disputes, from the early 1960s the PRC (the People’s Republic of China), despite the 
common political regime of the two countries, parted company in the field of geo­
strategic and political cooperation.45
As a lasting consequence of WWII in the Pacific, the US began to dominate Asia and 
the Pacific area as the leader of the Western Pact, following the demise of the European 
and Japanese Empires. In other words, it meant that the war transformed the power 
structure throughout the world, particularly in Asia and the Pacific in terms of the ability 
to control the sea. With the onset of the Cold War, the maritime boundary between the 
two pacts was set up, with the narrow Bering Strait separating the Soviet Far East from 
Hokkaido, the northernmost island of Japan, which was close to Soviet Sakhalin and the 
Kurile Islands46. This boundary and the transition of the international security 
environment brought a completely new element into the conduct of international and 
military affairs. Moreover, this maritime environment had not changed even by the end
43 After the end o f the Japanese control of the Korean Peninsula, the two superpowers’ military 
occupation was begun. Finally, the current boundary was decided via the Korean War. North Korea 
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) was adjacent to continental Asia as a member of the Eastern 
Pact. In contrast, South Korea (the Republic of Korea) was completely converted into a maritime 
country as a member of the Western Pact.
44 V. Sabanyev, “Pacific Fleet Sailors”, Soviet Military Review, No. 8 (August 1980), pp. 34-36.
45 From the second half of the 1950s, the PRC received the help of massive Soviet aid, for example an 
increase of Soviet naval advisers, and many ships such as destroyers, submarines, torpedo boats and 
minesweepers. Refer, David G. Muller. Jr., China as a Maritime Power (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1983), pp. 29-89.
46 J. P. Cole, Geography o f World Affairs (Middlesex: Penguin Books Inc., 1974,4th ed.), pp. 256-257.
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of the 1950s, even though there were a few regional conflicts, i.e., the Dutch in the East 
Indies and the French in Indo-China. Above all, the consequences of WWII enabled the 
US to become the predominant maritime power in the whole of the Pacific, meeting the 
communist threat in the Cold War47.
B. Purpose of Study
During the Second World War, one of the most significant revolutions in the field of 
military affairs was the systematic development of amphibious operational capabilities 
in order to overcome the obstacles of straits and sea, in the hope of attacking mainland 
Europe to defeat Germany, and to recover the islands and countries in the Pacific from
thJapan. The first great invasion from the sea in the 20 century occurred at Gallipoli in 
1915 during WWI, which, while the overall campaign was a great disaster for the Allies, 
not only produced many significant lessons, i.e., the importance of armoured landing
AQ
boats , but also temporarily discredited the concept of large-scale amphibious assaults. 
In the US, the necessity of amphibious landing operations was, however, not overlooked, 
but taken into profound consideration.
Given the establishment of the advanced base force at Quantico, the US, particularly the 
Joint Board of the Army and Navy, established a landing force role for the marines, 
devised adequate amphibious doctrines, and supplemented the lack of transport vessels
47 Another critical area was Europe, which was protected from Soviet expansion by a collective security 
system with the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on April 4, 1949 in 
Washington, DC, see NATO, NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1969), 
pp. 15-16.
48 Tom McGowen, Assault from the Sea: Amphibious Invasions in the Twentieth Century (Brookfield, 
Connecticut: Twenty-First Century Books, 2002), pp. 5-15. Here, the River Clyde, which had been a 
coal carrier, was employed to sail straight onto the shore.
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and landing craft via a series of fleet landing exercises (FLEX) and joint Army-Navy 
exercises (JANET).49 These kinds of efforts were both the foundations for a series of 
successes for the US Marine Corps (USMC) in the Pacific during WWII, which was the 
golden age of amphibious warfare, and their survival in the post WWII armed forces 
unification controversy. Right after the war, the US was trying to maintain a military 
posture, in accommodating the facts of the atomic age and jet propulsion, and 
simultaneously reducing their military forces to peace-time levels despite expanding 
overseas commitments. In the light of this fact, the US War Department, dominated by 
the Army and Air Force, favoured the USMC’s drastic reduction to a 60,000-man force 
restricted to performing the “waterborne aspects of amphibious operations, but the 
National Security Act in 1947 reaffirmed its primary responsibility for the amphibious
• • 50mission .
In addition to that, the complete success of the amphibious landing at Inchon during the 
Korean War, which is regarded as one of the great military operations in history, 
highlighted the worth of the USMC, despite the fact that the supporting powers of the 
two Koreas, the US and USSR possessed atomic bombs, which remained unused by 
both sides. In 1952, the USMC’s performance led to an amendment to the National 
Security Act of 1947, which legally guaranteed its size at a minimum force level of 
three combat divisions and three air wings.51 In July 1956, the First Marine Aircraft 
Wing moved from Korea to Iwakuni, Japan, which, in July 1962, became officially a
49 Frank O. Hough, Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, vol. 1 of History 
o f U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II (Washington, DC: GPO, 1956), pp. 11- 37.
50 Gordon W. Keiser, The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944-1947 (Washington, DC: 
NDUP, 1982), p. 113.
51 William D. Parker, A Concise History o f the United States Marine Corps 1775-1969 (USMC, 
Historical Division Headquarters, 1970), pp. 87-88.
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USMC Air Station. The III Marine Amphibious Force stationed in the Pacific also 
transferred from mainland Japan to Okinawa in 1957 as a result of an agreement with 
the Japanese Government to remove all American ground troops from that nation. 
From then on, the USMC began to consider amphibious forces as an ingredient of US 
foreign policy in East Asia. Moreover its substantial characteristics such as mobility, 
versatility, and sustained reach coupled with naval power enlarged its role throughout 
Southeast Asia and the whole of the Pacific area.
The Soviet amphibious force, known as the Soviet Naval Infantry (SNI: Morskaya 
pekhota), fought as normal infantry during WWII. Despite its long history, there were 
few opportunities available for amphibious operations during the Great Patriotic War. 
However, it did take part in a number of quite successful attacks in the Black Sea area, 
North Norway-Finland, and the Far East. By the end of the war, approximately 350,000 
naval infantrymen were part of Soviet forces. Nonetheless, after the end of the war it 
was disbanded, and the existing troops were subordinated to the respective coastal 
defence commanders53. The chief reasons might have been the limitations of both the 
defence budget and naval power to project the SNI abroad as well as the emergence of 
nuclear weapons. After the end of WWII, the USSR perceived that the greatest potential 
threat from across the sea derived from both the US maritime expansion throughout the 
Pacific to Japan and the atomic bombs possessed by the US. In particular, the USSR 
confronted the huge US maritime capabilities with a short coastline, which included 
Vladivostok in the extreme south of the Pacific as the only year-round ice-free port. In 
this situation, it was natural that the USSR had to concentrate on developing new naval
52 Paolo E. Coletta (ed.), United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1985), pp. 170-246.
53 Milan. Vego, “Soviet Amphibious Forces”, Naval International (May 1983), p. 274.
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powers and institute its own nuclear forces so as to deter the potential US threat.
As a result of the above facts, the revolution in military affairs in the USSR focused on 
the mass production of nuclear weapons and the equipping of the services with nuclear 
rocket weapons from just after WWII to the end of the 1950s.54 The greatest attention 
had been given to the development of the capabilities for waging nuclear war assuming 
an outbreak of general war via the building of very large numbers of submarines as well 
as the creation of both the strategic rocket forces and the Air-Defense Command55. 
Meanwhile, Soviet strategists like Malinovsky warned that world war could break out 
from a local conflict, so no one could dismiss the possibility of a swift war, not only 
because the first surprise nuclear rocket strike might bring unprecedented destruction, 
but because the war might not just be limited to strikes with nuclear weapons.56 
However, this kind of view slowly changed after the Cuban confrontation in October 
1962, and thereafter the Soviets no longer insisted that war would inevitably become a 
world war.57
Within these transitions of Soviet military thought, it seems that the Soviet strategists 
started to scrutinize the nature of war, and, in particular, the operations of the US and 
British marines in the postwar period such as the uncontested landings in Lebanon in 
1958. The result of the scrutiny and analyses of the USSR’s requirements for naval
54 William R. Kintner and Harriet Fast Scott (trans. & eds.), The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military 
Affairs (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), pp. 26-27.
55 When Zhukov became the Minister of Defense in 1955, he accepted the possibility of nuclear war, and 
took steps to improve air defence in order to blunt any strike by American bombs. As a result, the Air- 
Defence Command (PVO-Strany) became independent. John Keegan, World Armies (London: The 
MacMillan Press Ltd, 1979), p. 732.
56 Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Formulation, and 
Dissemination (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 40-41.
57 Ibid.
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operations led to the decision to re-institute the SNI in the early 1960s, as a specialist 
force designed to spearhead amphibious assaults in a limited war. The SNI were 
grouped in brigades, and attached to each of the four Soviet Fleets: Baltic, Northern, 
Pacific, and Black Sea. The Brigade in the Pacific Fleet could be considered as the 
counterpart of the USMC in the Pacific area, despite major differences such as size, 
composition and missions. The Soviets learned a lesson from the Russo-Japanese War, 
that the eastern ports were easily blocked by the string of islands and peninsulas. As 
such, they tried to occupy the choke points of the ports such as the northern part of the 
Korean peninsula and the Kurile Islands at the end of WWII. From this perspective, the 
Pacific Brigade deployed at the port of Vladivostok was a springboard for projecting 
their maritime power abroad.
Given their demand that the Soviets be involved in the Pacific War, the Allies gave the 
Soviets the authority to disarm the Japanese in Manchuria at the Yalta Conference in 
April 194559. Immediately after the surrender of the Japanese forces, the Soviets 
established a military administration by setting up a provisional Communist regime in
thNorth Korea. In contrast, the US forces arrived in South Korea on September 8 , and 
instituted the United States of America Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK).60 
In 1948, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) were formed in the south and north respectively. From this time, Korea was
58 Norman Polmar, The Naval Institute Guide to the Soviet Navy (Maryland: the United States Naval 
Institute, 1991, 5th ed.), p. 57. According to the Russian Newspaper, Pravda, the highest point o f Naval 
Infantry power reached about 500,000 during WWII after its creation in November 1705 when, 
pursuant to a decree of Peter I, the formation of a regiment of naval infantry for boarding, landing and 
marching service on the ships of the Baltic Fleet started. Pravda, November 27, 2001.
59 Department of State, Foreign Relations o f  the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Conferences at Malta 
and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, DC, 1945), p. 396.
60 Malcolm W. Cagle & Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis, ML: Naval Institute Press, 
1957), pp. 1-11.
339-  18
divided into two regimes strongly opposed to each other; moreover the border became a 
critical frontier of the Cold war. The physical and political division of the Korean
thpeninsula at the 38 parallel made it abundantly clear that the two ruling pacts had been 
trying to create their own military forces.
I have so far examined the history of the two countries’ amphibious forces in the Asia- 
Pacific region until the early 1960s concerning their rises, developments and falls. Their 
histories fluctuated according to the political and military circumstances of their own 
country. However, from the early 1960s, they took control of their own status alongside 
the other services. Furthermore, their developmental processes and enlargements of role 
and function, size and capabilities were closely related to those of their countries foreign 
and defence/ maritime strategy policies. The marines and naval infantry’s status at the 
beginning of the 1960s are in Figure 1-2 on the basis of the foregoing history and force 
presence in the Asia-Pacific region.
The Korean War brought an actual change in US foreign and defence policy towards 
Korea and Asia. After the end of the Korean War, the US policy makers thought that the 
main cause of the war had been the omission of Korea from its defensive perimeter in 
the Far East announced on January 12, 1950. For instance, the US Secretary of State, 
John Foster Dulles, stated at St. Louis on September 2, 1953 before the American 
Legion convention, “it is ... probable that the Korean War would not have occurred if 
the aggressor had known what the US would do”61. The US believed that it could deter 
or prevent a war between the Communists and the Western world by strengthening the 
resolve of nations, which regarded the communists as enemies.
61 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
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Figure 1-2: Amphibious Forces Presence
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In this context, numerous multilateral and bilateral treaties, both in Europe and Asia, 
had extended the US commitments over almost all the pro-Western community 
surrounding the USSR. As a part o f this policy, the bilateral treaty between the US and 
ROK was signed on October 1, 1953, just two months after the end o f the Korean War, 
following the bilateral treaty with Japan on September 8, 1951 during the Korean War, 
stipulating the obligation that in the case o f an armed attack in the Pacific area on either
o f the Parties, each party would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
62constitutional process.
62 American Foreign Policy 1950-1955, Basic Document, Vol. I, released July 1957, Department of State 
Publication 6446, General Policy Series 117, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1957), pp. 789-967, and between 
1788-1789.
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As far as the Communist countries were concerned, it was necessary to conceal their 
defense treaties so as not to reveal their intentions and capabilities. Little is known 
about both the original military convention between the USSR and DPRK secretly 
contracted on March 17, 1949, together with the agreement in the fields of economy and 
culture for the next 10 years, and the Mutual Defense Treaty between the DPRK and the 
PRC in Moscow signed on the next day. After that, the Premier of North Korea, II- 
Sung Kim, visited Moscow and Peking in June and July 1961, and ratified the Amicable 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaties (ACMAT), which articulated that if  each 
party met a war situation, the other party must immediately support it by all available 
means including military assets.64 From this time, the real defence alliance relationship 
within the Communist and the Western communities was formulated around the two 
Koreas in Northeast Asia, the Asian frontier in the Cold War.
In retrospect, concerning the transition of the maritime powershifts in the Pacific, the 
winners in the ocean wars, that is, the power which controlled the sea, took the initiative 
and critically affected the balance of power in the relevant ocean area. In addition, the 
two superpowers and their relationships with China, Japan, and the two Koreas shaped 
geo-political and strategic affairs in East Asia and the Western Pacific. These factors 
implicitly and explicitly influenced both the role and function, and the rise and fall of 
each country’s amphibious force, which undertook its enlarged mission in the relevant 
area, i.e., Southeast Asia, as well as in the stationed region. In this regard, the purposes
53 Chun-Ki. Eun, M  f o i l  9\ - [ N o r t h  Korea’s Diplomatic Policy toward China and the
USSR1 (Seoul: Namji, 1994), pp. 92-93.
64 Gye-Dong. Kim, ^14^1 $\ 32.^ ^  [Foreign Policy of North Korea] (Seoul: Baiksan Publishing 
House, 2002), pp. 138-140. The period of the Mutual Treaty with the USSR was 10 years, but without 
each party’s will to stop, it was automatically extended for the next five years. Consequently, it would 
last until the end of the Cold War without an amendment. On the contrary, the treaty with the PRC 
stipulated an unlimited period from the first.
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of this study are to provide an account of their role, function and capabilities discerning 
the peculiarities and influences in the developmental process in the context of the 
international and internal political and security environment.
2. Research Area and Methodological Issues
A. Time Setting
This study covers 1963-2001. The year, 1963, was an important year for the changes in 
foreign and defence policy in international politics. First of all, the two superpowers 
slowly recognized, with the shifts in American and the Soviet military thinking, that the 
threat of the use of nuclear weapons would not work in the future, as a direct measure 
for waging general war after the end of the Berlin crisis in 1961-265, and the Cuban 
missile crisis in 1962. The two crises were not a confrontation by allies or substitutes; 
nonetheless, they ended without escalating to a general war. The two leaders controlled 
the crises leaving room for bargaining. In other words, there was the definite possibility 
of avoiding a mutually damaging war or of coercing an adversary by threatening war 
rather than waging it. From this time, the strategy for using a potential military 
capability including nuclear weapons to pursue a nation’s objectives came down to a 
last resort.66 After all, with these crises as a momentum, the hot line, which was a direct 
telephone link between Moscow and Washington was inaugurated by the agreement
f lsigned in Geneva on June 20, 1963.
65 At the end of the crisis, there had been no real change either in Soviet demands or in the Western 
position, but Soviet threats of unilateral action had lost some of their potency. Elisabeth Barker, “The 
Berlin Crisis 1958-1962”, International Affairs: A Quarterly Review, Vol. 38, No. 1, (London: Chatham 
House, January 1963), p. 71.
66 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy o f Conflict (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 1-7.
67 P.M.H. Bell (2001), p. 269.
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Next, in the Northwest Pacific, there were two very important issues in terms of 
international relations. The first was the struggle between the PRC and USSR beginning 
in 1959, whose mutual distrust deepened significantly due to both the test-ban treaty, 
and the Sino-Indian border dispute. It appeared to the Soviet leaders that the PRC was 
attempting to exploit the Cuban missile crisis for its own national interests. The Soviet 
leaders, however, gave up trying to restrain the Chinese polemics that the USSR was 
giving up its most powerful bargaining weapon by signing the test-ban treaty. In the end, 
the PRC detonated its first nuclear weapon in 1964, and joined the ranks of the medium- 
class nuclear states. The next was the US involvement in the Vietnam War initiated from 
the establishment of the Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam in December 1960. 
The US was convinced of the critical importance of South Vietnam because of the 
domino effect, and therefore provided economic assistance and military advisors. 
Despite those efforts, South Vietnam’s President Ngo Dinh Diem was assassinated on 
November 2, 1963, and the demise of his regime followed. As a result, the worsening 
situation led to the deeper US military involvement in the Vietnam War.69 All in all, the 
most important factor about this starting point is that events encouraged both 
superpowers to develop their amphibious forces in order to take an appropriate role in 
international politics.
7 n • •The final year covered by this study, 2001 , was also a dramatic year in terms of
68 John Gittings, “Co-operation and Conflict in Sino-Soviet Relations”, International Affairs: A Quarterly 
Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (London: Chatham House, January 1964), pp. 74-74.
69 Bernard B. Fall, “The Second Indochina War”, International Affairs: A Quarterly Review, Vol. 41, No. 
1 (London: Chatham House, January 1965), pp. 66-67; H. G Nicholas, “Vietnam and the Traditions of 
American Foreign Policy”, International Affairs: A Quarterly Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 (London: 
Chatham House, April 1968), pp. 189-201.
70 Even so, it will be expedient to discuss the major changes in the independent and dependent variables 
up to the present day, if they are necessary for predicting or explaining the future of the two countries’ 
amphibious forces.
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changes in the causes and method of waging war as well as the relationship between the 
countries regardless of their roles in international politics. Even though most political 
commentators declared that the Cold War had ended with the demise of the USSR and 
the reunification of Germany, the military alliances never completely disbanded whether 
the NATO or the bilateral treaties in Asia and the Pacific Area. For example, the NATO 
and WEU still considered the ballistic missiles of Russia and the other countries of the
n -I
former USSR to be a cardinal potential threat.
It is, however, true that the post-Cold War military action in Afghanistan represented a 
global coalition effort in the process of conducting the War on Terror. In this war, most 
states including Russia (the main rival in the Cold War) and China (a new potential 
enemy in the new post Cold War era) expressed their sympathies and promised positive 
support . The world order began to be reorganized from this time and the Iraqi War is a 
current example. Furthermore, defence planning, as the US Defense Secretary Donald H. 
Rumsfeld has stated, shifted from the “threat-based” model dominated thinking in the 
past to a “capabilities-based” model for the future.73 Accordingly the role, function, and 
organization of amphibious forces are significantly being transformed, particularly in 
the USMC. For example, according to the Commission on the Review of Overseas 
Military Facility Structure of the United States-more commonly known as The Overseas 
Basing Commission-, which was established in 2003 by Public Law 108-132, the US 
marines presence in Okinawa will reduce by up to 8000 personnel from its current 
strength of approximately 20,000. It means that the basic role of the III marine division
71 Boyer, Y. et al., “Europe and the Challenge of Proliferation”, Chaillot Paper 24, The Institute for 
Security Studies of Western European Union (WEU), May 1996.
72 The New York Times, September 13-17, 2000.
73 Washington Post, November 1, 2001.
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has essentially changed from deterring the emergence of a regional dominant power to 
acting as a stabilizer of the region. If there were still a dominant enemy, the US might 
have not planned to reduce the manpower of the III marine division.74 In the long run, 
the years, 1963 and 2001, were very important reorientations as regards international 
politics and the development of amphibious forces.
B. Methodological Issues
This thesis intends to be primarily concerned with theory testing. In order to test the 
theories, I will extract the independent variables to use in analyzing and evaluating the 
capabilities and doctrines via examining the theories of military and maritime
7^strategists. It means that deductive thinking will be used for a logical approach. In 
particular, I will focus on explaining how the theories held by military and maritime 
strategists impact on the developmental process of the amphibious forces.
My basic methodological approach is positivist, although I hope to use both qualitative 
and quantitative data. The main point of this study is a review of the similarities and 
differences between the geo-political influences and their capabilities comparing 
Continental and Maritime amphibious forces. For this I will employ the historical
nr
comparative research design using two cases, across time, in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Fundamentally, it is desirable to use original materials, but access to them has been 
difficult due to each country’s classification procedures. As such, regarding the goal of
74 LA Times, May 27, 2003; A1 Cornelia, et al., “Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility 
Structure of the United States”, J655N. Ft. Myer Dr. Suite 700 Arlington, VA 22209, May 9, 2005.
75 Alan. Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 51-57.
76 W. Lawrence Neuman, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (Needham 
Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 2000, 4th ed.), p. 387-409.
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foreign and defence policies, and doctrines, the official documents such as White Papers, 
Annual Reports, and military field manuals published by governments and relevant 
services will be employed. In some aspects, especially regarding the comparative 
analysis of the capabilities of amphibious forces, my research requires confidential 
documents, but I will use open materials to the utmost such as the data in the Military 
Balance of the International Institute for the Strategic Studies (IISS), Jane’s Fighting 
ships and the results of previous studies.
3. Questions Raised and Framework Used
A. Questions Raised
From the above perspectives, I raise the main question: what are the roles and functions 
of amphibious forces in terms of international political relations in the nuclear age? In
order to answer this question, I also address the following questions:
Firstly, what are the general roles and functions of amphibious forces? And, how do they 
contribute to the achievement of a state’s national goals or foreign policy objectives in 
wartime or peacetime?
Secondly, what are the conditioning factors in the make-up of amphibious forces, and how do 
they influence the rises and falls of the USMC and S(R)NI?
Thirdly, are there any differences between the roles, functions and ultimate characteristics of the 
operational concepts of the USMC and S(R)NI in the Asia-Pacific region?
Fourthly, in practice, amphibious operations are, as most strategists have pointed out, very 
difficult to execute in wartime. How did/does the USMC try to overcome these 
difficulties in terms of the doctrinal development?
Lastly, considering the past and present construction o f the USMC and S(R)NI, what kinds of 
principles for amphibious forces buildup can be drawn up? How can the relationship 
between the independent variables and general amphibious forces buildup be described?
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B. Framework used
(1) Analysis Framework
In order to answer the above research questions, I will use the following framework for 
analysis to provide a logical approach in explaining how the independent variables in 
this model interact to determine the roles, functions and the development of amphibious 
forces in the two countries (see Figure 1-3). Military forces assessed are not for 
domestic, but for international use.
Figure 1-3: Relationship between Independent and Dependent Variables
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If there was no specific tension in relation to another country or region, the development
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of a country’s military forces would be limited at the minimum force level. The location 
of amphibious force in a national military organisation is usually below the three major 
services as a branch of the navy. Scholars and political researchers have long recognized 
the role of military forces as a political tool in exercising a country’s foreign policy 
objectives. The purpose of this thesis is, as indicated, to examine the roles, and 
functions of the American and Russian amphibious forces in the Asia-Pacific region. To 
achieve this goal, it is necessary to explain why the strengths of the two marine corps 
fluctuated with the transitions of the independent variables. This means that the analysis 
should be understood in terms of the entirety of each country’s national strategic
77direction for military force planning.
In terms of the roles and functions of amphibious forces, they have been closely related 
to each country’s national foreign policy objectives, and defence and maritime 
strategies/ policies over time. Amphibious forces have a history of adaptation since their 
historical creation. In a microscopic sense, an amphibious force is the force to be 
specially organized for the amphibious operation which projects “power, support, or 
medical and humanitarian relief inland from the sea, rivers or lake without using formal
na
ports, slipways, Ro-Ro terminals, beaching sites or airfields” . However, an 
amphibious force usually maintains its equipment and military skills on the battlefield 
by fighting alongside conventional army troops as for example, the USMC did during 
the Korean (the activities of the 1st Marine Division after the Inchon amphibious landing
• 70 • •operation) and Vietnam Wars . Hence, in a macroscopic sense, it can perform several
77 For the process of limiting the independent variables, refer Chapter II. 4. Roles, Functions and 
Independent Variables.
78 Ewen Southby-Tailyour OBE (ed.), Jane’s Amphibious and Special Forces (Surrey: Jane’s Information 
Group Limited, 2003, Issue 10), p. [32] (hereafter cited as JASF-ISSUE 10).
79 Geoffrey Till (1987), pp. 112-123; Geoffrey Till (ed.), Seapower: Theory and Practice (Essex: Frank
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specific missions such as nation-building work, counter-insurgency, humanitarian relief, 
rescue and peacekeeping operations ordered by the highest command which are quite 
different from those of war, in addition to its basic functions of spearheading force in an 
amphibious landing operation and ships guards / security duties ashore. Consequently, 
even though its functions and tasks could be divergent according to missions, there is no 
difference in terms of its roles (peacetime80: defence posture, deterrent and compellence, 
and wartime: warfighting) in comparison to other services or branches of the national 
armed forces. From these perspectives, the roles and functions of the American and 
Russian amphibious forces will be discussed in the context of the following table (see 
Table 1-2).
Table 1-2: Roles and Functions of Amphibious Force81
Classifications Roles Functions Remarks
Wartime Waging War
• Coastal Defence/ Islands Defence
• Contribution for SLOC Defence
• Contribution for Sea Control/Denial
• Provide Security for Advanced Naval Bases
• Projection of Force
Peacetime
Defence
Deterrence
Compellence
• All Above Functions
• Force Presence (Forward Deterrence & Defence)
• Compellence against Relatively Minor Opposition
Including 
the realm of 
MOOTW
Coercion
• Contribution to the Improvement of Diplomatic 
Relationship
• Exercising Political Effect
Cass & Co. LTD., 1994), pp. 178-179.
80 The role of the SNI in terms of its political effect toward the Third World, in the Cold War seems 
completely different from that of the USMC, but it could be interpreted as a peacetime role of the SNI.
81 Regarding the roles and functions of amphibious forces, there is no uniform reference point in this 
regard. Currently, those of the USMC can be seen as a benchmark for a fully capable amphibious force 
in relation to other countries. For the process of extracting the roles and functions of AF, see Chapter II.
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(2) Thesis Framework
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter I is a historical introduction to the 
dissertation, historical focus. Chapter II, as a theoretical study, describes the roles and 
functions of amphibious forces, and the conditioning factors for their construction via 
schema theories posited by military and political commentators in the application of the 
general theories concerning the totality of military forces. However, it basically focuses 
on explaining why I used the above analysis framework. In Chapters III, IV and V, 
firstly, the general situations of the international and regional security environment and 
the transitions of maritime dominion as the background information for developing 
further analysis are provided in the first part of each chapter. Secondly, I will provide 
the in(ex)trinsical interests of the two superpowers regarding the Asia-Pacific region 
and the transitions of the military/maritime strategies and policies. After that, the role 
and functions, and amphibious lift capability focusing on the Asia-Pacific area are 
briefly presented. Lastly, in the last part of each chapter, a comparative analysis of the 
differences between the superpowers with regard to the independent variables as well as 
the USMC and S(R)NI’s roles, functions and amphibious lift capabilities are 
chronologically analyzed. In addition, an explanation of how the new doctrines of the 
USN/MC reflect the principles of war is briefly described. In Chapters III and V, case 
studies focusing on the employment of amphibious forces in the relevant region are 
included. Lastly, I will try to generalize the relationships between the independent 
variables and their effects in order to apply them to the other states’ amphibious force 
buildup by setting out the independent variables and major findings in the form of 
conclusions in Chapter VI.
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Chapter II. What is an Amphibious Force
1. Definitions
There are over 40 countries which possess dedicated amphibious infantry units in the
Q'y
name of marines or naval infantry . Moreover, many other countries, typically Japan, 
with no such organisations, also maintain similar capabilities by embedding them within 
the army or navy in order to use the sea routes in wartime or peacetime, whether their 
original purpose is to attack the enemy in wartime or not. The terms for amphibious 
forces used in the thesis are various according to the usage of the individual country, 
because they may reflect the particular military history and political culture. The prime 
reason for this may arise from the intrinsic reason of it never having had its own 
original fighting scope unlike the other services: Army, Navy and Air forces.
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) gives as the first definition of ‘amphibious’, 
“living both on land and in water”. It further distinguishes the military terms as to the 
third meaning: (of a military operation) involving forces landed from the sea and (of 
forces) trained for such operations. These definitions are unlimited to define that of an 
amphibious force as a branch of the navy or any other service, as this thesis will explain. 
In order to name this kind of force, the term ‘Marine Corps or Marines’ is more 
commonly employed in Western countries, in contrast with the term ‘Naval Infantry’ in 
the countries affected by the Soviet military culture, for example, North Korea. With the
82 JASF-ISSUE10, p. [34]
83 Sara Tulloch (ed.), The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 
47.
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constant American influence, the term ‘Marines’ has increasingly come to be used as the 
definition for amphibious forces as distinct from ‘Naval Infantry’. Furthermore, the 
term ‘triphibious’ is occasionally employed in order to express the added dimension of 
the air activity84 of the USMC and UK Royal Marines (UKRM). To summarize, the 
term ‘amphibious force’ is used to include not only Marines and Naval Infantry units, 
but also those who have been trained and will potentially be used for amphibious
O f
operations even though they are those currently organized into the other services . 
Nonetheless, this thesis tries to use its original name and focuses on legally organized 
troops possessed in the relevant country.
Other confusing factors concerning definitions are the differences between the 
definitions of the words: roles, functions and missions. As defined in the Oxford
Of
Dictionary, these terms are often used interchangeably , but the distinctions among 
them must not be overlooked. The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia (JDE) of the US gives 
the difference among them in detail in a sentence that “the primary function of the 
Services is to provide forces organized, trained, and equipped to perform a role -  to be
on
employed by the combatant commander in the accomplishment of a mission” . The
• 00definitions of the terms illustrated in JDE are as follows:
84 Raymond G. O’Connor, “The US Marines in the 20 Century: Amphibious Warfare and Doctrinal 
Debates”, Military Affairs, Vol. 38, Issue 3 (Oct., 1974), p. 97.
85 Because, amphibious operations are not the privilege of marines, naval infantry, nor the slightly 
misnamed coastal artillery. Given the complexity of the amphibious art, it is essential that all trained 
services including naval, marine, army, air and merchant navy forces must be trained to make up the 
whole of amphibious operations, see JASF-1SSUE 10, p. [36]. In this context, regardless of their name, 
the term ‘amphibious force’ is used to include all forces designed for amphibious operations.
86 For example, the first meaning of ‘function’ as a noun: 1. a) an activity proper to a person or institution, 
1. b) a mode of action or activity by which a thing fulfills its purpose, and 1. c) an official or 
professional duty, includes all meanings of the terms “role, missions, and functions”, see, Sara Tulloch 
(1997), p. 606.
87 Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US, Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia (July 16, 1997), pp. 624-625 (hereafter 
cited as ‘JDE’).
88 Ibid.
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Firstly, “roles” are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services were established by 
Congress in law.
Secondly, “missions” are the tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defence to the 
combatant commanders.
Lastly, “functions” are specific responsibilities assigned by the President and Secretary of 
Defence to enable the Services to fulfill their legally established roles.
Judging from the above broad definitions, the roles of amphibious forces come from its 
original established purpose regulated by the law in association with the general
OQ
attributes of military forces, e.g., amphibious operations, offence, and defence . In stark 
contrast, the functions of amphibious forces depend on their position in the state’s 
military hierarchy, because it is usually the responsibility of the upper level commander 
to provide organised, trained, and equipped troops for a designated forces to perform a 
particular objective. For example, if USMC fulfills a task, the responsibility to provide 
forces primarily rests on the Department of the Navy (DoN, Secretary of Navy). 
Furthermore, USMC devolves this responsibility to its major components, such as its 3 
divisions and wings. Even so, it does not mean that the responsibility includes the 
functions of both building-up and manipulating the troops90. It is, in a few cases, 
different in these two different functions, i.e., manipulating belongs to the supreme 
command like the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in the US, and then it is defined according 
to its position in the military hierarchy in the form of a ‘Directive’91. The missions of 
amphibious forces are task-oriented as ordered by the supreme commander or the leader
89 As Carl Von Clausewitz wrote, the aim of war would always and solely be to overcome and disarm the 
enemy in order to achieve the political purpose. And then offence and defence are basic activities for 
engagement, see Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (eds. & trans.), 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, Paperback Printing), pp. 90-99, 360-366 (hereafter cited 
as Carl Von Clausewitz, “On War”).
90 In the US, the words ‘Operational and Support Responsibilities’ is substituted by ‘building-up’ and 
‘manipulating’ respectively, see The Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC), JFSC PUB 1: The Joint Staff 
Officer’s Guide, 2000, p. 1-4.
91 Refer, the US Department of Defense (DoD), Directive (Subject: Functions o f  the Department o f  
Defense and Its Major Components) No. 5100.1 (September 25, 1987, and August 1, 2002).
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of a state regardless of the conditions, either wartime or peacetime.
2. Location within a State’s Military-Operational Hierarchy
The amphibious forces most frequently discussed after WWII were those of the two 
superpowers (the US and USSR), and the UK. But, there are in fact several different 
forms of amphibious forces, with varying missions. The reasons for this are not only, as 
described in the JASF-ISSUE 10, because there are over 70 per cent of the world’s 
population, 80 per cent of countries and almost all centres of international trade and 
military power in the littoral regions of the world, but also because there is no country 
that ignores the advantages of possessing an up-to-date amphibious capability, so it does 
not matter whether its name is amphibious force or a general branch of navy or 
maritime police forces, whatever its size may be, in order to protect its national interests 
concerning the adjacent seas.92
The national interests even in the littoral regions may not be protected by merely an 
amphibious force, and therefore it becomes no more than a part of the navy, which 
basically includes surface (battleship) and underwater (submarine) vessels. In addition 
to that, as concluded via the historical disputes between the strategists, originally 
Halford Mackinder and Alfred Thayer Mahan, with the development of war scales and 
features (e.g., coalition warfare) as well as technology, “naval force alone is too weak 
for offence to really maintain itself in the world struggle, if it is not based on great
* QQindustry and has a great population behind it” . As such, it was natural historically that
92 JASF-ISSUE 10, p. [32]
93 Eric Grove, The Future o f Sea Power (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 5.
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a state basically kept two powers, land and maritime. However, with the transport 
revolution based on flight, the modem type of military organization came to possess 
basically three services, land, sea and air powers. When J.F.C. Fuller and Basil H. 
Liddell Hart established the fundamental theoretical framework for the air-land team in 
armoured warfare94, the major powers found the possibility of using it as a part of the 
navy, and configured the Naval Wings, i.e., the Royal Flying Corps for coastguard duty 
in October 191295. In this mood, a few major powers, notably Britain, Japan and the US, 
converted their capital ships or building programmes to those of fleet carriers96. As a 
result of this fact, naval aviation was comprised in the naval power. In this context, the 
basic location of amphibious forces is seen in Figure 2-1, which may not be adapted by 
all countries, and which varies according to a nation’s political and strategic conditions.
Amphibious forces, as a branch of a state’s naval forces, are obviously a war-fighting
07instrument. It is no exaggeration to say that the history of amphibious operations is as
94 David Maclsaac, “Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists”, in Peter Paret (ed.), 
Makers o f Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 632.
95 See, the Royal Navy homepage, <http ://www.roval-navy.mod. uk/m>. and the Fleet Air Arm Archive, 
<http://www.fleetairarmarchive.net/Historv/index.htm>. accessed: January 26, 2004.
96 The first aircraft carrier, even remotely considered, was the British cruiser, Hermes, which was able to 
carry two seaplanes at first by installing a wheeled launching platform in June 1913. The US 
commissioned its first aircraft carrier, Langley (CV-1), on March 20, 1922. Refer, Scot MacDonald, 
Evolution o f Aircraft Carriers (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1964), pp. 2-17; George W. Baer (1994), p. 
100; The US Navy, “Carriers: List of Carriers”, in the USN homepage, 
<http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/ships/carriers/cv-listl.html>. accessed: March 17, 2004.
97 Here, the definitions of terms, ‘amphibious operation’ and ‘sealift’, should be distinguished. The 
former is “an attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces embarked in ships or craft 
involving a landing on a hostile shore”, whilst the latter includes “the initial movement and critical 
resupply of equipment, warriors, and materials to a theatre of war using the sea routes, which is an 
enduring mission of a navy as the modem day version of Mahan’s navy”. The critical different point 
here is the phrase, ‘a landing on a hostile shore’, in the former, which means that a simple movement to 
a theatre of war, where it is not the enemy’s shore at that time, is not considered as an amphibious 
operation. In this manner, ‘Amphibious Withdrawal (AW)’, the withdrawal of forces by sea in naval 
ships or craft from a hostile shore, is a type of amphibious operations. Refer, the US Army Field 
Manual 31-11, Naval Warfare Publication 22(A), Marine Corps Landing Force Manual 01, Doctrine 
for Amphibious Operations (Washington, DC: USN & USMC, July 1962), pp. 1-3 & 1-4; John Scott 
Redd, “Naval Forces and Joint Vision 2010: Traditional and Emerging Roles”, in Richard H. Shultz Jr. 
and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (eds.), The Role o f  Naval Forces in 21st Century Operations (Washington,
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long as that of human warfare as seen in the historical evidence that the Egyptian 
Empire was subjected to attacks by sea-borne raiders from the Mediterranean islands
n o
and the coastline of southern Europe as early as 1200 BC . About 2,500 years ago, 413 
- 4 1 5  BC, the Greeks made full use of amphibious operations with an armed force, 
however their defeat in Sicily became a key turning point in the Peloponnesian War." 
In these cases, all countries used an armed force100 as an amphibious force101, later in 
the form of ‘fleet infantry or marines’ to distinguish them from ‘sailors’ until the 
creation of a regular force as a branch of the navy.
Figure 2-1; Basic Location of an Amphibious Force
Submarines Naval aviation
Air Force
Amphibious Force
Army
Warships (surface)
Navy
Secretary of Defence 
(Minister of National Defence, etc.)
The Supreme Political Leader 
(President or Premier, etc.)
Officially, the first organization for purely amphibious operations was the Infanteria de 
Marina Espanola [Spanish Marine Infantry: SMI] with its creation by order of King
DC: Brassey’s, 2000), pp. 151-153.
98 Ian Speller and Christopher Tuck, Amphibious Warfare: Strategy and Tactics (St Paul, MN: MBI 
Publishing Company, 2001), pp. 8-9.
99 Ibid., and Tom McGowen (2002), p. 5.
100 Strictly speaking, it was a total concept of military forces, because at that time there was no 
distinction between army and navy.
101 The early history of these “soldiers of the sea” remained ad hoc; organised in times of national 
emergencies and quickly disbanded in the aftermath of its employment, most likely during peace.
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1 09Carlos I in order to serve with the fleet on a permanent basis in 1537 , despite the fact
that the long history of amphibious operations commenced in 1200 BC. It is from this 
perspective that most authorities, notably Jane’s, accept SMI as the oldest existing
Marines. From this, the following definitions of amphibious forces can be extracted:
Firstly, authority; the troops should be created by an order of the highest leader of a state or on 
a legal basis.
Secondly, the ultimate aim of creation; troops must operate with the fleet to project a military 
force ashore or on land from the sea. It means that an amphibious force is clearly a 
branch of the navy103. Reflecting the fact that amphibious warfare takes place when 
military capability ‘moves to battle by ship but fights on land’104, it is essential to 
depend on naval power for support, in order to overcome the complexity and dangers 
of crossing a stretch of water and consolidating ashore105.
Lastly, perpetuity; troops must exist on a permanent basis, which means that temporary 
organised troops for an amphibious landing operation by any military operational 
demand is not to be considered as an original amphibious force.106
From the above perspectives, the Amphibious force has been designed to carry out war- 
oriented tasks, in the field of littoral warfare with the accompanying role of 
spearheading the amphibious landing as a part of naval operations, devoting most of 
their time to preparing for war by planning selected landing sites (planning), to enhance
102 JASF-ISSUE 10, p. 587.
103 Of course, there are a few exceptions, i.e., The Australian Marines (AM). In this case, AM held 
amphibious craft such as LCM (landing craft, mechanized) and LARC (lighter amphibious resupply 
cargo), not ships like LST (landing ships, tanks) which are a component of the Navy, so that AM 
receives additional support from the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). See, The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 1989- 1990 and 1993-1994, p. 154-155 and 149-150 
respectively; JASF-ISSUE 10, p. 25.
104 Joshua Goldstein, International Relations (New York: Harper Collins, 1996), p. 238.
105 JASF-ISSUE 10, p. [36].
106 In my view, these three factors are the ingredients for defining the attributes of amphibious forces. 
The factor of perpetuity, however, suffered from the transitions of the international and domestic 
political/ military situations as seen in the cases of USMC, the S(R)NI. For example, the first RNI 
regiment with two battalions that each had five companies was created by order of Peter I, in October 
1705, replacing Army troops with regiments of sea soldiers, and it repeatedly experienced rises and 
falls. Even so, RNI (SNI) counts its age from the year of its formation, 1705. In the light of this fact, it 
is difficult to calculate exactly how many years meet the requirements of perpetuity. Regarding the 
history of RNI, refer, Dominik George Nargele, “The Soviet Naval Infantry, an Evolving Instrument of 
State Power”, Ph D Thesis (Washington DC: Georgetown University, 1983), pp. 27-77; Pravda. 
November 27, 2001.
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fighting capability (exercise) and to maintain readiness (maintenance). Consequently, 
the role usually associated with amphibious forces is basically to fight in wars. However, 
as seen in Figure 2-1, it also has always had more than a fighting function as an 
instrument of national policy. Its peacetime employment can take a variety of forms and 
serve a variety of ends, like serving the general role of military forces as well as of 
naval forces. In light of this fact, Arch Whitehouse emphasized the roles of the Navy-
Marine Corps team by writing that:
“Military success is measured in terms of carrying out the national policy. Today, our 
national policy demands that the Navy maintain a capability of projecting Marines ashore 
anywhere.... The Navy-Marine Corps team is exceptional in history since its mobility and 
versatility permit it to make a contribution to virtually every medium of warfare, land, sea 
and air.”107
To sum up, the amphibious force is a part of the navy, and it is at the same time a 
component of a state’s military forces. If the sagacious maxim of Clausewitz that “War
1 ORis thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” is true, it can be 
applicable in peacetime or not, and an amphibious force must at least be a certain means 
of the use of force in war fixing its essential value in the projection of power from the 
sea under the topographical environment of the earth109. As widely accepted110, there is 
no doubt that the roles of military forces have developed into a firm instrument of a 
state’s foreign policy, so it is natural that amphibious forces as a component of military
107 Arch Whitehouse, Amphibious Operations (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co. 1963), p. 312.
108 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 75.
109 According to JASF-ISSUE 10, “five per cent of the world’s coastline is manmade where ships, 
landing craft and hovercraft can unload with ease, about 25 per cent have beaches suitable for landing 
craft, 75 per cent of these coastlines can be crossed by hovercraft, 95 per cent can accept landing by 
small assault craft, sometimes putting ashore cliff and rock climbing specialists, while less than 1 per 
cent is unsuitable for any form of landing”. See, JASF-ISSUE 10, p. [32]
110 Especially see, Robert J. Art, “The Fungibility of Force”, in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.), 
The Use o f  Force: Military Power and International Politics (New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publisher, Inc, 1999), pp. 3-22.
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forces are a true political instrument by having the capability of projecting force from 
the sea, and threatening such action, or placing them in a specific locality.
3. Roles and Functions of Amphibious Forces
The need for an organisation of amphibious landing operations either in offence or in 
defence has almost been taken for granted down through maritime history from 1200 
B.C. because of the various topographical factors, without any distinction of seas, rivers 
or lakes, encountered in wartime. The requirement for amphibious operations has a 
growing importance and there has really been a remarkable increase in its being an 
ingredient of military forces, particularly of the world’s navies. The capability of naval 
forces has clear limitations in occupying the land area, apart from the question of the 
ability of the fleet to put ground forces ashore111. From this perspective, it is most likely 
that one crucial factor affecting governmental decision-making processes for the 
construction of an amphibious force would be the necessity to make amphibious 
landings to make a beachhead on the enemy’s shore in a future expected war. To be 
candid, this principle probably worked until the end of WWII, and for a while in the 
aftermath of the Korean War, because of the successes of wars in both the European and 
Pacific theatres, i.e., North Africa, Sicily, Normandy, Guadalcanal, Tarawa and Okinawa, 
during WWII, and at Inchon during the Korean War which were initiated by successful 
amphibious operations112.
111 James F. Dunnigan (1982), p. 196.
112 Brigade General. Richard F. Vercauteren, “Amphibious Operations in the Modem Age”, in the HQ of 
ROKMC, 5L7-] -g- fSymposium Articles for the Future Development of
ROKMC]. August 7, 1996.
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Given the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 60s, when the two 
superpowers were already capable of destroying each other, it was impossible to use the 
full extent of the total military capacity of either superpower. From that time, the roles 
and utilities of military forces began to be transformed in the direction of creating a 
superior bargaining position so that there was, in the words of Dr Stanley Hoffmann, “a 
predominance of the latent over the manifest, of the oblique over the direct, of the
i  1 -2
limited over the general in all considerations of force” . Nonetheless, the demise of the 
USSR and the end of the Cold War occurred at the beginning of the 1990s. What 
accounted for this? This was not purely the result of military capability by itself -  
certainly not amphibious warfare, unlike the outcome of wars in the previous era. The 
main reasons might be not only the US military domination in each contentious area of 
the world to protect the Western powers from Soviet expansionism and threats, but also 
the economic, political, and moral pressures from within the Soviet Union114. 
Amphibious forces, particularly USMC, played a significant part within the overall role 
of the US military forces, as did SNI in the Soviet military forces. In this way, the roles 
of amphibious forces have changed and enlarged from those mainly based on 
amphibious landing operations or such similar operations to take the initiative on the 
battlefield, to those of general military or naval forces. In this sense, it is necessary to 
examine its roles and functions in the light of the utilities of the whole military force as 
well as the naval forces.
113 Lawrence Freedman, “Military Power and Political Influence”, in the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, International Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 764- 
767.
114 Joseph H. Alexander and Merrill L. Bartlett, Sea Soldiers in the Cold War: Amphibious Warfare, 
1945-1991 (Annapolis, ML: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 6-7.
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A. General Roles of Military Forces and MOOTW115
(1) The Theories of the Military Strategists
The importance of military forces was emphasized at least from the 5th century B.C. in 
China by Sun Tzu, who said, “War is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of 
life and death on the road to either the safety or ruin of a state.” Here, among diverse 
translations of war -corresponding to the several meanings of the word “w ar[J^^f: war, 
soldier, weapon]” 116, this pregnant sentence highlighted the significance of military 
affairs. He continually emphasized the importance of the build-up of military forces in 
that at least a thousand swift and heavy chariots, a hundred thousand mailclad soldiers,
117and basic logistic and supply systems are essential to raise or prepare for a war. The 
most obvious characteristic of his concept was, of course, to defeat the enemy without
1 1 o
waging a war. Even though he wrote the book with this concept , it is undeniable that 
he considered military forces as an indispensable factor in managing a state. Put simply, 
a state cannot freely exist without developing its own military forces to prepare for an 
anticipated war in the near future. Despite his purpose in writing this, it could be 
inferred that the roles of military forces in that era should have involved the roles of
115 Military Operations Other Than War
116 Byungchun. Ro, TSun Tzu’s Art of War! (Seoul: Gana, 1996, 8th ed.), p. 26. In reality, this
word can be translated into at least 7 different meanings: 1) military forces, 2) weapons, 3) soldiers, 4) 
military affairs, 5) war, 6) the supreme military power, and 7) combat power.
117 The ROK Army College ROKAC], [Lecture on Sun Tzu’s Art of War].
(Daejeon: ROKAC, 1999), p. 16, and Byungchun Ro (1996), p. 56.
118 Most specialists about Sun Tzu’s Art of War think that his fundamental logic is based on the way of 
winning without waging war, which is demonstrated in chapter three, ‘offensive strategy[H^(]. For 
example, he highlights that in the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to capture the enemy 
whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is the last resort J k H f l - t ,
Moreover, as Michael I. Handel described [see, Michael I. Handel, Masters o f  War: Classical Strategic 
Thought (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, 3rd ed.), p. 22], if Sun Tzu considers a large variety of 
non-military means such as diplomacy as a means for waging war, he might find a supporting role for 
military forces. It means that he sees the diplomatic role of military forces, because, without the 
background power deriving from military forces, other countries might not be obedient spontaneously. 
However, it is difficult to find this as a clear statement.
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preserving a state and its resources, enlarging its state power abroad, and protecting 
soldiers and the civilian population from the violence that the enemy would inflict upon 
it. As most interpreters of his thoughts concluded, his basic standpoint was that war 
would be indispensable, because waging war was determined by the supreme leader of 
the state. As a result, it was likely that he put the focus on how to prepare for and to win 
a war; thus the roles of military forces remained on the levels of defence and offence.
The first revolutionary strategist systematically establishing the roles of military forces 
was Carl von Clausewitz who observed that their distinctive role could be a means of 
obtaining political aims. He might be classified as a forerunner of this kind of view. 
Objectively speaking, Sun Tzu’s thoughts on waging war also implicitly included that 
military forces could be one of the tools for accompanying the national policy goal 
judging from the sentence that “the general is the bulwark of the state: if the bulwark is 
complete at all points, the state will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the state will 
be weak” 119. Here, he affirms the correct position of the general, the supreme 
commander of military force, as a supporter for the leader of a state. It means that the 
military forces are also one of the tools for evolving the state’s foreign policy.
Compared with Sun Tzu’s thought, Clausewitz defined the fundamental role of military 
forces by examining the characteristics of war that “War is merely continuation of
1 90policy by other means” in chapter one, Book 1 on “What is War?” . Furthermore, he 
additionally described the relationship between political objectives and war in that
119 Byungchon Ro (1996), p. 86.
120 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 87.
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•  * 191 •  •“political objectives are the goal, war is the means of reaching it” . Certainly, this 
implication included both the real nature of war and the attributes of military forces so 
that he succeeded in setting out a theory putting the nature of war and military forces as 
a means of achieving a state’s political objectives. He wrote in Chapter 3B, Book 8 on 
“War Plans”, “To discover how much of our resources must be mobilized for war, we
199must first examine our political aim and that of the enemy.” As Peter Paret has
• • 123pointed out, he regarded war as an extreme but natural expression of policy. 
Considering these assessments of the nature of war, it is clear that it could never be an 
independent thing in itself. Consequently, military forces were the basic instruments for 
waging war, which included the basic roles of offence and defence: being at the same 
time the most effective method of achieving the political goals of the state.
With time, the roles of military forces fluctuated because of several transitions in the 
environments such as the developments of new weapons and the relationships with the 
other countries through the establishment of the United Nations (UN). First of all, the 
most significant factor was the emergence of nuclear weapons, which raised a suspicion 
among the strategists whether the former utilities of military forces, e.g., a means for 
defence or offence or politics, were properly defined or not. This kind of suspicion was 
grounded on the observation that the nuclear powers would be unable to use their most 
powerful weapons in a real war, because it would deservedly invite their own 
destruction.124 As such, the role of military forces as a means of achieving political 
objects was somewhat disputable. Consequently, the basic question among the
121 Ibid.
122 Michael I. Handel (2001), p. 97.
123 Peter Paret (2000),‘Clausewitz’, pp. 186-187.
124 R. J. Vincent, “Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet Union and Western Europe”, 
Adelphi Papers, No. 119 (London: IISS, Autumn 1975), p. 3.
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strategists and policy makers was ‘how much would be enough or would additional 
weapons compared with those of the other side be politically influential in these 
circumstances?’ The answer might be that there are no limits or that additional weapons 
would not have political influence anymore. From this time, the newly-coined terms 
such as ‘the diplomacy of violence’, ‘the manipulation of risk’, ‘the dynamics of mutual 
alarm’, and ‘the credibility of the threat’ posited mainly by T. C. Schelling were 
becoming more popular .
This is not to say that conventional weapons and the former roles of military forces 
were completely obsolete. Indeed, as K. J. Holsti has stated, “Even the nuclear powers 
have found it expedient to maintain conventional forces to deal with limited 
pro vocations... nuclear power cannot easily be converted into political influence”127, the 
roles of conventional forces have not been, and will not be diminished: on the contrary, 
they might become more complicated and fractionised. In this connection, many states 
frequently have to depend on the use of military forces in the bargaining process. Up to 
the present day, military forces are still one of the most effective means for not only 
exercising a state’s power toward other states, but also protecting its territory from the 
threats of other states. As such, there is no doubt that the role of military forces has 
developed into a firm instrument of a state’s foreign policy. In this age where societies 
are closely engaged via transnational associations, as K. J. Holsti argued, military forces, 
particularly a nuclear force, are often thought to increase the diplomatic influence of
125 Laurence Martin, “Changes in American Strategic Doctrine-An Initial Interpretation”, Survival, Vol. 
XVI, No. 4 (July/August 1974), pp. 163-164.
126 Refer, T. C. Schelling, The Strategy o f Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), and Arms 
and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
127 K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework fo r Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1995, 7th ed.), p. 216.
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those who possess powerful capabilities.
Next, from the perspective of the transition of the relationships between states, the 
offensive role of military forces is basically ruled out at least in the Western community. 
After WWII, there was a radical change in attitudes towards the use of force in 
international relations. A good example of this is the reflection on the UN Charter,
which regulates that:
“To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace. (Article 1), 
all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace, security and justice, are not endangered (Article 
2 ) m
The Charter allows the use of force only in the case of self-defence or the necessity “for
i inthe purpose of maintaining international peace and security (article 43) However, as 
seen in the cases of several wars after WWII, i.e., the conflicts in East Asia, this has not 
radically impacted on a state’s behaviour in international relations. Even so, it appears 
that the offensive role of military forces have declined in the light of the official 
disputes among the strategists.
After all, the intrinsic roles of military forces certainly cannot be altered, even though 
the implications have become significantly complicated and deepened. In this sense, 
apart from their domestic functions, Julian Lider has divided the external functions of 
military forces into the following four categories.
128 Ibid., p. 117-124.
129 See, the Charter of the United Nations, <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapterl & 7.htm>. 
accessed: February 8, 2004.
130 Ibid.
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Firstly, a defence against any aggression (the waging of an external war is always described 
in defensive terms).
Secondly, a deterrent against various types of war.
Thirdly, coercion as a means of backing negotiations of any kind.
Lastly, a protective structure behind which other instruments of foreign policy -  diplomatic, 
economic and political -  can operate.131
These kinds of fractionisation of the role of military forces in peacetime are well
thdescribed by Robert J. Art in the 4 edition of The Use o f  Force (see Table 2-1), adding
1 ^the role of swaggering.
Table 2-1: Fractionisation of the Roles of Military Forces in Peacetime
Type Purpose Mode Targets
Defence
Fend off attacks and/or reduce 
damage of an attack
Peaceful,
physical
Primary: military 
Secondary: industrial
Deterrence
Prevent adversary from initiating 
an action
Peaceful
Primary: civilian 
Secondary: industrial 
Tertiary: military
Compellence
Get adversary to stop doing 
something or start doing something
Forceful,
physical
Military, civilian, 
industrial with no clear 
ranking
Swaggering Enhance prestige Peaceful None
He also argues for the importance of military force in the 5 edition of the same book 
that military forces are an indispensable part of a state’s foreign policy, because they can 
be exercised forcefully as well as peacefully133. To summarize, there is seldom any 
difference among scholars concerning the roles and functions of military forces. In view 
of all this, the roles and functions of military force are manifestly many and diverse.
131 Julian Lider, Military Theory (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company Ltd., 1983), p. 25.
132 Robert J. Art, “The Four Functions of Force,” in Robert J. Art & Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.), The Use o f  
Force: Military Power and International Politics (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc, 1993, 4th 
ed.), pp. 3-11.
133 Robert J. Art, “The Fungibility of Force”, in Robert J. Art & Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.) The Use o f  
Force: Military Power and International Politics (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 
1999, 5th ed.), p. 3.
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The ‘swaggering’ role is, strictly speaking, a little awkward, regardless of whether it 
refers to the role of military forces in such peacekeeping operations or not, because in 
most cases the winner or stronger could take the opportunity to enhance its prestige if it 
was successful. The role of protective structure posited by Lider can be merged into 
these three categories, because the concept of power is very relative to that of enemy 
and is related to all the resources of a state. This is expressed in the idea that ‘modem 
war is total war’.
From the above perspectives, the role could be summarized as a means of not only 
protecting a state’s sovereignty including territory and resources from external attacks 
(defence134), but also evolving the foreign policy of a state employed either peacefully 
(deterrence) or forcefully (compellence). The difference between deterrence and 
compellence is like that of statics and dynamics. Thomas C. Schelling explains it 
clearly:
“Deterrence involves setting the stage-by announcement, by rigging the trip-wire, by 
incurring the obligation-and waiting. The overt action is up to the opponent.... The 
act that is intrusive, hostile, or provocative is usually the one to be deterred; the 
deterrent threat only changes the consequences ... Compellence, in contrast, usually 
involves initiating an action that can cease, or become harmless, only if the opponent 
responds”.135
134 As Carl von Clausewitz states that defenders can take offensive action, so modem war includes 
preventive war (to consider an attack against a potential enemy before he establishes a balance of 
power) and preemptive war (at a stage of crisis or an escalating war, military preparations by one side 
may be perceived as preparations for a potential attack, thus the other side creates incentives for a 
preemptive strike). In this context, it is not difficult to conclude that the concept of defence broadly 
means offensive action as well.
135 Thomas C. Schelling (1966), pp. 71-72. The similar term ‘coercion’ is usually employed in diplomacy 
as a bargaining process, which is based on the power, notably military power, to hurt. Coercion implies 
the meaning of deterrence as well as compellent intentions {Ibid., pp. 1-6, and 71.). According to 
Lawrence Freedman’s study, the distinguishing feature of coercion is that “the target is never denied 
choice, but must weigh the choices between the costs of compliance and of non-compliance”. 
Lawrence Freedman (ed.), Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), p. 36.
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The role of military forces in peacetime focuses on keeping the day-to-day tensions 
between nations below the threshold of armed conflict or war and maintaining a state’s 
influence in foreign countries, whereas that in wartime is to fight by engagements in any 
form of offence or defence.
(2) The Relationship with MOOTW
If evidence for a new trend in the upgraded role for military forces was found in the 
peacekeeping operations of the Cold War era by the mandate of the UN to preserve 
political stability or human rights throughout the world, then this should be added to the 
role of military forces. Contemporary peace operations apparently cannot be explained 
by the above traditional roles of military forces in the context of the political-military 
environment, operational objectives and tasks. These objectives are not victory, in the 
sense of defeating a defined enemy militarily to achieve a political goal, but the 
successful implementation of a mandate, usually maintaining the political-military 
status quo}36 The forces can be employed only in the cases of self-defence, defence of
117the mission, and deterring a small-scale threat. As such, it is difficult to simply 
classify this as a particular role of military forces. It will be necessary to examine the 
relationship between the roles in these kinds of operations and those in the accepted 
concepts.
It can, in the broadest sense, be included in the above roles of military forces of either 
coercion or deterrence or defence, however these kinds of operations are, in a narrow
136 William J. Durch and J. Matthew Vaccaro, “The Environment and Tasks of Peace Operations”, in 
Antonia Handler Chayes & George T. Raach (eds.), Peace Operations: Developing an American 
Strategy (Washington, DC: NDUP, 1995), pp. 23-24.
137 Ibid., p. 25.
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sense, not easy to classify into those categories. They can be classified, as the US Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (USJCS) have done, in terms of MOOTW138, which in reality includes 
all types of employment of military forces in peacetime in order to deter potential 
aggressors, protect national interests, support the UN or other regional organisations, 
satisfy treaty obligations, support civil authorities, or provide humanitarian assistance 
(HA) in the forms of peace enforcement, counter-terrorism, some foreign internal 
defence (FID), enforcement sanctions, support for insurgency and counterinsurgency,
i OQ
evacuation of noncombatants, HA, and the support of counter-drug operations .
The difference between MOOTW and the utilities of forces in peacetime is that the 
former includes some part of the range of the latter, when operations involve a risk that 
a large scale of military forces could become involved in combat.140 Whilst the 
previous roles of military forces place the focal points on the developmental points of 
crisis towards a large-scale war, those in MOOTW seem to focus on avoiding war as far 
as it is possible for a state involved to do, except for a case that is impossible. In other 
words, when instruments of national power are unable to achieve national objectives or 
protect national interests any other way, the national leadership may decide to conduct a 
large-scale war, placing the state in a wartime situation, the declaration of war by the 
supreme leader of a state may follow. On the other hand, MOOTW focuses on deterring 
war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities so that it may 
involve elements of both combat and non-combat operations in peacetime, conflict, and 
exceptional war situations (i.e., monitoring a cease fire).
138 Refer, The US Joint Chiefs of Staff (USJCS), Joint Pub 3-07: Joint Doctrine for Military Operations 
Other Than War, June 16, 1995.
139 JDE, pp. 513-516.
140 Ibid.
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Herein lies a complex problem in deciding what are the guidelines to distinguish large 
and small-scale wars. Does a general war use unlimited resources including nuclear 
weapons? The answer is probably ‘No’, because the policymakers of states and 
strategists never imagined simply that kind of a general war as a future war even during 
the Cold War period, even though they planned and prepared for it. According to a study 
by the RAND Corporation, the guideline is the level of major regional conflict.141 In 
this regard, it is more acceptable that MOOTW is the military activity before the 
leadership of a state declares the outbreak of war, as the concept established in the post 
Cold War period, the beginning of the 1990s, which reflects the transitions of 
international relations and the doctrinal developments142.
It is not difficult to conclude from the foregoing accounts that the concept of MOOTW 
is literally to regulate peacetime military operations in the process of conflicts, which is 
not directly related to the previous roles of military forces, which is mainly operated by 
missions assigned by the authorities, such as the supreme leader of a state or Secretary 
(Minister) of Defence143. Hence, the effects of the roles of military forces 
unintentionally or intentionally emerges in the process of waging operations, as the 
range of MOOTW includes the role of deterrence.144 Consequently, the term 
‘MOOTW’ is used for the purpose of defining the difference between wartime and 
peacetime operations. It is a matter of the level of execution (for example, the roles of 
military forces can vary, according to the countries or organisations such as the UN, US
141 Alan Vick, David T. Orletsky, Abram N. Shulsky, John Stillion, “Preparing the US Air Force for 
MOOTW”, MR-842-AF, p. 1. <http://wvyw.rand.org/publications/MR/MR842>. accessed: February 9, 
2004.
142 The US Army FM 100-7 defines that MOOTW is operations in two states of the range of military 
operations: peacetime and conflict. The Headquarters of the US Army, FM100-7: Decisive Force: The 
Army in Theater Operations (Washington, DC: Department of Army, 1995), p. 8-1.
143 Refer, the definitions of roles, functions and missions in the above.
144 JDE, p. 513.
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or Somalia in the UN-led operation in Somalia from 1992-9514>), whether the effects o f 
the roles o f military forces emerge or not. All in all, the relationship between the roles o f 
military forces and MOOTW can be outlined in Figure 2-2.
Figure 2-2: The Relationships among the Roles, MOOTW and W ar146
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The basic assumption of the above depiction is the fundamental belief that all countries 
either neighbouring or with allied relationship have an invisible basic tension with the 
other countries, because the political, economic and social goals o f a country cannot,
145 It was a humanitarian intervention for the UN and US, but the deployment of forces had the effect of 
deterring the civil war as well as applying coercion using armed forces, whilst the forces of Somalia 
fought each other in the form of the civil war. See, Antonia Handler Chayes & George T. Raach (1995), 
pp. 27-29; George B. N. Ayittee, “The Somalia Crisis: Time for an African Solution”, Policy Analysis 
No. 215 (March 28), 1994.
14(1 Re-made on the base of the figures of C. R. Mitchell’s the Sequence of Conflict Management 
Techniques, see, The Structure o f  International Conflict (London: MacMillan, 1981), p. 256 and Glen 
H. Snyder & Paul Diesing’s Crisis Phases, see, Conflict among Nations (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1977), p. 15.
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without coordination in terms of at least negotiation, concession or control, coincide 
with each other. At this stage, the role of military forces is defence, in the form of a 
protective structure, which, of course, works throughout all stages including wartime. 
However, the basic level of tension varies according to the geo-political, economic and 
strategic location of a country, hence the basic roles of a state’s military force apply to 
the second (deterrent) or third (compellence) at times.
To conclude, military forces have been the basic political instruments for achieving 
national objectives in the situations of international (very rarely domestic) conflicts 
since the ancient era. As such, military forces deserve their existence in any country as 
one of the most important ingredients of national resources for evolving national power 
abroad as well as protecting national interests from any kind of threat, considering their 
roles as examined in the studies of former politicians and strategists. However, at a 
more systematic and sophisticated level, reflecting not only the recently developed field 
of the air force and the services based on technological developments and innovations 
(i.e., the Strategic Rocket Forces of the former USSR), but also the subdivided branches 
in each service, it is natural that all countries redistribute their roles by legal stipulation 
in the form of the constitution or laws or presidential decrees, reflecting both the 
theories of military strategists about the distinct roles of each service and the 
spontaneous roles possessed by each service in the fundamental purposes of its creation. 
Consequently, it is to be hoped that the next step is to examine the roles of naval forces 
as defined by the maritime strategists and the legal stipulations of the US, as the leading 
power possessing the most developed amphibious force on earth, in order to gain fresh 
light on the subject.
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B. Roles of Naval Forces in the Theories of Maritime Strategists
The notable igniter of maritime theories was A. T. Mahan who is unquestionably widely 
known all over the world with his studies on naval and international affairs explaining 
the fact147 that the keys to national greatness are world trade, expansion, and sea power. 
In this sense, he recognized the importance of seapower, which included both the 
military strength afloat and peaceful commerce and shipping, in their roles in the fields 
of commerce and the strategic lines of sea communications rather than the others, i.e., 
offensive or defensive operations, or sea blockade.148 The concept of strategic lines was 
one great example, because the flexibility of sea routes, in terms of easy and wide 
unlimited maritime roads, like the use of the sea in modem war, provided both free 
supplies and an exit route, which were two essentials for the safety of an army on shore 
(a ground force, in modem terms, an amphibious force) or of a fleet.149 To summarize, 
even though he never directly referred to the roles of seapower as a means of national 
politics, his ideas were able to act in the same context as Clausewitz, giving due 
consideration to the ultimate goal of seapower, which is national greatness. However, it 
is unlikely that the focal points of his work about naval warfare strayed very far from 
Jomini’s principles of war150.
147 The other important point of his findings is concerning the elements of seapower, which affects the 
seapower of nations by its principal conditions: Geographical Position, Physical Conformation, Extent 
of Territory, Number of Population, Character of the People, Character of the Government. See, Alfred 
T. Mahan, The Influence o f Sea Power upon History 1660-1783 (London: Sampson Low, Marston & 
Co., 5th ed.), pp. 28-89. However, these factors have emerged into the modem policy-decision making 
system, e.g., PPBS (Planning, Programming Budgeting System).
148 As his work has been criticized, in association with Jomini’s ideas by a few strategists, it seems that 
the mainstream ideas of naval forces roles on the battlefield are discussed in relation for the roles of the 
army dealing with the influence of seapower at a specific time in history. Allan Westcott (ed.), Mahan 
on Naval Warfare: Selections from the Writings o f  Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan (Mineola, NY: Dover 
Publications, 1999), pp. 49-99.
149 Ibid, pp. 75-78.
150 Even though Jomini dealt more with the practical aspects of war than did Clausewitz, it is true that he 
also recognized, as did Clausewitz, the importance of political objectives in wars between nations. Brig.
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A truly great maritime strategist who applied his principles to the nature of war 
reflecting Clausewitzian theory was Sir Julian Corbett, who elaborated on the limited 
warfare idea and the relationship of strategy to broad political policy. Yet, he inherently 
assented and expressed the principles of maritime warfare in almost the same ways as 
Mahan such as the basic concept of “the command of sea”, the importance of “lines of 
communications” for either commercial or military purposes, the concentration and 
forms of blockade, but they disagreed at some points, e.g., Mahan’s tendency to elevate 
concentration151. By contrast, his greatness in the development of maritime strategy was 
that he explored the nature of maritime warfare in a limited war waged under limited 
political objectives. In this sense, he made the distinction between major and minor 
objects to be pursued in a war; thus he depicted naval strategy as only a sub-division of 
a division of strategy.152 In the light of this fact, even though he did not directly outline 
the roles of naval forces in peacetime, he did give a clue to development of the 
systematical roles of naval forces.
Despite these kinds of theoretical developments, the first and second World Wars 
remained the classical models of the use of force to intrude upon the conduct of 
hostilities. Nevertheless, the naval operational concepts of the German and Italian 
navies in the Atlantic and Mediterranean theatres were completely different from the 
main objective of naval warfare, which was “to secure the command of the sea or to 
prevent the enemy from securing it”. They concentrated on a single task: severing Allied
Gen. J. D. Hittle, “Jomini and his Summary o f the Art of War”, in Roots o f Strategy Book 2: 3 Military 
Classics (Mechanicsburg, PA, 1987), pp. 359-431. In these regards, it is not too much to say that most 
strategists have implicitly or explicitly taken military forces for granted as an ingredient of achieving 
the national political objectives abroad.
151 Eric J. Grove, “Introduction” for Julian S. Corbett: Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, in John B. 
Hattendorf and Wayne P. Hughes (Series eds.), Classics o f  Sea Power (Annapolis, ML: the United 
States Naval Institute, 1988), p. xi-xiv.
152 Ibid., p. xix.
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1lines of communication, instead of attempting to pursue the model of fleet battle, 
using particularly U-boats. Owing to this kind of use of naval force, the few maritime 
strategists who are engaged in studying naval issues began to re-examine the subject by 
classifying the peacetime roles of naval forces to obtain national political objectives as 
well as distinguishing the wartime roles of naval forces. It seems that much of this work 
began to appear only in the 1970s after not only careful consideration of the effect of 
nuclear weapons on international politics, but also by observing the fact that the roles of 
Great Power navies had been shifting to political missions as a means of deterring or 
compelling the other states’ actions.
A good example of this was the work done by Edward N. Luttwak, who emphasized the 
political use of the navy. He based his approach on an analysis of the role of the US 
Sixth Fleet in a major international incident such as the 1972 expulsion/ withdrawal of 
Soviet forces from Egypt on the theory of suasion, which was akin to the ffactionisation 
of the peacetime use of military forces in terms of the effects of military forces 
employment and progressive levels of conflict. However, his explanation provided a 
more delicate mechanism, because as seen in Figure 2-3, he analyzed laterally on the 
bases of the effects according to the countries involved, e.g., the effects of armed 
suasion on the reactions of the USSR, Turkey, and Israel, rather than all levels of 
intensity.
In analyzing this point, he highlighted that the navy’s ability to threaten, support, and 
use force has several implications for the countries involved through the intermittent
153 John B. Hattendorf, “Recent Thinking on the Theory of Naval Strategy”, in John B. Hattendorf & 
Robert S. Jordan (eds.), Maritime Strategy and the Balance o f  Power (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1989), 
pp. 136-137.
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manifestation of the US political will with respect to its possible use.154 His 
contribution to the development of naval strategy was that the focus of his work was the 
exploitation of potential force like the Clausewitzian ideas on the relationship between 
military affairs and politics, not the actual application of naval forces as it had been for 
Mahan, and Corbett155.
Figure 2-3: The Political Application of Naval Power
Supportive
Mode
Deterrent
Mode
Coercive
Negative 
(i.e., “Deterrence”)
Supportive 
(reaction: the target-ally/ 
client-is reassured)
Positive 
(i.e., “Compellence”)
Latent Naval Suasion
(reactions evoked by routine 
and/or undirected deployment)
Active Naval Suasion
(reactions evoked by any deliberate 
________ action or signal)________
Naval Suasion
(specific to sea-based/ related force)
Armed Suasion in General
(all types; all modes; all levels of intensity)
Source: Edward N. Luttwak, The Political Uses o f  Sea Power (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 7.
This line of thinking was developed further by many academics, and dealt with in 
practical disputes about the uses of a navy. Among many others at various levels, Ken
154 Edward N. Luttwak, The Political Uses o f  Sea Power (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1974), pp. 1-7.
155 John B. Hattendorf (1989), p. 141.
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Booth is the most prominent in his work, Navies and Foreign Policy,156 is the most 
fundamental statement about the political use of a navy as a means for evolving foreign 
policy. He argues that the navy exists “as part of a state’s general maritime policy, 
whose objective is to attempt to use the sea for one’s own purpose, while being in a
• 157 « •position to attempt to prevent others from using it”. He lists three levels of roles in a 
trinity, namely the policing, diplomatic and military roles. Here, the military role, 
balance of power functions and projection of force functions, support the other two 
additional roles as the base of the trinity. However, if considered in the light of the 
above general military thinking, it seems that the policing role, coastguard 
responsibilities and nation-building functions, is purely related to domestic issues, 
because the navy is, as he argued, a means of extending sovereignty, defending offshore 
resources, and contributing to internal stability. Thus, this role might be the fundamental 
raison d ’etre of why a state builds it up. The other two roles are, in strict meaning, 
additional employments of the navy generated by possessing it. The next role, the
15R •military one (strategic nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence and defence, and 
extended deterrence and defence) is dealt with in the aspects of the defence and 
deterrence roles of the general armed forces. Lastly, with the diplomatic role, the navy 
can provide the force to change the political calculations of other nations as well as 
promote prestige, which would be explained by the compellence roles or coercion, when 
it is purely employed for diplomatic purposes in the context of latent or active means.
To summarize, the roles of naval forces seen in the above varying situations have
156 Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1977).
157 Ibid., p. 15.
158 It can be inferred that the meaning of military and diplomatic roles includes the role of compellence as 
well, see ibid., pp. 235-265.
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expanded into some new dimensions, as did those of the general armed forces in the 
post World War era, from a means of naval warfare and for using the sea effectively as a 
means of evolving a nation’s foreign policy, and have emphasized some traditional 
usages with the form of either MOOTW or War. In the long run, naval forces are an 
ingredient of the broad spectrum of warfare and a specialized means for political 
purposes, and strictly diplomatic purpose. In reality, the maritime strategist, Geoffrey 
Till divides the spectrum of naval tasks into three categories: good order at sea, naval 
diplomacy, and war fighting (see Table 2-2)159. It is, however, true that the demarcation 
among spectrums is, as he admitted, very ambiguous.
Table 2-2; The Spectrum of Naval Tasks
Classifications Tasks
Intensity Frequency
High Low
War Fighting
Against Relatively Major Opposition i i L
Against Relatively Minor Opposition
Naval
Diplomacy
Coercive
Alliance Building
International Maritime Assistance
Good Order at Sea r r
Low High
Source: Geoffrey Till (ed.), Seapower: Theory and Practice (Essex: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 180.
After all, an appropriate way to explain the roles and functions of a navy, considering 
the enlargement of the spectrum of the use of force, is to classify it with a time partition 
of peacetime and wartime, which can be condensed into Table 2-3 on the basis of the 
modem maritime strategist’s theories. Of course, according to the maritime strategists, 
their classifications of the spectrums about roles and functions do not coincide with
159 Geoffrey Till, “Maritime Strategy and the Twenty-First Century”, in Geoffrey Till (ed.), Seapower: 
Theory and Practice (Essex: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1994), pp. 179-197.
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each other.
However, not all navies carry out all these roles and functions. The roles and functions 
of a state’s navy are inevitably connected with its strength, geo-strategic position, 
interests and strategy, and the navy’s missions may be determined by the military or 
political commander of a state on consideration of these factors. For this reason, each 
navy has a different mission, although its basic roles and functions are generally similar.
Table 2-3: The Roles and Functions of Naw160
Classifications Roles Functions Remarks
Wartime Waging War
Contiguous Sea /Coastal Defence 
SLOC Defence and Interdiction 
Blockade
Sea Control (and Denial) 
Projection of Force
Peacetime
International
Defence
Deterrence
Compellence
Coercion
All Above Functions 
Naval Presence (Forward Deterrence & 
Defence)
Gunboat Diplomacy (Showing the Flag) 
Strategic Deterrence
MOOTW
Domestic 
(Policing Role)
Sovereignty
Protection of the Offshore Estate 
Maintenance of good order 
Contribute to internal stability 
Contribute to internal development
* SLOC: Sea Lines of Communication
160 Eric Grove (1990), pp. 232-236; Geoffrey Till, Modern Sea Power (Oxford: Brassey’s Defence 
Publishers, 1987), pp. 1-9, 91-172, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age (Basingstoke: MacMillan 
Academic and Professional Ltd, 1990, reprinted), pp. 181-225; John B. Hattendorf (1989), pp. 149- 
158; Ken Booth (1977), pp. 15-25.
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C. Roles, Functions, and Legal Stipulation of the US
(1) Roles and Functions of Amphibious Forces
In having a peacetime political role, in addition to its combat capabilities, the roles and 
functions of amphibious forces are not dissimilar to those of all other forms of military 
power. The familiar attributes of an amphibious force-its performative capability of 
amphibious landing operations in conjunction with the attributes of the navy, such as 
mobility, flexibility, and wide geographic reach, etc. - render it peculiarly useful as an 
instrument of policy even in the absence of hostilities. Traditionally, an amphibious 
force was developed for the purpose of performing amphibious landing operations by 
overcoming the gap of natural water obstacles, seas, rivers, lakes, etc., but it has 
enlarged its roles and functions into all realms of the general purposes of military forces 
in some countries, particularly in the US.
The fundamental question to be raised here is ‘how many roles and functions can an 
amphibious force perform among the navy’s or in a joint operation161?’ Is the answer 
only a projection of force on shore? Or, is it all of them? The answer may depend on 
‘what kinds of missions will be allocated to the amphibious force from the supreme 
military and political leader of a state to a specific scene in either peacetime or wartime’, 
as inferred in the definitions of the roles, functions, and missions. If USMC held or kept
1 AOnuclear weapons in an advanced base in 27 countries worldwide deployed by the US ,
161 Today’s military operations are not performed just by a single service or branch, because both the 
uncertainties and risks in battlefield situations, and the changing characteristics of the international 
security environment demand a cooperative operation involving most of the available resources in the 
form of a joint operation or allied operation.
162 The US secretly deployed (because in most cases they were deployed without informing the state 
involved) thousands of nuclear weapons surrounding the USSR and potential adversaries with priority 
given to the forward bases of the US Forces, see New York Times, October 21, 1999.
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why have no military strategists or political commentators discussed the strategic 
deterrence role for amphibious forces up to the present time? And in that case, might it 
be considered as one of its roles? The answer may be ‘No’, not only because this issue 
has rarely been dealt with in the academic community, but also because it has so far not 
been unveiled to the public. Consequently, with the transitions of both the war and 
political environments, it is necessary to have an inclusive approach in order to explain 
them in terms of the use of armed forces in peacetime for the following reasons.
The first is that for the wartime roles and functions, amphibious forces significantly 
contributed to the victory of the Western allies in the Cold War163. During the Cold War, 
it was true that nuclear weapons changed the nature, character, and purpose of war; thus 
a World War III did not occur, although it might be true that amphibious forces, in 
combination with naval power, might have enhanced deterrence or compellence. From 
this perspective, they cannot remain only in the realm of the projection of force. Next, in 
its domestic role, there is, as Lieut. Col. Southby-Tailyour argued, a point ought not to 
be overlooked, that amphibious forces, a branch of the navy, are a maritime 
counterbalance to political ambitions in the case of an attempted coup d ’etat by 
politically ambitious army leaders - or of course vice versa.164 This may be impossible
163 Refer, Colin S. Gray, The Leverage o f  Sea Power (New York: The Free Press, 1992), pp. 265-277. 
Here, he argues, “the Western seapower would perform its classic missions... to work for strategic 
advantage as well as should have enabled its political owners to succeed in a more or less protracted 
struggle against a wholly continental enemy in a World War III in which nuclear weapons were not 
used extensively ... could have functioned as a vital enabling agent for Western victory,” pp.275-276.
164 JASF-ISSUE 10, p. [36]. In fact, it is difficult to find an example that an army coup d ’etat has been 
prevented by an amphibious force. However, I agree with this argument, because there was a similar 
case in South Korea. In 1961, when South Korea’s domestic situation was seriously unstable, there was 
the 516 Military Revolution on May 16, led by the Army Major General Park. A Marine brigade 
participated in this revolution, and performed some most critical operations such as a breakthrough of 
the governmental forces’ Han River blockade, which was possible due to a different operational 
command authority system compared with the Army. If the government had controlled the Marines or 
employed them as a counterforce against the revolutionary force, it might not have succeeded, because 
most army troops planning to participate were not able to operate on schedule.
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in the developed nations, but it might have warranted an adequate use of amphibious 
forces in certain situations. So, it is possible that this idea could be used to undertake the 
various domestic policing of naval forces as posited by Ken Booth.
(2) Legal and Directive Stipulations of the USMC
Nowadays, in possessing the most developed amphibious force in the world, the policy 
of the US toward the MC is a very appropriate example of knowing about its 
development and operations, and which direction it will take. USMC is under the 
protection of the law, the Douglas-Mansfield Act of 1952 (Public Law 416, 1st Session 
of 82nd Congress) regulating its force structure. However, it appears that this legal 
protection reflects the uncertain roles and functions of USMC which duplicate those of 
Army ground forces. Concerning the historical disputes in the US, the raison d ’etre of 
USMC was enlarged from providing internal security aboard ships, to providing a 
means to meet the most likely threats to US national security along with the 
enlargement of the US role in the international political topography (refer Table 2-4).
Table 2-4: Transitions of the Raison D ’etre of USMC
Classifications Time Raison D ’etre Remarks
Phase 1
After the 
American 
Revolution
Main: Ships Guards and Security Duties Ashore 
Secondary: to Provide Infantry for Ship Battles or 
Landing Operations
Limited
(President
Order/
Congress)
Phase 2
1899-1941
(Military
Intervention)
Main: Capture of Advanced Bases by Amphibious 
Assault as an Expeditionary Force 
Secondary: Ships Guards and Forward Naval 
Bases Protection 
* Increased its reputation for “Peacetime” Utility
Regular
1942-1945
(WWII)
Main: Amphibious Landing Operations in the
European theatre and the Asia-Pacific region
Phase 3 After WWII
Main: Force in Readiness to Respond to 
, International Crises 
Fundamental: Amphibious Assault
Enlarged
Main Source: Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History o f  the United Marine Corps (New York:
MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc, 1980), pp. xv-xvii.
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As USMC Gen. James L. Jones has said, “USMC is the nation’s premier expeditionary 
force, the contribution to the ascendancy of the US as a superpower during the 20 
century is our history, our legacy and our future”165, and it is certain that USMC remains 
organized, equipped, trained, and deployed mainly to conduct attacks from the sea. This 
is the lasting characteristic of an amphibious force: and is at the same time the raison 
d ’etre in every country who possesses it. In this sense, it seems that the roles of 
deterrence, compellence, and coercion are manifestly abstractions derived from its 
advanced presence or deployment and possession having the characteristics of general 
armed forces like the other services; thus these are unable to be the raison d ’etre of an 
amphibious force.
As a result, the functions, not roles, of USMC were promulgated by the US Department 
of Defense (US DoD), which regulates the functions of the DoD and its major 
components in the form of a Directive on August 1, 2002166, canceling the previous one 
of September 25, 1987. The functions of USMC are shown in Table 2-5, but most of 
them are promulgated together with those of naval forces due to the inherent character
of the amphibious force. From Table 2-5, the following facts can be extracted as a rule.
Firstly, USMC contributes to the conducting of traditional functions of naval forces by 
providing its forces.
Secondly, USMC has the general responsibility for conducting amphibious operations or to 
provide essential factors such as doctrine, training, and equipment for the other 
services for joint amphibious operations.
Lastly, as a regular force having the general capability of an armed force, USMC should 
support or perform or provide its forces for any kind of military operations on order 
(as directed).
165 The Headquarters of USMC, United States Marine Corps Concepts & Issues 2000 (Washington, DC, 
2000), p. vi (CMC Introduction).
166 The US DoD, DoD Directive, No. 5100.1, August 1, 2002.
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Table 2-5: The Functions of USMC
Classifications Functions Remarks
Primary 
(Navy and/or 
Marine Corps)
Destroy enemy naval forces
• Suppress enemy sea commerce
Gain and maintain general naval supremacy
Control vital sea areas
Protect vital sea lines of communication
• Establish and maintain local superiority
• Seize and defend advanced naval bases
• Conduct the above land, air, and space operations
Marine Corps: 
Provide Fleet Marine 
Forces, Detachment, 
Organisations
Further 
(Marine Corps 
shall)
• Develop Doctrines, Tactics, Techniques, Equipment
• Train and Equip Forces for Airborne Operations
• Develop Doctrine, Procedures, and Equipment for 
Airborne Operations
• To Organize, Equip and Provide Naval Forces
• Responsible for the Amphibious Training of all 
forces, and so on.
For Joint Amphibious 
Operations
• To Organize, Equip, and Provide Forces for Strategic 
Nuclear Warfare to Support Strategic Deterrence
• Provide the Afloat Force for Strategic Sealift
• Provide Forces to Operate Sea Lines of 
Communication
• Provide Forces for the Support and Conduct of 
Psychological/ Special/ Space Operations and so on.
For the Other 
Operations
Collateral 
(Navy and 
Marine Corps)
• To Interdict Enemy Power
• To Conduct Close Air and Naval Support for Land 
Operations
• To Establish Military Government and so on.
Source: The US DoD Directive, No. 5100.1 (August 1, 2002), pp. 19-23.
To put it simply, the ultimate goal of the existence of USMC is to conduct amphibious 
landing operations, and it is appropriately structured to meet the most likely threats to 
US national security. It shows that USMC is not a single purpose force, but it has
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developed into a multiple-purpose force under the protection of law enlarging its 
functions according to the transitions in the world security environment.
4. Roles, Functions and Independent Variables
It is not difficult to conclude from the foregoing accounts that, as navies have done, so 
the functions of amphibious forces vary according to the individual country, but the 
roles are almost the same in the aspects of having the characteristics of military forces, 
although the distinctive quality of the roles varies according to size, armaments and 
capabilities. How many roles and functions amphibious forces have or will fulfill 
depends on how well they are organised for amphibious operations, because the 
capability to perform the other additional tasks comes from this. As such, a country, 
which has great interests in conjunction with the sea or a specific area, usually possesses 
and deploys a relatively larger amphibious force for the purpose of defending its 
interests against a potential or manifest enemy.
A. Interests, Policies, Strategies and Decision Making System
In the broadest sense, a superpower should show a tendency to deploy its force outside 
of its homeland in order to protect its critical interests from an adversary, not only 
because the effectiveness of force is in inverse proportion to the distance from its source 
(in other words, it is the very important prior acquisitive precaution to gain supremacy 
at the initial stage of the war in terms of operational art), but also because it is a signal 
to reassure and strengthen one’s allies. Michael C. Desch well explained this 
relationship in comparison with that of an ordinary state, which could use only its 
limited internal resources to defend itself or pursue other ends. In stark contrast, “a great
3 3 9-65
power can”, as he observed, “increase its military strength by utilizing the resources of
1 A7intrinsically valuable areas outside of its homeland” (refer Figure 2-4).
Figure 2-4: The Operational Concept of Resources
State’s Power Operational Concept
Ordinary State Internal
Resources
External
Threat
Great Powers
Internal External
Resources Threat
Intrinsically 
Valuable Area
Extrinsically 
Valuable Area
Source: Michael C. Desch, “The Keys that Lock Up the World”, International Security, Vol. 14, Issue 1
(Summer 1989), p. 98.
Here, he classified Northeast Asia as an intrinsically important area, which had to be
* 1  Aftincorporated into US grand strategy in the post war period, and beyond. It has also 
become increasingly vulnerable, because the divided two Koreas were aligned with at 
least one superpower, which meant that this implied the importance of a relationship 
with an ally in the utilisation of military forces. Even if the two superpowers, the US 
and USSR, never actually went to war in the North-West Pacific during the Cold War, 
nevertheless the forces im(ex)plicitly provided each side with a considerable deterrent
167 Michael C. Desch, “The Keys that Lock Up the World: Identifying American Interests in the 
Periphery”, International Security, Vol. 14, Issue 1 (Summer 1989), 97.
168 Ibid., pp. 110-111.
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or compelling leverage against each other in situations short of war.
From the above perspectives, the roles, functions, and missions of the two amphibious 
forces169 that will be discussed here are determined by the grand strategy to obtain the 
goals of the national policy of each country taking responsibility for a part of the total 
resources. The concern of the war planners and policymakers is how to organize all the 
available resources to achieve the national aims as well as to maximize their country’s 
benefits. In order to do that, considering the degree of national interest, they may deploy 
or possess the necessary forces to a greater or lesser extent. For example, the movement 
of US strategic thinking because of the geopolitical and strategic situations in the Cold 
War era focused on the direction of weaving the roles and functions of related forces 
into a coherent concept, e.g., Joint Operations, for using early, forceful, global, forward 
deployment of conventional power, both to deter war with the Soviet Union, and to 
achieve the US war aims just in case deterrence failed. The size, armaments and 
capabilities of amphibious forces are determined by the operational demands in the 
hierarchy of the national strategic direction (NSD, refer Figure 2-5: the US NSD).
As seen in the figure, all strategies and plans are systematically related to each other; 
moreover they closely influence the other strategies and plans. However, whatever the 
national strategic directions of a given state, policy makers or relevant organisations 
must resolve conflict within the state to create appropriate decisions within the range of 
the embodiment of national interests and values. One of these organizations is the US
169 Clark G. Reynolds observed that different type of nations-continental powers, maritime-islands 
nations, and small coastal states - had different uses for navies. Amphibious forces, a branch of navy, of 
the two countries represent three different uses of them, refer, Clark G. Reynolds, Command o f the Sea: 
The History and Strategy o f Maritime Empires (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1974), pp. 12-16.
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Department of State (DoS) or the ministry of foreign affairs, which decide the foreign 
policy objectives based on the national interests in different regions and other states 
considering the transitions of the international system. These foreign policy objectives 
are a means of achieving national security, and are at the same time the ends of waging 
the theater strategy. This is a complicated intertwining of an ends-means net in terms of
Keith R. Legg and James F. Morrison170.
Figure 2-5: The US National Strategic Direction
National Interests & Value
National Policies
Regional Interests 
(Foreign Policy)
National Security Strategy
Theater Strategy
National Policy Statement
National Military Strategy
Theater Plans
Joint Strategic 
Capabilities Plan
Navy Plans
Maritime Strategy/ Plan
Marine Plans
USMC Strategy/ Plan
Source: Re-made on the Basis of the National Strategic Direction in USJCS, Joint Publication 3-0:
Doctrine for Joint Operations, September 10, 2001, p. 1-5.
In line with this net, the relationship between the strategic goals and the foreign policy 
objectives along with the transitions of domestic decision-making and international
170 Keith R. Legg & James F. Morrison, “The Formulation of Foreign Policy Objectives”, in James 
Barber & Michael Smith (eds.), The Nature o f Foreign Policy: A Reader (Edinburgh: Holmes 
McDougall, 1974), p. 196.
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political systems has changed pluralistically and multilaterally. With the development of 
modem governmental organisations, it is likely that the two defence and foreign affairs 
administrations are located at the same level; thus the structure to control and adjust the 
differences between them is the National Security Council (NSC) or a similar security 
decision-making organisation, which depends on the relevant state’s political culture, 
directed by the supreme mler of a state (see Figure 2-6).
Figure 2-6: Political-Military Strategic Decision System
The Supreme Ruler
IndirectIndirect
Military Resources
Observation
Intemational/Int 
emal Security 
Environments
Diplomatic Resources
Defence Affairs
Defence Policy Objectives/ 
Executive Strategies/ Plan
Observation
International Relations/ 
Other States’ Internal 
Security environment
Foreign Affairs
Foreign Policy Objectives/ 
Executive Strategies/ Plans
NSC
Function: Strategic Analysis, Control/Adjustment 
Decision: National Objectives, Goals
Reflection/Report ^  Action ^  Cooperation ^
Sources: Remade on the bases both ‘Three Sector Model of Strategic Analysis’ in David Jennings, 
“Strategic Decision Making”, in David Jennings & Stuart Wattam (eds.), Decision Making: An 
Integrated Approach (London: Pitman Publishing, 1994), p. 217, and ‘Decision Cycle’ in JDE, p. 222.
This model is applicable to all governments; sometimes the names of the structures are 
different like the Politburo of the USSR. This decision model is based upon the 
Observation, Reflection, Decision, Action cycle, which operates in all kinds of structure,
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even in the HQs of USMC or the lower subordinate structures. Even so, it is never 
intended to deny the logic of the Clausewitzian school that armed force is a means of 
evolving foreign policy.
B. Which factors should be Compared and Analysed?
In the long run, the modem roles and functions of amphibious forces are fundamentally 
derived from the capabilities of amphibious landing operations. On this basis, 
amphibious forces can perform any kind of mission, as directed by the supreme mler of 
the state in the situation of a war or MOOTW. As such, the modem character of 
amphibious forces can be defined as a naval ground force prepared, organised, and 
equipped to perform amphibious landing operations when they are needed within a 
specific geographical environment, but it can also role-play and function like the 
general ground force of an army as the USMC did during the 2003 War with Iraq for 
example.
From Figure 2-6, the independent variables affecting the construction of amphibious 
force can be extracted, which are the national goals and interests (or regarding the Asia- 
Pacific region in the cases of the US and USSR/Russia), the national defence strategy/ 
policy, and maritime strategy/policy. By analysing and comparing these variables, the 
basic causes of the differences between the constmction of amphibious forces in the 
relevant nations will be explained.
• t l i  •In addition to this, over the last decades of the second half of the 20 century in 
particular, there were many attempts to examine which factors determine the size of 
military forces in a state, such as that by the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) which employed the absolute figures of each country’s military 
spending to assess transitions in the level of military preparations. One remarkable 
study is James L. Payne’s work, which elaborates the benchmark for military forces
171construction by comparing the size of individual countries’ military forces. He 
explores many specific conditions at five levels, namely the effect of wealth, 
geographical influences, foreign military involvement, domestic uses, and cultural & 
ideological influences, which affect a nation’s level of military preparation.
1 77From the standpoint of seapower, the modem maritime analyst, Sam J. Tangredi , lists 
six characteristics: economic strength, technological prowess, socio-political culture, 
geographical position, dependence on maritime trade and sea resources, and government
1 77policy updating Mahan’s list. These specific conditions are, to some extent, 
interlocking and supportive. Consequently, to provide an appropriate explanation for the 
transitions of amphibious forces, it is necessary to identify the latent factors influencing 
the establishment of national interests, values and policies from Figure 2-6: Political- 
Military Strategic Decision System.
Unlike the other branches of the navy, the economic strength of a nation is not a 
significant factor in the build-up of amphibious forces, as is seen in the cases of the 
USMC and SNI after WWII. One of the plausible excuses made by those who were 
opposed to amphibious forces, as seen in the defence unification of 1944-1947 in the
171 James L. Payne, Why Nations Arm (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1989), pp. 14-15, 37-168.
172 Sam J. Tangredi, “Sea Power: Theory and Practice”, in John Baylis, et al. (eds.), Strategy in the 
Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 119.
173 Regarding Mahan’s list, refer footnote 67 in the Chapter II. Eric Grove also listed these six factors, but 
he divided them into two parts: first (1. Economic Strength, 2. Technological Prowess, 3. Socio- 
Political Culture) and second order (4. Geographical Position, 5. Sea Dependence, 6. Governmental 
Policy and Perception). Eric Grove (1990), p. 231.
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US, was to save on the defence budget and promote its effectiveness.174 They suggested 
that the USMC’s primary mission, amphibious warfare, was neither a required nor a 
viable military capability. However, the main reasons for the survival of the USMC 
were the possibility of it being employed in future conflicts in terms of roles and 
functions. This decision was finally arrived at by the President with the support of 
members of the Senate and the assistance of Congress.
In stark contrast, in the immediate postwar years, Soviet military debates focused on 
exaggerating the role and significance of Stalin’s leadership and his pronouncements in 
the sphere of military affairs because of the socio-political culture of the Soviet Union. 
In this situation, despite the fact that the real problems of military science were studied 
very little or ignored altogether175, discussions on the influence of the nuclear weapons 
used by the Americans in the last stage of WWII were at that time initiated by the 
military strategists and commentators. The priority of military forces construction 
focused on improving their capability to be employed in a nuclear war, thus the building 
of fleets and amphibious forces practically ceased, since their military value in a future 
nuclear war was regarded as useless or obsolete. Furthermore, the new maritime 
security environment in Northeast Asia formed with the end of WWII, limited coastline
174 On that occasion, Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall submitted the defence unification 
proposal to solve the inequality of the budget process, because the US Army needed to budget for the 
build up for mobilization. With this submission, the struggle to take a superior position in the allocation 
of the US defence budget took place among the services, for example, the Army against the Navy, the 
Army against the Marines, and even the Navy against the Marines. Lt. Gen. Victor Krulak explained 
the struggle: “In time of peace the armed service competes for dollars, whilst in time of war they 
compete for military tasks and material priority”. See, Victor H. Krulak, Oral History Transcript 
(Washington DC: Historical Division of the USMC, 1973), pp. 113-114; James P. O’Donnell, “The 
Struggle for Survival”, CSC 1985, <http://globalsecurity.org/militarv/librarv/report/1985/OJP.htm>. 
accessed: April 19, 2004.
175 Harriet Fast. Scott and William F. Scott, Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Formulation, and 
Dissemination (Boulder, CO: Westview press, 1988), p. 19.
176 S.G Gorshkov, The Sea Power o f the State (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 156.
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and advanced bases177, really restricted any movement towards a recovery of the will to 
build up the Soviet navy. It made it necessary for the USSR to revise maritime strategy 
and tactics, which not infrequently brought about radical transformation of its naval 
forces, as well as altering many technical means of waging war.
Is it possible to think that there is the influence of a political system, or a Socio-Political 
Culture, on the above outcomes? It is undeniable that there was certain help given to the 
USMC from it in the process of ‘Military Unification 1944-47’. However, if there were 
no demands in terms of the roles and functions of the USMC on the whole US national 
strategic direction system, the USMC would have found it difficult to survive in that 
process. In contrast, if there were certain roles or functions for the SNI, it might not be 
absorbed into the Coastal Defence Unit, for example. Similarly, as Eric Grove has 
explained, “Certain social and political systems are better at adapting to technological 
change than others”. It seems a little inconvenient to conclude that there is no 
relationship between economic strength, technological prowess and socio-political 
culture. However, not only looking at amphibious forces, whose manoeuvre capability 
is from the sea to the enemy shore, the main technological factor demanding the 
economic strength of a nation, mainly centers on the navy, but also considering the 
national political-military strategic decision system, it is deniable that the three factors, 
the economical strength, technological prowess, and socio-political culture are
177 Most maritime strategists have highlighted the importance of the magnitude of any element of naval 
power. Among the first of these is, however, probably advanced bases, particularly for the superpowers, 
because a modem fleet is capable of self-sustained strategic activity only to the extent that it can carry 
the necessities of that activity such as fuel, ammunition and food, in its own bottoms. Therefore, it has 
become a criterion of naval fabric, roles and functions regardless of peacetime or wartime. For the 
importance of it, refer the Headquarters of USMC, FMFRP 12-45:Naval Bases: Location, Resources, 
Denial, and Security (Washington, DC: 1992), pp. 1-7.
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1 7Rindependent variables.
Above all, from the foregoing examples and accounts, it is, of course, difficult to see 
that the above assumption can apply to the construction of all amphibious forces 
throughout the world. However, considering the two cases and the time spectrum of this 
thesis, the basic accounts of the international and regional security environment, and the
1 70transitions of maritime dominion should be essential prerequisites prior to a 
discussion of the main independent variables as a background. As such, these are first 
reckoned as being the general factors, and the time spectrum is also divided into three 
phases reflecting the changes in the independent variables. As a result, this thesis will be 
analysed by a total of six factors including the three factors derived from the US 
national strategic direction.
In order to analyse the peculiarities of amphibious capabilities, it is essential to compare 
their composition in relation to the characteristics of ground forces as well as their roles 
and functions, but the more important factor is the naval sealift capability. This is 
because an amphibious landing operation itself is impossible without movement to the 
enemy shore. In addition, in order to answer the fourth question of how the USMC tries 
to overcome the difficulty of amphibious landing operations in terms of doctrinal
178 As Eric Grove illustrated, it meant a nation’s inhibitions to invest in a navy because of socio-cultural 
factors as with Japan, which has the basic guidelines for national defence, or in similar countries. The 
demands of the national political-military strategic decision system can cover this and stand prior to the 
three factors. See, Eric Grove (1990), p. 230-231.
179 In geographical terms, Soviet-American security relations were seen in terms of “landpower versus 
seapower”. If geo-strategic circumstances permit, the Soviet/Russians, as Colin S. Gray has argued, 
have a strong will to construct its maritime power in order to offset the achievement of any superior 
maritime power. Consequently, the fundamental condition for maritime power build-up depends on 
geographical sanctions such as a hinterland for a naval base to deny the others hegemony or access to 
relevant oceans, and legal approval for the right of free navigation in any ocean and coastwise. Refer, 
Colin S. Gray, Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense o f the West (New York: Ramapo Press, 
1986), pp. 7-10.
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development, this can be done by examining doctrine reflecting the transitions of the 
above independent variables rather than discussing the two superpowers’ general 
amphibious landing operational doctrines. The most important thing in the amphibious 
landing operation in terms of doctrine is the sequence of events or activities that 
consists of 5 phases: planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement to the objective, and 
finally assault and capture of the objective as USFM 31-11 (Doctrine for Amphibious 
Operations) described. In reality, these 5 phases are used in most countries even though 
each phase’s name is a little bit different . Consequently, my discussion will focus on 
the emerging doctrine in the USMC during the nuclear era.
180 For example, the Soviet amphibious landing operation consisted of 3 phases: embarkation, the sea 
passage, preparation and landing phases. However, in order to execute an operation, it is necessary to 
plan how to execute it. In this sense, the Soviet doctrine naturally included the planning phase. To do 
rehearsal depends on available time for the execution. In the case of the SNI, the objectives were 
located relatively short distances from the home base compared with that of the US. Thus, it could be 
inferred that the SNI doctrine combined the rehearsal phase together with landing phase. For the Soviet 
amphibious landing operation phases, Geoffrey Till, Modem Sea Power (London: Brassey’s Defence 
Publishers, 1987), pp. 125-127.
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Chapter III. Until the End of the Vietnam War 81
1. General Factors
A. International Security Environment
The showdown between the US and USSR had been firmly in place by the end of the 
1950s. Soviet territorial expansion had begun during the Second World War and ended 
with the occupation of nine Eastern European countries (an area about 39,000 square
1 87miles and a population of over 90 million non-Russian inhabitants) . In order to 
prevent the Western European territories and their political system from becoming part 
of the Soviet satellites and their communization, the Western European countries 
including the US and Canada created NATO on April 4, 1949 in Washington, DC. The 
counterpart of NATO was the WTO, a multilateral military alliance of Eastern Europe as 
a ‘Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Co-operation’, which was ratified in 
Warsaw on May 14, 1955. As such, Europe became the most critically disputed area 
where the interests of the two organisations represented by the powers of the US and 
USSR potentially came into collision. In contrast, the composition of such a 
confrontation in the Pacific region was, as previously stated, formed on the basis of 
many bilateral or mutual defence treaties rather than multilateral ones among the states 
on either side reflecting the changes in the security environment with the
181 In 1973, the US admitted defeat in Vietnam via the Paris agreement between the US, the South and 
North Vietnamese Governments and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. 
Here, they agreed to withdraw all foreign troops and the dismantling of foreign bases within sixty days. 
As a result, the last US troops withdrew from Vietnam on March 29, 1973. After that, the North 
Vietnamese occupied Saigon (renamed Ho Chi Minh City) on April 30, 1975.
182 NATO, NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1969), pp. 15-16.
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communization of mainland China as well as the outcome of the Korean War.
From the very first of the above confrontations, Europe was provided with shelter under 
the US nuclear umbrella by Article 5 of the NATO treaty, a commitment which lasted 
beyond the end of the Cold War. However, with the creation of the Soviet Strategic 
Nuclear Forces, it came to be recognized not only as a deterrent to NATO first use of
187 ♦nuclear weapons, but also to weaken conventional deterrence in Europe. Meanwhile, 
the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 led to the negotiation of arms control measures 
between the two superpowers to avoid a nuclear catastrophe. The fruits of these 
endeavours were the establishment of a ‘hot line’ reflecting the lessons of the Cuban 
missile crises, and some arms control agreements such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty 
(LTBT) of 1963, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of
1 841967 , the Non-Proliferation Treaty of nuclear weapons (NPT) of 1968 and onward,
and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Strategic Arms Limitation Talk of 
1972, and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) in 1974. Although their real effects
185  • »were doubtful , it was not surprising that the major world powers including, of course, 
the medium powers among most of the developed countries worldwide, whether 
spontaneously or not, signed up to those treaties, even taking ample time to join. 
However, it was certain that in this detente period the major powers did not want to go 
to nuclear war regardless of what their real war plans were.
With the threat of a Soviet military invasion, the anti-Communist countries were afraid
183 Stephen J. Cimbala, NATO Strategy and Nuclear Escalation (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989), p. 75.
184 In the aftermath of this treaty, the Latin America Denuclearization Treaty followed, which was the 
first regional denuclearization effort by a group of regional powers.
185 Refer, Michael Sheehan, Arms Control: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1988), pp. 
22-40 (Chapter 2).
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they would lose their territories and sovereignties, and that the Communists would gain
power through a combination of elections, subversion, and unrest. This tension slowly
began to shift towards the Third World, where radical change was welcomed and
encouraged by the USSR on the basis of strong military power as well as Communist
ideology. The main reason for this was the anarchic nature of the international system
and the absence of a supranational authority. Thus, neither side could neglect the
possibility that the others would become aggressive in the future, nor was there a
credible guarantee that they would remain peaceful due to the military strength that both
186sides possessed in secure second-strike capabilities. In this situation, they did not 
want to threaten the other’s vital interests, and pursued a policy of protecting themselves 
through deterrence. Consequently, they tried to avoid severe conflict that had the 
potential to escalate into a general war in Europe, where arms control measures and 
political protocols were flourishing, focusing on the reduction or control of nuclear and 
conventional arsenals to a level where they would not threaten the others.
B. Regional Security Environment
The North East Asian region was steadily becoming one of the most important zones in 
the world where the four main powers-the US, the USSR, China and Japan actually 
faced each other, and where their borders and maritime interests intersected.187 The 
Korean peninsula is located at the centre as one of the potential conflict zones on the 
border dividing North and South Korea, therefore the relationships between the 4 great
186 Robert Jervis, “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?”, Journal o f Cold War Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 
(Winter 2001), pp. 36-54.
187 Henry Trofimenko, “Long-Term Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Soviet Evaluation”, Asian 
Survey, Vol. 29, No. 3 (March 1989), pp. 238-239.
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powers was naturally determined by the course of events both in the region and 
elsewhere in the world. The US was waging the Cold War with increasing intensity in 
Vietnam after its full-scale involvement, but was simultaneously willing to keep its 
hegemony through improving both the self-defence capabilities of the Western alliance 
and its relations with the USSR.
The most dramatic change in the relationships among the relevant countries that
affected the balance of power both in the region and throughout the world occurred
between the PRC and USSR. The 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship and mutual
assistance, which pledged Soviet assistance in the event of the PRC being attacked by
Japan or any country allied with Japan (i.e., the US), seriously cracked not only because
of the bitter personal rivalry between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung, but also
1 88because of the open Sino-Soviet political/ideological split of the early 1960s , so that
the tension between them continuously escalated. After Khrushchev’s ousting in
October 1964, the new Soviet leadership tried to improve the relationship between the
two countries, but with the Chinese boycott of the 23rd Soviet Communist party
congress, small-scale border clashes, a three day anti-Soviet rally at the Soviet embassy
180in Peking, and the intensification of the Chinese “Cultural Revolution” in 1967-68 , it
was further damaged. In addition, even though the most serious border fighting along 
the disputed Ussuri River border in March 1969 was terminated via border negotiations 
in October of that year by threatening the PRC with the use of nuclear weapons, both
188 Gerald Segal, “Sino-Soviet Relations after Mao”, Adelphi Papers, No. 202 (London: IISS, Autumn 
1985), p. 4.
189 The major motive of the termination of the Cultural Revolution stemmed from the Chinese fear of a 
Soviet attack under the rubric of the “Brezhnev Doctrine”, see Marian R Kirsch, “Soviet Security 
Objectives in Asia”, International Organization, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer 1970), p. 453.
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sides remained mainly concerned with the threats of land attack.190 Despite this 
settlement, that same year, the USSR continuously accused the PRC of trying to 
dominate Asia if not the whole world, and viewed its foreign policy as more dangerous 
than American foreign policy.
The implications of intense Sino-Soviet relations were very considerable. The USSR 
was forced to prepare for a possible two-front war, which deepened its concern about 
encirclement by hostile military coalitions. The PRC considered the USSR as one of its 
cardinal concerns in the field of security191, because it posed potentially the most 
devastating threat through troop reinforcements, expansion and construction of airfields 
in Siberia, and emplacement of rocket launchers with a nuclear warhead capability in 
the border regions. Consequently, military tension along the Sino-Soviet border 
remained high with major forces confronting one another and both nations 
supplementing their border forces (see Table 3-1). Moreover, the two nations continued 
to seek more reliable defences against a possible war and to restrain the other’s
109 1O'*expansionism in South and Southeast Asia. For the West, the implications of this
190 In the 1970s, US military experts believed that China had achieved a modest ICBM force and 
relatively invulnerable second-strike nuclear capability by the mid-1970s, which were not to be 
regarded as a serious threat. The PRC nuclear capability made Moscow very cautious about military 
action along the Sino-Soviet border.
191 In reality, it appears that the PRC denounced Soviet-American ‘contention and collusion’ after the 
open Sino-Soviet break in 1963, since it began to consider both super-powers as a threat.
192 After the Cultural Revolution in the PRC, the Chinese believed that they had a duty and a mission to 
spread their achievement throughout the world to encourage the under-developed poorer countries 
stand up and challenge the developed countries of the world. Refer, Wang Gungwu, “Chinese Society 
and Chinese Foreign Policy”, International Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 4 (October 1972), pp. 616-618; for the 
results of the Cultural Revolution, see, Joan Robinson, “the Cultural Revolution in China”, 
International Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 1 (April 1968), pp. 214-227.
193 Despite this antagonism, there had been some tacit Sino-Soviet co-operation in third-world conflict- 
notably in the Vietnam War, where both could agree that they faced a common enemy, even though 
they failed to achieve ‘united action’. On the contrary, there was mutual mistrust that if the US 
withdrew from Indochina, it would be filled by the other under the ‘vacuum theory’. Refer, J. L. S. 
Girling, “Russia and Indochina in International Perspective”, International Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 4 
(October 1973), pp. 608-609.
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military confrontation were not negative, as long as it did not threaten a general war194.
Table 3-1: Deployment of Chinese and Soviet Army Troops 
along the Sino-Soviet Border after 1970
(Number of divisions)
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
PRC 47 51 65 70 75 81
USSR 30 33 44 45 45 43
Note: Soviet divisions were believed to be far superior in firepower and mobility to Chinese divisions.
Source: The Japanese Defence Agency, Defense o f  Japan 1976, p. 13.
This pattern of relations was very well suited to the regional security system as the 
USSR and US inevitably tried to prevent war with each other and to stabilize the 
existing balance. However, in the meantime the PRC arose as a potential third great 
power at least in this region in terms of the balance of power, having its own seat in the 
UN instead of Taiwan from 1971195, posing challenges to not only the USSR along its 
Asian frontier and the US along the Asian rim-lands, but also the Soviet’s powerful 
support for revolutionary movements throughout the Third World.196 Until 1971, the 
US was the main enemy of the PRC on the issues of Taiwan, Vietnam and Korea, 
encircling it with both military bases and mutual security agreements with relevant 
countries including Australia and New Zealand in the South, resulting in US opposition 
to PRC interests after the Communist victory in 1949. However, in 1969 the new Nixon 
administration came to power, and proceeded to relax long-standing restrictions. As a 
result of this, the President visited the PRC from February 21 to 28 in 1972, and then 
both leaders, Nixon and Mao Tse-tung, agreed to “the time-honored Panch Shila or five
194 With the possession of the hydrogen bomb, war between East and West was no longer inevitable; at 
the same time peaceful coexistence and cooperation became necessary.
195 Of course, it was not the matter of the admission but the representation of China, because the PRC 
was also a member of the UN from its foundation. Until this time, the US blocked the PRC from 
legitimately taking its place as one of the Great Powers. Refer, Evan Luard, “China and the United 
Nation”, International Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 4 (October 1971).
196 Charles L. Robertson, International Politics since World War II: A Short History (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1975, 2nd ed.), p. 298.
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principles of peaceful coexistence, endorsed normalization of relations, listed 
differences over policies on Vietnam, and found a suitable formula for the thorny issue
107of the future of Taiwan” . These agreements were condemned by the USSR as 
intensifying the military means for preparation for war. Geostrategically, the USSR 
faced the PRC with hostility on one side, so that it tried to extend its power into South 
Asia to contain the enlargement of PRC influence. At the same time, it increased its 
efforts to mend diplomatic relations with Western Europe and the US by the SALT 
agreement. This triangular relationship among the three countries in this period 
experienced some twists and turns, but ultimately the alliance was maintained.
In the 1960s, Japan had become a major political and economic power in Asia. Its 
importance was in its ability to offer economic assistance to the undeveloped countries 
in Asia, which found it almost impossible to survive without economic aid from outside. 
It was likely per se to lead to political turmoil in that those countries could be 
communized via ideological attacks from the USSR and PRC. Japan provided the US 
with significant strategic forward bases and was also one of its most important trading
1 Ofipartners . However, Japan was forced to improve its relationship with the USSR and 
PRC in the light of three factors: military capabilities and presence in the Far East; the 
stability of regional security environment; and bilateral diplomatic relations. Even 
though a normalization of the relationship with the PRC was not achieved, and the 
peace treaty with the USSR was not concluded because of the territorial claim to the 
four islands off the coast of Hokkaido at this time199, Japan began to proceed to
197 Charles L. Robertson (1975), p. 335-336.
198 In the late 1960s, Japan was the second market only to Canada, refer, Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and 
US Security (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 29.
199 Yukio Satoh, “The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy”, Adelphi Papers, No. 178 (Autumn 1982), 
p. 4.
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establish diplomatic relations with them.
To sum up, under the above international political conditions, the Sino-Russian conflict 
was of prime importance in the regional security environment, which made the US 
exercise its hegemony in driving power politics via its active foreign policy. Despite this, 
it remained for the US a particularly sensitive issue to prevent communist expansionism 
throughout the third world via low-intensity conflicts instead of the danger of a major 
war between the nuclear countries. In the long run, it was a period when the whole 
regional security environment was continuously developed in a way which was 
favorable to the US due to the ideological struggle between the USSR and PRC who 
had variant views about communism. Meanwhile, the US engagement in the Vietnam 
War continued for the ostensible reason of protecting the West, capitalist and non­
communist countries, from communist expansionism. This influenced the transitions of 
the operational concepts of the US forces as well as the mission of the US marines in 
the Pacific area. Put succinctly, the regional security environment rested on the 
symmetrical structures in terms of mutual security, but were somewhat unbalanced 
because of not only the transitions of international relations but also the cultural and 
historical affinities and heterogeneities.
C. Maritime Dominion
Maritime dominion can be seen as the ability to use the sea as an individual state or a 
regime by positioning advanced bases and by the law of the sea. The former usually 
depends on the relationship between a country that wants to employ the other country’s 
naval base or port and a host country in terms of alliance and diplomatic relations or
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security interests. The need for naval bases is, of course, continuously changing in 
response to modifications in strategy and the ever-growing importance of the oceans as 
sources of supply for edible and inedible resources. Given their global interests, both the 
US and USSR, needed a worldwide network of bases to sustain forward deployment 
and strategic mobility, to ship amphibious forces to the enemy’s shore, and to show the 
flag and influence foreign policies. The antagonism of the host country, the split of de 
facto alliances and changes in the diplomatic relations between the host countries and 
the users could seriously affect the right for the bases to be used by either of the two 
superpowers.
In this regard, with the beginning of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the early 1960s, the PRC 
bases such as Dairen, Port Arthur, and Shanghai became unavailable to the USSR. The 
evidence of this is that it is impossible to find any official visit to the PRC base 
(Shanghai) after 1956 compared with the increase in Soviet naval visits throughout the 
Pacific area including Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, Singapore200, and the 
US . This was a great handicap to the Soviet navy’s influence over Southeast Asian 
countries via showing the flag and projecting their naval power, even though it had 
access to Singapore, where there was overhaul and yard work on ships from 1968 
onward, and Sihanoukville in Cambodia, where there was a good will operational visit 
in 1969 . Instead, the Soviet navy began to enlarge its operational field in the Indian
Ocean in 1968, for the purpose of reducing Western influence along the entire Indian 
Ocean littoral. It seems that the USSR had attempted to enlarge its interest toward the
200 The main purpose of this access was overhaul and yard work on Soviet ships.
201 Bruce W. Watson, Red Navy at Sea: Soviet Naval Operations on the High Seas, 1956-1980 (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1982), p. 136 and 210-14 (Appendix: Table 15-19).
202 Bruce W. Watson (1982), p. 213.
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Indian Ocean and the Middle East, as the US interests focused on the preservation of a 
noncommunist government in South Vietnam in Southeast Asia.
The latter, the law of the sea, is ‘a system of rules and principles determining the legal 
status’ of the various uses of the sea, which are concerned with 1) various areas -  
territorial seas, the high seas and straits, 2) various purposes -  commercial, fishing and 
fighting, 3) and various times -  peace, crisis and war. However, it had been 
inconceivable to regulate the law of the sea in wartime under the authority of the UN 
until now, because of its complexity as witnessed by the Falklands/ Malvinas conflict of 
1982 and the Iran/Iraq war of 1980-8204. Most maritime strategists have always accepted 
that naval strategy has been influenced by the law of the sea to some extent, particularly
90^as strategy has evolved in response to technological developments. However, there 
has been a general assumption that when international law has been influenced, this has 
been in relation to peacetime activities and that it was impossible to reach an agreement 
for wartime use of the sea through international law as demonstrated by the results of 
the United Nations conferences of 1958 and 1982, which indicated that such agreements 
regulated the law of the sea in times of peace only.
In July 1957, the USSR announced that an extensive sea area off Vladivostok, in the 
Peter the Great Bay, would be treated as its internal waters, and declared that free
203 P. D. Barabolya, et al., Manual o f  International Maritime Law (Part I) (Moscow: Military Publishing 
House, 1966), The US Naval Institute Intelligence Command (trans.), Washington, DC, p. 2.
204 Whilst the impact upon non-combatant activities with very basic interference was of little influence to 
third states’ right at sea, those of these two wars were very serious, i.e., a 200-mile ‘maritime exclusive 
zon (MEZ)’ by the UK. So, as R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe have pointed out, the major naval 
powers may not choose to give up its exclusive uses of the sea, even though certain agreements among 
all countries might be ratified. Refer, R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law o f the Sea (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999, 3rd ed.), pp. 421-428.
205 For the details of the relationship between the law of the sea and maritime strategy, refer Geoffrey Till 
(1987), pp. 18-22.
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passage would be denied without previous special admission. After that, it flouted the 
conclusions of the UN conference held in Geneva in 1958 in which the Western major 
naval powers were prepared to concede a width of six miles for territorial waters and a 
further six miles for exclusive fishing rights by insisting on twelve miles for territorial 
waters . In addition, it ridiculously claimed the Sea of Okhotsk as being inland waters 
in 1959 as a result of the Yalta Treaty, which acquired for the USSR the Kurile Islands 
and south Sakhalin (refer Figure 1-2). One reason for this was to protect its naval
AAO
facilities from the threat posed by a missile attack from the Western powers m time 
of war.
It is not difficult from the foregoing accounts to perceive the transitions of maritime 
dominion, which were determined by the complexity of the diplomatic relationships of 
the then international political system. The capabilities of the US and USSR navies 
could be roughly divided as follows209 in terms of ‘the command of the sea’210 posited 
by Alfred T. Mahan, for the purpose of global war conditions considering not the naval
strengths, but the purely geographical locations of each country’s naval force:
Firstly, the US included Cam Ranh Bay in the South China Sea to its outer ring of defence 
(Sapporo-South Korea-Okinawa-Taiwan-Philippines) as an effect of the engagement 
of the Vietnam War. The western part of this line could be considered as its 
operational area.
206 A. D. Nicholl, Rear-Admiral, “Geography and Strategy”, in M. G. Saunders, Commander, RN (ed.), 
The Soviet Navy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1958), pp. 250-251.
207 Rear-Admiral E. Biorklund, “On the Perimeter”, in M. G. Saunders (1958), p. 281.
208 The USSR constructed the provision of mobile operational bases throughout the whole of this area.
209 Refer, Patrick Wall (ed.), The Indian Ocean and the Threat to the West (London: Stacey International, 
1975), pp. 16-17 [Map: Rival naval and air facilities and or influences].
2,0 Hereafter, the term ‘command of the sea’ is used in the context of Corbett’s thinking that ‘Command 
of the sea means nothing but the control of sea communications....the primary function of our 
battlefleets is to seize and prevent the enemy from seizing the main lines of communication”. Not only 
because Mahan’s definition that ‘Command of the sea... was an exclusive thing: it could not be shared, 
and was applicable to one nation at a time’ has been challenged, but also because did he believe that it 
is essentially a relative and not an absolute thing. Refer, Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy and the 
Nuclear Age {London: MacMillan, 1990, reprinted), pp. 128-131.
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Secondly, the Soviets temporarily considered the Sea of Okhotsk including the Kurile islands 
area as its territorial waters. Furthermore, it had operational superiority in the Indian 
Sea including the Bay of Bengal. However, its operational manoeuvre activities were 
extremely limited not only in the East China Sea because of the aggravation of its 
diplomatic relationships with the PRC, but also in the East Sea and in the Eastern part 
of the Pacific Ocean from Japan211.
Lastly, the other sea areas might be decided with the de facto military alliances in wartime 
except for the potential territorial waters.
2. Independent Variables and Their Effects
A. USMC
(1) The US Interests/ Foreign Policy
At the beginning of the Cold War, it was essential for the US to spur its efforts to 
decrease Soviet Power, because of the image of the Soviet Union as expansionist212 in 
conjunction with the unstable security environment throughout the whole world and the 
expected dangers of prolonged competition with the USSR. As such, in 1948, the 
Truman administration juxtaposed them as “communism” and “democracy”, and listed 
three intrinsically valuable areas: Western Europe, the Mediterranean and Middle East,
91 Tand the Far East, regarding the USSR as an extremely serious threat. A good
211 Vladivostok, the main base of the Pacific Fleet, was at the end of a long supply chain, because it was 
remote from the Soviet industrialized area, e.g., Moscow. From a strategic point of view, ships from 
this base have to pass through narrow chokepoints, either the Korean Strait (a eastern waterway of 
Korea or the western waterway of Japan), or La Perouse (Soya) Strait between the Japanese northern 
island Hokkaido and the Soviet island Sakhalin, none of which would be controlled by the Soviets or 
their allies in time of war. For the details, see In-Soo Lim, “The Role of Naval Power in the North-West 
Pacific 1953-1991”, Ph D thesis (Aberystwyth: University of Wales, Aberythwyth, 1992), pp. 82-84.
212 According to the “traditionalist” or “orthodox” school, the Cold War was a great invisible struggle, 
which considered the USSR as inherently expansionistic. However, a more reasonable explanation is 
that it was a clash between different social systems under the distorted security concept that they 
basically wanted to keep the status quo, but they did not trust each other’s intentions, thus provoking a 
security dilemma. Refer, Robert Jervis (2001), pp. 39-45.
213 Policy Planning Staff, “PPS/23: Review of Current Trends of the US Foreign Policy”, in the US DoS,
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illustration of this is the NSC 20/4 on November 23, 1948, which considered the will 
and ability of the leaders of the USSR to pursue policies threatening the security of the 
US as the greatest single danger to the US within the foreseeable future.214 After 
Truman’s victory in the election of 1948, this report was announced to the public by his 
Inaugural Address of January 20, 1949, he listed the following four additional central
points.215
Firstly, he endorsed the United Nations,
Secondly, he applauded the European Recovery Program,
Thirdly, he announced that the United States was planning a North Atlantic defence pact,
Lastly, he announced he would embark on a bold new program of technical assistance for 
undeveloped areas.
In this regard, the main goal of US foreign policy at the end of the 1940s was to rescue 
Western Europe from communist control, so that preserving Western Europe had the 
first priority in terms of vital areas throughout the world in US foreign policy objectives. 
Indeed, it appears that successive US administrators never lost sight of the objectives 
laid out in the NSC-20/4 in the Cold War era. Parenthetically, as NSC-68216 defined, 
“the fundamental purpose of the US is, of course, to assure the integrity and vitality of 
our free society on the basis of the Constitution”. In order to do this, the policies and 
programs in NSC-68 were directed towards the strengthening of the free world and 
therefore the frustration of the Kremlin design.
On the other hand, it was historically true that many American doctrines and strategies
Foreign Relations o f the United States 1948, Vol. 1, Part 2 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), pp. 510-529 
(hereafter cited as FRUS with appropriate volume and page numbers).
214 The US National Security Council, “NSC 20/4: Note by the Executive Secretary on US Objectives 
with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to US Security” (Washington, November 23, 
1948), in FRUS, Vol. 1, Part 2 (1948), p. 663.
215 Thomas G. Paterson, et al. (1991,1900 to Present), p. 454.
216 The US NSC, “NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security”(Washington 
DC: April 7, 1950), in FRUS, Vol. 1 (1950).
3 3 9 -8 8
of foreign policy were developed in the Asian rather than the European context, 
especially at a time before it emerged as a one of the superpowers after WWII. However, 
it was not clearly defined, as is shown in the above four points of Truman’s report. In 
1947-49, the US government evidently did not think there was an imminent threat of a 
hostile power gaining control over this area with its dominant positions in the fields of 
military and economic strength despite the fact that its political philosophy and patterns 
for living had very little applicability to the masses of Asian people. As a result of this, 
it appeared that the absolutely vital area in the Asia-Pacific region for US security
917included Japan and Philippines as the cornerstones of a Pacific security system.
With the outbreak of the Korean War, this general orientation was sharply changed 
especially in the aftermath of the armistice agreement on July 27, 1953, between Mark 
W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command (UNC) and Peng The-Huai,
910
Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, and Kim II Sung, Marshal of DPRK , 
but the state of division and confrontation remained the same as before the war. The 
Korean War was the first major confrontation between the free world and the
910communists, and it produced the following ironic consequences :
Firstly, the change in Russia’s recognition that the Americans had a strong will to protect the 
free world from territorial and ideological expansion,
217 The Truman administration concluded that the US army, with only fourteen divisions and “twenty- 
division” global commitments, must be more rationally deployed in central locations to sustain a 
beleaguered Europe. As such, Secretary of State Acheson, in January 1950, defined the island line, 
Aleutians-Japan-Ryukyus-Philippines, as part of the US military perimeter. It seemed to reinforce its 
army in Europe. Other areas in Asia, Korea included, he thought of as part of the “commitments of the 
entire civilized world under the Charter of the UN”. See, McGeorge Bundy (ed.), The Patterns o f 
Responsibility (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), pp. 199-200; Fred Greene, U.S. Policy and the 
Security o f Asia (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), pp. 28-29; PPS/23.
218 The reasons why the ROK government did not participate in the agreement are not only that it did not 
have the authority of operational control over the ROK Army, Navy and Air force, which had gone to 
the Commander-in-Chief of the UNC, on July 16, 1950, but also that the ROK government was 
seriously against the armistice. See, The ROK Ministry of National Defence (ROKMND), Defense 
White Paper 2000 (Seoul: ROKMND, 2000, English version), Appendix 9 and 11.
219 Fred Greene (1968), p. 30.
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Secondly, the upgrading of the priority in US foreign policy interests toward Northeast Asia in 
order to avoid another major engagement on the Asian mainland.
Through the Korean War, the spread of communism in Asia was temporarily stopped 
and the foundation for the US defence commitment to the Korean peninsula was laid. 
Moreover, the Korean War changed the dimensions of the US-Korean relationship as 
well as the US policy toward East Asia in that it concluded several bilateral and 
multilateral security treaties in the Pacific . Furthermore, there were states that faced 
special security problems stemming from partitions or territorial divisions in the 
Western Pacific area-Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan-where there was a possibility of creation 
of a regional second conflict of the same type as the Korean War. In retrospect, more 
than any other single event, the Korean War contributed to the shaping of postwar US 
foreign policy toward Northeast Asia and the relevant Pacific area. From the mid 1950s, 
the US began to perceive the following critical reasons for maintaining a substantial
military presence in East Asia.
Firstly, the realization that an incident in the Pacific region may have as much relevance to 
US national interests and to the success or failure of its foreign policy as in the 
Atlantic region;
Secondly, the opposition to any one-power domination in the Asia-Pacific area;
221Lastly, the criticality of Japan as a Western security asset in the Pacific.
Put succinctly, the Korean War served as a major momentum for the transition of US
220 The US had mutual security and cooperation treaties with Japan (1951), the Philippines (1951), 
Australia and New Zealand (1952), the Republic of China (1954, lasted until 1979), and the Southeast 
Asia Treaty comprising Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan 
(1954). All of these security commitments were signed originally in the early 1950s during and 
immediately following the Korean War. Refer American Foreign Policy 1950-1955, p. between 1788- 
1789.
221 Gaston J. Sigur, “The US-Japan Relationship and US Policy in Asia and the Pacific”, in Gaston J. 
Sigur and Young C. Kim (eds.), Japanese and US Policy in Asia (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 
pp. 3-4; Chung Min Lee, The Emerging Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia: Implications for Korea’s 
Defence Strategy and Planning for the 1990s (Seoul: the Research Center for Peace and Unification, 
1989), p. 10.
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security interests, which meant that the Korean peninsula was worthy of US security 
attention as an intrinsically valuable area as is posited by Michael C. Desch.
Furthermore, the US needed to undertake extended economic and military aid to 
Vietnam from the end of the 1950s in association with the strategic ‘Domino’ theory, 
which was initially presented by President Eisenhower. The fall of Indo-China would 
lead to the fall of the regional countries from Burma, Thailand, Malaya and Indonesia to 
India, Australia, the Philippines, Formosa and Japan. As a consequence of this view, the 
US Secretary of Defence, McNamara evaluated, in March 1964, that Southeast Asia had 
a great strategic significance in the forward defence of the US, and that the US must 
meet the challenge in South Vietnam in order to defend Southeast Asia. Under this 
kind of firm foreign policy objective against Soviet expansionism, the US engaged in 
the Vietnam War. Ironically, with the full-scale engagement of the US in the Vietnam 
War, the US interest toward this area was highlighted in the context of its national 
policies for self-preservation under the justification of protecting the nations of the free-
999world . In hindsight, the decades beginning with the signing of the Korean armistice in 
July 1953 and the firm involvement in the Vietnam War by the US could well be 
characterized as the highpoint of the cold war in Asia.
However, after the Tet Offensive of 1968224, which led to the enunciation of the Nixon
222 H. G. Nicholas, “Vietnam and the Traditions of American Foreign Policy”, International Affairs, Vol. 
44, No. 2 (April 1968), pp. 189-201.
223 As Henry Kissinger explained, the initial motivation of the US in involving itself in the Vietnam War 
was that the loss of Vietnam would lead to the collapse of noncommunist Asia and to Japan’s 
accommodation to communism. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: A Touchstone Book, 1994), 
pp. 656-658.
224 The night of 30-31 January 1968 just before the lunar New Year’s Day, when the South Vietnamese 
forces were relaxed, North Vietnam launched a surprise attack. The influence of this was massive on 
both the US military commanders in Vietnam, the government and public from a psychological point of
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Doctrine (otherwise referred to as the Guam Doctrine) on July 25 1969 that “in 
responding to future Asian crises the US is going to encourage and has a right to expect
99 ^that this problem will be increasingly handled by the Asian nations themselves” , the 
US came to the conclusion that the war was, in the final analysis, not winnable. From 
this time, the US government was eager to preserve anti-Communist governments while 
minimizing the cost to American lives. The subsequent retrenchment of the US war 
effort in Vietnam followed by the withdrawal of the US 7th infantry division from South 
Korea in 1971 were preludes to the Nixon-Kissinger formula of initiating a gradual 
disengagement from Southeast Asia. From that time, the US turned from military ways 
to diplomatic options in solving the matter of East-West confrontation. It meant that the 
US began to seek an outcome, which would enable it to continue its postwar role as the 
■ protector and sustainer of noncommunist countries.
The US saw an opportunity by undertaking a fundamental rapprochement with the PRC, 
based on the evidence of both Mao’s comment that the PL A would not go abroad226, and 
the ongoing antagonism between the USSR and PRC. This improved relationship with 
the PRC brought a strategic windfall for the US in counterbalancing the Soviet presence 
and the modernization of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and a growing SSBN sanctuary in the 
East Asia, as mentioned in the regional security environment, without damaging the
view, due to the activities of the mass media. After all, the request for the dispatch of more than 20,000 
troops from the US HQ in Vietnam was refused. From an initial deployment of 3,500 Marines at Da 
Nang, the US troop strength rose to 184,000 by the end of 1965, 385,000 by the end of 1966, and
486,000 by the end of 1967, but the increase in troop strength in 1968 was kept to about 50,000. From 
1968, the US faced great resistance so that it began to seek a way to withdraw from Vietnam. Refer, 
John Lewis Gaddis, “Flexible Response and Vietnam”, Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (1999), pp. 
222-236.
225 This outline was concretized by his special message to Congress on 15 September 1970. Refer, John 
Whiteclay Chambers II, et al., The Oxford Companion to American Military History (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p. 503.
226 It meant the PRC did not intend to become involved again in communist wars of liberation, refer, 
Henry Kissinger (1994), pp. 644-645.
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continuing existence and independence of Taiwan. The US toppled the static balance of 
power with the USSR by readopting its foreign policy objective in terms of Quincy 
Wright. Nevertheless, the fundamental Cold War structure of the balance of power 
system in East Asia remained firmly in place.
(2) Military Strategy/ Policy
The main objective of the US military strategy in the Asia-Pacific region was to counter 
Soviet expansionism. In this context, the US continued its efforts to restore the regional 
military balance by the basic concept that there would be no peace without equilibrium. 
In this light, maintaining the US military presence, especially its navy and strategic air 
force, to counter the USSR’s increased military activities was an essential part of the US 
military strategy in this region. However, the size of the US military presence fluctuated 
with the changes in the diplomatic relationships between the relevant countries, 
particularly in terms of the strategic triangle: the PRC, the US and USSR, and the 
domestic political environment.
After the end of WWII, US military strategy was based on the twin pillars of 
‘containment’, the theme of George F. Kennan’s famous “X” article in Foreign Affairs, 
and deterrence, in some aspects a military arm of containment, because NSC-68 and the 
Korean War encouraged greater emphasis on military means for opposing communism
9 9 0
considering that the Communist threat was regarded as mainly military. The US 
military strategy was also divided into two categories: nuclear and conventional options,
227 The US reformed the balance of power system in Northeast Asia by making a friendly relationship 
with the PRC. The antagonism between the USSR and the PRC was a good opportunity for the US to 
rally from its inferior position in the region. Quincy Wright explained this with the term, ‘a dynamic 
balance of power’. Refer, Michael Sheehan (1996), p. 12.
228 John Whiteclay Chambers II (1999), p. 472.
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because it was confronted throughout the Cold War with the potential need to face a 
strategic nuclear conflict with the USSR and enter a major conflict. In reality, before 
NSC-68, the US defence planning had concentrated on the strategy and forces needed 
for a general nuclear war. At the centre of the US military strategy, there was the US 
concept of how many wars it should simultaneously engage in, including a conventional 
or unconventional and theatre nuclear war in Europe, a similar theatre wide conflict in
990Northeast Asia and the Pacific, and smaller conflicts in a region like the Gulf. The 
size of the US military forces, including how much manpower it would keep as a 
forward presence in each region, depended on this basic concept of US force planning 
to fulfil force requirements for any future wars.
Basically, the nuclear option was a part of this concept in terms of theatre nuclear war,
990but it was determined by the pendulum of nuclear superiority between the US and 
USSR (refer Table 1-1: the pendulum of nuclear superiority). In the 1950s when the US 
had a nuclear monopoly or superiority, it could deter by the option of ‘massive 
retaliation’, which however retained a degree of ambiguity. With the gap in missile 
technology, it was unable to guarantee the safeties of the US nuclear umbrella over the
991free world and of its homeland from a Soviet nuclear attack. In this situation, the 
question of “how much can the US nuclear forces survive” was central, thus the US
229 Anthony H Cordesman, “US Defence Policy: Resources and Capabilities”, Whitehall Paper Serious 
1993 (RUSI, 1994), p. 34-5.
230 Colin S. Gray explained that the structure of policy choice for the US was determined by the three 
core ideas that: ©  deterrence by anticipation of massive societal punishment; (2) of being denied 
victory; ©  of US victory. See, Colin S. Gray, “War Fighting for Deterrence”, The Journal o f Strategic 
Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, (London: Frank Cass, March 1984), p. 5.
231 The US proclaimed in NSC-68 that “Now (we) face the threat of atomic warfare...this fact imposes 
on us, in our own interests, the responsibility of world leadership...coupled with the probable fission 
bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union, the intensifying 
struggle requires us to face the fact that we can expect no lasting abatement of the crisis . . . ” Most non- 
Soviet countries were provided with the US nuclear umbrella during the Cold War by the NSC-68 and 
bilateral treaties. Refer, “NSC-68, IV, B. Objectives”.
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Secretary of Defence, Robert S. McNamara, changed its nuclear option to Mutual 
Assured Destruction.232 His strategy depended on assured second-strike capability of 
the reserve retaliatory force, which was completed by 1967 under the basic concept of 
‘flexible response’. All non-Soviet countries implicitly relied upon the nuclear deterrent 
capability of the US.
Owing not only to the above eroding of US superiority, but also the limited use of 
nuclear weapons in dealing with most situations of international tension, the US 
conventional force level had to be re-examined, because the planned conventional force 
based on NSC-68 was reduced in the wake of the Korean War and because of a move to 
an atomic-intensive defence policy. In order to maintain strong ‘general purpose forces’ 
to deter and defend, which became a principal military instrument of foreign policy, the 
US adopted the so-called ‘2 1/2 war’ concept in 1962233, which postulated the situation 
of two major concurrent wars in Europe and North or Southeast Asia, and a minor 
conflict elsewhere (see Table 3-2).
Table 3-2: Forces Required for ‘2 1/2 Wars*. 1962
Theatre No. of Divisions No. of Tactical Fighter Wings
Major (Europe) 17 25
Ma jor (Asia) 8 12
Minor (Cuba/elsewhere) 3 1/3 4
Total 28 1/3 41
Source: William Kaufmann, Planning Conventional Forces 1950-1980 
(Washington DC: Brookings, 1982), p. 7.
Here, it seems that the number of divisions required for Asia had considered not only
the numbers of North and South Koreas’ divisions234, but also the basic strategic
232 Timothy Garden, Can Deterrence Last? Peace through a Nuclear Strategy (London: RUSI, 1984), pp. 
41-44.
233 Robert R Haffa, Jr., Planning U.S. Forces (Washington, DC: NDUP, 1988), p. 42.
234 The numbers of the Army divisions of North and South Korea were 19 and 30 (including Marines 
Corps divisions) respectively. At that time, the number of total armed forces of South Korea was
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concept that it did not allow for simultaneous attacks in Korea and Vietnam (see Table
3-3).
Table 3-3: The Allocation and Deployment of Major GPF in Asia, 1965 and 1973
Classification Strategic Concept Remarks
2 1/2 War 1 1/2 War
Threat General Attack Conventional Attack
Exclude
Nuclear
War
Support Limited Allied Support
Priority Vital to US
Forces 
(Army/ MC 
Divs)
CONUS 3 2 1/3 -2/3
Deployed 4 1 2/3 -2  1/3
Reserve - -
Strategic Concept
1) Holding action 
required while 
Reserves mobilize
2) Reserve reinforcement 
required
3) Did not allow for 
simultaneous attack in 
Korea and Vietnam
1) Nuclear capability of US strategic/ 
theatre forces serves as a deterrent 
to full-scale attack in Asia
2) Prospects for a coordinated 2-front 
attack on US allies are low because 
of the risks of nuclear war and the 
improbability of Sino-Soviet 
cooperation
3) Reserves may not have to mobilize
Source: Robert R Haffa, Jr., Planning U.S. Forces (Washington DC: NDUP, 1988), p. 78-79
This admirable plan was affected by the changing security environments as well as the 
domestic demands of the anti-war atmosphere derived from the Vietnam War, and was 
not achieved as has widely been recognized. Furthermore, the detente mode, like the 
triangular relationship, in the international security environment contributed to 
thwarting American foreign policy objectives and interests, which caused the weakening 
of US overseas commitments as represented by the Nixon Doctrine. As a result, more 
than half the total of US forces in the Korean peninsula and Japan withdrew. With
600,000, which were almost double compared to that of North Korea (estimated: 352,000). See IISS, 
The Military Balance 1964-5, pp. 10 & 30.
235 The US Army’s 7th Infantry Division, some 20,000 troops, leaving only one infantry division 
withdrew from Korea, and it was not redeployed again. In stark contrast, the number of US forces 
personnel decreased from 41,000 to 26,500 from 1969 to 1971, but it had been increased to 65,000 with 
the end of the Vietnam War by the relocation plan of the US overseas forces. See, Defence o f Japan 
1980, p. 322 (Reference 48: Changes in strength of US forces personnel in Japan); Regarding the US
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these reductions and redeployment of the US forces in Asia, the US reset its strategic 
concept for GPF from 2 1/2 War to ‘1 1/2 War (see Table 3-3), which meant that the 
pendulum of the containment policy had moved from the military to the diplomatic 
option.
(3) Maritime Strategy/ Policy
At the end of WWII, the US Navy was a newly constructed, balanced force, prepared 
for and experienced in wartime operations ranging from amphibious assault to air attack 
and fleet defense. However, with the emergence of nuclear weapons, the US Navy met a 
fundamental question of its strategic value in the nuclear era, which led it into budgetary 
disputes with the Air force and Army. The Navy department’s desire for complete 
independence failed and it was moved under the aegis of a new Defence Department. 
Despite this, it succeeded in continuously holding the Marine Corps and Naval aviation 
from becoming a branch of the Army and Air force respectively under the National 
Security Act of 1947, but the size of the US Navy had to be downsized, e.g., 105 aircraft 
carriers to 8.236 It seemed that the main role in the nuclear strategy was to be given to 
the new air force and its B-36 bomber from the navy and its carriers, while retaining a 
tactical atomic capability. Despite the fact that the US Navy was no longer at the centre 
of the country’s offensive strategy, the Role for Sea control, which is the Navy’s main 
reason for existence, was still the bridge between the US and the other areas.
forces in Korea, refer “US, South Korea reach agreement on redeploying US troops from Seoul: 
Pentagon”, in <http://www.spacewar.com/2004/04072323Q653.s2xl6k93.html>. accessed: October 16, 
2004.
236 John Whiteclay Chambers II (1999), p. 490.
237 The US Navy’s mission in the Offtackle, the Joint Chief’s 1949 war plan, was mainly defensive, a sea 
control campaign of running convoys for the coalition, see, George W. Baer (1994), pp. 316-317.
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In relation to Soviet naval developments in the 1950s, the US Navy considered a three 
track strategy focusing on the role and functions of carriers and submarines: ®  an 
attrition campaign by hunter-killer groups to destroy submarines at sea, (2) the barrier 
strategy, waiting for the Soviet submarines at the entrances to the oceans from the 
Soviet home bases, (3) the carrier-air strike at the home bases. In addition to this, little 
attention was given to the supporting role of such as transport and escort based on the 
traditional role of the navy: ®  supply and support US forces deployed overseas, ©  
supply and support US allies, in support of treaty commitments, ©  deny use of the 
Seas by the USSR to further its objectives or interfere with ours, ®  import the raw 
materials and commodities necessary to sustain US armed forces and the US war 
effort.238 Put succinctly, with the focuses of the US strategy itself including maritime 
strategy in preparing for a general war with the Soviet Union, supposing a central role 
for nuclear weapons, the traditional roles and functions of the US Navy were extremely 
limited.
However, the operations in the Korean and Vietnam wars, and the employment of the 
Navy in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 did much to increase the value set on it in the 
US. The most desperate bid, as L. W. Martin argued, was the possibility of its sharing a 
certain role in a strategic nuclear strike, which was regarded for a while as the only 
reliable meaning of future military existence, not just for its present role in limited
J ' l Q
warfare. Yet, so far as naval forces were concerned, the US was compelled to 
exercise them to exert sustained influence beyond its borders or to defend the Western
238 The Department of the US Navy, Naval Research Advisory Committee, Report on Historical 
Perspectives in Long-Range Planning in the Navy (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy-Research, Engineering, and Systems, 1980), pp. 23-24; George W. Baer (1994), p. 337-339.
239 L. W. Martin, The Sea in Modern Strategy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 10-11.
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alliance from communist expansion for obvious geographical reasons. In other words, 
there was no change in the basic role and functions of the US Navy as seen in the 
Korean War and the Vietnam War. These were ‘strategic deterrence’, ‘sea control’, and 
‘projection of power ashore’. Apart from the first, as evidenced in the Korean and 
Vietnam Wars, the relative importance and priority should have been afforded to ‘sea 
control’ and ‘projection of power ashore’.240 Nonetheless, the decline in numbers of the 
US Naval vessels, except for the realm of ‘strategic deterrence’, had anything but 
benign consequences for its naval capabilities, finally bringing about an obvious gap 
between its security commitments and capabilities for the pursuit of the Soviet Navy.241 
In this regard, the judgment of Admiral Zumwalt, CNO of the USN from 1970 to 1974, 
is very impressive, he said that “In 1970, when I first became CNO, ... We (USN) had 
just a slightly better than an even chance ... of winning a sea-control war with the 
Soviets... In the years since 1970 our chances for success have diminished”.
Reflecting on the prospect of imminent Soviet nuclear strategic parity, the US changed 
its strategic options from the deterrence of nuclear war by the threat of assured 
destruction to a flexible containment response. In order to do that, the US needed an 
invulnerable second-strike nuclear force. In having submarine-launched IRBM, Polaris, 
the US Navy took charge of the most important role in the nuclear strategic option,
74^which put it back into the forefront of the central national strategy. Instead, attack
240 It is necessary to differentiate more between the ability of navies to project ‘influence’ ashore and 
their ability to project ‘power’ ashore. The establishment of sea control would inevitably project 
influence ashore, and it might well do so far more effectively than striking at shore targets with piloted 
aircraft, cruise missiles or naval gunfire support. This should be a precondition for the projection of 
power, mainly amphibious forces as a spearhead echelon.
241 The number of US Naval vessels in 1975 was listed as less than 500 ships including fleet oilers and 
ocean tugs compared with 976 at the peak of the Vietnam War and about 900 in 1964.
242 Jane’s Fighting Ships 1975-1976, p. 93.
243 The desire of American determination to acquire a massive nuclear retaliation capability derived from
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carriers were removed from operating as part of the Single Integrated Operational Plan 
(SIOP), and shifted to a more suitable role in a limited war such as the sea-control 
targets and littoral and near-coastal targets.244 With these changes, Polaris took a large 
portion of the Navy’s defense budget, so that the rehabilitation and modernization 
programme for the ships including attack carriers proceeded very slowly, despite the 
fact that 72 percent of the ships were in an unsatisfactory condition in the late 1950s. 
For example, when Kennedy was inaugurated, there were six fleet ballistic missile 
submarines in operation. In the early 1960s, the Kennedy administration accelerated its 
programme for 41 submarines each carrying 16 Polaris missiles, which was completed 
by the middle of 1967.245
In the Western Pacific, the chains of bases available to the US from Japan in the north 
including those of the ROK, through Okinawa and Formosa to the Philippines in the 
South provided a firm maritime defence line against Communist expansion. From the 
end of the Korean War, the US took more responsibility as the main retaliatory striking 
power against Communist expansionism particularly in the fields of sea and air power 
in the Pacific area defending the outer ring of defence in the western Pacific. The 
bilateral treaties with the regional countries, each with a maritime connection, gave an 
obvious mission of at least keeping open the sea-lanes to the allies, which contained the 
USSR.246
the launching of the Soviet Sputnik satellite on October 1957, which became a national obsession. As a 
result, the US accelerated the deployment of Air Force ICBMs and Navy SLBMs.
244 George W. Baer (1994), p. 375-378.
245 Instead of decommissioning the small submarines with 17 Regulus missiles, the US furnished its 
submarines with the UGM-27A Polaris A-l missile (1,200 mile range), the UGM-27B Polaris A-2
(1,500 mile range), and the UGM-27C Polaris A-3 (2,500 mile range). IISS, The Military Balance 
1964-5, p. 23.
246 George W. Baer (1994), p. 332-333.
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The Seventh fleet, which was bom in early 1943, took the responsibility of guarding 
about 30 million square miles of the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and was the 
forward deployed active naval force for fighting.247 It was suitably organized to provide 
remarkable flexibility for quick response to any routine task or emergency (see Table 3- 
4 and 3-5).
Table 3-4: The Deployment of the USN and Composition of the 7th Fleet in 1975
Classification Carriers Surface Combatants ARGs
2nd Fleet (Atlantic) 4 67 1
3rd Fleet (Eastern Pacific) 6 56
6th Fleet (Mediterranean) 2 17 2
7th Fleet (Western Pacific) 3 25 2
Middle East Force (Persian Gulf) 2 +1 Amphibious Ships
Detailed Composition of 7th Fleet
3 Carriers, 4-5 Cruisers, 18-19 Destroyers or Frigates, 8 
Amphibious ships, 5 Submarines, 5-6 Tow, Salvage, and 
Rescue ships, 1 Repair or Tender, 9-11 MLSFSs
Notes: 1. ARGs (Amphibious Ready Groups), MLSFSs (Mobile Logistic Support Force Ships).
2. ARGs are 3-5 amphibious ships with a Marine battalion embarked.
Sources: IISS, The Military Balance 1974-1975, p. 7; George R Steele, II, Vice Admiral, “Ready Power 
for Peace-The US Seventh Fleet, Proceedings Vol. 102, No. 1/875 (January 1976), p. 27.
It performed, apart from those in the Korean War, the following wartime and peacetime
'JAQ
activities with the main goal to support the US national and foreign objectives.
Firstly, as a wartime mission, it secured the sea-lanes, projected strong air power against the enemy 
ashore, conducted amphibious landings, provided naval gunfire support to Allied troops, 
and made an indispensable contribution by air and mine warfare in the Vietnam War249, 
Secondly, as a counterinsurgency mission, it was dispatched to the South China Sea, with the 
strength of three carrier task groups and an embarked Marine Amphibious Ready Group, 
Laos in 1961,250
247 The Pacific Fleet consisted of two complementary fleets, the Third and Seventh. The former covers 
Eastern and Central Pacific, Aleutians, Bering Sea, etc. Hereafter, the 3rd fleet will not be discussed if it 
is not necessary, because its operational area is outside the scope of my research.
248 Main ideas come from George P. Steele, II, Vice Admiral, “Ready Power for Peace-The US Seventh 
Fleet, Proceedings Vol. 102, No. 1/875 (January 1976), p. 27.
249 For the US, the Vietnam War was actually performed by ground forces and the air force. As such, the 
role and functions of the US Navy remained in the realm of being largely supportive to its sister 
services.
250 Despite the deployment of US Naval forces in the South China Sea, the Kennedy administration 
decided not to intervene in Laos. The reason of this decision was that the airlift of troops to Laos would 
have been extremely limited because of its geographical location inland. See George W. Baer (1994),
Table 3-5: The Main Bases and Facilities of the 7th Fleet
Country Name Mission / Purpose Remarks
Japan
Atsugi Logistic Support for the 7th Aviation Units Joint facility units with Japan
Iwakuni HQ of USMC First Aircraft Wing Relocated in April 1971
Misawa Logistic Support for the 7th Aviation Units Designated on Oct 1 1975
Okinawa Operational Marine Corps Units The Third Marine DivisionNaval Air and Operating Base
Sasebo Maintaining Base Facility/ Logistic Support
Yokosuka Logistic Support for the 7th Fleet The Homeport of the 7th Fleet
(1 Carrier, 2 Cruiser, 1 DS, 
2 Combat Stores Ships)
The
Philippines
Cubi Point Logistic Support for the Aviation Units Part of Subic Bay Complex
Subic Bay Logistic Support for the 7th Fleet A Submarine/ Tactical Support Squadron
USA Guam The Reconnaissance Squadron
Vietnam Moc Hoa A Naval Advanced Tactical Support Base Closed in April 1971Qui Nhon Naval Support Activities Closed in 1971
Note: DS (Destroyer Squadron)
Sources: Paolo E. Coletta (ed.), United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985); George P. Steele, II (1976).
Thirdly, as a contingency mission for crisis management, it was sent, as a part of the US Task Force 
(Task Force 77), which comprised twenty-five ships including five carrier battle groups, 
to the East Sea of Korea in the Pueblo incident in 1968,251 
Fourthly, as a peacetime activity, it exercised to strengthen mutual defence with the military forces 
o f the allied nations such as the Republic of China, ROK, the Republic of Philippines, 
Thailand, UK, etc.,
Fifthly, in a deterrent role, it carefully observed the forces of potential adversaries, mainly the 
USSR and PRC’s military forces,
Lastly, in humanitarian assistance, it provided major assistance to the small Indian island nation of 
Mauritius, which had been hard hit by a tropical cyclone, and gave periodical flood relief 
to the Philippines.
pp. 385-386.
251 The Pueblo was a US navy intelligence collection auxiliary ship, which was captured by North 
Korean gunboats in international waters in the East Sea of Korea on January 23, 1968. The next day, 
President Johnson ordered a naval task force to go to the East Sea of Korea to press North Korea to 
return the ship and crews, refer, In-Soo Lim (1992), pp. 61-71; John Whiteclay Chambers II (1999), p. 
580.
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(4) The Development of the USMC
(A) General Rise and Fall
The status of the USMC is a service of the US armed forces that is an integral part of 
the Department of the US Navy. It is not a branch of the Navy which is its sister service 
unlike the other countries, i.e., the Royal Marines. As previously mentioned, the size of 
the USMC was guaranteed at least three marine divisions and three aircraft wings, with 
a fourth division and wing in organised reserve, by the constitutional legislation in 1952. 
Given the full activation of the three divisions for the Korean War from the peacetime 
manning level of 50 percent by the passage of the Public Law 416 as one of the 
amendments to the National Security Act of 1947, the so-called Marine Corps Bill, the 
force level was increased from the minimum level of 74,279 in the early 1950s to nearly 
250,000 in 1953 at the end of the Korean War.252 In the aftermath of the Korean War, 
the size continuously fluctuated with the events of international politics, because of the 
deficit in the allocated budget.253
In these circumstances, despite the constitutional regulations, the Eisenhower254 
administration wanted to downsize the Marine Corps divisions to regimental size units 
by designation of Major General David Monroe Shoup255 as the 22nd Commandant of
252 John Whiteclay Chambers II (1999), p. 416.
253 For example, the Eisenhower administration forced the USMC to drop to near 200,000 men by the 
end of FY 1956. In addition, the Congress cut $ 100 million from the budget and refused to approve the 
higher manning level despite the attempts of the USMC to keep its number by reducing the 
procurement request. As a result, the readiness condition of the USMC in terms of personnel and 
materiel seriously suffered. Allan R. Millett (1980), p. 521.
254 When he, Dwight D. Eisenhower, was Army Chief of Staff just after WWII, he viewed the USMC as 
an unwanted competitor with the Army considering shrinking budgetary resources, and favored a 
reduction to 60,000 men restricting its mission to performing the waterborne aspects of amphibious 
operations. Refer, Robert Debs Heinl, Soldiers o f the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962 
(Annapolis, ML: USNI Press, 1962), p. 515.
255 Eisenhower thought that it would be better to reduce the size of the USMC, because he joined the 
USMC after passing the Army ROTC at DePauw University. Apart from that, he never expected to be
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the USMC.256 However, the role of the USMC in overseas operations was not 
negligible, and amphibious operations were the main feature of most Navy and Marine 
Corps operations in the 1950s and 60s, e.g., Korea from 1950 to 1953, Lebanon in July
'yen
1958, and the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 . In addition, the US depended
upon a forward collective defence in Europe and Asia, which required maritime 
superiority. Finally, just before his resignation, Eisenhower submitted a budget for a 
Marine Corps of three divisions and three air wings: a total of 175,000 personnel.
With the full engagement of the Vietnam War, the formation and fundamental role of 
each division was not completely set up until 1969. However, the 3rd Marine division 
was re-reinforced by transferring some elements of the Third MAF from Vietnam, the 
8,000-man Ninth Marine Brigade and a 400-man tactical fighter squadron from the First 
Marine Air Wing, on July 14 1969.258 In 1971, Secretary of Defence, Laird, put forward 
the concept that the basic defence posture of the Army would be oriented toward NATO 
and the Middle East, and the Marines toward Asia.259 As such, the majority (the 1st and 
3rd Marine Divisions) in terms of the FMF manpower and forward-deployed forces, 
became Asia-Pacific oriented. As a result, whatever strategic concept the US chose, i.e., 
‘2 1/2 war’ or ‘1 1/2 war’, the size of the USMC remained at least at the level of three 
divisions and three air wings, the 2nd division and 2nd Air Wing for Europe, the 3rd 
division, 1st independent brigade and 1st air wing for the Asia-Pacific region and the 1st
the commandant.
256 Chester G. Hearn, An Illustrated History o f the United States Marine Corps (London: Salamander,
2002), p. 166.
257 As soon as the announcement was made of a naval “quarantine” of Cuba by the Kennedy 
administration, the US Second Fleet, carrying the II MEB, moved into assault landing positions around 
the island, San Cristobal, and within eight days, the USMC assembled a task force of 40,000 men, the 
largest amphibious gathering since Okinawa for a single operation.
258 William D. Parker, A Concise History o f  the United States Marine Corps 1775-1969 (Washington, 
DC: Historical Division in the HQs of the USMC, 1970), p. 114; Washington Post, July 17, 1969.
259 Francis J. West, “Marines for the Future”, Proceedings, Vol. 104/2/900 (February 1978), p. 39.
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division and 3rd air wing for strategic reserve stationed at North Carolina (Camp 
Lejeune), Okinawa (Camp Butler)/ Iwakuni in Japan, and California (Camp Pendleton) 
respectively.260
(B) The Marines in the Pacific
The 3rd Marine Division was disbanded at the end of World War II, but reformed in 
January 1952 by reinforcing the 3rd Marine Brigade, which was formed in June 1951. It 
was basically sent to Japan to reinforce UN forces in the Far East, but with the 
withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division from Korea to Camp Pendleton, it (as a reduced 
Division) moved to Okinawa in 1955. Prior to its move, the 4th Marine Regiment was 
sent to Hawaii to become the major Marine ground element of the Pacific fleet, now 
being known as the 1st independent Marine Brigade. The 1st Marine Air Wing 
participated in the Korean War being redeployed to Iwakuni in July 1956. In the 
aftermath of the Korean War, the 3rd Marine Division and 1st Air Wings were the 
nucleus of the US classic conventional deterrence against the expansionism of the 
communist regime as a part of the total US armed forces in the area. However, given the 
outbreak of the Indochina War, most combat strengths of both units were dispatched to 
Vietnam. Consequently, the fundamental role and functions of both were seriously
*yf.\
diminished during the Vietnam War . In addition, the number of US forces in Okinawa
260 NSC-68 did not regulate the size of US conventional forces. As such, the JCS calculated the need of 
the conventional force to be about twenty-seven Army and Marine Corps divisions, 408 warships, and 
forty-one Air force and Marine Corps fighter attack wings considering the limited budget. However, 
they were decreased to seventeen Army and Marine Corps divisions, 376 warships, and twenty-four Air 
Force and Marine Corps fighter-attack wings. William W. Kaufmann (1982), pp. 2-3; William W. 
Kaufmann (1982), p. 7; for the details of the USMC bases refer Hunter Keeter, The US Marine Corps 
(Milwaukee, WI: World Almanac Library, 2005), pp. 39-41.
261 The 9th regiment and most aircraft of the 1st Air Wing were dispatched. For a while, the manning level 
of the latter shrank from over 6,000 to 2,700, which was fully recovered with the return of the HQs of 
the 1st Air Wing in April 1971 as the result of the deactivation of the III MAF. See, Paolo E. Coletta 
(1985), p. 171.
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including the 3rd Marine Division, began to be reduced in manpower as a result of the 
Nixon Doctrine. Instead, the US began to deploy 2 amphibious ready groups in the 
Western Pacific area, which usually consisted of an amphibious assault ship (LHA- 
LPH) and between two and four other amphibious ships, which could embark a Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU: a battalion size). One of these expanded its operational area 
to the Mediterranean Sea. They conducted combined landing exercises with the alliance 
forces, and visited ports, i.e., the 34th MEU’s exercise with a Turkish infantry battalion 
on the coast of Turkey southwest of Iskenderun in June 1974 and the following visits to 
Genoa, Livorno, and Naples. The goal of these exercises included evacuating non- 
combatants from hostile areas and civil disturbance control techniques.
(C) Amphibious lift capability
Despite the fact that the National Security Act in 1947 reaffirmed the USMC’s primary 
responsibility for amphibious mission, the Navy was disinterested in amphibious 
mission. As such, the US Navy and administration allocated one and one-third 
amphibious division lift capabilities to the USMC after the Korean War by the 
allocation and deployment of a Major GPF plan. As a result, the USMC was always 
harassed by the absence of an amphibious lift capability, despite the fact that it received 
new landing ships such as 2 LCC ( ‘Blue Ridge ’ Class), 7 LPH ( Two Jima ’ Class) and 2 
LHA { ‘Tarawa’ Class) until 1974263. Consequently, it is not surprising that the US 
amphibious lift capability at this time was slightly more than a Marine division/aircraft 
wing team and supporting elements (approximately 30,000 troops)264, which was
262 Edwin H. Simmons, “The Marines: Now and In the Future”, Proceedings, Vol. 101, No. 867 (May 
1975), p. 106.
263 Jane’s Fighting Ships 1975-1976, the US Amphibious Warfare Ships.
264 Jane’s Fighting Ships 1975-1976, the US Amphibious Warfare Ships.
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divided about equally between the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets (refer Table 3-4).
(D) Case Study: The USMC in the Vietnam War
Under the limited war goals of the US, the USMC was engaged in the War from just 
after the Communist invasion of Laos at the end of 1960, the landing of the Pacific Fleet 
Marine Forces in Thailand on April 12 1962 and the deployment of the Medium 
Helicopter Squadron 362 of MAW-1 from Iwakuni to the Mekong Delta area, for 
example. At the request of the South Vietnam government, the two Battalion Landing 
Teams (BLTs), BLT 3 of the 9th MEF of the Seventh Fleet and BLT 1/3 in the 3rd Marine
thDivision in Okinawa landed at Da Nang by the 7 Fleet and Marine KC-130s 
respectively, to secure the air base there to enforce containment against the implicit 
Soviet expansionism on March 8 1965. In the aftermath of these deployments, the 
USMC continuously accumulated its combat strength by creating the III MAF (refer 
Figure 3-1) and supported the South Vietnamese and fought against the VC in 
innumerable battles until its complete withdrawal in 1975. In the war, it lost 12,926 men 
killed and 88,594 wounded, and 252 helicopters and 173 fixed-wing aircraft265.
Apart from the activities of the USMC with its victories and defeats, and support, the 
Vietnam War enormously influenced the transition of the USMC from the standpoint of 
its role and functions, readiness, usefulness in a limited war or insurgency, size and 
doctrinal development. The US foreign policy objective in the Vietnam War was 
ultimately to defend South Vietnam from communization by North Vietnam under the 
justification of NSC-68, which must be secured as the first priority in the region.
265 Refer, Chester G. Hearn (2002), pp. 166-183.
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Figure 3-1: The Organisation of the USMC in the Vietnam War
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HQs of USMC, 1970), pp. 113 & 115.
Even so, given the transition of the military strategy to a flexible response in the nuclear 
parity era, the ultimate goals of the war were really limited not only to winning a
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guerrilla war against the Viet Cong (VC) seen as the representative of a global 
communist conspiracy backed by the USSR and the PRC, but also to building free 
institutions in South Vietnam .
The US war planners reflecting their experience in the Korean War , carefully 
considered the opposition of the PRC to the US presence in Vietnam. It led to the 
operational area of all allied military forces being limited to South Vietnam; thus they 
did not invade North Vietnamese territory and restricted themselves to air
A/'O
bombardment. Finally, the US failed to achieve its objectives in the Vietnam War and 
withdrew all its forces leaving the resultant communisation of the whole of Vietnam. As 
the above US War aims indicated, the use of the USMC in the Vietnam War was similar
Of* 0to its means of US diplomatic coercion in peacetime. Even though for several 
reasons, including the ability to carry out nuclear threats, the American compellence 
strategy against the communists by use of conventional forces failed in terms of the 
highest level of strategic hierarchy, the USMC deployed in the region demonstrated its 
usefulness even in the nuclear era, providing a combat readiness coupled with naval sea
770lift capability and ground combat ability to perform the American containment
266 Henry Kissinger (1994), p. 675.
267 The decision to invade North Korea by the United Nations Command (UNC) in the ROK prompted 
the open involvement of the PRC in the Korean War, which led to a stalemate on the frontier for two 
years.
268 Of course, at the initial stage of the American engagement, the US War aim was not limited, because 
Congress authorized the President to “take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against 
forces of the US”. William C. Gibbons, The US Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and 
Legislative Roles and Relationships. Part IV: July 1965-1968 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), pp. 102-107.
269 Coercion includes the use of forces for the purposes of deterrence and compellence. The American 
wish to change the communists’ behaviour was not effective. Refer, David E. Johnson; Karl P. Mueller; 
William H. Taft, V, Conventional Coercion across the Spectrum o f Operations: The Utility o f  US 
Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), pp. 7-54.
270 Even though it is not easy to evaluate how successful its preparedness was, the USMC had prepared 
to operate in a counterinsurgency environment exploring all such issues via a series of exercises called 
Silver Lance. Refer, Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View o f the US Marine Corps
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strategy.
Following the initial deployment, several steps such as the full activation of the III
771MAF , were made to enlarge the size of the USMC, eliminating the disputes regarding 
the role and functions of the USMC as well as budgetary concerns. Before the Vietnam 
War, the USMC had pursued the maintenance of its manning levels relinquishing an 
additional procurement as well as cutting its budget demands. It is true that the role and 
functions of the USMC actually duplicated those of the other services as a maritime 
ground force having air power as well. As a result, it was threatened not only by the
777other services , but also by the politicians who had concerns over the domestic
77^ 2
economic implications of high defence costs, i.e., Eisenhower . However, during the 
Vietnam War, the size grew from a strength of 190,213 in 1965 to a peak of 314,917 in 
1969. Furthermore, its performance during the Vietnam War led to a guarantee of its 
minimum size and functions by the amendment of the National Security Act of 1947 in
1973, more specifically stating that:
“The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organised as to 
include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land 
combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein... The Marine Corps 
shall develop, in coordination with the Army and Air Force, those phases of 
amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by 
landing forces. The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint
(Annapolis, ML: Naval Institute Press, 1984), pp. 179-181.
271 The remainder of the III MAF and 1st Air Wing in Vietnam was deactivated at DaNang on April 14 
1971.
272 One superior competitor arose with the creation of the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) transported by 
the US Air Forces Military Airlift Command, which could be quickly deployed by air. As such, the 
USMC’s slogan of “the Nation’s versatile amphibious force-in-readiness” seemed to be slowly losing 
its original meaning. However, the existence of the STRAC stimulated the USMC to modernize its 
FMF to react to international crises in a readiness mission.
273 For example, under the Eisenhower administration’s policy, the “New Look”, the USMC had little 
reason for self-assurance. It emphasized the importance of the Air Force’s strategic forces, which had 
the priority to increase the defence budget by cutting the other services’ conventional forces. See, Allan 
R. Millett (1980), pp. 518-519.
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mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Marine 
Corps to meet the needs of war”.274
As highlighted, the USMC strengthened its status as an integral part for the US joint 
operation not just for the defence of the advanced naval bases and amphibious 
operations. In this regard, the Vietnam War was a turning point for the enlargement of 
the functions of the USMC.
The Aircraft Wings are a valuable asset of the USMC for attacking the enemy’s coastal 
and interior military installations, capable of striking decisive blows as well as 
employing rapid maneuverability towards the objectives. For the first category of the 
Air Wing missions, the 21st Commandant of the USMC, General Randolph McCall Pate 
ordered the development of the concept of vertical envelopment using helicopters to 
move troops beyond the beachhead in line with its new air-amphibious warfare doctrine 
under the name of Short Airfield for Tactical Support (SATS) from 195 8.275 With the 
development of the SATS concept, it allowed the deployment of high performance, 
tactical aircraft ashore in an area where no airfield had existed just days before. One of 
the successful developments was the construction of steel matting and arresting 
equipment built upon a base of laterite over Chu Lai’s shifting sands to provide close air
77Asupport to southern I Corps and northern II corps. Given this construction, the III 
MAF also enlarged its operations in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces. With this 
success, the concept of SATS was successfully initiated.
Before the Vietnam War, the operational concept for the USMC Aviation in amphibious
274 National Security Act o f 1947, P.L. 80-253 (61 Stat. 495), as Amended through September 30, 1973 
(GPO, 1973), pp. 16-17.
275 Chester G Hearn (2002), p. 163.
276 Allan R. Millett (1980), pp. 568-569.
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landing operations was not completely successful. As the Doctrine for Amphibious 
Operations277 suggested, the USMC was in the process of developing the practical use 
of air assets to improve its mobility. It describes three movements by the helicopters in 
the process of amphibious assault landings: scheduled, nonscheduled, and on-call 
helicopter movements, even though it is not easy to find evidence that the USMC 
employed the helicopters as an assault means in a real amphibious assault landing 
operation before the Vietnam War. As John Glenn pointed out, the USMC in the 
Vietnam War very effectively employed its helicopter units in completing troop 
transport, re-supply, medical evacuation, reconnaissance, and gunship support missions
77R •unlike any previous war in history. The use of helicopters to transport some elements 
from the carrier Iwo Jima to directly inland in the first major action between US troops
770and the VC of the III MAF at Chu Lai in August 1965 proved the possibility of them 
being used as manoeuvre assets in the process of amphibious landing operations. 
Furthermore, the USMC focused on the further development of the Fleet Marine Force 
to support its force-in-readiness mission. In the early 1960s, the USMC established a 
long-range development programme designed for the 1970s and 1980s combining 
ground and air units, which was called the doctrine of the “Marine Air-Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF)” to enhance its readiness. The success of the gradual accumulation of 
combat power from a FMF size via the 9th MEB to the 3rd MAF according to the 
progress of the crisis situation provided a cornerstone for the further development of the 
concept.
277 The US Department of the Navy, Office of the CNO and HQs of the USMC, FM 31-11, NWP 22 (A), 
LFM01, Doctrine fo r Amphibious Operations (July 1, 1962).
278 Kathleen D. Valenzi (ed.), Forged in Steel: US Marine Corps Aviation (Charlottesville, Virginia: 
Howell Press, 1987), p. 19.
279 Chester G. Hearn (2002), p. 171-172.
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To conclude, the basic role of the USMC in the region proved its utility in a 
compellence role against the expansion of the communist regime as a force-in-readiness 
of the whole American defence system as it had shown in the Korean War by
^OA
contributing to the protection of South Korea from communisation , although it failed
AOI
in the Vietnam War for several reasons . Without a war, it was certainly a deterrent 
force to suppress disputes and conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region. The Vietnam War 
was a great opportunity for the USMC not only to prove its ability in conventional and 
counterinsurgency warfare as a part of both the US forces in Vietnam and the 
Vietnamese military forces via numerous successful operations, but also to test its 
readiness and doctrines in having both ground and air components. As a result, the 
position of the USMC as a service contributing to a joint operation together with the 
other services has been taken for granted with the revision of the National Security Act 
of 1947.
B. SNI
(1) The Soviet Interests/ Foreign Policy
After WWII, the USSR emerged as one of the supreme powers in the bipolar 
international political system, dominating the Communist regimes of the East. The 
principal national aim was to maintain itself in power. The second objective was to 
expand its power throughout the world based on the original Leninist dogma of world 
revolution that the Soviet government should assist and encourage revolution in all
280 In the Korean War, the US assumed that the USSR would not tolerate a successful American initiative, 
despite the fact that its nuclear power was superior to that of the USSR. As such, the aim of the 
termination of the war was to return to the status quo ante.
281 This is because South Vietnam was finally communized, despite the Marines’ massive casualties and 
many successful operations in the Vietnam War.
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industrial countries, since the “capitalist-imperialist” system was on the point of 
collapse due to its own inherent contradictions and class hatred. However, the industrial 
democracies, notably the countries of Western Europe, surmounted the very serious 
economic and colonial issues without collapsing. Furthermore, the will of the US to
• • • oooprotect this region with nuclear and conventional strengths obliged the Soviet leaders 
to turn their expectation of revolution toward the Third World where their ideological 
propaganda could work. As such, the attribute of the second aim by means of ideology 
had a completely different pattern compared with the imperial expansion of Tsarist 
Russia initiated mainly from the era of Peter the Great in the 18th Century283.
Despite the fact that the USSR had a great capacity for policy initiatives in terms of 
ideological and military power, its foreign policies and interests were affected by the US 
security interests. However, it was historically true that the Soviet role in Asia reflected 
serious ambivalences and contradictions. For example, as Fred Greene has written, it 
seems from some aspects that the Sino-Soviet dispute affected the establishment of the 
USSR’s foreign policy goals with regard to Japan by way of seeking to break the
9JM
American-Japanese alliance . In fact, in the USSR high commander’s view, with the 
steady worsening of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the PRC’s acquisition of nuclear
AOf
weapons , it was helpful to contain the Chinese threat. Having no possibility of
282 It was likely that the risks of a conventional invasion of Western Europe were actually greater than 
any prospective gains.
283 The RNI was officially founded in this era, but it, including the navy, virtually returned to non­
existence. The priority of foreign policy shifted to the land after the death of Peter. See, Paul Dukes, A 
History o f Russia: Medieval, Modern, Contemporary (London: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 94-95.
284 However, the USSR confronted a basic dilemma in association with the Japanese acquisition of 
nuclear warheads. In any event, the relationship would break down or Japan pursues its own course. As 
Michael Sheehan has discussed, the USSR had to adjust and refine the balance of power in response to 
that phenomenon, since Japan might emerge as one of the great powers in this region given its 
background of military as well as economic power. See, Michael Sheehan, The Balance o f Power: 
History and Theory (London: Routledge, 1996), 13.
285 When the PRC tried to obtain nuclear weapons, the USSR first provided technical support. However,
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tying Japan into the Communist regime, the USSR tried to loosen their relationship with 
the US and move Japan into a nonaligned posture. In the above circumstances, the 
Soviet foreign policy objectives have inevitably seen equally significant shifts toward 
the Pacific, in particular, in the region of Northeast Asia in order to establish a new 
balance of power more favourable to the USSR through the relaxation of tension with
9R7the West. According to the realist image of international relations , the priority of the 
foreign policy goal was to free their hands for the growing opportunities (the Vietnam 
War) and the difficulties (the Sino-Soviet split) that confronted the USSR throughout
?oo
Asia. Since the military clashes on the Ussuri River in 1969, the Soviet Union had 
considered the PRC as its main enemy and vice versa.
Nonetheless, as conceived in the Brezhnev Doctrine290, for the USSR, Eastern Europe 
had a major strategic purpose (the role of a Buffer Zone from their potential enemies 
and rivals as well as advanced land military bases), in addition to their economic and 
ideological importance for its long-term goal to extend influence over the Western half 
of Europe. In this region, the Soviet foreign policy goal was to firmly establish its 
sphere of influence using its armed forces, for example, the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces in August 1968, so much of the West’s attention
the USSR stopped and suddenly withdrew this support as the dispute developed. Then it began to 
discuss with the US the limitation of the proliferation of such weapons.
286 Fred Greene (1968), pp. 44-45.
287 As Michael Sheehan had discussed, the realist insists that the activities of a state are inevitably 
focused on achieving the short term or immediate goals of security and survival rather than its long­
term future vision and security. Michael Sheehan (1996), p. 8.
288 ISC (the Institute for the Study of Conflict) Special Report, “The Peacetime Strategy of the Soviet 
Union”, in Strategic Review (Washington, DC: US Strategic Institute, Summer 1973), p. 66.
289 Ralph N. Clough (1975), p. 133.
290 The Brezhnev Doctrine assisted in sustaining Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe giving a 
justification for Warsaw Pact states to intervene in a state that challenged to the supremacy of the 
Communist regime. Michael Sheehan & James H. Wyllie, The Economist Pocket Guide to Defence 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1986), pp. 37-38.
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had been focused on attaching great importance to Soviet foreign policy in Europe. The 
reason for this was that despite its long-term goal, the strategic and political conditions 
of Western Europe were unfavourable to both spontaneous revolution and military
901 ♦ •conquest . As such, the Soviet leadership seemed to have a short-term objective by 
way of hindering closer union between Western countries including the exclusion of the 
US from Europe by the relaxation of tension.
With the above worsening of the international political situation, the Soviet expansionist 
policy rapidly moved to concentrate on the Middle East, the Indian sub-continent and
909South East Asia , where the Soviet leadership appreciated that a successful subversion 
of a country in any of these three areas would create a momentum for further expansion. 
In this manner, basic foreign political and strategic interests depended on the situation 
and occasion, in which the industrial countries had not collapsed from within and could 
not be overthrown by invasion, but must be changed by way of moral or political 
support by providing ideological, political and military training in order to achieve the 
second aim.
To summarize the characteristics of the Soviet interests in this period, on the one hand, 
it had competed with the US as a global power but had to accept minimum obligations
291 In this period, despite the fact that the USSR and WTO allies held more powerful conventional forces, 
the balance of power in Europe could be maintained due to the nature of the nuclear weapons deployed 
mainly by the US. The reason for this is that the nuclear and conventional balances usually interact 
with each other. See, Michael Sheehan (1996), pp. 181-185.
292 From some aspects, it seems that the USSR approached Indochina from a worry that the US power 
vacuum would be filled by the PRC unless suitable measures to establish countervailing Soviet 
influence were adopted as a part of rival competition with the PRC for the suzerain state of 
communism. See, J.L.S. Girling, “Russia and Indochina in the International Perspective”, International 
Affairs, Vol. 49, Issue 4 (October 1973), pp. 608-609.
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OQ'X • •instead of getting any rights and privileges . For example, in the Vietnam War where 
the US was actively involved with increasing intensity, the Soviet leadership hesitated 
to act as an intermediary in order to maintain a peaceful coexistence. Consequently, the 
only thing that the USSR could do for North Vietnam was to support it unofficially in 
the form of military advisers and technicians or providing supplies. Put simply, the 
Soviet autocracy did not want to be involved in the war under the justifications of 
avoiding nuclear war and offering protection against PRC adventurism by keeping its 
flexible relation with the US294.
On the other hand, it shared a sociopolitical system with the PRC, but its responsibilities 
as the centre of a revolutionary movement began to erode by allowing the PRC to 
denounce it as being an ideological turncoat. In South and Southeast Asia, it formed a 
rivalry with the PRC rather than the US in the late 1960s and early 1970s despite the 
fact that it had successfully maintained a presence there295. For example, India, which is 
located adjacent to the PRC, which had attacked it in 1962, and made frequent military 
incursions along the frontier, was not protected by a nuclear umbrella so it wanted to 
possess nuclear weapons. However, the Indian desire for the possession of nuclear 
weapons did not meet with the favour of the USSR so India realigned its policy towards 
a rapprochement with PRC, and furthermore criticized the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia.296
293 Vernon V. Aspaturian, “Soviet Foreign Policy”, in Roy C. Macridis (ed.), Foreign Policy in World 
Politics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1976, 5th ed.), p. 154.
294 P. M.H. Bell (2001), p. 278.
295 Roy C. Macridis (1976), p. 155.
296 As Kirsch has pointed out, by examining the Soviet proposal for an Asian collective security system 
as represented in the edition of Izvestia on May 28, 1969, it seems that the Soviet security aims were to 
contain the PRC; to prevent Japan, India, and others from allying with China against the Soviet Union. 
Marian P. Kirsch (1970), pp. 461-464.
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To conclude, the relaxation of tensions with the West enabled the USSR to pursue at 
least three main foreign policy aims with powerful economic-technological foundations 
and the possession of advanced technological weapons including thermonuclear
warheads and ICBM delivery systems.
Firstly, to continuously pursue its own relaxation of tension with the US and the West including 
Japan in the context of facing challenges on two fronts that inter alia the conflict with the 
PRC (the only declared foe at that time) was the urgent matter297,
Secondly, in order to solidify the de facto  alliance in Eastern Europe as represented by the WTO, it 
declared the so-called ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’ that communist countries must subordinate 
their independence to the . interests of communism,
Thirdly, to enlarge its influence throughout the world by creating allies via supporting the 
revolutionary movements and intervening in a number of regions where the interests were 
not clashing with the US, e.g., the Caribbean, the Middle East and Southeast/west Asia in 
order to preserve and expand the Soviet system.
(2) Military Strategy/ Policy
In pursuit of the above foreign policy objectives, the USSR needed strong military 
power to buttress its relations with selected nonaligned nations on the back of economic 
assistance. Given its geo-strategic position in that it occupied about half of Europe and 
two fifths of Asia, and that the boundary was divided into five sectors , the Russians 
did not always feel free from invasion, or the perceived threats from its ubiquitous 
enemies, and the traditional economic and industrial inferiority compared to the West.
297 One Moscow action was an attempt to make the Mongolian People’s Republic a member of the WTO 
in that the USSR had ratified a twenty-year mutual assistance treaty in 1966. It meant that the USSR 
could exploit the armed forces of the WTO in the defense of its Asian borders with the PRC. However, 
it failed to get the WTO members agreement to do that, in which they did not want to broaden their 
forces activities from a European to a global scale. Refer, Jay B. Sorenson, “Asian Defense-Soviet 
Style”, Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 66, No. 29 (July 1969), p. 84-85.
298 The five sectors are the North (the long Arctic Ocean coast), the East (the long Pacific Ocean coast; 
neighbours: the US and Japan), the Southeast (a long international boundary; neighbours: Mongolian 
People’s Republic, China and North Korea), the Southwest (neighbours: Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey), 
and the West (neighbours: its six COMECON partners). J.P. Cole (1974), pp. 256-278.
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In this situation, it appears, as widely recognized by the historical commentators299, that 
the USSR pursued absolute security, whilst it threatened to create absolute insecurity for 
its neighbours and other states by adopting a threatening force posture. It is most likely 
that the concept of security was regarded as resting on the strength of its military power, 
considering that the Soviet security concerns had greatly evolved by its virtual 
encirclement after the Second World War and the Sino-Soviet split.
With regard to the size and amount of weaponry for a military force build up, it was 
likely that they were affected not only by Russia’s traditional emphasis on ‘bigness’ as a 
symbol of ‘goodness’ or ‘greater effectiveness’, but also by the deep-rooted Russian- 
Soviet sense of insecurity.300 There were at least two theories related to the Russian 
image: Mikhail V. Frunze’s understanding in the 1920s in the early stages of Soviet 
military doctrinal development that multimillion-man armies would be necessary in the 
future, and the principle of ‘quantity and quality of divisions’ in Stalin’s five 
permanently operating factors301 asserted during the Second World War.302 The latter 
was the decisive principle of the military force buildup in the postwar period until 1960. 
In this way, the buildup of Soviet military forces and weaponry was decided on the basis 
of the belief that, as the leading socialist state, it should possess a superior military 
capability in terms of size and number of arms regardless of nuclear and conventional 
troops, unlike the US strategic concept of examining possible future wars. The Soviet 
fear of insecurity, and encirclement by hostile forces, was enhanced by the series of
299 The Soviet leaders were deeply concerned with international relations, and tried to put into practice 
their policy of ‘peaceful coexistence’ in the world, when they did not possess overwhelming force. 
Refer, Paul Dukes (1974), pp. 2-3.
300 Dennis Ross, “Rethinking Soviet Strategic Policy: Inputs and Implications”, The Journal o f Strategic 
Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (May 1978), pp. 4-5.
301 These were stability o f the rear, morale of the troops, quantity and quality of divisions, armaments of 
the army, and organizational ability of command personnel in the army.
302 Harriet Fast Scott & William F. Scott (1988), pp. 6-18.
339 - 119
alliances erected by the US in the 1950s around the periphery of the USSR and the 
communist camp , the Sino-Soviet dispute in the late 1950s and by the unreliability of 
the Warsaw Pact alliances with the riots in East Germany and Poland.
In the post-Stalin era, the Soviet Minister of Defence, Marshall Georgiy K. Zhukov, 
suggested a direction for the future military force buildup in his address to the
Communist Party Congress:
“In structuring the Soviet Armed Forces, we proceed from the fact that the methods 
and forms of future war will be different from all past wars in many ways. Future war, 
if it is unleashed, will be characterized by the mass use of air forces, thermonuclear, 
chemical and bacteriological weapons. However, we proceed from the fact of the 
latest weapons, including weapons of mass destruction. Without strong ground forces, 
without strategic, long-range and frontal aviation and a modem naval fleet, without 
well-organized cooperation between them, modem war cannot be waged.”304
At that time, the traditional services were considered as a fairly important means for a 
possible future war, seeing nuclear weapons as augmenting the traditional role of 
artillery. However, with the beginning of a revolution in military affairs, the Soviets 
tried to examine the essence, purpose, and character of a possible war and the 
preparation of the country and its armed forces for war. For a while, until the beginning 
of the 1960s under the Khrushchev regime , the priority for military buildup shifted to 
the importance of the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Air Defence Forces . This
303 For example, NATO in Europe, CENTO in the Northern tier of the Middle East, SEATO and ANZUS 
in the Southeast Asia, the Pacific, and the bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the 
Philippines were viewed as the threat of encirclement. Raymond L. Garthoff, “Soviet Perceptions of 
Western Strategic Thought and Doctrine”, Gregory Flynn (ed.), “Soviet Military Doctrine and Western 
Policy (New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 272.
304 Harriet Fast Scott & William F. Scott (1988), p. 21.
305 For example, he proposed in the Supreme Soviet in 1960 to reduce the armed forces by 1,200,000 
men and dispose of military aviation and surface ships, though it would not be achieved. Timothy 
Garden (1984), p. 51.
306 The Soviet doctrine stated that “The main role in the war will be played by the Strategic Rocket
3 3 9 - 120
priority was highlighted by the political ascendancy over the military leadership, that is, 
the bureaucratized nature of Soviet institutions, i.e., the Politburo, as well as the 
ultimate goal of the military force build up, ‘the safety of the homeland’.
The development of the Soviet doctrine focusing on the size and composition of 
military forces, taking into account the possibility of waging war with conventional 
weapons, and the inauguration of Brezhnev to the seat of power in the Kremlin, 
significant resources were given to all services, although not completely in the same 
way, accepting the new doctrine of the possibility of wars to be fought and won with or 
without the use of nuclear weapons. From this time, the Soviets drove ahead to achieve 
radical improvement in their position in all aspects of military power. According to an 
analysis by Arthur J. Alexander, among the Soviet services, whilst the share of total 
budget spending fell by 20% from 1970 to 1975, the growth of the other services
0^7increased in the order of the SRF, Air Force, the ground forces and the Navy. 
Consequently, the traditional principles for military forces buildup, ‘sufficiency’ and 
‘superiority’, were influenced by the transitions in the Soviet military doctrine, that the 
necessity of winning a war in the nuclear era would require both masses of men and 
equipment, and balanced forces for the joint action of all services of the armed forces in 
order to survive nuclear exchanges and to fight globally on continent-wide fronts.
The goals of military force construction in association with its concept of ‘absolute 
security’ to seek world domination would be summarized as being for the safety of the
Forces and also by troops of PVO (antiair defence) and PRO (antimissile defence)”, see Harriet Fast 
Scott & William F. Scott (1988), p. 59.
307 Arthur J. Alexander, “Decision-Making in Soviet Weapons Procurement”, Adelphi Papers, No. 147/ 8, 
(Winter 1978/9), p. 5.
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homeland, the inviolability of Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe, ‘friendly’ powers
OAO
on the Soviet periphery, and the entitlement to a role at least equal to that of the US. 
The first goal would be satisfied by the establishment of the satellite countries on its 
periphery, i.e., Eastern Europe and the possession of the nuclear weapons equal to or 
outnumbering the US by the end of this period (refer Table 3-6).
Table 3-6:Historical Changes of Nuclear Strength
Classification
1964 1969 1974
USA USSR Remarks USA USSR Remarks USA USSR Remarks
ICBM* 834 200 +634 1,054 1,050 +4 1,054 1,575 -521
SLBMb 416 120 +196 656 160 +494 656 720 -64
Bombers0 630 190 +440 560 150 +410 437 140 +297
Total 1,880 510 +1,270 2,270 1,360 +908 2,147 2,435 -288
a: ICBM (range 4000+ mile); IRBM (1,500-4,000); MRBM (500-1,500); SRBM (under 500) 
b: USA (UGM-27C Polaris A3: 2,880 miles, 1964, UGM-73A Poseidon: 2,880, 1971),
USSR (SS-N-5 Serb: 750, 1964, SS-N-6 Sawfly: 1,750, 1969, SS-N-8: 4,800, 1972) 
c: Long-range Bombers (long range: over 6,000 miles, medium: 3,500-6,000)
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 1974-1975, pp. 73-75.
For the second goal, it deployed massive conventional forces, more than half of the total 
Warsaw Pact forces in numbers of divisions and manpower needless to say together 
with their holdings of equipment and armament (refer Table 3-7).
Table 3-7: The Theatre Balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact
Classification NATO Warsaw Pact Of which USSR Remarks (%)
Division
equivalents
Armoured 18 40 24 60
Inf, mech and airb 45 60 26 48
Total 63 100 50 50
Combat/ direct support Troops 1,170,000 1,265,000 715,000 56
Main Battle Tanks 10,000 26,500 14,100 53
Tactical Aircraft 2,848 5,250 3,070 60
Notes: 1. Inf (Infantry), Mech (Mechanized), Airb (Airborne)
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 1974-75, pp. 95-100.
308 Helmut Sonnenfeldt and William G Hyland, “Soviet Perspectives on Security”, Adelphi Papers, No. 
150 (Spring 1979), p. 16.
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The justification for military intervention in its satellite communist countries was 
strengthened by the Brezhnev doctrine. In stark contrast, the Soviet military strength in 
the Far East was not enough to deter even the PRC from the standpoint of a simple 
comparison of the number of divisions (refer Table 3-1), if it had not possessed an 
overwhelming nuclear arsenal compared with the Chinese. The main reason for 
maintaining ‘conventional superiority’ would result in both a change in Soviet military 
doctrine that war might be controlled and not necessarily become nuclear, and the fact 
that a protracted conventional war would be very risky because of the weaker 
infrastructure of the USSR.309 In this sense, the priority of Soviet military forces 
buildup like that of its foreign policy was given a great deal of weight in the European 
theatre during this period.
(3) Maritime Strategy/ Policy
The Russian thinker, Alexander Herzen, more than one hundred years ago, called the 
Pacific “the Mediterranean of the future”, a place unmarred by “mouldy prejudice,
11 A
stagnant ideas, envious parochialism and stationary civilization”. With the victory 
over Japan in the Second World War, the US and USSR met each other across the 
Pacific, which began to assume an ever-growing importance in the invisible struggle
oil
between expansionists and defenders . With the acquisitions of the strategically 
important potential naval bases, such as the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin, as well as the 
indication that the Soviet navy would be adapted to operate overseas, the naval strategy
309 Willard C. Frank & Philip S. Gillette, Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915-1991 
(West Port, CT: Greenwood, 1992), p. 8.
310 Alexander Herzen, America and Russia: In a Russian Discovery o f America (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1986), p. 283.
311 Whilst the US occupies a central position with respect to SLOC, the USSR/Russia is located in the 
Eurasian Heartland having advantageous interior lines of land communication in the area. See, Colin S. 
Gray (1986), p. 11.
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also started to be rapidly amended . However, not only with the geographical 
restraints on the use of the outlets (the Tsugaru, Tsushima and Soya straits) to the East 
Sea by Japan, more realistically used by the US, but also with the transition in Soviet 
military strategy, the USSR paid attention to improving its naval capabilities particularly
TITin the fields of submarine and missile technology. In fact, the US naval policy and its 
strength had always been the main focus of Soviet naval attention after 1945.
As most strategists have observed, Soviet naval construction mainly focused on 
submarines and cruisers until 1955 under the control of the Soviet Minister of the Navy, 
N. G. Kuznetsov.314 On January 6 1956, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov replaced the intrepid 
Kuznetsov who had contracted an illness at that time. He directly projected the plan for 
the build-up of new types of submarines and warships useful in the nuclear and missile 
age315. Meanwhile, in about 1955-56, Nikita Khrushchev, the secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Party, concluded that military expenditure was enormous. It was 
absolutely necessary to decrease this through justifying and unifying most forms of
312 For example, the submarine building programme based on the 1948 projection planned to build a total 
o f 1,200 submarines until 1965, but the project was curtailed to one-third of the original plan due to the 
main mission of the Soviet navy, the defence of the Motherland. See, John Moore, Seapower and 
Politics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), pp. 46-147.
313 Even though the Soviet leadership did not then understand the importance of seapower, they had been 
affected by German submarines and the victory of the US in the Pacific. As a result, they pursued a 
strong navy in certain branches as a requisite fulfillment of the leading power o f the Eastern 
hemisphere. As Western attention by the end of 1950s was concentrated on nuclear weapons, on the 
new range of missiles and rockets, and air strength, the USSR also invested in similar areas. See, 
Donald W. Mitchell (1974), pp. 475-476.
314 The Soviet Ministry of Navy was reintroduced in July 1951, but the Navy was re-subordinated into 
the central Defence Ministry after Stalin’s death. At that time, Kuznetsov’s main concern was to 
possess enough immediately available ships, though they were not the latest ships, to raise a large 
number of sailors in order to operate the new ships. In this context, he deserved the credit for paving 
the road to Soviet naval expansion. Refer, George Katkov and Jan Kowalewski, “The Russian Navy 
and the Revolution”, in M. G. Saunders (1958), pp. 99-100.
315 Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov was called the father of the modem Soviet Navy as well as a proponent 
of submarines and small missile-armed combatants. He was appointed head of the navy at the 
Twentieth Party Congress in 1956.
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T 1military expenditure with the support of Marshal Zhukov . Given this reformation of 
the Soviet armed forces reflecting the severely critical opinion of Khrushchev about 
naval investment, the number of naval personnel was reduced from about 600,000 to 
less than 500,000 by a carefully thought-out plan concerning the value of a conventional
T1 7 * •surface navy and naval aviation. As a result of this reformation, the USSR was able 
to possess technologically significant items such as atomic and thermonuclear weapons, 
nuclear-propelled submarines, “Sputniks”, as well as the reconstituted Soviet navy in 
terms of size, variety and progress. In the 1950s, the USSR considered the US 
carriers318, which were capable of attacking with nuclear bombs, as one of the primary 
threats. Faced by the rise of US surface and air power in distant sea areas, the priority
T1 Oturned to constructing nuclear submarine forces , which were generally regarded as a 
strategic nuclear deterrent force due to their stealthy and nuclear-propelled 
manoeuverabilities , and antisubmarine ships, i.e., Moskva-class ASW programme. In 
addition to that, for reasons of geography, the Soviet Fleet had to be separated into four 
areas, the Northern, the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Far East. In the case of an all-out 
nuclear war, active cooperation with one another because of the distances involved 
would make timely help for one unique military objective impossible. In this situation, 
it was natural that the build-up of very rapid and powerful submarines would have
316 Zhukov was the most powerful military character of the post-war era, and tried to prevent the military 
affairs from being controlled by the Communist Party. However, owing to his powerful leadership, he 
was dismissed from his high office in October 1957. Jan Kowalewski, “the Russian Navy and the 
Revolution: (b) 1921 to 1958, in M. G. Saunders (1958), p. 98.
317 Donald W. Mitchell (1974), pp. 477-8. The abolition of the SNI was not connected to this reduction, 
because it had happened in the early 1950s.
3,8 At that time, the primary concern of the USSR was the US strategic bombers, i.e., 1,750 in 1959, but 
the US maritime capability was limited to conventional air strikes from carriers that would have to 
close to within range of Soviet shore-based air forces. Michael MccGwire, “Gorshkov’s Navy: Part I”, 
Proceedings, Vol. 115/8/1038 (August 1989), p. 44.
319 For example, the Echo I and II nuclear-powered guided missile (SSGN) submarines, and the Yankee I, 
II / Delta-classes nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).
320 Steve F. Kime, “A Soviet Navy for the Nuclear Age”, National Security Affairs Issue Paper 80-81 
(Washington, DC: NDUP, 1980), pp. 11-12.
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T71priority over the other maritime branches.
In conjunction with the above developments of sea power, much of which was allocated 
to the Far East, the USSR greatly expanded its naval bases in the Pacific area, e.g., 
Vladivostok (main base and headquarters of the Soviet Navy), Russki island 
(Submarine bases at Novich Bay), Nakhodka (the smaller submarines), Sovietskaya 
Gavan, Korsakov (a shipyard and submarine base), Nagayevo (submarine base and 
repair facilities), Petropavlovsk (submarine base), and Providence Bay. In addition to 
these well-equipped and strategically located bases, the USSR could access most of the 
harbour facilities of the PRC and DPRK. It appeared that the USSR had obtained 
valuable bases in order to project its naval power into the Pacific area, which meant that 
the critical drawbacks of the geography of the USSR, with its limited access to the open 
oceans, had partly been solved.
It is still unclear whether the primary purpose of Soviet naval expansion until the early 
1960s was defensive or whether it assumed a more aggressive offensive posture. In 
either case, it is undeniable that Soviet naval expansion seriously affected not only the 
countries located near the four major Soviet naval fleets , but also the countries of the 
Third World. However, it is more reasonable to affirm that considering both its naval 
strength and its geographical position, as most strategists have argued, the entire raison
321 The transfer of warships from Europe to the Far East was a very difficult matter because of the 
limitation of sea routes. The only available passage was the Northern, some 6,000 miles long, which is 
only open in the summer season. In order to overcome this limitation, the USSR developed icebreakers, 
e.g., the icebreaker Lenin that was able to cut a way through nearly nine feet of ice, but it was not a 
satisfactory situation. See, Rear-Admiral A. D. Nicholl, “Geography and Strategy”, in M. G. Saunders 
(1958), pp. 244-246.
322 M. G Saunders (1958), pp. 276-277.
323 Geoffrey Kemp, “Maritime Access and Maritime Power: The Past, the Persian Gulf, and the Future”, 
in Alvin J. Cottrell and Associates (eds.), Sea Power and Strategy in the Indian Ocean (Beverly Hills: 
Sage Publications, 1981), pp. 51-52.
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d ’etre of the Navy was to protect the mainland of the Soviet Union from aggression 
particularly in the form of an assault from the sea. Consequently, despite the fact that 
the Soviet leadership perceived the importance of maintaining a substantial naval power, 
the navy’s missions by then were: (1) territorial defence against bombardment and 
amphibious assault; (2) area defence against incursions into Soviet sea-space, by enemy 
surface units and submarines; (3) reinforcement and support of the Army. These 
missions motivated the massive construction programme focusing on cruisers, 
destroyers and submarines, but this was curtailed since their mission of area defence 
was able to be performed by ships armed with cruise missiles via the success of the 
techno-scientific revolution in the military affairs rather than the large gun-armed 
surface combatants.
Even so, in totally altering the balance of the roles and functions of the Soviet navy in 
this period, two major difficulties had to be faced. The first was a wider debate about 
the question of detente: about arms control, the importance of the Third World, and a 
whole range of defence issues concerning deterrence, e.g., the risk and likelihood of 
nuclear war, the type and length of war. The second was the problem of the cleavage 
between the naval and domestic political leadership which appeared in opposition to 
Gorshkov, and which had rejected the naval leaderships’ advocacy of seapower. As a 
result, the characteristics of Soviet naval development and its role could be summarized 
as a reflection of the compromise between the extreme positions of the Soviet 
leadership biased in favour of nuclear and techno based military services such as the 
Strategic Rocket Forces.
324 John Jordan, An illustrated Guide to the Modern Soviet Navy (London: Salamander Books Ltd, 1982),
p. 6.
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In addition, there were two schools of thought within the Soviet navy about the best 
option to meet the demands of defending Russia against attack from the sea during the 
1960s as represented in the magazine, Morskoi sbornik. Whilst one, represented by 
Gorshkov, favoured a well-balanced mix of naval forces, submarines, aircraft, surface 
ships and amphibious forces, who thought that a well-balanced fleet would be effective 
in both nuclear and non-nuclear war, the other, e.g., Professor Admiral Panteleev and 
Admiral Kharlamov, asserted that the Soviet navy could discharge its mission with 
nuclear submarines and aircraft given the background of their contention that “the 
concentration of large numbers of different types of forces is sometimes simply wasteful
T7A •  •  *and sometimes it is just not possible”. In the 1967 article in Morskoi sbornik entitled 
“The development of the Soviet naval art”, Gorshkov provided the counterargument in 
the above context based on “The naval history” and “The Leninist principles of Soviet 
Military Science”. At the time, the Soviet navy was contesting the US’s unhindered use 
of the seas for the projection of its military power. Consequently, it was necessary for 
the Soviet navy to keep a more assertive posture, so it required more ships on station 
and in continuous deployment and at forward bases as well as power projection forces.
Furthermore, in the aftermath of the article, there was increasing use of naval forces for 
specifically political purposes in more distant regions of the world; the Mediterranean 
after the six day war on 5 -  11 June in 1967, the Indian Ocean from 1968, the Caribbean 
and West Africa from 1969 and South East Asia in 1970. As a result, the sharp increase 
in Soviet naval forces was a natural consequence and it brought about a somewhat
325 Michael K. MccGwire, “Advocacy o f Seapower in an Internal Debate”, in Robert G. Weinland; 
Michael K. MccGwire; James M. McConnell, “Admiral Gorshkov on ‘Navies in War and Peace’ ”, 
Center for Naval Analyses Report, No. CRC 257 (Arlington, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, 
September 1974), pp. 21-36 (hereafter cited as CRC 257).
326 CRC 257, p. 57.
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severely overstretched build-up from 1967 onwards (see Table 3-8). In the end, there 
arose the second round of a full-dress debate about the roles, functions and missions of 
the Soviet navy, which began from the early 1970s.
Table 3-8: A Comparison of the Soviet Naval Strengths in 1964 and 1975
Classifications Component 1964 1975 Remarks
Manpower Naval Air/ NI/ Total n.a /n.a / 460,000 75,000/17,000/475,000 +17,500
Submarines Nuclear/ Diesel 30/400 70/175 +40/ -225
Surface
Cruisers 20 32 +12
Destroyers 105 78 -27
FPB with SSM (not all) 400 438 +38
Other vessels 1,900 903 -997
Naval Aircraft 800 715 -85
Deployment
Northern Fleet 150 Sub 160 Sub (80 SSN), 56 MSCS
Baltic Fleet 70 Sub 30 Sub, 50 MSCS
Black Sea Fleet 50 Sub 20 Sub, 60 MSCS
Pacific Fleet 120 Sub 100 Sub (40 SSN), 55 MSCS
Notes: 1. n.a (not available), FPB (Fast Patrol Boats), SSM (Surface-to-surface Missiles), MSCS (Major 
Surface Combat Ships)
2. Its expansion was not impressive in numbers of vessels, because many ships were retired from 
their active services. However, the Soviet Navy improved its quality, i.e., its increase of the 
SLBM to 720 (in 70 nuclear submarines).
3. The number of deployment means average strengths only.
Sources: IISS, The Military Balance 1964-1965, pp. 5-6; 1974-1975, pp. 9-10.
In accordance with this development, the Soviet Pacific Naval forces increased in
T77activities as well as in scale (see Figure 3-2). First of all, they enlarged their 
operational range to the East China Sea and most of the Western Pacific area including 
near Alaska (the Aleutian Islands area of the US) and Hawaii. It exercised for the first 
time on a global scale with the Okean-10 manoeuvres in April 1970 involving the 
participation of some 30 cruisers and numerous aircraft of the Pacific fleet, which
327 The Japanese Defence Agency, Defence o f Japan 1976 (English Version), pp. 17-18.
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stretched as far south as the neighbourhood o f  Guam. Two more similar large-scale 
oceanic exercises were also held in the summers o f 1971 and 1973.
Figure 3-2: Outline of Soviet Navy’s Ocean Manoeuvres in the Western Pacific
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Source: The Japanese Defence Agency, Defence o f  Japan 1976, p. 18.
Next, intelligence ships including scientific research vessels and fishing survey ships 
operated routinely around Japan and most o f the Pacific area to gather information. 
Their activities in the East China Sea could be interpreted as threatening the East coast 
o f the PRC as a result o f  their dispute. Lastly, whilst naval ships made port visits to only 
2 countries, the PRC and Indonesia in the late 1950s in the Asia-Pacific region, they 
visited about 14 countries and 20 ports in this period, including the US (Honolulu, San
,28 According to an analysis by Michael K. MccGwire, the exercise implied the Soviet navy’s readiness 
to repel attacks on Russia and to launch its own strikes as well as the reference to ‘US imperialism’ 
being limited to Southeast Asia. See, CRC 257 , p. 36.
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Francisco, Seattle) and Japan (Tokyo, Yokohama), but excluding the PRC and
'1'JQ
Indonesia. Judging from this string of movements and manoeuvres, the Soviet Navy 
had developed to the level of a “blue water” navy.
(4) The Developments of the SNI
(A) General Rise and Fall
Meanwhile, the naval infantry units subordinated to the coastal defence units were 
reorganized as one of the official branches of the Soviet Navy in the relevant fleet in
O-IA
1961 . Gorshkov perceived the greatest potential threat to their homeland as being
from the US maritime power in the Pacific area as an anti-Soviet “oceanic strategy” 
with both heavy reliance on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and a 
maritime power projection capability shown in the Inchon amphibious landing in the 
Korean War after a thorough strategic consideration of the causes of the German navy’s 
failure in WWII and the history of landing operations until the post-war period . In 
this regard, to ensure the ability of each fleet to fulfill its operational-strategic missions, 
the capabilities of the balance of the navy were required so that they could apply the use 
of their forces jointly or individually, depending on the specific mission and capabilities. 
As a result of the scrutiny by the naval leadership, they concluded that a necessity for
329 Bruce W. Watson (1982), p. 210 (Table 15).
330 As continuously discussed, in the construction of a new type of the navy, there were implicitly two 
fundamental issues to be resolved between the USSR and its Third World goals: the geographical 
isolation of the USSR from the Third World states and the military power of the US. In order to 
compensate for these factors, cooperation was essential, not only among the various branches of the 
navy including amphibious forces and Naval Infantry, but also with the ground and air forces. Thus, the 
new issue in the organization of the Navy was taken into consideration in bringing ashore amphibious 
landing forces through the sea route. In this connection, the recreation of a fully fledged amphibious 
force was a prerequisite for modem warfare as a useful means of maritime power projection. V. D. 
Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, in Harriet F. Scott (ed.), Soviet Sources of Military Doctrine and 
Strategy (New York: Crane and Russak, 1975, 3rd ed.), pp. 134-135.
331 Bruce W. Watson (1982), p. 5.
332 S. G. Gorshkov (1979), pp. 217-219.
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amphibious operations could arise in the future, and that each fleet needed to be 
prepared to carry out such missions, which would be the raison d'etre of the SNI as part 
of the Soviets’ drive to achieve their position in all fields of military forces.
The SNI was grouped in brigades attached to each of the four Soviet Fleets. In this 
period, it is difficult to find any evidence that it had an international policing role. It had 
two basic missions as an amphibious force like the other marines such as the UKRM 
and USMC: to defend important naval bases and installations against enemy attack, and 
to project force against enemy coastal axes either independently or in conjunction with 
Soviet ground and airborne forces. As Soviet military doctrine and maritime strategy 
suggested, its wartime mission was to protect and secure the land flanks of interest to 
their navy and ground forces as an auxiliary force to overcome the obstacle of the sea. 
In fact, the SNI made 110 tactical amphibious assault landings, four landings on an 
operational scale, and no landings at a strategic level, during both offensive and 
defensive operations in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-5. The Soviets extracted the
following four lessons from those amphibious landing operations334:
Firstly, heavy fire support of an amphibious assault landing to suppress enemy defences opposing 
the landing is essential,
Secondly, there is a great need for speed in getting the troops ashore from the landing ships on to 
the beach,
Thirdly, one of the major problems in an amphibious assault landing is posed by the difficulties of 
coordination between supporting ships and the assaulting force itself,
Fourthly, it is very important to get a beachhead position very quickly established once the troops 
are all ashore.
333 C.N. Donnelly, et al., “Soviet Amphibious Warfare and War on the Northern Flank”, Consultant 
Report STC CR-57 (Sandhurst: Soviet Research Center in RMA, 1985), p. 34 (hereafter cited as STC 
CR-57.
334 Ibid., p. 35.
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Given these lessons, the SNI regiment was heavily organized from the first by having 
tank battalion, sappers and NBC sections (refer Figure 3-3).
Figure 3-3: Organisation of the SNI Regiment
Signal Co Tank Bn
HQsPt
HQs Co
Mortar Pt Antitank Pt
Engineer Co
Infantry Co (3)
Chemical PtInfantry Bn (3)
Naval Infantry Regiment
Sources: Andrew W. Hull, “Soviet Naval Infantry”, Marine Corps Gazette (July 1980), p. 66.
However, the amount of manpower was relatively smaller than the others, i.e., the 
numbers in the SNI battalion were between 350 to 400 men, whilst a rifle battalion, 
which was making up the main body of the tactical assault force together with the SNI, 
was approximately 600 men. It did not have artillery sections, because, as Andrew W. 
Hull has analysed, “the Soviets felt that it could rely on shipbome ordnance and artillery
'1'ic
organic to ground forces units for any necessary artillery support” during the 
amphibious landing operation. Consequently, even though the USSR reorganized the 
SNI brigades attached to each of the four fleets, its actual optimum amphibious landing 
size was a battalion, on occasions a company group, as an initial assault force or at most 
for independent tactical assault.
335 Andrew W. Hull, “Soviet Naval Infantry”, Marine Corps Gazette (July 1980), p. 66; IISS, The 
Military Balance 1974-75, p. 10.
336 C. N. Donnelly (1985), p. 42.
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(B) Amphibious Lift Capability
In fact, the Soviet amphibious lift capability to support assault operations was really
limited to the tactical level. Until 1963, the Soviets had in service 10 Russian LST Type,
4 Russian LCG Type and 71 small landing craft. With the reorganization of the SNI,
the Soviets steadily constructed their own models of amphibious ships such as the
Polnocny-class LSMs (1963 -  73, eight tanks or eight to ten APCs and a company of the
SNI), the Alligator-class LSTs (1966-75, 39 medium tanks or a battalion), and the
Vydra-class LCUs (1967-72, 4 Tanks, half company). Moreover, it realized the
usefulness of the air cushion vehicle (ACV) in transporting troops and combat vehicles
at the initial phase of an amphibious landing. As a result the first Soviet LCAC, the
•  •  •Gus-class and the Aist-c\ass entered into service in 1969 and in 1970 respectively. As 
a result of the steady improvement of the amphibious lift capability, the Soviets 
theoretically made it possible to carry all their SNI troops and equipment in wartime 
(refer Table 3-9), but its operational range was limited to the sea adjoining its homeland. 
While in 1963 the Soviets did not have any amphibious ships capable of sustained
employment on the open ocean, at the end of this period, it had 14 such ships in service. 
Table 3-9: Amphibious Lift Capability for the SNI in 1974
Classifications Pacific Baltic Black Sea Northern Total
Alligator 4 4 3 3 14
Polnocny 15 20 20 10 65
MP 2,4 , 6, 8 LSV/M 10 10 10 10 40
Vydra MP 10 LCT 45 40 30 15 130
Total 74 74 63 38 249
Source: E. P. Takle, “Soviet Naval Infantry”, RUSI/RMASResearch Centre Bulletin, p. 30; Jane’s 
Fighting Ships 1975-1976, pp. the USSR’s amphibious forces.
337 Jane’s Fighting Ships 1962-63, p. 421. However, according to Dr Milan Vego, the USSR had in 
service 133 relatively modem LSMs/LCUs and approximately 100 small landing craft, see Milan Vego, 
“Soviet Amphibious Forces”, Navy International (May 1983), p. 274.
338 Milan Vego (1983), pp. 274-275.
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(C) Activities and Missions
The SNI participated in numerous small unit and large-scale exercises in this period. For 
example, it deployed on a worldwide scale during the Okean-70 exercise, but the 
amphibious landing in the Arctic during the Okean-70 exercise was specially mentioned 
in Morskoi sbornik?39 (June 5, 1971). The reason was that the landing on the Rybachiy 
Peninsula of a reinforced battalion size of the Black Sea naval infantry demonstrated its 
indispensability and improved skill by landing on difficult terrain after a relatively long 
voyage under adverse weather conditions340. As such, despite the purpose of this 
exercise being to demonstrate the navy’s readiness to repel attacks on Russia, and to 
launch its own strikes341, the real ability of the SNI remained at the level of tactical 
amphibious landing operations. To conclude, it seems that the SPFNI retained its 
original roles and functions such as the defence of naval bases and its homeland by 
deploying along the Sino-Soviet border and the islands near Vladivostok, and also for 
tactical amphibious landing operations in wartime.
Given this limited capability, as Bradley Hahn has summarized, the SNI had the
following missions342:
Firstly, conduct amphibious landing on a tactical level,
Secondly, hold captured beachheads against counterattack,
Thirdly, support prolonged river crossings,
Lastly, defend naval installations at home and abroad.
As such, the role and functions of the SNI in this period remained as an auxiliary branch
339 This was published under the aegis of the Soviet MoD and served as the navy leadership’s principal 
medium of mass communication.
340 Bradley Hahn (1984), p. 20.
341 CRC257, p. 36.
342 Bradley Hahn, “The Soviet Union’s Rapid Deployment Force”, Pacific Defence Reporter (April 1984),
p. 18.
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of the navy to support the other services in wartime, thus it was unable to conceive of 
any policing role.
3. Conclusions
With the impact of the emergence of the nuclear parity era, the numerous strategies 
propounded concerning the methods of conducting a future thermonuclear war had 
varied from massive retaliation to flexible response. In accordance with this strategic 
concept, the goal of possessing nuclear weapons was changed from the necessity for a 
first strike on the basis of the principle of nuclear sufficiency to selective capability for 
a second strike response. In this regard, the foreign policy goals of the two superpowers 
are well summarized by the two Doctrines: the Brezhnev and Nixon Doctrines. They did 
not want to lose their spheres of influence or face each other directly anywhere in the 
world in military terms. Furthermore, the US slowly retreated from its firm position of 
defending its allies from the establishment of an additional communist government or 
anywhere in the Western hemisphere according to the Nixon Doctrine, which was the 
reflection of its weakening effect of its domestic anti-war public opinion and the 
economic situation as well as the developments of economic and defence capabilities 
among its allies. In addition, a regional security environment favourable to the US had 
been established by an amicable settlement with the PRC, which was clearly a 
geographical alliance to cover the threat of the USSR located at the forefront of the 
Asia-Pacific region. This was good evidence that diplomatic success could cover the 
deficiency of military power by reshaping the strategic configuration.
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It seemed that the emergence of nuclear weapons debilitated the role and functions of 
the navy and amphibious forces, but it was only temporary. With the increase of the 
nuclear capacity of the two superpowers, the importance of conventional forces 
including both navy and amphibious was also relatively augmented because of the 
changing characteristics of the security strategy, which reflected fears of a mutual 
disaster. At the end of this period, the number of USSR nuclear arms was superior to 
that of the US (refer Table 3-6). Each was continuously developing new and improved 
systems within the limits agreed in the ABM treaty, which provided a rationale for the 
two superpowers to improve their nuclear capabilities. Ironically, the emergence of 
nuclear weapons and the fear of mutual destruction even in a major conventional war 
between the two blocs highlighted the necessity of maritime power, particularly because 
of its indirect use as an instrument of both domestic and foreign policy in peacetime 
together with the development of the law of the sea.
The primary role and function of the US forces in the region was changed in order to 
focus on security commitments compared with the prevention of direct military threats 
to the US in the Second World War and following with the emergence of the USSR as 
the supreme state of the communist world. The presence of American personnel, civilian 
and military, had considerable significance in terms of its defence commitments with its 
alliances. In fact, the actual deployment of military manpower provided psychological 
and diplomatic reassurance, a capacity for effective military action, an ability to react 
quickly in a crisis, and a secure platform for extended military endeavour. However, it is 
also undeniable that the presence of American forces aroused the American public with 
fears of a massive involvement in a major war, which led to the announcement of the 
Nixon Doctrine.
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The main characteristics of the Soviet attitude regarding the use of force could be 
summarized as an ambitious but cautious approach to involvement in any kind of direct 
military conflict with the US. It meant that its ability to operate in distant areas was 
really restricted, as it faced the Western alliance forces from Europe to the Far East. The 
USSR did not have a sufficient surface navy, and it had submarines mainly for home 
water control, that is, for defence against enemy attack. The Soviet maritime operational 
environment was really poor, because each ship or submarine had to pass through the 
East Sea (Sea of Japan) and its straits. However, the massive construction of numerous 
Soviet nuclear submarines slowly began to compel the US Navy to a reassertion of their 
sea control mission. In other words, the USSR emerged as a maritime power at the level 
of competing with the US in blue water.
In the circumstances that the land frontiers was firmly fixed, the sea, as a gateway 
towards the Third World, was the only way for the USSR to enlarge the communist 
hemisphere in line with its foreign policy objectives in the confrontation between the 
two blocs. In this sense, the purpose of the Soviet naval force buildup began to change 
from the defence of its homeland to a means of projecting its power towards the rest of 
the world. At the end of this period, it demonstrated that its naval power was capable of 
operating throughout the world’s oceans as was seen from the large-scale naval 
exercises. The success in building up a blue-water navy raised the Soviet status in the 
eyes of the international community enabling it to compete with the US throughout the 
world via sea routes.
The Vietnam War was a good example of indicating the future shape of military 
confrontation between the two superpowers in the nuclear parity era. Whilst the reaction
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of the PRC and USSR against the US attack beyond the 38th parallel in the Korean War 
was not carefully examined by the military and political leaders of the UN alliance, the 
military objectives of the Vietnam War were limited, reflecting the transition of military 
strategy by carefully considering the possible reaction of the PRC and the USSR so as 
not to provoke direct military involvement with them. The Vietnam War clearly 
represented the phenomenon of a war in the nuclear age, when the interests of the 
superpowers, who possessed massive retaliation capability, directly clashed. In some 
aspects, it had taken note of the characteristics of the Cold War, which would end 
without a major war between the nuclear powers.
A complex result of the independent variables hamstrung the role and functions of the 
amphibious forces, seriously restricting their ability to insist on compliance to their 
urgent demands, i.e., the USMC in the Vietnam War and the deployment of SNI on the 
Russo-Sino border. However, from the military strategic point of view, both had the 
raison d ’etre to maintain their amphibious forces as their military and maritime 
strategy/ policy suggested. The geostrategic encounter via the sea required an 
amphibious force, because the worth of amphibious operations had been proved over a 
long period of history in that success in an amphibious landing operation would 
constitute the cornerstone of final victory or prove a decisive turning point in the war. 
Whilst the marines were for the US a useful means of reacting to any kind of regional 
crisis as the sign of maintaining its defence commitments, the build-up of the SNI 
included at least a two-fold purpose: an instrument to defend its homeland and naval 
bases, and its usefulness in wartime to recover any of its territory lost in an attack by the 
western alliance. It is difficult to imagine that the Soviets intended to practically use the 
SNI for amphibious landing operations in a war against the PRC to land at a point on
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the Chinese eastern coastal area, i.e., Shanghai, in order to compel the PRC to wage a 
two-front war, although this was not completely out of the question. All in all, it appears 
that the resurrection of the SNI was one outcome in the process of the rise of total 
Soviet power to safeguard its interests as well as pursuing the expansion of the 
Communist world.
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Chapter IV. Until the Demise of the Cold War43
1. General Factors
A. International Security Environment
After the end of the Vietnam War, international relations slowly went through a phase of 
bipolar antagonism between the two military blocs, because, the ideological differences 
were still the main criteria for judging every political crisis during this period. Despite 
the fact that the superpowers had experienced detente, it was not surprising that the 
ideological and power-political confrontation between East and West brought about a 
pre-eminent position for the two superpowers within their spheres of influence as well 
as the division of the world. With the communization of the Southeast Asian countries, 
Vietnam, Cambodia (renamed Kampuchea), and Laos, the Soviet and the PRC 
leaderships turned their interests to Africa in order to enlarge their influential area via 
economic aid, e.g., the completion of the Tanzanian railway in 1975 by the PRC, on the 
bases of ideological struggle and military intervention344.
The USSR, on the strength of its massive military power as a political instrument, had
343 The USSR was officially dissolved with the Minsk declaration by the Presidents of Russia, the 
Ukraine and Belorussia on December 8 1991. However, as most political commentators said, the Cold 
War was terminated with the unification of Germany on October 3 1990. Herein, the dividing line was 
decided. Nonetheless, in reality, Gorbachev’s liberalizing reforms of foreign and domestic policies, 
glasnost and perestroika, opened up space for change in the security environment. In addition, the aim 
of US foreign and security policy under President George Bush was changed to an attitude of warm 
relaxation. Thus, the events of the following independent variables here would have been focused 
before that.
344 Until 1977, the PRC aided a total of 29 African countries, whilst the USSR helped only 22 countries 
even though the scales of aid were different, see P. M. H. Bell (2001), p. 322.
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extended its influence in various parts of the world and particularly in the Middle East. 
It had been maintaining friendly relations with the radical Arab nations including Iraq, 
Syria and Libya, continuously providing them with military aid. In addition, the USSR 
had placed under its influence Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and South Yemen, 
sending them military advisers and civilian engineers as well as extended military and 
economic assistance. At a time when the US and its allies worried about the growing 
influence of the USSR in the above region, the USSR embarked on military intervention 
in Afghanistan, which heightened the tension between East and West, and which made 
the Middle East security environment more fluid and unstable. 345 Thus, the 
characteristics of this period can be delineated as the major powers continuously 
pursuing a way of enlarging their areas of influence. Regarding the tendencies of the 
driving force of the two superpowers’ foreign policies toward the Third World, the 
USSR had a more aggressive policy than the US, as seen in the invasion of Afghanistan, 
but to the extent that the USSR avoided any situation likely to involve direct military 
confrontation.
Nonetheless, their ability to act unilaterally in their own power-political interests 
decreased, because they were always confronted with a rival regime or country by a 
series of self-fulfilling prophecies in which defensive actions provoked countermeasures. 
As G H. Snyder and P Diesing have argued, the US and USSR could not help but 
perceive each other as rivals, since the other was the only state that posed a serious 
military threat to its own security.346 Throughout the experiences of detente, the US 
realized that the USSR had not abandoned its original objective of expansionism by
345 Defence o f Japan 1980, pp. 38-40.
346 G. H. Snyder and P. Diesing, Conflict among Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1988), p. 420.
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evaluating not only the deployment of new Soviet missiles after the SALT I agreement, 
but also its widespread activism in the Third World347. In the meantime, the US 
deployed their nuclear arsenals in 27 countries surrounding the USSR and Warsaw Pact 
countries in which there were, according to Simon Duke’s report, approximately 7,000 
nuclear warheads in 1979.348 The critical momentum, which changed the US attitude 
toward the USSR from friendship to antagonism was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
in December 1979349, which was viewed as an action to threaten Western interests in the 
Middle East as an extension of Soviet expansionism. This triggered the return of Cold
• OCAWar policy in the US from the end of the Carter administration, onwards. For 
example, the SALT II agreement, signed in Vienna in June 1979, was not ratified by the 
US Senate due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Nonetheless, the political protocols between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries were 
continued. The characteristics of security in Europe were that both military blocs made 
unilateral gestures of arms reductions initiated by the Mutual and Balanced Forces 
Reduction (MBFR) negotiations launched in Vienna in 1973 among 23 NATO and 
Warsaw Pact members, and the Conference on the Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) held in Helsinki in 1975, which developed into the Conference on Confidence- 
and-Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in Stockholm in
347 Phil Williams, “US-Soviet Relations: Beyond the Cold War?”, International Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 2 
(Spring 1989), pp. 276-277.
348 Simon Duke, United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), p. 69.
349 It seems that the USSR had a strong interest in Afghanistan because of both its borders and its long 
historic involvements via trade, military aid, and economic assistance. As such, the improvement of 
Afghan-American and Afghan-Pakistani relations was viewed as a great threat to Soviet security itself.
350 This confrontational strategy developed under Jimmy Carter and was expanded by Reagan because of 
the deployment of the SS-20 from 1977 throughout Europe. With this, all NATO European capitals 
were under direct threat from Soviet theatre nuclear forces, refer Thomas M. Nicholas, “Carter and the 
Soviets: The Origins of the US Return to a Strategy of Confrontation”, Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 13, 
No. 2 (London: Rank Cass, June 2002), pp. 21-42.
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1985. The main purposes of these activities could be concluded as not only the 
normalization of East-West relations, but also the ratification of the territorial status quo 
by reducing the possibilities of the outbreak of war through increasing the transparency 
of military activities, which was conducive to assuaging the possibility of one bloc’s 
misinterpreting the actions of another. The results of these kinds of efforts were to 
inhibit opportunities for surprise attack and political intimidation; thus ultimately to
Tfl
enhance regional stability in terms of security. Although it was impossible to 
practically mitigate the level of military tension, it did mean that both blocs realized the 
certain result of war, which would bring mutual disaster. It appeared at least externally 
that a real war involving the unrestricted use of both nuclear and conventional weapons 
was highly unlikely.
B. Regional Security Environment
The vacuum of the US influence in the Asia-Pacific region derived from the withdrawal 
of the US military forces from Vietnam (1975), Thailand (1976), and force reduction in 
South Korea (1976), and the abrogation of the US-Taiwan defence pact in 1978, which 
became an arena of competition between the USSR and the PRC as each sought to 
enlarge its own influence. During the Vietnam War the Vietnamese fought each other 
over ideology, but a united Vietnam would pay due regard to the prism of Sino-Soviet 
ties by their giving support to the North Vietnamese in waging the revolutionary war. 
However, the worsening relationship between the USSR and PRC did not allow things 
to move in that direction. So, the PRC repeatedly denounced Vietnam as the ‘Cuba of
351 John Borawski, “The Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures in 
Europe”, Arms Control, Vol. 6, No. 2 (September 1985), p. 115.
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Asia’, but the USSR ratified the Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty in November 
1 9 7 8  3 5 2  After that, Vietnam invaded Cambodia on Christmas day 1978 with the 
support of Soviet military equipment and advisers on the ground . This Soviet- 
Vietnamese intimacy brought about the Chinese invasion of northern Vietnam in 
February 1979, which was, as most political commentators had doubted, the result of 
China’s ambition to be seen as the regional hegemon.354 In the long run, the US power 
vacuum created further competition between the USSR and PRC in the Indochina 
peninsula, which gave the countries of the western bloc in the region, such as Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, great fears of 
a possible American retreat from the region.
In order to allay this suspicion, the US encouraged far greater cooperation between non­
communist countries in the region. An organization for this purpose was the Association 
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was formed by Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore in August 1967 as an anti-Communist regional 
organization to promote some sense of political and economic solidarity. With the 
retreat of the US military forces from Vietnam, the influence of this organization in the 
region became so powerful that it would underpin the movement for regional
' I C C
autonomy. However, with time, the political stance of the organization was shaken 
during the Cold War era by mutual suspicions, e.g., a struggle between Indonesia and
352 Roger Buckley, The United States in the Asia-Pacific since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), pp. 159 -  161. This war ended with the Vietnam announcement on May 25 1988 that it 
would withdraw 50,000 troops from Cambodia by the end of the year.
353 Former French Indo-China had been divided into four political units: Laos (independent 1949), 
Cambodia (independent 1953), and North and South Vietnam (partitioned in 1954). The situations of 
Laos and Cambodia were almost similar to that of Vietnam before unification. Hence, when the 
Vietnamese troops entered Cambodia, they were welcomed by the Kampucheans.
354 Roger Buckley (2002), p. 161.
355 Amitav Acharya, “A New Regional Order in South-East Asia”, Adelphi Papers, No. 279 (August 
1993), p. 11.
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Malaysia for dominance, as well as resistance from the superpowers to the USSR’s 
pressure to accept the unified and communized Vietnam as a member . In other words, 
ASEAN’s efforts to promote regional peace and stability were undermined by the 
constraints imposed by the prevailing patterns of inter-state relations and superpower 
rivalry.
In terms of the transitions of the balance of power, the invisible struggle between the 
PRC and USSR still remained very intense357. The USSR regarded the efforts for an 
improvement in Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations as an attempt at forming an 
international network in East Asia designed to contain it. This deterioration, including 
the Soviet interventions in Africa as well as the inferiority of the PRC’s nuclear strength, 
allowed the strengthening of ties between the US and the PRC, and the weakening of 
Soviet antagonism towards the US.
Japan became an economic giant and ultimately one of the world’s largest creditors with 
the growing economic interdependence of nations across the world. It had the resources, 
the wealth, and had been moving towards assuming leadership in Asia by utilizing its 
resources for defence or providing aid to the poor countries of Asia. Furthermore, its 
defence expenditure reached over $ 11 billion in 1983 as the second in the region after 
the USSR ($ 23 bn), and overtaking the PRC ($ 7.79 bn) notwithstanding the relatively 
small numbers of its active military forces (Japan: 240,000, the USSR: 5,115,000, the
356 Roger Buckley (2002), pp. 158-159.
357 The USSR deployed 450,000 troops formed into 46 divisions, and 2,060 planes, about a quarter of the 
entire ground forces and air forces respectively, in the regions along the Sino-Soviet border. In the 
realm of naval forces, it assigned about one third of the entire vessels of the Soviet navy, 785 ships with 
a total displacement of 1.52million tons. In contrast, from the PRC point of view, the Sino-Soviet 
border and the Sino-Vietnamese border were regarded as its main fronts. So, it deployed about 65 
divisions and 41 garrison divisions with a combined force of 1.5 million, nearly half of its 129 
divisions. See, Defence o f Japan 1980, pp. 47-71.
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PRC: 4,000,000). With a series of four defence buildup plans to establish an effective 
defence capability, it could maintain an appropriate scale of military forces including 
modernized maritime and air forces capable of coping with any type of aggression and 
thereby deterring aggression.359
More importantly, Japan and the US rebuilt and improved their relationships from 1975 
in contrast with 1971, when the US changed its policy towards China without 
previously warning Japan. In addition, Japan and the PRC signed a Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship on August 1978 on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each 
other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. Indeed, 
Japan could become the strongest power in Asia politically as well as in the world 
economically. Thus, by the end of the 1980s, there were four major powers in this 
region. The system of the balance of power had moved from being two opposing blocs
'Iff)to a triangle or a quadrangle.
C. Maritime Dominion
Geo-strategically, the location of Vietnam is not only at the end of the western Pacific as 
an intersecting point between the Pacific and Indian Ocean, but is also on the sea route
358 IISS, Military Balance 1985-1986, pp. 17, 112, 170-172.
359 Defence o f Japan 1980, pp. 94-97.
360 Documentation, “Sino-Japanese Relations: Treaty of Peace and Friendship”, in Survival (November/ 
December 1978), p. 263.
361 Sino-US relations in this period can be regarded as being at a pragmatic stage, because their relations 
included at least one important element of friction that the PRC pursued a ‘one-China policy’ and the 
US was willing to support Taiwan, for historic, and partly economic and strategic reasons.
362 Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan and the US in East Asia 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995), p. 6.
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between South and East Asia. The Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty in November 
1978, and Soviet support in the Sino-Vietnamese War such as the protection of 
Vietnamese ports in that Soviet naval ships visiting the Vietnamese ports of Haiphong, 
Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh City, and Cam Ranh Bay, deterred Chinese air and naval attacks 
on those ports, and enabled the USSR to open an advanced naval base at Cam Ranh
TATBay . This represented a significant shift in the balance of maritime power in the 
South Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and in South and Southeast Asia, not only because the 
Soviet potential for disrupting the Western sea lanes from Japan to the Middle East was 
greatly increased, but also because the Soviet navy was now in a position to respond 
much more rapidly to Indian Ocean crises.
After the Second World War, the US established an overseas bases structure to resolve 
conflicts in the Atlantic and Pacific (not for the remote Indian Ocean) in order to defend 
the two frontiers, Europe and the outer ring in the Western Pacific as a part of a 
containment policy. The Johnson administration prohibited US naval ship visits to South 
African ports and ended the joint naval exercises with the alliance, which resulted in the 
gradual withdrawal of US maritime forces from advanced naval bases such as 
Simonstown on the Cape of Good Hope.364 The Western Indian Ocean was very 
important in terms of the protection of the oil traffic in which the US and the Western 
Pacific countries, i.e., Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, were vitally interested. As seen from 
the above international security environment, the USSR and PRC had been checked in 
their ambitions by a limited US presence throughout the post-World War period. 
Considering the USSR’s maritime strategic configuration, it was a cornerstone for
363 Bruce W. Watson (1982), pp. 139-140.
364 Anthony Harrigan, “Security Interests in the Persian Gulf and Western Indian Ocean”, Patrick Wall 
(ed.), The Indian Ocean and the Threat to the West (London: Stacey International, 1975), p. 23.
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enlarging the Soviet Pacific Fleet; at the same time being a starting point for the 
maritime arms race in the Indian Ocean and the second Cold War, which meant the end 
of detente between East and West.
From this time, the other major powers, notably Japan, and the PRC, slowly enlarged 
the radius of their maritime activities in the Western Pacific. Apart from the USSR, 
Japan actively moved toward maritime force-building in order to protect its sea lanes 
from the Middle East, a vital necessity for a complex economy tied to global markets. 
Japan was at the head of others in the naval arms build-up in that it constantly improved 
its naval capability focusing on the qualitative domain (see Table 4-1).
As regards hardware, the only significant increase in terms of the changes of quantity 
happened with regard to FFHs/FFs, which increased from 34 to 60 during the 1980s. 
Whilst the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) decommissioned the old 
type of submarines and destroyers, it commissioned two new classes of submarine and 
DDGs, the Harushio, and the Hatakaze. In addition, despite the significant decrease in 
aircraft numbers, it acquired 59 P-3C maritime reconnaissance aircraft. With these kinds 
of new commissions and acquisitions, according to IISS, the Japanese Navy was the 
world’s fifth largest as regards its absolute capabilities and its shape and posture (after
TASthe two superpowers, UK and PRC). During the 1980s, the US urged Japan to 
increase its defence spending due to the US trade deficit with Japan and the outset of the
TAAsecond Cold War. The US was unable to properly defend its allies in the Western
365 IISS, Military Balance 1989-1990, p. 236.
366 The US considered Japan as the greatest potential for expanded military efforts by any ally in the 
region. The US needed a steady and substantial increase in Japanese self-defence capabilities to enable 
Japan to work more effectively with the US in performing common security interests in the region, see, 
The US DoD, Annual Report Fiscal Year 1982 (hereafter ARFY), Jan 19, 1981, p. 87. For the US trade
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Pacific, because the plan to put two carrier battle groups (CVBGs) in the Indian Ocean
tlihad drawn a deployed CVBG from both the 6 Fleet in the Mediterranean and the 
Western Pacific area of the 7th fleet367. Consequently, it was natural to concede some 
part of maritime dominion to others.
Table 4-1: Japanese Naval Development in the 1980s
Classification Component/Class 1980 1990 Remarks
Manpower Naval air/Total 12,000/44,000 12,000/44,000
Harushio 2 +2
Yuushio 2 10 +8
Submarines Uzushio 7 5 -2
Oshio 5 -5
Subtotal 14 17 +3
Hatakaze 2 +2
Tachikaze 2 3 +1
Amatzukaze 1 1
Akizuki 2 -2
DDGs/ DDHs/ DDs Harukaze 2 -2
Ayanami 7 -7
Murasame 3 -3
Subtotal 17 6 -11
Shirane 2 2
Haruna 2 2
Asagiri 8 +8
Hatsuyuki 12 +12
Abukuma 4 +4
Takatsuki 4 4
Yamagumo 6 6
FFH/FF Minegumo 3 3
Yubari 2 +2
Ishikari 1 1
Chikugo 11 11
Isuzu 4 4
Katori 1 1
Subtotal 34 60 +26
Patrol/Torpedo 9 9
Mine Warfare 40 47 +7
Naval Air Aircraft/Hel 120/76 99/72 -21/-4
Notes: DDG (Destroyer with area SAM), DDH (Destroyer with hel), FFH (Frigate with hel), FF (Frigate) 
Source: Military Balance 1981-1982, pp. 82; 1991-1992, pp. 166-7.
deficit, see US Congress Senate, Committee on Finance, United States-Japan Trade Relations: 
Hearings before the Committee on Finance, 101st Congress Second Session, April 25, 1990.
367 ARFY1982, p. 85.
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In addition to the Japanese movement, the PRC angrily responded to the Soviet use of 
Cam Ranh Bay due to its antagonism against the USSR and Vietnam, and it began to 
seek a way to enlarge its maritime scope in the Western Pacific, e.g., the Spratly Islands
'l/'O
Dispute, many of which were under Vietnamese control as part of its policy to pursue 
a position more independent of superpower politics. As Table 4-2 shows, the Chinese 
maritime strength grew both quantitatively and qualitatively during this period.
Table 4-2: The Chinese Naval Development in the 1980s
Classification Component 1980 1990
Manpower Naval Air / Marine / Total 30,000/28,000/298,000 25,000/6,000/260,000
Submarine
SSBN / SSB 0 /1 1 /1
SSN / SS 2 /8 3 4 /6 0  (1SSG)
PSC DDG / FF(G) 11 / 16 19/37
FAC
Missile / Patrol 164/24 200 / 77
Gun / Torpedo 336/285 385/ 190
Naval Air Aircraft / Hel 700 824/61
Sources: Jane’s Fighting Ships 1980-1981, pp. 98-109; 1990-1991, pp. 106-130; Military Balance 1990-
1991,pp. 148-152.
As previously mentioned, the Chinese navy was the third largest in the Western Pacific
as well as the fourth in the world, but it was an important element in the balance of 
power in this region as it was certainly one of the fastest growing navies. The strongest 
point of the PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) was that it had nuclear ships, 1 
SSBN and 4 SSN, in the Western Pacific apart from the superpowers. All in all, the 
maritime balance of power in the Western Pacific also moved from being between two 
opposing blocs to a triangle. It could be affirmed that the relatively weakened American 
naval power derived from the naval arms race in the Indian Ocean, because the US had 
to transfer some of the Pacific fleet from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean.
368 Regarding the Spratly Islands Dispute, refer, Bradford L. Thomas, “The Spratly Islands Imbroglio: A 
Tangled Web of Conflict”, Peace Research Centre Working Paper, No. 74 (Canberra: Australian 
National University, April 1990).
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However, the US Navy was assisted by the buildup of the Japanese naval forces, who 
helped to cover the exit of the Soviet vessels from their home bases to the Western 
Pacific area in the event of a global war. In addition, the PRC was seeking to gain an 
advantage over the two bloc’s maritime dominion.
2. Independent Variables and Their Effects
A. USMC
(1) The US Interests/ Foreign Policy
The American capacity to respond to an aggressive Soviet foreign policy in the Third 
World declined largely as a result of the divisive and emasculating impact of the 
Vietnam War, whilst the Soviet capability to take advantage of opportunities in the 
Third World increased. In the aftermath of the withdrawal from Indochina, 
congressional and public opposition to the use of military force including commitment 
abroad caused a great atrophy of American foreign policy based on its military power. 
In short, the US extension of nuclear and conventional deterrence was clearly less 
credible than it had been previously, particularly where its interests were not at stake. In 
this situation, as the focuses of the Cold War competition between the two blocs had 
moved towards the Third World, the US leaders were looking to regional powers like 
Iran, Japan, Somalia to assist the US in preserving its global interests and began to 
project its policy objectives with nonmilitary means, i.e., human rights under President 
Carter at the initial stage of his presidency .
369 Thomas G. Paterson, et al. (1991), pp. 618-619.
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However, US foreign policy turned into active reaction to the Soviet intervention 
particularly under the Reagan administration, which considered the USSR as the source 
of international insecurity. As a result of the Reagan belief that public opinion had 
changed in now favouring a more militarized, interventionist foreign policy, the US 
openly began to support anti-communists who were battling the Soviets or Soviet- 
backed governments, i.e., the CIA’s support of Islamic rebels in Afghanistan and anti- 
Communist insurgents and terrorists in Angola, Cambodia, and Ethiopia371 in 
accordance with a strong military forces buildup policy.
As the Asia-Pacific countries remained relatively outside the short-term US foreign 
policy focuses due to the counter actions against the active Soviet policy in the Third 
World even under the Reagan administration, the suspicion of the Asian noncommunist 
countries about the US willingness to defend them from Soviet territorial expansionism 
raised a fundamental question about the Nixon-Kissinger formula to withdraw US 
military forces from abroad. In some aspects, the closer Sino-American relations had 
contributed to the increase of Soviet military deployments in the Far East. In this regard, 
the strategic configuration in East Asia could now be identified as being triangular 
involving the Japanese-American partnership, the USSR and PRC, since the PRC was 
aligned, but not allied. The basic goal of the Nixon administration was also to prevent 
the further extension of the communist sphere. To do so, it anticipated that the tacit 
alliance brought about by the rapprochement with the PRC could work as a block
370 One of the major turning points of US foreign policy was the huge blunder of the modernizing of 
Soviet nuclear forces in Europe in 1977, the deployment of the SS-20, a mobile, three-warhead missile 
with an extended range covering all NATO European capitals. Thomas M. Nichols, “Carter and the 
Soviets: The Origins of the US Return to a Strategy of Confrontation”, Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 13, 
No. 2 (June 2002), p. 29.
371 Thomas G Paterson, et al. (1991), pp. 645-647.
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against the USSR, which was the only country capable of dominating Asia. In the long 
run, the interests of US foreign policy focused on keeping its dominant position in 
world politics, and keeping its original interests in the Pacific area via Nixon’s
7^9triangular diplomacy, notwithstanding its withdrawal from Vietnam .
As Admiral John S. McCain Jr., US Navy (Ret) said in an interview with Strategic 
Review373, the US considered the ROK comparable to the Republic of Vietnam in 
strength, independence, freedom and geo-strategic location to the allies. The doubts of 
Asian countries about the possibility of the withdrawal of the US commitment in East 
Asia forced the US to change the priority of its foreign policy objectives, in particular, 
toward the Korean peninsula. The withdrawal of the US forces from Vietnam meant that 
the US policy to solve regional problems using major power diplomacy had failed. Of 
course, the Nixon administration and onward recognized that if the Korean peninsula 
was communized by an invasion of North Korea, it would have had a disastrous impact 
on Japan374, which was regarded as the most important strategic balancer in the 
region. The Korean peninsula was a strategic key: and at the same time a symbol of 
the US will against latent suspicions, whilst Taiwan was relatively safe because the 
Shanghai Communique signed by Nixon operated as a road map for Sino-American 
relations. In this regard, as mentioned earlier, US foreign policy was exercised in two
372 The withdrawal of the US military forces from the Vietnam War seemed for a while to be ‘American 
exceptionalism’ inferring that its positive foreign policy for the defence of the non-communist world 
had come to an end. See Michael Dunne, “US Foreign Relations in the Twentieth Century: from world 
power to global hegemony”, International Affairs 76,1 (2000), p. 39.
373 Admiral John S. McCain Jr., USN (RET.), “Our Pacific Interests”, Strategic Review, Vol. I, No. 1 
(Spring 1973), p. 15-16.
374 Most of the Annual Reports in the 1980s considered Japan as one of the most dynamic of the 
democracies and the keystone of the US security position in the Far East. The next countries were the 
Philippines, ANXUS partners-Australia and New Zealand-and South Korea. See, The US DoD, Annual 
Report Fiscal Year 1981, p. 50.
375 Seung-Young Kim, “American Elite’s Strategic Thinking towards Korea: From Kennan to Brzezinski”, 
Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 2001), pp. 196-197.
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ways: strengthening the regional community, by which it would be said that in some 
aspects a tacit alliance against the Soviet Union was coming into being, and also a 
security commitment within the de facto bipolar alliance.
Nonetheless, the basic diplomatic mind-set of the US foreign policy represented by the 
Nixon Doctrine did not change, because, as Kissinger wrote, “there was no significant 
conceptual difference between the various assessments of the international environment 
by the Nixon, Ford and Reagan Administrations. All were determined to resist the 
Soviet geopolitical offensive and considered history to be on the side of the 
democracies” . There was, however, an enormous difference in their approach toward 
the USSR, which mainly consisted of the military means largely , represented by the 
Reagan administration’s policy of militant anticommunism . To summarize, the US 
foreign policy objectives in this period toward East Asia were almost the same as those 
objectives summarized by Gaston J. Sigur.
(2) Military Strategy/ Policy
The military buildup initiated by President Carter, which was expanded by President 
Reagan decisively reflected not only the Soviet Expansionism throughout the Indian 
Ocean and the Middle East Asia (Gulf), but also the US failure to stop the shift in the 
balance of strategic nuclear power in favour of the USSR. The US changed to the 
‘global war’ strategy with the strategic goal of sufficiency. This meant that the US 
should maintain strategic nuclear forces with the level of sufficiency to deter general
376 Henry Kissinger (1994), p. 766.
377 According to Frank L. Klingberg’s analysis, the main US foreign policy objective was to turn back to 
the ‘Cold War’ spirit of America’s military buildup in response to the Soviet expansionism from 1980. 
See, Brian M. Pollins & Randall L. Schweller, “Linking the Levels: The Long Wave and Shifts in US 
Foreign Policy, 1790-1993”, American Journal o f  Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 2 (April 1999), p. 434.
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war and GPF levels had to recalculate on the basis of a global war, because the US-
*iHQ
Soviet military balance had deteriorated to a dangerous degree. Furthermore, the 
doctrine of ‘flexible response’ had not provided practical options at the operational
07Q
level; thus it demanded greater accuracy and a wide range of target options.
Consequently, the Reagan administration made the modernization of nuclear forces the 
major factor in its defence policy by strengthening all three legs of the strategic triad 
(the Peacekeeper missile, strategic bomber, TRIDENT II missiles) as well as strategic
'X i o ncommand, control and communication (C ) systems . As widely known, the most
controversial initiative of the US in this era was the Strategic Defence Initiative, SDI or
‘Star Wars’, which was directed by President Ronald Reagan in March 1983, which was
• •  '1 8 1an extraordinary plan to introduce a comprehensive system for anti-missile defence . 
Notwithstanding, until the end of the Cold War, the US was unable to achieve the goal 
of superiority through the relative numbers of nuclear weapons, although in specific 
capabilities it was in the ascendancy (refer Table 4-3).
378 Kevin N. Lewis, “The Discipline Gap and Other Reasons For Humility and Realism in Defence 
Planning”, Paul K. Davis, New Challenges for Defence Planning (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 
pp. 104-106. And, from the Kennedy administration, US military planning was based on five elements: 
NATO, South Korea, a strategic reserve, flexibility, and mobilization. Refer, Maurice A. Mallin, Tanks, 
Fighters & Ships: US Conventional Force Planning Since WWII (New York: Brassey’s 1990), p. 126.
379 Timothy Garden (1984), pp. 45-46. Because, as Table 4-3 shows, the US deployed about two-thirds of 
warheads in submarines, which meant that it had invulnerable second strike capability, but less 
accuracy from the first strike. In stark contrast, the USSR held about two-thirds of its warheads in land- 
based missiles, which were vulnerable to a pre-emptive attack. P.M.H. Bell (2001), p. 349.
380 Casper W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1985 (Washington, DC: DoD, 
1984), pp. 6-7.
381 The basic concept of the SDI was knocking out in-coming ballistic missiles by updating the existing 
anti-ballistic missile technology, which had performed for around twenty years. As such, it was not 
quite new, but President Reagan’s speech meant that the administration would accelerate related 
researches to catch up with the USSR’s technology. Refer, Christopher Lee, War in Space (London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 1986), pp. 115-133.
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Table 4-3: Comparison of the US and USSR’s Missiles and Warheads
Classifications 1970 1980 1990USA USSR USA USSR USA USSR
Missiles
ICBM 1054 1465 1039 1330 990 1710
SLBM 656 229 576 937 624 930
Total 1710 1694 1615 2267 1614 2640
Warheads
On ICBMs 1054 1465 2139 4388 2440 6955
On SLBMs 656 229 4880 1897 5376 3162
Total 1710 1694 7019 6285 7816 10117
Note: ICBM: inter-continental ballistic missile; SLBM: submarine-launched ballistic missile
Source: P. M. H. Bell, The World since 1945 (London: Arnold, 2001), p. 501
In the field of conventional forces, US military strategy focused on developing a course 
of action for Southwest Asia, whilst it began to reduce its commitment to Northeast Asia 
by a way of encouraging allies to take on more of the responsibility for defending 
themselves and thereby contributing to the defence of the region. The priority of 
Northeast Asia seemed less important than Southwest Asia and the Middle East in this 
period. With the increase of the Soviet maritime potential in the Indian Ocean and 
Persian Gulf, the strengthening of maritime capabilities to project power rapidly and 
effectively to those regions emerged as one of the salient features of US strategy. To 
inspire and restore confidence in US power, the “Carter Doctrine” on 24 January 
1980 extended US policy commitment to these regions. As such, the US attempted to 
acquire military capability in the region to respond effectively to “threats across the
382 In 1977, President Jimmy Carter announced that he would withdraw all US troops from South Korea, 
but the plan drew fire and only 3,400 troops ultimately returned before the plan was cancelled by 
President Ronald Reagan.
383 The annual report to the congress from fiscal year 1983 described the Southwest and Africa as 
secondary among the priorities of national security policy toward regions. See, Caspar W. Weinberger, 
Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1983 (Washington DC: DoD, 1982), pp. 11-19-20.
384 Carter declared, “the US would consider any attempt by an outside force (the Soviet Union) to gain 
control of the Gulf region an assault on US vital interests that would be repelled by military force if 
necessary”. Consequently, the Carter administration expanded military aid to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Israel, and Pakistan.
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entire spectrum of conflict”.385 In order to do that, the US created the Rapid 
Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) for contingency situations, which consisted of 
one Marine Amphibious Force, three Army Divisions (the 82nd Airborne, 101st 
Airmobile, and 24th Mechanised), a variety of smaller combat and supporting units 
(200,000 men), and seven tactical fighting wings. However, the US allocated its forces 
up to five Army and two Marine Corps divisions, and 10 tactical fighter wings due to an
• 'IRAincrease of continuous tension.
The salient feature of the conventional strategy in the Reagan administration is shown 
by the following four initiatives accepting the consensus among US military planners 
that conventional forces were becoming more crucial than before because the USSR had
achieved nuclear parity.
Firstly, an increase in the Navy’s fleet from about 450 warships to more than 600,
Secondly, an imprecise plan to pressure peripheral Soviet interests around the world in order to 
gain military leverage in other areas of critical interest to the US,
Thirdly, a move to accelerate development and procurement of ‘smart’ battlefield weapons and to 
increase the stockpile of war materials needed in a protracted conflict in Europe,
Fourthly, steps to increase the level of training and combat readiness of existing conventional 
forces.387
However, the Reagan administration did not greatly alter the basic defence programme 
of its predecessor towards Asia-Pacific. One of the distinguishing points was that whilst 
the Nixon administration had considered the PRC as a major counter-weight to Soviet 
military power in Asia as the USSR viewed it as the only major military threat, the
385 The US DoD Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1984 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1 February 1983), p. 37.
386 Congressional Budget Office, Rapid Deployment Forces: Policy and Budgetary Implications (US 
Congress, February 1983), p. XV.
387 William P. Snyder & James Brown, Defence Policy in the Reagan Administration (Washington, DC: 
NDUP, 1988), pp. xvii-xviii.
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Reagan administration saw Japan as playing a major role in future military planning for
100
the region reflecting the changing characteristics of the balance of power system. 
Even so, the US retained the policy of developing diplomatic ties with the PRC while 
continuing to press Japan for greater defence commitments.
(3) Maritime Strategy/ Policy
The US naval strategy of the Carter administration, apart from deterring strategic 
nuclear war, reflected the ‘1 1/2 war’ concept and the strategic configuration in East 
Asia, where it was possible to deter both a full-scale Soviet attack by the US 
strategic/theatre nuclear capability and a regional conflict, conventional war, by the 
forces of the de facto alliance and the implicit geopolitical alliance, the PRC. Thus, the 
maritime priority rapidly moved on from the defence of Central Europe to the defence 
of the SLOCs from the Indian Ocean to the Middle East. In this situation, it was natural 
that the US maritime strategy shrunk back to the realm of a defensive role, i.e., the 
protection of SLOCs and supplies to the allied forces, not the concept of Sea Control 
and Power Projection.389
From 1979, there were great debates not only on the role and functions of each service, 
but also on the direction for future naval force buildup within the Navy. The former was 
derived from the defence budget competition among the services, because the highest 
percentage of defence funding from the early 1970s was allocated to the Navy
388 Paul H. B. Godwin, “The United States and Asia: The Success of Continuity?”, in William P. Snyder 
& James Brown (1988), p. 51.
389 When Admiral Elmo Zumwalt became CNO in 1971, he assessed the navy’s missions: ©  ‘Assured 
Second Strike Capability by Polaris and Poseidon ballistic missile submarines’, ©  Sea Control, (D 
Projection of Force. As a result, the surface ships including carriers were continuously reduced, i.e., 
carriers from 23 in 1968 to 13 in 1973, amphibious assault ships from 157 to 65. Refer, Maurice A. 
Mallin (1990), p. 206-207.
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Department reflecting the enlargement of their roles in strategic deterrence390. At this 
time, the Navy operated in most of the distinct natural mission areas-Land War, War at 
Sea, and Strategic Deterrence (see Figure 4-1) even under the defensive strategic 
concept, which was really a natural phenomenon considering both the global geo­
strategic configuration between the two blocs, and the characteristics of naval power.
Figure 4-1: Existing Relationships of the US Armed Forces and Missions
Army Navy
Land War
Air Force
War at Sea Strategic Deterrence
Source: John L. Byron, Reorganisation o f US Armed Forces (Washington, DC: NDUP, 1983), p. 6.
The latter was actually a competition between the branches, most likely between attack 
carriers based on an offensive naval role posited by Admiral Thomas B. Hayward and 
submarine (cruise missile) based on the defensive principle of dispersion advocated by 
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt (see Table 4-4). However, between them there was no actual 
difference from the aspect of contributing to the ultimate national strategic goal of 
deterrence, they were opposite sides of the same coin. Nonetheless, how to define naval
390 Refer, Donald C. F. Daniel, “Beyond the 600-Ship Navy”, Adelphi Papers 261 (Autumn 1991), p. 7 
(Figure 1: Percentage allocation of spending authority, from 1948 to 1990).
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strategy was the most important factor in determining a future naval forces buildup,
QQ 1
because it provided the very cornerstone of the PPBS cycle as the first “P” .
Table 4-4: Comparison between the Offensive and Defensive Schools
Classification Offensive (Goal: Deterrent) Defensive (Goal: Deterrent)
Claimants Thomas B Hayward, James Watkins, John Lehman, Gerald E. Miller
Elmo R Zumwalt, John Chafee, 
Melvin R. Laird
Main Forces
• Attack Carriers, Marine Corps
• High End Equipments: Large Carrier 
Platforms, Warships, Amphibious 
Ships, Manpower
• Submarines, Cruise Missiles
• Low End Equipments: Small V/STOL 
Carriers 392 , SBN, Targeting Sensors, 
Long Range Missiles, Torpedoes
Operational
Concepts
• Projecting Power is the best way to gain 
Control of Seas
• Prefer deep-strike actions
• Maintaining Sea Control is at risk
• Big Ships are vulnerable to missiles
Basic Logic
• Soviet Naval Strength is defensive
• US geopolitical position demands the 
long-range, global sea-control, and 
power projection missions
• Soviet Navy is armed with Long-range 
Missiles and Torpedoes
Principles Sea Control, Power Projection, Presence, Concentration Sea Denial, Dispersion
Note: V/STOL (Vertical or Short Take-off and Landing)
Sources: Summarized from George W. Baer (1994), pp. 400-417; etc.
Among the four initiatives of the Reagan administration, a larger Navy buildup was the 
most ambitious and costly project, which meant that the offensive school won at least 
outwardly. The US maritime strategy quickly moved to emphasizing the sea control 
missions calling for a limited purchase of large, multi-purpose warships capable of the
' l Q ' l
power projection mission. From 1975, the US Navy considered 600 ships, or 500 
ships in a buildup plan, the minimum number required to meet its varied missions. At 
the end of the 1970s, the US adopted the latter with the announcement of Defence 
Secretary Brown in 1978 that a 525-ship fleet would be adequate to meet these missions
391 John Allen Williams, “The US Navy Under the Reagan Administration and Global Forward Strategy”, 
in William R Snyder & James Brown, (eds., 1988), p. 279.
392 Regarding the utilities of V/STOL, refer Gerald G. O’Rourke, “Why V/STOL?”, Proceedings, Vol. 
102, No. 1/875 (January 1976), pp. 39-45.
393 Robert P. Haffa (1988), pp. 69-70.
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in the 1980s, based on 12 large, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.394 However, with the 
emergence of the Reagan administration, it declared that it would build up to 600
' I Q C
ships before the end of the decade (refer Table: 4-5) to secure its North Atlantic and 
Pacific SLOCs, to contain Soviet naval forces in their home ports, and to project 
military power to any area where the Soviets might contest its vital interests. The 
fundamental aim of the maritime strategy assumed an American ability to fight 
simultaneously in both Europe and the Far East thus forcing the Soviets to fight on 
terms favourable to the US. More specifically, as Admiral James D. Watkins wrote,
there were the following objectives of the US Navy buildup:
Firstly, deny the Soviets their kind of war by exerting global pressure, indicating that the conflict 
will be neither short nor localized,
Secondly, destroy the Soviet Navy,
Thirdly, influence the land battle by limiting redeployment of forces, by ensuring reinforcement and 
resupply, and by direct application of carrier air and amphibious power,
Lastly, terminate the war on terms acceptable to the US and to our allies through measures such as 
threatening direct attack against the Soviet homeland or changing the nuclear correlation 
of forces.397
In this regard, it is difficult to see that the offensive school completely won, because, as 
is seen in Table 4-5, the buildup of the navy was intrinsically planned to meet the threat 
from the USSR Navy under the national goal of deterrence. In order to do that, the US
394 Samuel F. Wells, Jr., “A Question of Priorities: A Comparison of the Carter and Reagan Defence 
Programmes”, Orbis, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Fall 1983), pp. 641-666.
395 On the basis of this decision, there was a pessimistic view that the US Navy had a less than 50 percent 
chance of prevailing in a major US-Soviet war, and that SLOCs to its allies geopolitical friends (i.e., 
the PRC) across the Western Pacific might not be maintained in a major conflict due to the decrease of 
the number of ships resulting from the retirement o f the old ships dating from WWII from nearly 1,000 
in 1968 to 480 ships in 1981, see Francis J. West, Jr., “US Naval Forces and NATO Planning”, in 
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, inc, Naval Forces and Western Security (Washington, DC: 
Pergamon, 1987), p. 1.
396 Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1987 (Washington, DC: DoD,
1986), pp. 50-51.
397 James D. Watkins, “The Maritime Strategy”, in the Maritime Strategy, Proceedings (January 1986, 
supplement), p. 14.
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Navy was unable to disregard the low-end ships designed for point-specific sea control
OQO
to satisfy low-to middle level peripheral conflicts, and to ensure a balance of forces 
adequate for credible deterrence. As Table 4-5 shows, the real buildup of the ships
focused on the low-end ships despite the new maritime strategy.
Table: 4-5: Aggregate USN Programme bv Specific Contingency/ Number of Ships 
1 600-ship Naw) and the Strengths in 1990
Contingency CV Aegis CG DD FFG Amp URG SSN MCM Aux Total
Murmansk 4 8 24 9 25 51 16 4 9 15 165
Thrace 2 4 12 - 8 - 8 2 - 4 40
Persian Gulf 
Base Denial
2 4 12 6 14 34 8 2 6 9 97
Atlantic SLOC 4 8 24 5 61 - 16 34 - 15 167
Pacific SLOC 2 4 12 2 26 'i 8 32 z § 95
Totals 14 28 84 22 134 85 56 74 15 52 564
Overhaul 3 5 13 4 21 - - 19 65 - -
Total 17 33 97 26 155 85 56 93 15 52 629
Plus 25 fleet ballistic nuclear submarines (SSBNs), yielding a force of 654
Strengths (1990)a 14 4b 77 59 100 65 56 93 29 41 538
Difference0 -3 -29 -20 +33 -55 -20 0 +14 -11 -91
Plus 43 fleet ballistic nuclear submarines (SSBNs), yielding the force of 581(-73)
Note: a: This is study purpose only, which does not include patrol and coastal combatants (30), because 
the 600-ship force referred to ocean-going units only. The types of ship classifications of Haffa 
and IISS do not match correctly. 
b: This is the number of Battleships.
c: The goal is continuously changing according to the arms reduction talks and other factors. For the 
last goal for the 600-ships, refer Frank C. Carlucci, Annual Report to the Congress FY 1989, 
February 18, 1988, p. 192.
Source: Robert P. Haffa, Jr., Planning U.S. Forces (Washington, DC: NDUP, 1988), p. 72; IISS, The
Military Balance 1990-1991, pp. 19-20.
In accordance with its new maritime strategy399, the US systematically increased its 
military naval presence including the capability for power projection reflecting the
398 George W. Baer (1994), p. 419.
399 With a revision concerning Soviet strategic thinking, the first priority of the US Navy missions was to 
destroy the Soviet submarines before they sailed into the open ocean.
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improvement of technology in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, it increased its 
naval patrolling in the Northwest Pacific to deliberately put military pressure on the 
eastern flank of the USSR. As a well known US military specialist, William Arkin wrote, 
“The US Navy has always had a preference for the Pacific Ocean over the Atlantic and 
Europe.... (in particular) during the Reagan administration, the Pacific maritime 
preference has resulted in an even more aggressive outlook and strategy... the maritime 
strategy in the Pacific was specifically intended to take advantage of Soviet military 
weakness in the region”400.
It is not easy to calculate how much capability or how many ships including submarines
thand aircraft were sent to reinforce the 7 fleet in this period (refer Table 4-6). According 
to the Chief of Naval Operations, the 7th fleet ships were kept at a stabilized level of 55 
ships logging 18,000 out-of-area ship days at the end of the 1970s compared with its 
200-plus ships and 62,400 out-of-area ship days in 1969.401 Basically, the number of 
ships and activities of the 7th Fleet was significantly diminished. Its basic structure had, 
however, a paramount flexibility to reconstitute itself as a reaction force in accordance 
with operational demands in a crisis or war situation. Because, if it met an emergency, it 
would be augmented as required according to the stage of crisis from the 3rd fleet (the 
other Pacific fleet) and others by an order from the command authorities using the 
flexibility of organization and manoeuvrability of ships as in the cases of the Pueblo 
Incident, the Vietnam War, and Cuban missile crisis (refer Figure 4-2). In addition to 
this reinforcement, in a contingent situation, it would closely operate with the Japanese 
MSDF, whose main role was to assist the blockade of the US Navy by closing the
400 William M. Arkin, “The Nuclear Arms Race at Sea”, Neptune Papers, No. 1 (Washington, DC: 
Greenpeace-Institute for Policy Studies, October 1987), pp. 13-14.
401 The US CNO, Understanding Soviet Naval Deployments (Washington, DC: GPO, 1981,4th ed.), p. 16.
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Tsushima, Tsugaru and Soya straits, and to cooperate in ASW.
Table 4-6: The Strengths of the 7th Fleet in 1985 and 199Q402
Classification 1985 1990 Remarks
Pacific Fleet Reinforced from the others or Sum of the 3rd and 7th
8 SSBN, 3 SSGN, 37 SSN, 3 SS, 
7 CV/CVN, 100 PSC, 44 Amph.
3rd Fleet 3 SSBN, 25 SSN, 4 Carriers, 72 PSC, 26 Amph.
5 CVBGs, 1-2 BSAG, 4 URQ 
1 Amph Group. +1 Carrier
7th Fleet 20 SSN/SS, 3 Carriers (1 hel), 23 PSC, 6 Amph.
2 CVBGs, 0-1 BSAG; 1 URG; 
1 Amph Group. -1 Carrier
Indian Ocean Dets from 7th Fleet 1 Carrier battle Group (6 PSC)
Dets from 7th/2nd Fleets
Note: BSAG (Battleship Surface Attack Group), Dets (Detachment), PSC (Principal Surface Combatants), 
URG (Underway Replenishment Group).
Sources: IISS, The Military Balance 1985-1986, p. 11, 14; 1989-1990, p. 26.
Figure 4-2: The Basic Structure of the US Seventh Fleet
Battle Force
CTF-70
Commander of the 7 Fleet
P & R Force
CTF-72
Commander
CTF-71 CTF-73 
Logistic Support
Note: P & R (Patrol and Reconnaissance Force)
Source: Kensuke Ebata, “The US 7th Fleet”, Navy International (November 1983), p. 691.
Its paramount objective for defence posture was the readiness to meet and defeat any 
potential enemy. In order to do that, it could be reorganized out of accordance with its 
basic structure by forms of detachment or reinforcement. The realm of its activities was
402 Wartime disposition of the US naval fleets was completely different from this strength. While the US 
deployed 5 CVBGs, 2 BSAGs, and 4 URGs in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, there were only 2 
CVBGs and 1 URG under the 3rd fleet, refer Frank C. Carlucci (1988), p. 193.
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almost the same as those of the previous period except for not only the wartime mission 
in the Vietnam War, but also crisis response in the forms of detachment and readiness 
for the RDJFT, as an added mission.
(4) The Development of the USMC
(A) General Rise and Fall
The success of diplomatic means in its global containment strategy, the amicable 
settlement with the PRC, and the decline in the possibility of a war in Northeast Asia 
convinced the US to concentrate on defending Europe for the time being just after the 
Vietnam War. At that time, most civilians, the officers of the DoD and defence analysts 
of institutions such as Brookings403 (not the other services’ experts) were sceptical of 
the roles and functions of the USMC in the European theatre. Given the growing threats 
derived from the development of PGMs and the Warsaw Pact’s modernized ground and 
air units, they assumed that amphibious landing operations had become obsolete
emphasizing the following five points regarding the force structure of the USMC:
Firstly, US military commitments outside Europe and its surrounding waters were highly unlikely, 
Secondly, Marine ground forces did not possess adequate tanks and antitank weapons for European 
and the Middle East Asia warfare,
Thirdly, Marine Corps fixed-wing aviation duplicated Air Force and Navy tactical air and starved 
the ground FMF of funds and high-quality personnel,
Fourthly, the Corps’ dependence on heavy-lift troop-carrying helicopters made its tactical mobility 
questionable on battlefields affected by bad weather and intense anti-air defence,
Lastly, the Navy’s diminished interest in gunfire support ships and amphibious lift would prevent 
the FMF from reaching the battlefield on time and then landing against serious 
opposition.404
403 A good example of this is Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record’s book, Where Does the Marine Corps 
Go from Here?.
404 Quoted without quotation marks from Allan R. Millett (1980), p. 608. The main purpose of this
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In this era, the most obvious mission for the USMC was to focus on defending NATO. 
As a result, a MEU size of the Atlantic FMF began for the first time to exercise in 
Norway and northern Germany in 1975, which became an annual event and expanded 
its numbers to brigade size. In reality, the force structure of the USMC was not suitable 
for being seriously tailored for the NATO war scenario in terms of mobility, fire power, 
and tactical coordination, because it would have to fight either in the environment of 
sustained armoured combat in the Jutland area or Arctic mountain warfare in Northern 
Norway.405 In order to maintain the status quo and try to survive a protracted period of 
budgetary austerity, on the one hand the USMC projected to modernize its tank force 
(adopting the M-60 Al), artillery, antitank units, and anti-aircraft missiles, but it was 
uneasy about solving all the above problems. On the other hand, it highlighted its
thcontributions in Third World areas, i.e., the activities of the 34 MEU in the 
Mediterranean, and countering Soviet projection forces outside Europe406 being capable 
of reaching anywhere in the world, to express US concerns or interests, arid for directly 
attacking a hostile force in a contingent situation as well as maintaining its efficacy in 
terms of cost-effectiveness407.
In addition to these efforts, it introduced new concepts for amphibious landing 
operations, the MAGTF and the Over-the-Horizon (OTH), in order not only to minimize 
the mistrust about the possibility of amphibious operational landings in the era of the 
PGMs, but also to rationalize its possession of an air component. The former provided
criticism was to cut the defence budget by reducing duplicable functions of the armed forces in the 
post-Vietnam War era.
405 Francis J. West (1978), p. 41.
406 Ibid. As the ‘ 1 1/2 War’ strategy suggested, the policy-makers assumed that ground forces except for 
Navy and Air Force in a future Korean War would not be employed.
407 At that time, it provided 15 percent of the US divisions and 12 percent of its tactical aircraft wings, 
despite the fact that it used only 3.6 percent of the total defence budget.
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for combined arms at all levels of Marine unit deployment, which was based on existing 
battalion, regimental, and divisional structures within the Corps. The purposes of this 
were to solve the fundamental problems of both the paucity of amphibious lift capability, 
and the difficulties of full mobilization to meet a high-density conflict requiring a full 
divisional size from the peacetime employment of the MAB size. The compositions of 
MAGTF are various according to the required mission as MAU, MAB and MAF, each 
comprises four elements: Command, Ground Combat, Aviation Combat, and Combat 
Service Support Elements.408
The latter called for launching assaults from points over the horizon, where the 
opportunity for surprise was greater and the vulnerability of the US ships was less. The 
critics focused on the point that an opposed landing capability would be essential given 
the development of the C4I system, thus an unopposed landing site might not be 
available in a modem war. The OTH concept implied the avoidance of opposed landings 
by using enough flexibility and speed, even though the situation on the enemy’s shore 
might change (refer Figure 4-3).
In order to accomplish this, the USMC additionally needed to procure both the heavy 
lift hovercraft, LCAC, which enabled the crossing of 70 % of worldwide coastal areas 
compared with 17% of the existing landing craft,409 and the V-22 Osprey ‘tilt-rotor’. 
However, it seems that this OTH concept did not come true until the end of the Cold 
War, because its plan to procure the new equipment was delayed by reliability
408 For the details, see The Advanced Amphibious Study Group, Guidelines fo r  Forming a Composite 
MAGTF (Washington, DC: USMCHQ, 1985, 3rd ed.).
409 Peter A. Wilson, “The Marine Corps in 1995”, Proceedings, Vol. 111/11/993 (November 1995), p. 55.
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problems,410 and costs411. Meanwhile, with the worsening security environments and 
following the revisions of US strategies and policies, these critics faded away from the 
centre of strategic and policing attention leaving the fundamental issues of the USMC to 
be improved.
Figure 4-3: The Employments of the Landing Asset under the OTH Concept
TA C TIC A L S P E E D S
Source: Michael Evans, “Allied Amphibious Operations in the Forward Maritime Strategy”,
Navy International (September 1989), p. 375.
In the late 1970s, domestic support for the military establishment and the naval support 
for an enhanced power projection capability needed to react to the naval arms race in 
the Indian Ocean and the Southwest Asian region enabled the USMC to maintain a 
viable operational doctrine in order to face sophisticated opponents in the Third World. 
Given the creation of the RDJTF, the USMC emphasized the development of both the 
maritime prepositioning ship (MPS) concept to deploy heavy equipment in potential 
crisis areas, and a mechanized heavy amphibious brigade to be prepositioned in the
410 It planned to possess at least 90 LCACs, but the additional procurement after the first 9 in 1985 was 
delayed. As such, it got only 14 LCACs in 1989. IISS, The Military Balance 1989-1990, p. 19.
411 The V-22 Osprey programme was still in the R & D stage. The cost estimated at about 40 billion 
dollars was too high, and it also had a great problem in developing new material for the rotating 
engines. James L George, “US Amphibious Forces: The Evolutionary Revolution”, Navy International 
(October 1986), p. 612.
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forward deployed logistic ships. These concepts reduced the reaction time to a matter of 
days instead of weeks or more if transported by amphibious shipping.412 The 7th Marine 
Amphibious Brigade was activated in May 1980, and the prepositioning ships 
consisting of seven vessels and tankers at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean were 
deployed. As such, the Maritime Pre-positioned Forces (MPFs) came into being in the 
Mediterranean Sea and on the island of Guam in the Pacific Ocean in the 1980s, which 
offered strategic flexibility. Three squadrons of cargo ships, each capable of lifting 
almost all a MEB’s combat equipment and about thirty days supplies, were positioned 
strategically one for the Atlantic, another for the Indian Ocean, and the third for the 
Pacific.413 The MAB was the most likely form of employment for Marines in either 
low-intensity or medium-intensity as the equivalent of the SNI regiment (refer Figure 4- 
4).
Figure 4-4: The Basic Organisation of the MAB
MAG Bn BSSGLAV BN Bn Artillery BnAAV BnInf Bn (3)
MAB HQ
In addition, with the growing unconventional threats within the Third World, the USMC 
began to create special operational forces by order of the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
William H. Taft in late 1983. Under this direction, the FMFLant conducted a pilot 
programme on June 14 1985. The results were successful, because it had “an inherent
412 Before the deployment of the MPS, the majority of equipment and resources was planned to be moved 
by air during the first 30 days of a crisis, but the amount of a full month’s airlift equaled that of the first 
10 ships’ arrival. Stuart L. Perkins, Global Demands: Limited Forces, US Army Deployment 
(Washington, DC: NDUP, 1984), p. 50.
413 Peter A. Wilson (1995), p. 55.
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capability to conduct a broad spectrum of special operations in a maritime environment, 
particularly when a requirement exists for the insertion of surfacebome or 
helicopterbome forces from the sea”414. Thus, the USMC devised a special operations 
capable (SOC) training programme, which was conducted by all FMFs that had to be 
operating under the MAU (SOC)415 by January 1988. A MEU carries 15 day’s worth of 
food, fuel, and ammunition. The USMC had six MEUs, which rotated on routine 
deployments to the Mediterranean and the Pacific Rim, and to which the two forward- 
deployed MEUs were formally designated, one in each theatre.416 It seems that the 
USMC’s initial intention of developing all MAGTF sizes to be capable of special 
operations was limited only in activating the MEU (SOC) size during the Cold War.
After the end of US combat involvement in the Vietnam War, the strength of the USMC 
remained relatively constant. As Table 4-7 shows, whilst the percentage of the combat 
forces was about 58 percent in 1976, it increased to 76 percent absorbing the personnel 
of the logistics into the combat service support groups as a result of the doctrinal 
development of the MAGTF Furthermore, the force troops such as the artillery and tank 
battalions except for the naval forces, had been organized into the relevant size of the 
MAGTF to reinforce its fire support capability. In reality, although an infantry regiment 
had three battalions, each battalion was composed of four rifle companies unlike that of 
the US Army. This force structure would be regarded as the backbone of the USMC 
having the strongest combat power compared with the composition of the US Army’s
4,4 Harry M. Murdock, “MAU (SOC): A Powerful Maritime Force”, Marine Corps Gazette (August
1987), p. 67.
415 This concept was changed in 1988 into MEU (SOC). However, it seems that they were both 
simultaneously employed for a while.
416 Kathleen D. Valenzi (ed.), Strike Force: US Marine Corps Special Operations (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 
1991), p. 30.
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light division.417
Table 4-7; A Comparison of the Manpower between Fiscal Year 1976 and 1987
Classification
1976 1987
Remarks
Number
%
(approx)
Number
%
(approx)
Combat
Power
Land Forces 51,100 26 105,900 57 + 54,800
Tactical Air Forces 37,000 19 32,300 17 - 4,700
Force Troops 24,900 14 900 2 - 24,000
Subtotal 113,000 58 139,100 76 + 26,100
Support
Forces
Base Operating Support 22,000 11 21,300 11 -700
Other Supports 61,300 31 26,300 13 - 35,000
Subtotal 83,300 42 47,600 24 - 35,700
Total 196,300 186,700 - 9,600
Sources; Department of Defence, Manpower Requirement Report for F Y 1976 (February 1975), p. XII-7;
F Y 1988 (February 1987), p. V-7.
(B) Amphibious Lift Capability
Until the end of the 1970s, the Navy doubted the concept of amphibious landing 
missions because of concerns about the cost-effectiveness of the amphibious lift 
capability. The US projected a major and long-needed modernization and expansion 
programme to improve its amphibious lift capability under the goal of 75 amphibious 
ships capable of simultaneously carrying MAF-plus-MAB, but the goal was not 
achieved until the demise of the Cold War (refer Table 4-8). In this period, the main 
effort was given to developing the LHD multipurpose assault ship and the LSD-41 
Cargo Variant to carry the LCACs. Although the first LHD was commissioned in May 
1989, this was invented to embody the new doctrinal development with helicopter and 
V/STOL capabilities as well as well deck space for three LCACs. To replace the ageing
417 A heavy MAB is of similar size to the US light division in personnel, i.e., 13,000 of the 7th MAB 
versus 10,200 of the 7th Infantry Division.
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LSD 28 ‘Anchorage’ class, the 3 “ Whidbey island’ class LSDs were commissioned by
1987.
Table 4-8: Deployable Amphibious Ships fFY 1987)
Classifications Quantity Carrying Capacity Pacific Atlantic
LCC CommandShip 2 700 Troops (200 Officers), 3 LCPs, 2 LCVPS 1 1
LHA Assault Ship 5
1,703 Troops, 6 LCM 6s, 4 LCU, Harrier AV- 
8B VSTOL fixed wing aircraft in place of 
some helicopters as required, 19 Ch-53 D Sea 
Stallion or 26 CH-46 D/E Sea Knight Hels
3 2
LPH Assault Ship 7 1,746 Troops, 4 AV-8B harriers, 11 CH-53D or 20 CH-46 D/E 3 4
LKA Cargo Ship 5 360 Troops, 10,000 ton stores 3 2
LPD TransportDock 13
930 Troops, 9 LCM 6s or 4 LCM 8s, 
Up to 6 CH-46 D/E 7 6
LSD
Dock
Landing
Ship
10
“ Whidbey Island’ Class: 450 Troops, 2 or 4 
LCACs or 21 LCM 6s, AV-8B Harrier, Ch-53 
Serious Size 
“Anchorage” Class: 366 Troops, 3 LCUs or 4 
LCACs, 1 LCM, 1 LCPL, 1 LCVP
5 5
LST
Tank
Landing
Ship
18 400 Troops, 500 ton Vehicles, Helicopter Platform Only 9 9
Total 60 31 29
Sources: Michael H. Decker, Proceedings (November 1987), p. 76; Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report 
to the Congress Fiscal Year 1987 (February 5, 1986), p. 179-183, Jane’s Fighting Ships 1989- 
1990, IISS, The Military Balance 1987-1988.
Despite these improvements, as Michael H. Decker has analysed, the amphibious lift 
capability was limited to carrying the three amphibious MABs, which included 12 
amphibious ships to carry the 4 MEU SOCs deployed in the Pacific (2) and Atlantic (2) 
Oceans. To supplement the paucity of amphibious lift capability, it employed the 
Maritime Prepositioning Ships, the 5 LKAs, which were converted from relatively new 
commercial ships. There were 3 squadrons, and each carried the equipment of a Marine 
Amphibious Brigade.
418 Michael H. Decker (1987), p. 76.
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(C) The Marines in the Asia-Pacific region
Just after the Vietnam War, the only reason in the US policymakers’ judgment to keep 
the US presence in the Western Pacific Region was its effect upon Asian perceptions 
and regional stability, because they thought that the USSR did not have the forces to 
invade Japan as a result of a strategic configurative assessment in association with the 
Sino-Soviet confrontation, the improvement of Sino-American relations, and the 
termination of the Vietnam War. Furthermore, the US forward deployed forces were the 
most prepared to face a regional conflict, nonetheless they were also the most costly in 
terms of resources or defence budget. Hence, given these reasons, the US reorganized 
its forces in the Western Pacific Area, i.e., the withdrawal of the 700 troops in Taiwan 
and reinforcing the strength of the seventh fleet. The Table in Figure 4-5 shows the US 
presence in the Western Pacific excluding Hawaii, which would cover most oceans 
except for the Atlantic. This force structure was basically not changed by the 
termination of the Cold War. Although the marines occupied 19 % of the total American 
strength, the 3rd Marine Division was not given much attention in terms of developing 
its readiness during the 1980s. The only major event was the establishment of the 31st 
MEU (SOC) stationed in Okinawa as a quick response standing MAGTF under the 
command of the III MEF, which would be reinforced by the 1st independent MAB in 
Hawaii, and the I MEF in California. From these perspectives, it is not difficult to 
deduce the following basic roles and functions.
(D) Roles and Functions of the US Marines
The basic role could be characterized as a deterrent force against Soviet expansionism 
and any contingent regional conflict, i.e., an invasion of North Korea, by the US 
defensive commitment to the countries in the region and its foreign policy goals
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determined by the NSC-68. At the first stages of this period, the marines’ role was 
limited to deterring the North Koreans as a result of the American strategic environment 
assessment, but it was expanded to deter the Russians given the reinforcement of their 
forces in the Far Eastern and Pacific TVDs. As the fundamental role was upgraded to 
the level of compellence with the onset of the Vietnam War, this deterrent role would 
automatically be upgraded to compellence or defence to repel aggression. Furthermore, 
as the US foreign policy objective implied, it contributed to the deterrence of the 
emergence of any dominant military power.
Figure 4-5: The US Military Presence in the Western Pacific Area
U.S. forces In South
Strength 
Army
Navy, Marines 
Air Force 
Total
S. U.S. forces in Japan
Strength 
Army 
Navy 
Marines 
Air Force 
Total
2,400
6,500
21,600
14,400
44.000
South
Japan
'O kinaw a  
Taiwan
Hawaii
T h a ila n d
Philippines
7th Fleet (at sea) 
Strength 27,900
Ships Apx. 60 
Aircraft Apx. 220
U.S. forces in Marianas 
Strength
Navy 4,600
Marines 400
Air Force 4,000
Total 9,000
U.S. forces in Hawaii
Strength
Army 17,200
Navy 10,600
(excl. afloat) 
Marines 9.500
* Air Force 6.000
- Total 43,300
U.S. forces in the Philippines
Strength
Air Force 8,100
Navy 5,700
Army, Marines 1,500 
Total 15,300
U.S. forces in Thailand
Support units only 100
Army 33,500 24.5%
Navy 42,800 31.3%
Marines 25,800 19.0%
Air Force 34,600 252 %
Total 136,700 100 %
Source: The Japanese Defence Agency, Defence o f  Japan 1980, p.64
The marines’ presence itself had a great psychological impact on the protection of both
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US and allied interests and the advent of any potential adversary, as Colin Gray has 
observed, “a strong US military posture in Japanese and South Korean territory, with 
considerable offensive potential, is a vitally important constraint upon Soviet freedom 
of action”419. In this sense, it could be regarded as the most important strategic balancer, 
even though it seemed a little aggressive because of its character of being a maritime 
power projection force in a high state of readiness. Furthermore, it worked as a 
stabilizer in protecting the Asian allies from political disturbance, particularly after the 
end of the Vietnam War. The redeployment of the marines in Japan, which was the 
unique ground force component in Japan capable of forcibly entering a landmass at any 
point in response to a friendly government’s request for assistance, demonstrated the 
American will to defend its allies from the threat of the communist world.
The US marines’ presence in the Western Pacific enhanced the Navy’s sea control 
ability by assuring the Navy that the islands or land areas were under US control. The 
marines were stationed in most of the strategic spots in defending the SLOC from the 
homeland via the East Sea (Sea of Japan), the East China Sea and the Indian Ocean to 
the Persian Gulf as well as constraining the USSR and its allies from the sea, i.e., 
Okinawa, Subic Bay, the Marianas, and Hawaii. This function was the most likely to be 
passed over, but it protected the naval assets and advanced bases regardless of 
peacetime or wartime by providing a security detachment, according to the regulation of 
the amended National Security Act of 1947.
The distinguishing peacetime functions came from its characteristics of force-in- 
readiness to react anywhere, anytime by an order of the National Command Authority.
419 Michael E. Decker (1987), p. 78.
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In this sense, it could be regarded as a means for developing the foreign policy 
objectives by performing various missions, such as crisis intervention (the 32nd MEU in 
Beirut as a component of the Multinational Peacekeeping Force), search and rescue 
operations (the rescue operation of a detachment of the 3 rd Marine Division for the 
American container ship iMayaguez'> in May 1975), humanitarian and disaster relief, 
and evacuation of civilians from a dangerous area (the 32nd MAU in Lebanon in 1982), 
in the realm of the MOOTW as the Nation’s force-in-readiness envisioned by the 
amended National Security Act of 1947. The employment of the USMC in this region 
was affected by the nature of US geographical factors in association with the distance 
from its responsibilities as well as its allies and enemies. Whilst the purpose of an army 
presence was relatively limited to defending its stationing country, i.e., the 2nd Infantry 
Division in Korea against an invasion of North Korea, the marines were able to react to 
most regional political issues which needed military means.
The marines contributed to the improvement of diplomatic relations by ratifying 
bilateral military-to-military relations. For example, an organizational structure, the 
Joint Planning Committee (JPC) and the Ground, Air and Maritime Planning 
Subcommittees (GPSC, APSC and MPSC), was created to implement the “Guidelines 
for Japan-US Defence Cooperation” in 1979. The 3rd MEF is the only effective 
counterpart of the Japanese Ground Self Defence Force (JGSDF) based in Japan as 
distinct from any other American services. At the initial stage, the USN/USMC planners 
did not want to be involved in any bilateral activities, because they thought that it would 
interfere with the primary mission as an amphibious force readily available for
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commitment anywhere in the Asia-Pacific region.420 However, this attitude was 
changed emphasizing the importance of the American military presence in Japan with 
the Soviet military buildup in the Pacific in the early 1980s. As a result, they began to 
improve their mutual relationship via combined exercises, officer exchanges as well as 
the commander of the III MEF acting as ‘Deputy Co-Chairman” of the GPSC. 
Therefore, this combined relationship plays a major role in the development of the 
diplomatic relationship between the two countries by assuring and strengthening the 
mutual defence posture.
The wartime functions were to establish lodgements ashore in support of naval or land 
campaigns, to secure flank areas, or to seize the initiative in counteroffensive 
operations,421 under the command of the US Pacific Fleet to ultimately take hegemony 
in a war. The stationing base, Okinawa, is the very important strategic point in 
Northeast Asia forming a natural barrier to the East China Sea and the approaches to 
Korea as well as Japan’s southernmost main island of Kyushu in association with the 
marines’ main character of maritime projection function. According to the operational 
concept, a MEU, most likely the 31st MEU (SOC), would first proceed to the battlefront, 
and would deploy in several hours, and would be reinforced by a MEB (in the Pacific 
Fleet) in several days, and by a MEF in several weeks. If there were a war in the Korean 
peninsula, this operational concept would work efficaciously, because it might prevent 
escalation into a global war as it did in the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
However, if there were a war in Japan, it would escalate into a global war, considering
420 Ernest G. Ill Beinhart, “The United States Marine Corps and the Japanese Self Defense Force”, CSC 
Report 1985 (May 28, 1985), p. 31.
421 Caspar W. Weinberger (1987), p. 182.
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the importance of Japan in US foreign policy objectives as well as Japan’s status in 
international politics. In this case, the most likely scenario was a counterattack against 
at least a regimental size of a spearhead echelon of Soviet theatre operational landing 
forces on the northern part of Japan, when the JSDF had failed to repel the aggression 
under the terms of the Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation. In order to 
counterattack, it would be necessary to form the MEF size of MAGTF supported by the 
Navy’s Task Force within a short time, so as not to lose the initiative considering the 
characteristics of manoeuvre warfare in a modem war. However, if strictly assessing the 
US Navy’s amphibious lift capability, the possibility of a counterattack operation would 
have been really doubtful, not only because its amphibious lift capability with a rapid 
reaction was extremely limited, but also because the American priority of defence 
focused on the European theatre rather than Japan under the ‘swing strategy’. On the 
contrary, if a war was initiated in other areas, in Europe or the Indian Ocean, the 
marines of a MEB or MEF could have conducted amphibious raids on Petropavlovsk, 
the Kuriles, or elsewhere against Soviet naval bases to seize a secure key position on 
land in order to support the strategic naval goal of blockading the Soviet Navy in its 
territory.
Comparing the roles of the marines’ presence with those of the previous era, its 
fundamental roles of deterrence and defending the free world from Soviet expansion 
had not changed. With their return from the Vietnam War, their defensive posture 
contributed enormously to not only the defence of Japan and South Korea, but also 
deterring a threat from any potential enemy reflecting the reinforcement of the Soviet 
forces in the region. However, with the priority of the US foreign policy objectives and 
the increasing possibility of waging a global war against the USSR, the defence priority
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was focused more on Japan rather than on South Korea. Its peacetime and wartime 
functions should be separated from these roles. A major change was the establishment 
of the posture of force-in-readiness to perform various missions in terms of the 
MOOTW.
B. SNI
(1) Soviet Interests/ Foreign Policy
With Nixon’s visit to Moscow in 1972 and the agreement of the ABM treaty, the USSR 
felt that it had finally attained the longstanding foreign policy goal of ‘equality’ with the 
US in terms of international political influence throughout the world. It appears that it 
regarded detente as a giant step toward the Soviet-American condominium, so that
xL
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko stated on April 4 1974 during the 24 Party 
Congress of the CPSU that “Today, there is no question of any significance which can 
be decided without the Soviet Union or in opposition to it”. Along with the 
enunciation of Gromyko’s solemn remark, it pursued an active foreign policy to expand 
its political influence throughout the Middle East Asia and Africa, i.e., the Soviet-Cuban 
venture in Angola, which in its view was not of vital interest to the US.
Despite the fact that these kinds of Soviet intervention were regarded by the Americans 
as Soviet imperialism being again on the march as well as a symbol of American
A'*)'! ,  *
weakness, the USSR pursued even more actively its foreign intervention to expand 
its influence by rendering support to any nonaligned regime or national liberation
422 “Gromyko’s Report to the 24th Congress”, The Current Digest o f  the Soviet Press, No. 23 (April 20,
1974), p. 12.
423 Vladimir Petrov, “New Dimensions of Soviet Foreign Policy”, Franklin D Margiotta (ed.), Evolving 
Strategic Realities: Implications fo r US Policymakers (Washington, DC: NDUP, 1980), pp. 16-19.
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movement of its choosing. The Soviet leaders began to emphasize that the ‘global 
ideological struggle’ with the adversary must go on424. For example, a member of the 
Politburo, Mikhail Suslov, insisted in the 1970s that “support for national liberation 
movements would lead to the ultimate victory of socialism over imperialism”425. 
However, the ideological struggle was at that time not only being waged against the US 
and other imperial countries, but also against the PRC. Consequently, as it supported 22 
countries in Africa to counter the enlargement of the PRC’s influence, it had to resume 
the arduous and costly efforts to enhance its image as one of the world powers ‘equal’ to 
the US.426 One of the reasons for the Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan, its 
ally since the late 1950s, was Kabul’s tense relations with Pakistan, which was seen as a 
close ally of the PRC427. In this way, the Soviet invasion resulted in the struggle for 
hegemony in the Third World among the major powers including the PRC.
Although the USSR’s primary region of competition with the US lay in the European 
heartland, the priority of its foreign policy goals was slowly moving in the direction of 
the Asia-Pacific area, which was the source of a potentially critical challenge to Soviet
A'yo
power and prestige. In a triangular or quadrangular balance of power system, the 
Soviet foreign policy options in the Far East were inevitably limited. Japan’s growing 
potential in both economic and military capabilities, North Korea’s tilt towards the PRC, 
the Sino-Japanese and Sino-US rapprochement caused the regional balance of power to
424 Ibid., p. 19.
425 P.M.H. Bell (2001), p. 322.
426 Franklin D. Margiotta (1980), p. 20.
427 To lose Afghanistan to hostile forces would have meant that the USSR and its allies would be 
encircled by assorted enemies, from Japan to Norway. In the Soviet view, it was unable to abandon 
Afghanistan, since it had a substantial strategic value in maintaining a presence in the region along with 
Ethiopia and South Yemen, and as its immediate neighbour. See, ibid., pp. 30-34.
428 Chung Min Lee, The Emerging Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia (Seoul: RCPUK, 1989), p. 93.
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shift in favour of the US.429 As previously discussed, the priority of the Soviet interests 
in the Asia-Pacific region remained the isolation of the PRC by trying to avoid 
jeopardizing relations with the West, notably the US and Japan. One of the visible fruits 
was the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Treaty in November 1978. However, it failed to 
create a further network of bilateral treaties between the USSR and individual Asian 
countries in the Western Pacific area. It meant that, in the Soviet perception, all of the 
remaining Southeast Asian countries including the members of ASEAN had close 
military ties with the US.
In the late 1970s, there were two urgent matters of concern to the USSR regarding its 
foreign engagements in the Western Pacific region, arising from ideological and 
politico-strategic disputes between communist countries. The first was its continuous 
dispute with the PRC, which it was unable to normalize despite efforts, and which was 
closer to the US as a geographical partner in the East Asia together with Japan and 
South Korea.430 The second was the PRC’s confrontation with Vietnam, which was its 
principal ally in Southeast Asia. It supported the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea 
and tried to deter the Chinese invasion into Vietnam. In addition to these, the four 
Northern territories dispute with Japan remained serious. Given the situation of the 
complex interconnection of international relationships, it was unable to expand its 
influence in the Pacific anymore. With regard to this security environment, the USSR 
would fundamentally have a strong interest in removing the PRC, Japan and Korea from 
any active support for US forces or war efforts. From the above perspectives, the
429 J. Pollack & J. Solomon, “The Sino-Soviet Conflict and American Security Concerns”, the Rand 
Papers P-6288 (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, January 1977), pp. 3-4.
430 President Ford emphasized America’s special ties with Japan and the joint US-PRC opposition to any 
hegemony in Asia in the “Pacific Doctrine” in December 1975. Refer, Arnold L. Horelick, “Soviet 
Policy Dilemmas in Asia”, Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 6 (June 1977), p. 509.
3 39- 182
political goals of the USSR were extremely urgent to improve relations with the PRC at 
the expense of US/PRC ties, to prevent Japan from increasing its contribution to 
Western security, to unify Korea under communist rule, and to expand Soviet influence 
in Southeast/west Asia and the Indian Ocean431. After all, the foreign policy objectives 
in the region were decided by a combination of national security concerns and a desire 
to increase its influence.
(2) Military Strategy/ Policy
In some aspects, the Soviet military force buildup in this period is not easily explained 
by the principle of ‘sufficiency’ or ‘superiority’ in the fields of the number of troops and 
quantity of arms. Initially, the Brezhnev regime acquired its prestige in the international 
community by the most impressive military buildup, modernizing its nuclear and 
conventional military capabilities to exploit the post-Vietnam paralysis in the US. In 
other words, the intention of the military buildup by the Brezhnev regime was to use 
military power as a leverage to secure Western cooperation, which resulted in expanded 
military intervention such as that in Afghanistan.
In the field of nuclear strategy, the USSR declared in 1977 and 1982 that nuclear 
weapons would not be employed first, which was called a ‘no-first-use of nuclear 
weapons’,432 reflecting the US nuclear strategy of ‘flexible response’433. At that time,
431 Soviet Military Power (Washington, DC: GPO, March 1983, 2nd ed.), p. 35.
432 The USSR declared that it would not be the first to initiate nuclear war, G. Holden, The Warsaw Pact: 
Soviet Security and Bloc Politics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 58; Willard C. Frank & Philip S. 
Gillette (1992), p. 9.
433 The flexible response strategy is a product of the US attempts to avoid a nuclear holocaust by 
choosing a controlled and deliberate course of action for military response and action. See, Russell F. 
Weigley, The American Way o f War, ch. 17: ‘Strategies of Deterrence and of Action: The Strategy 
Intellectuals’, pp. 436-440. The shift of the US nuclear strategy from massive retaliation to flexible 
response contributed to create a more favourable climate for arms control negotiations.
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this was really arguable, because it may have implied that the USSR had no interest in 
nuclear war-fighting or that it retained it in reserve.434 Although that was not to say that 
it ruled out its first use of nuclear weapons at all levels, it appears that the possibility of 
a global nuclear war was enormously diminished considering the nuclear strategies of 
the two superpowers. However, when the Reagan administration began to introduce the 
new anti-missile defence system, SDI, the USSR could not disregard it and faced a 
dilemma almost impossible to resolve, because it could not afford to match it because of 
the unbearable cost, despite its repeated declarations of its confidence in being able to 
compete. With the projection of the SDI in the US, a new dimension of nuclear strategy 
beyond the ideas of mutual vulnerability and mutual deterrence represented by the ABM 
treaty was initiated435.
From the beginning of the 1970s under the Nixon Doctrine, the US began to turn to 
greater reliance on local paladins such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Japan, and 
South Korea, which began to be tightened into a more directly anti-Soviet encirclement. 
Furthermore, the Sino-US rapprochement was seen by the Soviets as the US drawing a 
more direct confrontational encirclement in the Asia-Pacific region. The implications in 
the military dimension of this encirclement were considerable, because the possibility of 
waging a two-front war became more realistic. As previously discussed, the USSR 
established an overwhelming superiority in terms of conventional forces in the 
European theatre and both blocs began to negotiate the MBFR. In stark contrast, the
434 It was nothing more than a declaratory statement, because it had a plan to employ nuclear weapons 
from the very start in the event of war with 12,000 tanks and 25,000 armored personnel carriers. Refer, 
James O. Jackson, “The Secret Plan for WWIII”, Time (July 4, 1994), pp. 22-23.
435 The USSR viewed the SDI as the result of the US intention to regain the option of a counterforce first 
strike by threatening to foil a Soviet retaliatory strike. In the Soviet view, it was not feasible, so it 
considered the SDI as an attempt to establish a political or even military use of a coercive first-strike 
capability. Raymond L. Garthoff (1989), pp. 247-250.
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Soviet view of its security in the Far East was really depressing, because it had to 
contend with a politico-military alignment between the West and the PRC in conditions 
where, unlike the Eastern Europe, it had virtually no buffer states, except for the 
Mongolian People’s Republic, which occupied the centre of the Sino-Soviet boundary. 
This threat perception was well represented by the warning of Marshal Ogarkov, then 
Chief of the General Staff, at the conference of senior Soviet officers in mid-1980 that 
“Broadening military contacts with China and increasing the supply of military 
equipment and technology, the Western powers count on pushing Peking toward openly 
aggressive actions against our country and the states of Southeast Asia”436.
In the stalemate of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, it pursued a 
strong military buildup policy coupled with an aggressive foreign policy objective. The 
Soviet leadership viewed its military power as a key means of accomplishing political 
and military objectives. Indeed, the Soviet security policies focused on the need to 
involve the political and military strategy of regional actors more directly, or to deny the 
benefits of Japan, the PRC and the US alignments437. As such, the USSR established the 
theatre command structures: the Western Strategic Command, controlling Soviet and 
Warsaw Pact forces west of the Urals and the Eastern Strategic Command, controlling
Q
Soviet Forces east of the Urals. Fundamentally, the Soviets were compelled to 
perform a two-front war, if a war in Europe occurred or vice versa, because it was 
possible to imagine that it would escalate into a global war. As such, the USSR
436 Gregory Flynn (1989), pp. 273-274.
437 Leszek Buszynski, “International Linkage and Regional Interests in Soviet Asia-Pacific Policy”, 
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Summer 1988), p.214.
438 College Station Texas, “Organizing for War: The Soviet Military Establishment Viewed Through the 
Prism of the Military District”, The College Station Paper Series, No. 2: MDA 903-80-C-0335, Project 
RF 4264 (September 1983), pp. 56-57.
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abandoned the ‘Swing Strategy’ (one theatre prepared to reinforce the other in a 
crisis)439, and reorganized the theatre o f military operations geographical concept (Teatr 
Voennykh Deistvii, abbreviated TVD) for wartime operations east o f the Urals in 1979 
(see Figure 4-6). This establishment was intended to allow the Far East Theatre 
comprising the Transbaykal, Far Eastern and Mongolian Military Districts (MDs) to 
fight independently without reinforcement at least for the initial stages o f combat. It 
made a significant contribution to the establishment, expansion and consolidation of 
Soviet power in the Far East against both Japanese and Chinese encroachment. However, 
it did not mean, as most analysts agreed, that the USSR pursued an offensive strategy 
against the PRC-US military alignment440. The purpose o f military buildup in the Far 
East TVD might be for deterrence, but it needed to maintain a sufficient level o f war- 
fighting capability.
Figure 4-6: The Soviet TVD Boundaries
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Source: The US GPO, Soviet Military Power 1985, p. 12.
4,9 For the details of the Soviet strategic operational models, refer Graham H. Turbiville and David M. 
Glantz, “Soviet Military Strategy: Context and Prospects (1990)”, Willard C. Frank & Philip S. Gillette 
(1992), pp. 326-330.
440 Gerald Segal, “Sino-Soviet Relations after Mao”, Adelphi Papers, No. 202 (Autumn 1985), p. 17.
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In this context, it appears that as Harry Gelman has discussed, the Soviet military
buildup in Far East implied the following purposes441:
Firstly, to defend its homeland from the PRC’s hostility. It deployed a number of Soviet divisions 
from the Pamirs to the Pacific, about 50 in the 1980s, and created the Far East Theatre of 
Military Operations (TVD) at the end of 1978 in order to upgrade operational efficacy of 
very widely dispersed forces against multiple potential adversaries. Furthermore, Soviet 
tactical airpower in Siberia and Far East was designated against China.
Secondly, to deter the US and Japanese forces. The Soviet buildup of the Pacific fleet was directed 
primarily against US and Japanese forces, and secondarily against the PRC. To defend its 
SSBNs in the Sea of Okhotsk bastion was a very important strategic configuration in terms 
of the withholding strategy within the nuclear strategy.
Thirdly, to put pressure on available US naval resources and to raise the political costs in the Far 
East of any US inclination to shift forces elsewhere, most likely to the Indian Ocean, in 
time of crisis, but it also affected the US option to assist NATO in time of war. Put 
succinctly, it did not have a pragmatic ally in the region, so it tried to overcome the 
stalemate via the buildup of strong armed forces to defend and deter all potential 
adversaries.
To conclude, the purpose of the Soviet military buildup was to seek measures to 
safeguard its security beyond its eastern borders considering the deep feeling of 
insecurity over its eastern territory.
(3) Maritime Strategy/ Policy
Along with the developments of the Soviet Navy and of the favourable nature of the 
maritime environment in terms of advanced base facilities, it seems that the Soviet 
naval leadership prudently reevaluated the role and place of a navy within the system of 
the component services of the armed forces to exalt the prestige value of the navy as a 
part of projecting the military and nonmilitary objectives of the state. As Soviet military 
theory supposed that strategic offense was the most important strategic stance of its
441 Harry Gelman, “The Soviet Union, East Asia and the West: the Kremlin’s Calculus of Opportunities 
and Risks”, Adelphi Papers No. 217 (Spring 1987), pp. 4-5.
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armed forces, one of the fundamental aims of the Soviet naval force buildup in the 
previous era (until the end of the Vietnam War) focused on rocket-firing submarines in 
the previous period which was to create a threat to US maritime dominance at sea, and 
which could threaten US naval forces by exploiting the submarine’s original 
characteristics of stealth.442 Given this achievement, the Soviet leaders slowly began to 
accept the basic theory of Gorshkov on the role and functions of seapower that any 
nation which aspires to global dominance needs to take control of the sea. It meant that 
the Soviet Navy tried to reemerge as an added instrument of political-military power to 
affect both international and regional power politics together with the active foreign 
policy objectives of the USSR, shedding the limited role of a force useful purely for 
protection of the sea flanks of the Soviet Army.
Gorshkov illuminated the role and place of navies within the system of component 
branches of the armed forces from 1972 to 1973 via 13 articles in Morskoi sbornik.
Here, he insisted that:
“If the USSR maintains a large and modem navy commensurate with its interests as a 
Great Power, and exploits the political influence potential provided by such a navy, it 
will be able to implement its policies more effectively both in peacetime and in
4 4 1
wartime”.
The focal point of this was divided into two categories: ‘the role and places of navies in
wars’ and ‘navies’ employment in peacetime as instruments of state foreign policy’. And,
his theory contained the following five fundamental theses444:
Firstly, given the increasing importance of the oceans as an arena of potential military conflict,
442 Andrei A. Kokoshin, Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917-91 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 
1998), pp. 170-172.
443 CRC 257, p. 19.
444 Without quotation marks, cited from ibid., pp. 2-3.
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and the navy’s special military features of high maneuverability, capability for covert 
concentration, and relative invulnerability to the effects of nuclear weapons compared with 
ground forces, the wartime importance of the navy is increasing,
Secondly, despite the introduction of nuclear weapons and the advent of detente, the armed forces 
have not lost their historic importance as instruments of state policy in either wartime or 
peacetime,
Thirdly, given the increasing economic and hence political importance of the oceans, and the navy’s 
special political features, the peacetime utility and importance of the navy are increasing, 
which gives it a unique position compared to the other branches of the armed forces as an 
instrument of foreign policy,
Fourthly, the structure of armed forces and the roles and places of their component branches can 
and do change, which are situationally dependent, e.g., maritime states must have navies as 
well as armies,
Lastly, there is a necessary link between the acquisition and maintenance of armed forces and the 
goals of the state policies. To achieve those goals, command echelons must have a shared 
understanding of the relative capabilities and optimal modes of employment of each 
branch of the armed forces.
On the basis of the above theses, the roles of the Soviet Navy in peacetime and wartime 
can be summarized as one of the instruments of state policy in peacetime and a 
powerful means for achieving the political goals of an armed struggle in war. The 
former would be considered as an added dimension to the role of the Navy with the 
enlargement of the Soviet political, military and economic investments in non- 
Communist countries of the Third World particularly from the mid-1960s. In order to do 
that, as Gorshkov said, “the diversity of the missions confronting us has brought about a 
requirement for numerous classes of surface ships each with its specific inventory of 
equipment”,445 it was necessary not only to make a substantial and sustained increase in 
the construction of ocean-going surface ships, but also to obtain base facilities in 
foreign states.
445 James M. McConnell, “Gorshkov’s Doctrine of Coercive Naval Diplomatic in Both Peace and War”, 
CRC 257, p. 105.
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However, it seems that his view was accepted almost at the end of the Vietnam war 
around the middle of 1974 as Marshal Grechko explicitly stated in the Voprosy istorii 
KPSS (Questions of CPSU History), “International functions of the armed forces had 
been given ‘new content’, and clearly implied that this was the protection and 
promotion of the overseas interests of the Soviet Union” . 4 4 6  In the 1970s, the use of the 
Soviet SSBNs was changed to the role of deterrent against nuclear escalation, from that 
of war fighting in the event of a general war in the 1960s. However, even for the 
deterrent purpose of nuclear submarines, he wanted to be able to counter the carriers 
directly by deploying them, equipped with the SS-N-21 Sampson SLCM and SS-NX-24 
SLCM, which would enable to them to threaten high-value targets, to their forward
i 447patrol areas.
Gorshkov considered the increase in surface warship construction as an essential 
component for being a blue water navy to protect Soviet interests abroad. From this 
time, the priority was shifted from its predominantly antisubmarine focus to a more 
balanced capability by projecting the construction of the Kiev-class carriers and Ivan 
itogov-class amphibious ships. As a result, it rapidly closed the extant gaps in the fields 
of aircraft carriers and amphibious forces lift capability, which extended its peacetime 
ability to support Soviet interests overseas with its deployments, operations, and 
overseas presence via most of the historic shipping choke points4 4 8  such as the 
crossroads of the Caribbean, Aden in the Indian Ocean, and Cam Ranh Bay in Southeast
446 Before that time, the strategic stance of the USSR would have been defensive rather than offensive. 
Because Brezhnev and Grechko stood on the opposite side of the cleavage with Gorshkov judging from 
their statements that “the missions of the Soviet armed forces is to defend the Soviet Union per se and 
the entire ‘Socialist Commonwealth’, refer, CRC 257, p. 25.
447 D. Conley, “Soviet Maritime Strategy”, Proceedings, Vol. 115/9/1039 (September 1989), pp. 49-52.
448 Robert J. Hanks, The Unnoticed Challenge: Soviet Maritime Strategy and the Global Choke Points 
(Washington, DC: Corporate Press, 1980), pp. 21-41.
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Sea beyond the Eurasian land mass (refer Table 4-9).
However, the construction programme of larger surface ships was resumed about 1983, 
reflecting the view of the General Staff4 4 9  that the Gorshkov theory had to be limited to 
the combat employment and structuring of the navy, except for the Ivan Rogov landing 
ship programme because of the threat to the Kuriles chain. 4 5 0  As a result, Gorshkov’s 
ambition to include the defence of Soviet interests in distant areas in peacetime was 
retrogressed. In addition to this, according to McConnell’s analysis of the Soviet Navy 
missions, Gorshkov’s assertion about the role of the SSBNs, an initial, deep-strike for a 
true strategic reach in the first moments of a general war was not accepted by the Soviet 
leadership.
Table 4-9: The Naval Balance between the US and USSR in 1987
Classification
Atlantic and Mediterranean Pacific and Indian Ocean
USSR US Remark USSR US Remark
Aircraft Carriers 0 7 -7 0 7 -7
Hel & VSTOL Carriers 3 6 -3 2 6 -4
Major Combatants Over 2000 Tons 94 106 -12 44 105 -61
Major Combatants Under 2000 Tons 90 0 +90 36 0 +36
Attack Submarines 185 54 +131 77 42 +35
Naval Aircraft 854 1,016 -162 461 1,016 -555
Source: Tom Gervasi, Soviet Military Power (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1988), pp. 8-9.
As such, the Soviet navy’s missions were limited to the level of defensive roles:0 to 
hold a force of ballistic-missile submarines in reserve for a secondary strike (called a
449 As indicated in the growth of the Soviet defence spending that the Soviet Defence Expenditure from 
1981-1984 remained the same at 17.054 bn Roubles lower than the 17.43 bn of 1976, the construction 
programme might be limited because of economic reasons. Refer, IISS, The Military Balance 1985- 
1986, pp. 17-20.
450 Michael MccGwire, “Gorshkov’s Navy: Part II”, Proceedings, Vol. 115/9/1039 (September 1989), p. 
44.
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‘Withholding strategy’)451, ©  to protect the insurance reserve in waters near home, (3) 
to protect the homeland against enemy seaborne air strikes, ®  to interdict the SLOCs 
of the Western allies. 4 5 2  However, as Gorshkov wrote, “The Soviet Navy, in the policy 
of our Party and state, acts as a factor for stabilizing the situation in different areas of 
the world, promoting the strengthening of peace and friendship between the peoples and 
restraining the aggressive striving of the imperialist states”453, the Soviet Navy was 
certainly built for the purpose of “force projection” into the Third World at the initial 
stage of this period.
In stark contrast, given the address of the General Secretary of the Communist Party, 
Leonid Brezhnev, about the importance of foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific Area at the 
party congress in March 1976, reflecting the fear of encirclement, the Soviet Pacific 
Fleet began to reinforce troops in the four southern islands of the Kurile chain and to 
build support facilities4 5 4  to use the Sea of Okhotsk for the deployment of SSBNs. 4 5 5  
At the highest point of the second Cold War, in the mid 1980s, the priority of the Soviet 
Pacific fleet Navy was upgraded compared with the other three fleets, reflecting the 
mood of arms control in Europe456, the naval arms race in the Indian Ocean, its 
adherence to the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the importance of the Sea of Okhotsk as a 
base for SSBNs (refer Table 4-10). In addition to some ports in North Korea457, the
451 Refer, Michael Sheehan & James H. Wyllie (1986), p. 262.
452 James M. McConnell, “Strategy and Missions of the Soviet Navy in the Year 2000”, in James L. 
George (ed.), Problems o f  Sea Power as We Approach the Twenty-First Century (Washington, DC: 
American Enterprise Institute, 1978), pp. 39-67; George W. Baer (1994), p. 420.
453 S.G. Gorshkov (1979), p. 277.
454 For example, a conventional submarine was reported some nine miles north of Petropavlovsk at the 
small port of Bitchivinka, and some Yankee SSBNs replaced at ports on Peter the Great Bay because of 
the increase of the number of Delta SSBNs. Norman Polmar (1991), pp. 418-420.
455 Michael MccGwire (September 1989), p. 42.
456 In some aspect, the priority of the European theatre was relatively downgraded, resulting from the 
judgment that commanding the Norwegian Sea was too difficult, see George W. Baer (1994), p. 423.
457 In 1975, North Korea permitted the Soviets to use the port of Najin on the northeast coast and in the
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opening of an advanced base, Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam , as a support base, provided 
a bridge role between Vladivostok and the Soviet bases in the Indian Ocean, i.e., 
Barbera in Somalia. This expanded the Pacific fleet’s operational radius throughout the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Table 4-10: The Naval Strengths of the Pacific Area in 1987
Classification StrategicForces Pacific Fleet
Abroad (Regular Deployment)
Indian/Yemen Vietnam
Submarines 32(385 SLBM) 76: 26 SSGN/SSG, 50 SSN/SS 0-1 2-4
PSC
82: 2 Carriers (V/STOL, Kz'ev-Class)8, 
14 Cruisers, 13 DD, 22 FF,
31 Corvettes
1-2 3-4
OSC 140 1-2 3-4
MCMV 96
Amphibious 21 (included 2 Rogov LPD) 1 0-1
Auxiliaries 135 6-8 9-12
Notes: PSC (Principal Surface Combatants), OSC (Other Surface Combatants), MCMV (Mine Counter- 
Measure Vessel).
a: Minsk (assigned in 1979) and Novorosiysk (assigned in 1984)
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 1987-1988, pp. 44-45.
Nonetheless, as the role of the Soviet navy remained at the level of the defence of its 
homeland first459, the missions of the Pacific fleet were, as Robert S. Wood defined, five 
fold460: 0  the protection of its ballistic missile submarines as a strategic nuclear 
reserve force, (2) the establishment of a maritime defence perimeter around the Soviet 
Union, ®  the destruction of US ballistic missile submarines as they departed their
early 1980s Wonsan, Hungnam on the east coast and Nampo and Haeju on the west coast were added 
to the Soviet access list. See, Norman Polmar (1991), p. 44.
458 The value lay in its proximity to the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the PRC and East Asian countries 
as located 2,200 nautical miles southwest of Vladivostok.
459 Soviet planning for the Far Eastern Theatre envisioned Far East TVD and the Pacific TVD. In 
wartime, the USSR employed intermediate High Commands of Forces in TVDs, which had a ground 
force asset as well as navy and air force assets. As a result, the naval operation of the Pacific fleet was 
inevitably subordinated to the Far East TVD in wartime. The Soviet aim in the region for a global war 
was to deter the PRC’s entry against the USSR, that is, to avoid land war in Asia, refer, Tom Gervasi 
(1988), pp. 18-21.
460 Robert S. Wood, “Sovet Naval Operations in the Pacific During a Global War”, Dalchoong Kim & 
Doug-Woon Cho (eds.), Korean Sea Power and the Pacific Era (Seoul: IEWS Yonsei University, 1990), 
pp. 38-39.
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Pacific base at Bangor, Washington, on the way to their operating areas, ®  the 
interdiction of the sea lines of communications, especially to and from Japan and Korea, 
and ©  the protection of their own sea lines of communications such as those to 
Petropavlovsk. In addition to these defensive missions, it had the potential capability to 
perform any kind of offensive mission consisting of large submarine and surface forces 
supported by two Kiev-class VSTOL carriers as well as the undeniable amphibious lift 
capability including two Ivan Rogov-class ships (refer Figure 4-7) . 4 6 1
Figure 4-7: The Organisation of the Soviet Pacific Fleet
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Sources: John Jordan, Modern Soviet Navy (London: Salamander, 1982), p. 12; Norman Polmar, The 
Naval Institute Guide to the Soviet Navy (Annapolis, ML: USNI, 1991), p. 16.
Put succinctly, it had to oppose the PRC, the US and their allies (South Korea, Japan, 
etc.) in war, and perform operations and deploy its power throughout the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans to support the growth and development of national liberation movements 
and socialist revolutions by the expansion of Soviet influence in the Pacific region as 
the peacetime mission of the Gorshkov theory had suggested. Of course, the Pacific
461 Norman Polmar (1991), p. 19.
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fleet including naval forces abroad was controlled by the Far Eastern TVD with its 
establishment in 1978.462
In order to achieve this, it continuously enlarged its operational radius and expanded the 
Soviet naval forces participating in exercises via filling a naval power vacuum in the 
wake of the US withdrawal. For example, a reported 220 ships and 400 aircraft 
participated in the global scale exercise Okean 75 under unified Moscow control via 
satellite4 6 3  compared with the Okean-70 (refer Figure 3-2). The purposes of this 
exercise would be not only to demonstrate its anti-SLOC operation capability in order to 
give a chilling warning against any future Western political or military action in the 
Third World, but also to convince Soviet leaders of its ability to pursue Soviet interests 
abroad during the latter stages of five-year economic plans. 4 6 4  And, as Table 4-9 and 4- 
10 show, the Soviets established a significant naval presence in the Indian Ocean and 
the Western Pacific, which provided political leverage against the regional countries 
including Japan and the members of ASEAN, and which provided a credible sea denial 
capability able to compete with the US in terms of maritime dominion in most of the 
Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. For the first time, the Soviet Navy participated in a 
Crisis Response operation in the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, and defended a 
Communist state against the PRC by dispatching two major battle groups to the South 
China Sea off Vietnam and to the East China Sea off the Chinese coast. 4 6 5
462 David C. Isby, Weapons and Tactics o f the Soviet Army (London: Jane’s, 1988), pp. 16-18.
463 Defence of Japan (1976), p. 17.
464 Andrew W. Hull, “Their Surface Forces”, Proceedings, Vol. 108/10/956 (October 1982), pp. 57-58. 
After that, this size of exercise was not undertaken again until the end of the Cold War probably 
because of the deployments in the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans and the change of strategic view 
focusing on the ground forces for the defence of the homeland.
465 Bruce W. Watson (1982), pp. 138-139.
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Despite the fact that the number of Soviet ships visiting Pacific area ports had increased 
to 156 by 1980466, the number of visiting ports and days spent in port were significantly 
decreased due to the influence of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Notwithstanding 
the above activities and operations, it was difficult to reverse the inferior position of the 
Soviet Pacific Fleet. In the long run, the Gorshkov theory was ended as an uncompleted 
masterpiece of maritime strategy due to the geo-strategic restraints and unchangeable 
mind-set of the high military / political commanders as well as a deficiency in economic 
support.
(4) The Development of the SNI
(A) General Rise and Fall
Given the transitions in the military and maritime environments in association with the 
active foreign policy objectives, the USSR needed the capability of conducting 
amphibious landings in order to undertake eventual war against the US and to show its 
ability to intervene in the Third World to support its interests overseas by constructing a 
large transoceanic amphibious capability. Reflecting the peacetime employment of the 
Soviet Navy, the peacetime mission of the SNI, overseas presence stationing would be 
in place at the start of a conflict, and so was added to the fundamental role and functions. 
From 1979, the SNI was enhanced by its burgeoning equipment inventory and 
personnel numbers. As a result, at the end of the Cold War, it was made up of 
approximately 18,000 troops, and its strength, organic firepower, and mobility including 
numerous artillery echelons such as artillery and rocket companies was improved (refer 
Figure 4-8).
466 Gerry S. Thomas, “Their Pacific Fleet”, Proceedings, Vol. 108/10/956 (October 1982), p. 87.
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Figure 4-8: Composition of the SNI Regiment
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Sources: Louis N. Buffardi, The Soviet Naval Infantry: DDB-1200-146-80 (Washington, DC: Defense
Intelligence Agency, August 1, 1979), pp. 3-4.
The primary mission of the SNI was amphibious assault, which could be accomplished 
through landings of various types such as strategic, operational, tactical, reconnaissance 
and sabotage landings depending upon the scale and mission of the landing. The 
secondary mission of the SNI was mainly considered as coastal defence in which its 
doctrine paralleled that of the ground forces. 4 6 7  The concept of strategic landing was 
conducted in support of theatre forces in opening up a new front of military operations, 
whilst the operational landing was made to assist ground or naval forces in a coastal
467 Louis N. Buffardi, The Soviet Naval Infantry: DDB-1200-146-80 (Washington, DC: Defence 
Intelligence Agency, August 1 1979), p. 13.
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region to surround and destroy the enemy in that area. The tactical landing and 
reconnaissance and sabotage landings were conducted by a battalion or less, operating 
independently or in conjunction with ground force units. A distinction was made 
between them according to the purpose of employment.
(B) Amphibious Lift Capability
At the initial stage of this period, the Soviet amphibious lift capability for the SNI still 
remained at the level of tactical amphibious landing operations, even though it was 
deployed simultaneously in the North, South, West and East of the Soviet Union in the 
Okean-15 exercise. As a part of the construction programme of larger surface ships, in 
1975 the first of the highly-capable Ropucha-class LSTs, and in 1978 the first Soviet 
LPD Ivan Rogov, powered by two gas turbines, entered service. In 1987, a total of 190 
amphibious landing vessels for the SNI, some 84 amphibious landing ships and more 
than 100 landing craft, were listed by the IISS (refer Table 4-11).
Table 4-11: Soviet Landing Ships and Craft in 1987
Classifications Quantity Carrying Capacity Pacific
LPD IvanRogov 2
One full battalion, six Ka-25 helicopters, 30 APCs and 20 
tanks, and three Gus- and two Lebed- class LCACs 2
LST Ropucha 23 10 tanks and 190 troops 8Alligator 14 39 medium tanks or APCs or a third of regiment 5
LSM Polnocny 45 6 tanks or 8-10 APCs and 180 troops 6MP-class n.a 10 tanks or 12 APCs and 200 troops (half battalion) 2
LCU Vydra 15 250 tons fewSMB-1 15 250 tons
LCM Ondatra 50 tons or 1 tank
LCAC
Aist 20 Four light tanks plus 50 troops or 3 APCs plus 100 troops Aist, 
Gus, 
Lebed- 
class: 24 
others: 
few
Tsaplya 1 25 troops
lebed 20 2 light tanks or 120 troops
Utenok 2 1 tank or 25 troops
Gus 31 24-36 men
Orlan 1 1 tank or 25 troops
Total 190+
Sources: IISS, The Military Balance 1987-1988, p. 38, Jane’s Fighting Ships 1989-1990; 2003-2004
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In addition to the above formal amphibious ships, the Soviet sealift capability was based 
primarily on its large merchant fleet, more than 1,700 ships in the forms of barge 
carriers, roll-on/roll-off cargo ships, and roll-on/float-off ships, whose combined 
deadweight tonnage exceeded 22 million. Considering the fact that these ships were 
frequently used to transport arms and the forces of friendly states in support of Soviet 
foreign policy objectives, if the Soviets had wanted to project its forces via sea routes, it 
might not have caused them serious problems in terms of sealift capability.
Given the improvement in the amphibious life capability, the new operational concept 
of the Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) that the Soviet forces would attempt to use 
to wreak destruction rapidly throughout the enemy’s areas, the SNI had come to practice 
more ambitious operational assaults such as “Comradeship-In-Arms 1980”, Zapad-81 
and Schchit-82, pushing large forces at high speed deeper into the enemy rear by 
widespread use of hovercraft and helicopters under the missions of operational and 
strategic landings. A strategic landing was not conducted by the SNI until 1979. In these 
exercises, the SNI demonstrated its upgraded ability for strategic amphibious landings 
as the main part of multinational forces in which Polish and East German marine forces 
comprised the first wave of any major assault469. The implication of these exercises was 
that it demonstrated its readiness to take advantage of opportunities for expansion, and 
to support Soviet foreign interests in the world. 4 7 0  However, considering the locations 
of the SNI adjacent to the very hot points of a possible major war with the Western 
alliance, the transition of military strategic thinking that a direct confrontation with the
468 Soviet Military Power 1987, pp. 97.
469 STC CR-57, p. 74.
470 Dominik George Nargele, “Their Naval Infantry”, Proceedings, Vol. 108/10/956 (October 1982), pp. 
152-153.
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US could be avoided, and the compositions of the projection forces of the USSR and 
US471, it was likely that the SNI did not conceive of a mission to conduct a large-scale 
amphibious landing operation at a point far away from the homeland.
(C) The SNI in the Pacific
In the above situation, the strength of the Soviet Pacific Fleet NI (SPFNI) in 1984 
increased from one regiment with about 4,000 troops to one division with 7,000 troops 
comprising two infantry, one tank and artillery regiments, as the largest among the four 
fleets 4 7 2  In addition, the amphibious lift capability of the Soviet Pacific fleet was 
enormously reinforced by the deployment of the Ivan Rogov-class dock landing ship 
(LPD)s, “Ivan Rogov”, being the first amphibious ship over 10,000 tons in the Soviet 
Navy in 1979, and the “Aleksandr Nikolaev” with the increase of the SNI in 1984, to 
increase amphibious lift capability. 4 7 3
Table 4-12: The DeflEnQplovments of the SPFNI
Size Place Mission
Div HQs, Main Forces Vladivostok Strategic Reserve
Elements (n.a) Slavyanka (Sino-Soviet border) Defence
1 Regiment and Spetsnaz bde Petropavlovsk Naval Base Defence
1 Battalion Simushir Island & Etorofu Island (the Kurile Chain & Northern Territory) Defence /  Deterrence
1 Detachment Cam Ranh Bay Support Foreign Policy
1 Battalion Dahlak archipelago (Ethiopia, Red Sea) Support Foreign Policy
Sources: “Soviet Naval Infantry and Amphibious Lift in the Pacific”, Armed Forces (October 1988), p.
448; etc.
471 The SNI was a relatively very small size compared with the airborne troops (10 air assault brigades 
and 7 airborne divisions). The US possessed two divisions, an air assault and airborne division each. 
The Military Balance 1987-1988, p. 17 & 34. It means that the Soviets focused on short distance 
operations where airpower could cover the troops. Actually, the Soviet Pacific Fleet Air Force strike 
assets (over 90 Backfire and Badger aircraft armed with cruise missiles), Soviet Air Force strike 
platforms (Backfire and Bear G armed with AS-4 and AS-6 cruise missiles), and 250 tactical aircraft 
(i.e., Fencer) were serious medium- and long-range threats to the Western Allied Forces around Japan, 
the Kuriles, and the Kamchatka peninsula. Refer, The US GPO, Soviet Military Power (1988), p. 123.
472 For the details of the reorganization of the SPFNI, refer Armed Forces (October 1988), pp. 446-448.
473 Naotoshi Sakonjo, “Superpower Naval Rivalry in the Pacific”, NUPI Report, No. 128 (June 1989), p. 
46.
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As such, the SPFNI was the most suitable means for not only an offensive strategic 
counterforce projection against the US alliance and PRC, but also an intervention force 
to achieve its foreign policy objective, the expansion of Soviet influence throughout the 
Third World (see Table 4-12).
(D) The Roles and Functions of the SNI
The SPFNI was deployed throughout the Northern territory-four islands off the northern 
coast of the Japanese island of Hokkaido-this was Moscow’s intention to support its
claim to the islands with military force. In this regard, it was employed for the purpose
of political coercion against Japan. Moreover, it operated as a forward defence force, 
since these islands had a strategic value forming not only a gateway between the Sea of 
Okhotsk and the Pacific Ocean, but also a defensive barrier protecting the Eastern 
USSR and being a vital link for securing Pacific Fleet operations474. As a valuable 
political and military means, the SPFNI was dispatched to support the Rene government 
in the Seychelles, when it was threatened by internal disruption. This kind of 
contingency mission was continued by the routine deployment of Soviet amphibious 
ships with SPFNI embarking to Third World areas, and by a near continuous presence in 
the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans as well as by conducting joint amphibious 
landing exercises with relevant countries, i.e., Syria in the Mediterranean in 1981 in 
which the SNI of the Black Sea Fleet participated. 4 7 5
The Soviet Pacific Fleet also performed large-scale amphibious landing operations in 
the Western Pacific Area. For example, the strategic purpose of the Soviet amphibious
474 Soviet Military Power 1983, pp. 51-52.
475 Soviet Military Power 1985, pp. 103-104.
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landing to simulate an attack on Japan’s Hokkaido Island aimed at controlling the Soya- 
misaki and Nemurokaiko straits was apparently to secure the Sea of Okhotsk as a 
sanctuary for ‘Delta IIP SSBNs in time of tension or war. 4 7 6  This was the largest 
landing exercise until then, and probably aimed to demonstrate its amphibious 
capability to the Western allies and the countries in the region in order to gain some 
advantage in pursuit of its interests overseas. In fact, at that time, the Western military 
planners expected that a world war would begin with the Soviets seizing the North of
« t h  * ♦ ♦ •the Japanese island of Hokkaido or other Pacific islands. The 79 Motor Rifle Division 
based at Leonipovo-Sakhilinsk and the 342nd Motor Rifle Division at Yuzhno- 
Sakhilinsk were believed to be second echelon formations for such operations, which 
would be delivered by the Soviet Pacific merchant fleet. 4 7 7  In this case, the mission of 
the SNI was to form the spearhead echelon of a large-scale offensive operation.
It appears that in having respectable global capabilities, the SPFNI significantly 
benefited from Gorshkov’s theory of a balanced naval force for peacetime and wartime 
missions compared with others. Of course, as he wrote that “the goals of a war were 
achieved mostly by taking over the territory of the enemy, successful operations of a
An o
fleet against the shore brought a better result than the operations of fleet against fleet’ , 
the goal of the SNI expansion in the region would be to counter the triangle alliance of 
Japan, the PRC and the US. However, with the enlargement of Soviet naval power, the 
USSR was able to employ it as a means for developing Soviet interests overseas by their
476 Kensuke Ebata, “Soviets Simulate Attack on Japan”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 4, No. 13 
(September 28, 1985), p. 664.
477 The Soviet Pacific merchant fleet had a capacity to transport up to seven motorized divisions in a 
single lift operation, see Armed Forces (October 1988), p. 450; Mark L. Urban, “Power Projection by 
Sea: The Role of Soviet Naval Infantry”, Defence (March 1983), pp. 154-155.
478 S.G. Gorshkov (1979), p. 214.
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naval presence and exercises throughout the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The SPFNI was 
also greatly expanded, and was dispatched and participated in operations as a part of the 
Soviet naval power and of joint services military training manoeuvres. Although, 
Gorshkov did not mention the role of the SNI in peacetime, the political significance of
the embarked SNI is represented by the words that:
“The symbolic presence of amphibious and SNI units has far outweighed whatever 
combat impact they could bring, but in superpower politics, symbolism has often 
assumed great significance. One side or the other can ‘send messages’ to its opponent 
or to an ally with displays such as these”479
To summarize, a fleet with the SNI embarked would make an intention clearer than if 
the fleet only comprised battleships. The expansion of the SNI brought about a synergy 
effect between the construction of surface ships and submarines in peacetime. In the 
long run, it could be said, the SNI was one of the most useful means of gaining political 
influence in the Asia-Pacific region indicating its superpower status.
3. Conclusions
The foreign policy of the USSR toward the Third World became more aggressive within 
the scope of not provoking the US so that a small intervention would not escalate into a 
direct military confrontation as seen in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which was 
not one of the intrinsically critical areas of US foreign interests. On the contrary, the 
Carter administration and its successors attempted to re-establish US predominance by 
changing the agendas of world politics in the light of both nuclear parity and the 
aftermath of the Vietnam War. Yet, the exclusion of the use of force by the US Congress
479 Armed Forces (October 1988), p. 448.
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in the areas where its interests were not critical, inhibited more active military 
intervention or defence against the USSR’s expansionism in the Third World as seen in 
the cases of Ethiopia and Somalia4 8 0  except for maybe the unique case of Lebanon. As 
in these cases, notwithstanding the changes of its foreign policy toward the Third World, 
the US also did not want to raise a direct military confrontation with the USSR 
throughout the world. They shared a common interest in wanting to avoid war and 
nuclear confrontation despite political and ideological conflicts. Consequently, it was 
not surprising that it proved possible to avoid a third world war.
In this period, Soviet military forces had been increasingly employed by the Soviet 
leadership in projecting foreign policy interests, which supported the expansion of 
Soviet influence through ideological propaganda and economic assistance. However, its 
over-intervention and the budget investment in its military arsenal including the 
technology for the anti-ballistic missile system in order to pursue strategic parity, was 
beyond its capacity and contributed significantly to the disintegration of the USSR itself. 
If its goal remained the preservation of its influence at the level of status quo, its 
military power would be sufficient, as the former Soviet Minister of Defense Andrei A
Grechko explained:
At the present stage, the historic function o f the Soviet Armed Forces is not restricted 
merely to their function of defending the Motherland and other socialist countries. In 
its foreign policy activities, Soviet state policy actively, purposefully opposes the 
export of counterrevolution and the policy of oppression, supports the national
480 With the naval arms race in the Northwest Indian Ocean area particularly from 1978, the US needed 
to establish an advance military base in this area. But, Ethiopia was a pro-Moscow country militarily 
and politically so that the US did not do so, despite the fact that it had provided substantial food aid 
which in 1985 amounted to almost $300m to solve the problem of the dire food shortage. And, it 
provided military assistance to Somalia, but it did not go beyond keeping the balance of power in the 
horn of Africa, because of the hostility between Ethiopia and Somalia. See, Donald Petterson, 
“Ethiopia Abandoned? An American Perspective”, International Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Autumn 1986), 
pp. 627-644.
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liberation struggle, and resolutely resists imperialist aggression in whatever distant 
region of the planet it may appear.481
In stark contrast, the US reacted not immoderately, but very rationally to the Soviet 
activities, i.e., the organization of the RDJFT for the Indian Ocean. This is not to say 
that the US had stopped the buildup of its conventional forces, but that it had 
concentrated its force procurement on long-range, mobile forces, since the threat was an 
ocean away, which led to an emphasis on the buildup of the navy and air force in the 
planning process. In reality, the procurement efforts to possess a 600-ship Navy 
including the expansion of carrier battle groups, increased the focus of attention on the 
readiness of all three services, i.e., the effort of the US Air force to expand long-range 
air transport capabilities.
The main security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region at this time interlocked the 
USSR-PRC-US triangle with their corresponding allies. Any shift in political relations 
between two sides in the triangle was immediately felt by the third side, which sooner
AQ1}or later took some compensatory steps. It appears that the strategy of every country 
in the region was fundamentally aimed at maximizing its own interests and increasing 
the power of its own position, which made it clash in varying degrees of intensity with 
the interests and positions of any other country in the region. A good example of this is 
the improvement in US-PRC relations, which was the key foreign policy objective of 
the US in order to preserve its hegemony established in the period after WWII, because
481 Dimitri K. Simes, “Assessing Soviet National Security Strategy”, in Terry L. Heyns (ed.), 
Understanding US Strategy: A Reader (Washington, DC: NDU, 1983), p. 214.
482 According to Thomas Hayward’s remark, interestingly, China was perhaps more in control o f the 
strategic focus of this triangle than either the US or USSR. See, Thomas B. Hayward, “Strategic 
Implications of Soviet-US Relations on the Asia Pacific Region”, paper presented at the Soviet- 
American Conference on the Asia-Pacific Region. (Moscow, June 1988),p. 21.
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it had begun to lose its initiative with the withdrawal from Vietnam, despite the 
demonstration of a massive military capability. In this connection, the USSR had two 
prime security concerns. Firstly, there was the sanctity of the Sino-Soviet border, where 
both sides faced each other and weapons were targeted in a more serious confrontation 
than any other in the European theatre. Secondly, the safeguarding of its satellite 
countries in and around Southwest and Southeast Asia was a crucial task for the USSR 
considering the sign of the weakening of US influence after the Vietnam War.
The Soviet basic military capabilities improved during the 1970s and provided the 
USSR with rough strategic parity, in some aspects quantitatively outnumbering the US, 
i.e., the number of nuclear weapons and ships, as well as a new conventional capability. 
The Asia-Pacific area was the region where the arms race continued particularly in 
terms of naval armaments, although other armaments, including nuclear, were also on 
the increase. In terms of nuclear strategy, despite the fact that the US had maintained a 
sea-based nuclear presence with the Seventh Fleet, there was no declaratory retaliation 
policy like the flexible response policy of NATO. As Norman Friedman has pointed out, 
the US naval forces in the Far East deterred the Soviets from massing sufficient forces 
to attack Japan, and reassured the PRC, and as a result, it indirectly helped to keep the 
very large Soviet army and air forces tied down on the Chinese border.
The presence of the US naval force was perceived by the USSR as the main force for its 
encirclement by Japan, the PRC, South Korea, and the US, which served to keep it 
essentially in a landlocked condition in terms of the ‘naval power’ described by Colin S.
483 Norman Friedman, The US Maritime Strategy (London: Jane’s, 1988), p. 121.
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Gray484. In these circumstances, the USSR was forced to respond to the US naval power 
projection485, because any general war between the two blocs, particularly in Europe, 
could instantly trigger a worldwide naval war from the Pacific to the Atlantic theatre. 
The purpose of the Soviet naval buildup concentrating on the fields of aircraft carrier 
and amphibious forces was at least ensuring the establishment of an equally favourable 
balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. As most political commentators have 
analysed, the reinforcement of the SPF did not largely influence the PRC and ASEAN, 
because the former possessed adequate resources for strategic self-sufficiency as a 
potential ally of the US and the latter had realized that Marxism was not the best way to 
bring rapid economic growth. As the Cold War ended without the outbreak of a real 
war, considering the geo-strategic environment of this region, it is impossible to believe 
the assumption that the ultimate goal of the Soviet military forces buildup in the region 
was to create a war against the US and its allies even if it had an offensive military 
strategy.
In this period, the US maritime strategy was clearly concerned with sea control for the 
SLOCs and power projection, whilst the USSR never lost the concept of using its naval 
power to pursue its interests as an instrument of its foreign policy. It does not mean that 
their respective use of maritime power was completely different, that is, ‘two sides of a 
coin’. Without the capability to protect the SLOCs, the power projection itself might not 
be guaranteed. This is the reason why Gorshkov tried to construct a balanced force.
484 Colin S. Gray (1986), p. 9.
485 Of course, there was another critical reason for the USSR, as Christopher Coker has pointed out, “the 
USSR may well have concluded that it needed to build up its strength in the area to restore the global 
correlation of forces, because US enthusiasm for playing the China card and rearming Japan had not 
diminished”. Put simply, the increase of the USSR naval power projection capability was the reflection 
of the US-USSR military rivalry in the Pacific. See, Christopher Coker, “The Myth or Reality of the 
Pacific Century”, The Washington Quarterly (Summer 1988), p. 13.
486 Gerry S. Thomas (1982), pp. 86-87.
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However his experiment ended like an unfinished masterpiece because of the 
unbearable economic cost. Strictly speaking, the Gorshkov theory was logically to 
construct a balanced naval force. In the 1980s, the Soviet Navy had reached the level of 
being an ocean-going fleet capable of competing with the US Navy.
Until the end of the 1970s, the US enjoyed an advantage over the USSR in nearly all the 
important areas which constituted a maritime balance, and these advantages were slowly 
reduced over the 1980s as the USSR continued to augment and improve its naval forces. 
According to the analysis of James F. Dunnigan, the SNI ranked second only to the US 
among the world’s amphibious forces, it was a distant second with a quality rating of 70
AQH JOO
points compared with the 106.2 of the US. As Roger M. Jaroch has analysed , even 
though it was possible for the SNI to deploy only regiments/brigades, the SNI narrowed 
the gaps compared with the abilities of the MAB in the field of ship-to-shore movement, 
and weapons and equipment by the strengthening of its organization compared with that 
of the previous era (refer Figure 3-3, Figure 4-8). According to his analysis, the SNI had 
surpassed the US Marines in the field of the portion of forces deployable by amphibious 
lift and the ability to cross obstacles and beaches. Of course, the former was supposed 
only in the case of its employment in the European theatre, where its objectives were 
located relatively close to its home base. Even so, it was true that the SNI had 
developed a capability to compare with the USMC, which meant it had brought itself up 
to the level of a global maritime projection force.
As Figure 4-9 shows, the Soviet amphibious lift capability, apart from the overall
487 James F. Dunnigan (1982), pp. 202.
488 Roger M. Jaroch, Lieutenant Colonel (USMC), “Amphibious Forces: Theirs and Ours”, Proceedings, 
Vol. 108/11957 (November 1982), pp. 41-48.
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maritime balance between the US and USSR, was certainly smaller than that o f the US 
not in terms o f the number o f ships, but o f the full load and submerged displacement. 
Between 1965 and 1987, the Soviet amphibious ship tonnage more than doubled, whilst 
its numbers remained at the same level. This suggests that the SNI was structured 
appropriately for its mission o f supporting the flanks o f the ground forces as well as 
seizing key objectives and the strategic straits near the periphery o f the Soviet landmass. 
This is evidenced from its exercises that were all “ limited in size, scope and duration; 
and ...w ere all conducted inside the range o f land-based air and logistic support’'489, 
whilst the USMC remained the most valuable strategic forces capable o f reacting by 
undertaking any kind o f mission anywhere anytime in the world under any conditions.
Figure 4-9: US and Soviet Navy Force Level Comparison
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484 Neville H Cross, “Soviet Naval Assault Forces”, Navy International (November 1990), p. 415.
Even though the Soviet Studies Research Centre (SSRC) in the Royal Military Academy 
at Sandhurst estimates that the ability of the SNI to back the carrier-based air force 
would enable the Soviets to develop a longer range amphibious capability on an 
operational or strategic level490, its ability to project its power beyond the reach of their 
land-based aviation was restricted by the deficiency in the Soviet ability to provide 
carrier-based air support4 9 1  compared with that of the US. In stark contrast, the US 
constructed larger amphibious ships to project power at great distances from American 
shores capable of carrying manpower and equipment including aircraft assets, reflecting 
the doctrinal development of the OTH concept. Consequently, the USMC’s ability in 
conjunction with the US Navy enabled the US not only to extend its military power at 
almost any point of the Eurasian rim, but also to exert a greater influence worldwide, in 
areas that were vital to the USSR’s interests, as well as deter their presence throughout 
the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean.
To conclude, in geo-strategic terms, the two superpowers’ interests covered great 
distances from the both their countries except for the two frontiers of Europe and the 
Far East, i.e., Indian Ocean, the Middle East, and Western Africa. The US power 
projection forces remained generally superior to those of the USSR in terms of long- 
range power projection capability4 9 2  despite the Soviet development of airlift capacity, 
amphibious shipping assets including the extension of the SNI organisation, and its 
basic infrastructure 4 9 3  However, with the enlargement of the Soviet Navy throughout
490 STC CR-57, p. 83.
491 According to the Japanese analysis, the range of the SS-20 missile and operational radius of the 
Backfire Bomber covered most o f the possible conflict area in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, 
including the entire Japanese archipelago, the Korean peninsula, and Taiwan. See, Defence o f Japan 
1980, p. 56.
492 Soviet Military Power (1988), pp. 131-132,
493 One of the most important preconditions for amphibious landing operation in wartime is local air and
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the Pacific and Indian Oceans to support the Soviet foreign policy objectives towards 
the Third World, the embarkation of the SNI on Soviet ships had significantly 
influenced other states’ attitudes towards the USSR in terms of a peacetime role494. Here, 
it is assumed as a principle that amphibious forces would be an attractive means for 
pursuing foreign policy objectives when a country has an open sea route to project its 
power via ocean either in wartime or peacetime. It is one of the main reasons why a 
state develops amphibious forces.
maritime superiority to soften-up the enemy’s shore forces and to guarantee the free manoeuvre of the 
task forces.
494 According to an analysis, some cadres from the SNI acted as military advisors in the use of riverine 
and coastal amphibious techniques to North Korean, Vietnam and Kampuchean military leaderships, 
see Bradley Hahn (1984), p. 16.
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Chapter V. In the Post-Cold War Era
1. General Factors
A. International Security Environment
From the late 1980s, the two superpowers began to move towards a peaceful 
relationship with a clearer agreement about what was or was not an appropriate stance 
toward the other in order to terminate the longstanding confrontation of the Cold War. 
The highlight of this was the proclamation of the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that 
the USSR would unilaterally reduce its conventional forces by 500,000 men -removing 
six divisions from Eastern Europe, declared at the UN on December 7, 198 8 495, 
following the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in Geneva in December 
1987. This kind of concession by Gorbachev on arms control and proposals for cutting 
the armed forces to levels of “sufficiency” rather than maintaining parity with the US4 9 6  
caused a rapid relaxation of tension throughout the world. Despite the fact that 
Gorbachev faced an increasingly difficult domestic situation, the improvement of the 
security situation between East and West proved irreversible; it was a natural 
phenomenon of that time.
Meanwhile, the reunification of Germany, which had been a fundamental cause of 
conflict in Europe, was a turning point for the end of the Cold War, and facilitated a 
major process of multilateral integration and peaceful cooperation in Europe, i.e., the
495 Blackwill. D.R. & Larrabee. S.F. (eds.), Conventional Arms Control and East-West Security (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1989), p. xxiv.
496 Matthew Evangelista, “Norms, Heresthetics and the End of the Cold War”, Journal o f Cold War 
Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter 2001), p. 9.
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treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht in December 1991, the Partnership for 
Peace (PFP), and NATO’s enlargement. 4 9 7  It meant that the East-West confrontation in 
Europe, the most dangerous area for a possible nuclear war in the world, had come to an 
end. In addition to this, NATO representing North America and Western Europe clearly 
emerged as one of the most powerful structures in the world in the field of security and 
defence.
These kinds of changes in the distribution of power and influence, and the peace making 
movement within Europe in the international system pushed the US and USSR to 
improve their relations. More specifically, the Soviet-American rivalry within the 
bipolar structure had broken down, and the international system of the 1990s seemed to 
slowly move toward polycentrism or uni-polycentrism under the influence of the US. 
Notwithstanding this, Russia remained one of the dominant military powers. The 
confirmation of this belief took place during the Gulf War of 1990-91. In this war, the 
two superpowers were in close cooperation with one another, so that the USSR did not 
use its veto on behalf of Iraq. As a result, this war did not escalate into a general war, 
and was eventually terminated by the efforts of the US, Allies, and the UN. The second 
attestation would be the series of the Strategic Arms Reduction agreements (START) I 
(May 23, 1992, entering force December 5, 1994), II (Jan 3, 1993), START III 
guidelines agreed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at the Helsinki Summit (March 
1997) and the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programmes. The successor state of 
the USSR, Russia, which could not afford to maintain its nuclear arsenals effectively,
497 S. George and I. Bache, Politics in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 
122-124.
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proposed deeper cuts to the level of 1,000-1,500 warheads. 4 9 8  Moreover, most of the 
former states of the USSR, where nuclear warheads had been deployed or held during 
the Cold War era, needed some help from the US to dismantle their nuclear arsenals as a 
part of the CTR agreement499. Meanwhile, Presidents Yeltsin and Bush signed the 
Washington Charter, which stated that ‘Russia and the US do not regard each other as 
adversaries and are developing a relationship of partnership and friendship’500. However, 
as most strategists expected, Russia has never abandoned its nuclear option, which it 
needs to preserve its prestige in world politics. 5 0 1
Nonetheless, outwardly, the most significant evidence of the demise of the military 
alliance in the Cold War occurred in the War on Terror against Afghanistan in 2001. In 
this war, most states, not only the US’s Cold War alliances, Russia which was the main 
rival during the Cold war period, and China which is a new potential enemy in the new 
post Cold War era, but also most Islamic countries expressed their sympathies and 
promised positive support including the authority to use their military assets. In 
particular, NATO invoked Article Five , its mutual defence clause, for the first time, in 
its more than 50-year history. This movement was clearly seen as possibly opening up a 
collective response from most countries in the world against a new kind of war as
498 CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPQLITICS/02/09/nuclear.review/index.html>. accessed: 
September 23, 2003.
499 For example, the US is planning to contribute a total sum of $ 2.7 billion to Ukraine. See Office of 
Assistance Secretary of Defence (Public Affairs), “Correction: United States and Ukraine Extend 
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement”, News Release No. 365-99 (August 5, 1999).
500 The Washington Charter includes expanded political dialogue at all levels; co-operation in multilateral 
institutions; regional co-operation; co-operation in non-proliferation and on measures to counter 
terrorism and drug problems. Paul D. Wolfowiz, “The US -Russian Strategic Partnership”, in Stephen 
Sestanovich (ed.), Rethinking Russia’s National Interests (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1994), pp. 64-7.
501 Refer below, “The Russian Interests and Foreign Policy”.
502 NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, “on the North Atlantic Council Decision On 
Implementation Of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 September Attacks against the 
United States”, Statement to the Press (September 12, 2001).
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declared by US President Bush and the alliance.
The end of the Cold War has made the possibility of a world scale war using total 
resources including the nuclear arsenals of a country or its allies almost impossible as 
the confrontation structure between East and West has collapsed. Nonetheless, various 
conflicts deriving from religious or ethnic discord, which had happened during the Cold 
War era, have now become preeminent, e.g., the Timor Civil War (1975-1999) between 
the pro-Indonesian faction and Indonesians (volunteers) vs. the faction claiming the 
immediate independence of Timor (leftist faction), the Middle East War (I: 1948-49, II: 
1956, III: 1967, IV: 1973) between Israel vs. Egypt and Syria, or intensified and 
increasingly complicated, e. g., the Chechen Conflict (1994- ) with the Russian 
government vs. the Chechen armed forces. Moreover, the international community has a 
serious concern about the transfer or proliferation of mass destruction weapons (nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons), including ballistic missiles and other delivery 
vehicles, which are feared to aggravate regional conflicts503.
With these changes, the dominance of the superpowers began to be challenged by the 
resistance of the Third World to military intervention. The superpowers also recognized 
this. The collapse of bipolarity facilitated the restoration of the UN’s original roles, the 
objectives of its establishment: securing peace, promoting economic progress and the 
attainment of human rights, establishing a new world order on the issues of the Third 
World as well as mediating in regional conflicts which masqueraded under the 
justifications of the protection of the human rights, environmental issues and the need of 
poorer or weaker countries. The good examples of these categories were the US and UN
503 Defence o f Japan 1996, pp. 3-4 and 228-238.
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led operations in Somalia (1992-1995), and the UN operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(1992- )504. The Gulf War could be classified as one of the US and UN led operations.
To conclude, the characteristics of this period could be put forward that “low politics” 
involving human rights, anti-colonialism, racism and economic prosperity slowly began 
to predominate, replacing “high politics” such as military/ national/ security/ strategic/ 
ideological concerns in consideration of national interests. Consequently, the 
superpowers should have adopted a more pragmatic and low-key approach to most 
internal and international issues occurring throughout the world. The superpowers 
recognized what they could or could not do in solving those conflicts. In the field of the 
military, the operations led by the US and UN have significantly increased. Put simply, 
it could be summarized that the international system itself has changed from a survival 
game of ideological/ military confrontation between the two blocs to the punishment of 
rogue states, preservation of the status quo and human rights.
B. Regional Security Environment
After Gorbachev came to power in the USSR, there also appeared a change in the 
security situation in this region reflecting the transformation of most aspects of Soviet 
foreign policy. In this regard, Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech on July 28505, 1986 
responded to the most important point of the Chinese demands that was to withdraw a 
substantial part of Soviet troops from the Soviet-Chinese border, which had been 
declining in numbers since 1990 after the announcement of Gorbachev about a
504 However, during the Kosovo War, Russia opposed the NATO air strikes on Serbia. It participated in 
the UN peacekeeping operations in Kosovo aft§r the war to preserve its national interests.
505 Ramesh Thakur & Caryle A. Thayer (eds.), The Soviet Union as an Asia-Pacific Power (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1987), pp. 201-205.
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unilateral reduction of Soviet military forces in the Far East in May 1989. The 
withdrawal from Mongolia was completed in 1992; only 3,000 administrative troops 
remained506; the reduction of the ground forces from the border unilaterally by Russia
cn7
was from 450,000 to 190,000 troops . It meant not only that their readiness posture 
was at a lower level than before, but it also saw the end of the antagonism between the 
Russians and Chinese which had commenced in the late 1950s.
The collapse of the USSR caused Russia and the PRC to reexamine and adjust their 
foreign policies so that they moved quickly to establish treaties with other countries as 
well as those within their own blocs, e.g., the PRC with the former Soviet republics. The 
ROK established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in September 1990 and 
with the PRC in August 1992. Moreover, after the Japanese Emperor visited the PRC 
for the first time in history in November 1992, the PRC and Japan agreed to initiate a 
bilateral security agreement in May 1992. Diplomatic relations between the US and 
Vietnam, which had been broken since the Vietnam War, were normalized in July 1995. 
The decisive point is that relations between Russia and the PRC, which had long been 
sour, have now substantially improved. Regarding these kinds of improved relationships, 
the security environment in this region was seen as moving in a peaceful direction like 
that in Europe. Nonetheless, the critical issues, such as the Northern Territories dispute 
between Japan and Russia, and the division of the Korean peninsula, remain unsettled.
The Korean peninsula remains one of the two divided countries in East Asia (the other 
is the PRC and Taiwan, which is viewed by most politicians and strategists as having
506 IISS, The Military Balance 1992-1993, pp. 89-90.
507 Defence o f Japan 1996, p. 30.
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been integrated into one country, even though each has its own political entity as an 
independent state), where local stability and security are closely intertwined with the 
regional and global interests of the four major powers, in what may be called, a 
quadrangle. However, the concept of a de facto alliance has significantly changed 
concerning the surrounding four major powers. As Russia pronounced in the early 
1990s509, the PRC is also slowly changing its position following the nuclear crisis of 
1994 in the peninsula regarding the DPRK’s desire that in a war situation it would 
dispatch the PLA to a Korean war as it did in the Korean War in the 1950s,. The PRC’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman announced in the latter part of 1995, “China 
does not believe the friendship treaty is a treaty requiring the dispatch of military 
forces”510. Furthermore, Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan (later the Foreign Minister 
by 2001) said on an official visit to South Korea that the PRC-DPRK treaty was a “dead 
document”511. Judging from these kinds of statements, both are considering the DPRK 
as a neighbour rather than an ally to prepare to join in a future war, especially if  the 
DPRK initiates such a war. However, it seems that the reason that they do not abrogate 
the mutual treaties completely is to strengthen their influence in the Korean 
peninsula on issues such as the nuclear negotiations as a last resort in a worst-case
508 Of course, Taiwan wants to maintain contact with the PRC as a relation of “state-to-state”, whilst the 
PRC considers it as a wayward province. The Chinese position is that this is a domestic matter in which 
nobody can intervene. See, Financial Times, July 24, 1999, p. 2.
509 After ratifying their diplomatic relationship, ROK and Russia are continuing a high level of political 
dialogue by way of deepening partnership relations. However, as seen in the dialogues of the high level 
politicians of Russia and DPRK, they have agreed to the gradual renewal of the ACMAT which 
articulated that if each party met a war situation, the other party must immediately support it. V. I. 
Denisov, “Russia and the Problem of Korean Unification”, Tae-Hwan Kwak (ed.), The Four Powers 
and Korean Unification Strategies (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1997), pp. 39-41.
510 Global Security Organisation. “Oplan 5027 Major Theater War”, on 
<http://www.globalsecuritv.org/militarv/ops/oplan-5027-1 .htm>. accessed: August 30, 2004.
511 Ibid.
512 According to the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chief of Staff, Jong-Hwan Kim, at the Parliamentary 
Inspection of the MoD on Oct 5, 2004, Russia amended the automatic military intervention article in 
the ACMAT to a matter for consultation in Feb 2000, but the PRC has not amended it up to today. 
Chosunilbo, “4*, ^r°1] xl^ [ th e  PRC will provide limited military
forces support to the DPRK in a war situation]”, October 6, 2004.
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scenario.
During the 1990s, most nations in the region had initiated proposals for a new 
multilateral security structure reflecting the fluctuation in the major power relations 
between Japan, the PRC, Russia and the US. The strategic options facing countries 
across the region have become much more complex than has been generally appreciated. 
With the Asian economic crisis as well as the demise of the Cold War, every nation’s 
security concerns have focused on seemingly boundless economic growth first. The next 
issue is the growing problem of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, which
c n
became a global issue after May 1994 and which cannot be solved easily. In terms of 
the de facto military alliance, North Korea is continuously losing support so that it has 
almost been quarantined from the outside world. Because of this, it has firmly held on to 
the nuclear option and would not discard the nuclear option, but prefers to use it as a 
last resort in negotiations with others as well as gaining external respect. Lastly, even 
though it has almost been in abeyance because of the rise of the war on terror initiated 
after September 11, 2001, the US plan to establish a Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) 
system together with its bilateral alliance with Taiwan provoked a political reaction 
from the PRC514. In reality, the US steadily surveyed the Chinese intentions regarding 
their efforts to modernize their military forces and improve their power-projection
513 Robert A. Manning & James J. Przystup, “Asia’s Transition Diplomacy: Hedging Against 
Futureshock”, Survival, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Autumn 1999), pp. 45-46.
514 The Chinese Defence White Paper in July 1998 described, “Hegemonism and power politics remain 
the main threats to global peace and stability... the enlargement of military blocs and the strengthening 
of military alliances have added factors of instability”. China’s State Council, Defence White Paper 
1998, Beijing, July 1988; Russia and China have strongly disagreed with the Bush Administration 
nuclear policy concerning the large-scale missile defence so that they have consistently warned that the 
NMD is a threat to Russia and China, see Washington Post, ‘Missile Defence: A Golbal Approach’, 
April 8, 2001, p. B07.
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capabilities all of which would be spurring concerns.515
The regional security environment can be summarized as an era in which there is no 
certain rival to the major powers, whilst the Korean peninsula remains divided, and 
there are still about 1,765,000 active armed forces personnel facing each other: 
1,082,000 of North Korea and 683,000 of South Korea516. In this period after the demise 
of the Cold War, the nuclear and conventional forces are not in balance so that, 
according to Snyder’s explanation, North Korea is trying to compensate for its 
inferiority in terms of alliance strategy by making nuclear weapons a top priority . 
This is still a very heated issue. However, it is not easy for the US to solve this issue 
unilaterally, whether peacefully or by forceful means, because the balance of power 
system in the Cold War has not completely disappeared. It means that the interests of 
the major powers concerning the two Koreas have not been satisfactorily settled, 
regarding not only the Korean peninsula, but also Northeast Asia.
The balance of power system in the Northeast Asian region is becoming more dynamic 
and autonomous, but less predictable than it was during the Cold War, because this 
region is still the intersecting point of the struggle for world power. The PRC has not 
completely become a capitalist country, because its lingering conservative orientated 
leadership has pursued a more ideologically-based foreign policy and increased
515 The US DoD, Report o f  the Quadrennial Defence Review (May 1997, Section II), p. 3.
516 IISS, The Military Balance 2000-2001, pp. 202-203.
517 Because, the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula was initiated on November 16 1990 at the request 
of the North Korean ambassador to UN which proposed the simultaneous nuclear facilities inspection 
of USFK and North Korea for allowing IAEA inspection just after the unification of Germany. Refer, 
regarding the chronology of major events related to North Korean nuclear issues, see, The Korean 
Defence White Paper 2000, p. 302-302. Regarding Snyder’s explanation, see Michael Sheehan (1996),
p. 181.
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confrontation with its neighbours518, whilst most of the others, notably those in Eastern 
Europe except for a few countries such as North Korea, have given up their political 
identities based on ideology519. Japan’s strategic behaviour driven by nationalism has 
rekindled historical concerns long held by other Asian states. The territorial dispute 
between Japan and Russia has remained, which is not an issue to be solved via 
multilateral or bilateral security politics. Even though Russian armed forces are no 
longer able to threaten their neighbours, because of the worsening economic situation 
with its financial constraints and uncertainties, it tries to remain a major nuclear power 
by modernizing its nuclear capabilities. As mentioned above, this region is still 
dominated by the confrontation between the two Koreas. As such, surprisingly it 
appears that there is no further development in the military dimension compared with 
that of the Cold War era unlike the diplomatic atmosphere of reconciliation as well as 
the pursuit of economic advantage as a foreign policy objective. Consequently, the 
modernization of armed forces in East Asia has continued , running counter to the 
world trend of arms reduction, particularly in Europe.
518 William T. Tow, “Reshaping Asia-Pacific Security”, The Journal o f East Asian Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 
1 (Winter / Spring 1994), p. 90.
519 In the aftermath of the ending of the Cold War, the US and the other Asian countries assumed that the 
PRC would replace the role of the USSR in the Cold War in the 21st century. In this context, it was true 
for a while that a future US-Chinese Cold War could not be ruled out, which came from either a 
function of the pathological need for an enemy in the post-Soviet age or a worry about its own capacity 
to shape international relations into the 21st century. Michael Cox, “New China: new Cold War?”, Ken 
Booth (ed.), Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), pp. 240-243.
520 As IISS observed, there is considerable doubt whether the Russian military would be able to fight 
effectively, because the military budget would depend heavily on economic development, see IISS, 
Strategic Survey 1992-1993, p. 73; Regarding the Russian nuclear submarines, see, Barbara Starr, 
“USN Keeps an Eye on Old Foes and Allies”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 19, No. 21 (May 22, 1993), 
p. 8; and refer the subchapter V. B: RNI, particularly the Russian military and maritime strategy/policy.
521 IISS concluded that there is an arms race in the region. As it pointed out, the most interesting factor is 
that most of the improvements to capability involve naval and air forces which are suitable for 
projecting military force in a region. For the details of regional trends and each country’s arms 
procurement, see, IISS, The Military Balance 1993-1994, pp. 146-149; 2003-2004, pp. 145-149; see 
below Table 5-1.
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C. Maritime Dominion
With the collapse of the Cold War order, the crucial change in terms of maritime 
dominion is the absence of Russia, the most powerful rival, from the competition, so
♦ • ^99that maritime hegemony has been gained by the US-Japan alliance . Moreover, the 
US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty was redefined to revitalize the strategic alliance in 
April 1996, in which the Japan Prime Minister Hashimoto and US President Bill 
Clinton considered its role as the keystone of US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region 
and agreed to expand it by enlarging the areas of cooperation. However, because low 
politics now assumed greater importance than high politics, the traditional concept of 
the ‘command of the sea’ in wartime also became almost obsolete524. In stark contrast, 
the ‘command of the sea’ for the protection of the SLOC in peacetime is rapidly 
emerging as the most important issue.
In reality, Japan had realized from the first that among the regional countries, it had a 
strategic weakness in the protection of its SLOC. As such, Japan went public with its 
resolve to overcome its vulnerability to the interception of oceangoing trade. Prime 
Minister Suzuki Zenko’s statement in May 1981 declared that Japan would attempt to
<9<defend its sea lines of communication (SLOC) to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles. 
Despite this recognition, during the Cold War, this programme was viewed as
522 Positively, as long as nuclear weapons are concerned, it is difficult to say so. However, as IISS and the 
Japanese Defence Agency analysed, it is true that Russian Naval forces’ activities in the Far East are at 
an extremely low level. Defense o f  Japan 1996, p. 37.
523 The National Institute for Defence Studies, Japan (JNIDS), East Asian Strategic Review 2000 (Tokyo: 
NIDS, 2000), pp. 122-124.
524 As noticed, the US and USSR/Russia were interested in SLOC from mainly the military standpoint in 
the Cold War, but South Korea was also interested in SLOC mainly from an economic standpoint 
because of its limited naval capabilities in the confrontation with North Korea.
525 Nihon Kaijyo Jieitai, “Japan Maritime Self Defence Force”, 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/world/japan/jmsdf.htm>. accessed: October 6, 2004. Actually, this category of 
JSDF’s roles and missions were legitimized as part of US strategies to contain the USSR in the 1980s.
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“unrealistic, unauthorized, and impossible” even within the Japanese Defence Agency, 
because of constitutional and other legal restrictions, which allowed only limited 
activities such as surveillance assistance, intelligence sharing, and search-and-rescue 
support to US naval forces. This programme led to a naval arms race in the region. For 
example, as Eric Heginbotham wrote, this kind of Japanese movement toward a blue 
water navy has been a major rationale for naval expansion during the post-Cold War era, 
because most South Korean military planners are implicitly considering that Japan, 
which is currently a neighbouring democracy, would be a potential threat after Korean 
unification. As explained in the regional security environment, the security dilemma 
would be the fundamental cause of a naval arms race, because a state, as William T. 
Tow has discussed, assumes that “other states hostile to itself develop or procure new 
weapons systems with the intent of coercing it into submission”527.
MO
In addition to this, with the growing threat of maritime piracy to commercial shipping
526 Eric Heginbotham, “The Fall and Rise of Navies in East Asia: Military Organisation, Domestic Policy, 
and Grand Strategy”, International Security, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Fall 2002), pp. 92-93.
527 William T. Tow (1994), p. 116. The antagonism between the Japanese and Koreans based on historic 
relations is not simple. According to the recent joint survey of Korea, China and Japan conducted by 
Korean Dongailbo, Japanese Asahi-Shinmun and the Chinese Academy of Social Science Research 
Center, 63 percent of Koreans and 64 percent of Chinese disliked Japan whilst 8 percent of each 
country’s population liked Japan. The Japanese also disliked Korea and China, 22 and 28 percent. 
Regarding the Japanese bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, 87 % of Koreans and 
84 % of Chinese opposed this. Concerning the Japanese Self-Defence Force’s involvement in non­
combat overseas duties, 68% of Koreans and 93 % of Chinese opposed this. Of course, these results 
might reflect the recent conflicts between the three countries such as the history textbook problem and 
the Japanese claim to the Korean controlled Dokdo Islands. However, it could be said that these kinds 
of unfavourable results can be produced at anytime, and will be a potential cause of a future conflict. 
See, Dongailbo, April 27,2005.
528 The definition of piracy defined by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is violence on the high 
seas, defined as beyond any state’s 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. Most commercial ships of the 
East Asian countries are sailing through the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia and Indonesia, which 
is the world’s most piracy infested channel. More than two thirds of the attacks reported to the 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB), a division of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), are 
occurring in Asian waters. See, The USCINCPAC Virtual Information center (VIC), Primer: Piracy in 
Asia (VIC, 31 Oct 2003), p. 2; Ali M. Koknar, “Piracy and Terrorism are joining forces and creating 
troubled waters for the maritime industry”,
<http://www.securitvmanagement.com/librarv/001617.html>. accessed: October 04, 2004.
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and the economic traffic of the sea, the protection of SLOC in peacetime and the 
territorial authority of the islands on the high seas came to be at stake among the 
countries in the region. In this regard, Japan and the PRC are competing to develop tacit 
alliances along the sea-lanes linking East Asian economies with the Persian Gulf and 
Indonesian oil. Furthermore, the competition for potentially oil-rich sea beds 
surrounding the Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China Sea has led to military 
confrontations and fueled an intense regional arms race involving the PRC and five
<90lesser powers, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, The Philippines, and Vietnam. Naval 
forces have emerged as an integral part of achieving a nation’s interests in association 
with protection of SLOC and territory within and outside a state’s territorial waters. 
During the Cold War, it was possible for each state to get support from the de facto 
alliance, but changed regional/ maritime security environments demanded that each 
country acquired sufficient naval forces to protect its own interests using its own 
resources. There were other causes, but this was the main reason for a naval force build­
up in each country (refer Table 5-1).
As Table 5-1 shows, it is difficult to find any evidence of arms races in the quantity of 
main arms, but it is true that the numbers of manpower in most countries except for 
China, Philippines and Taiwan, have increased. To speak more precisely, the strengths 
of the navies of the countries surrounding the straits of Malacca and involving countries 
which are party to the islands dispute have been enlarged. One remarkable fact is that 
the Thai Navy obtained the Chakri Naruetet, a 10,000-ton Spanish-built-aircraff carrier 
equipped with eight Sea Harrier fighters and six Seahawk Helicopters on March 20,
529 The US Energy Information Administration (EIA), “South China Sea Region”, 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/schina.html>. accessed: October 6, 2004.
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1997. This was the first instance of the acquisition of an aircraft carrier among East 
Asian countries. Most countries are modernizing their ships while decommissioning old 
ships. According to Eric Heginbotham’s analysis, since 1980, the aggregate East Asian 
naval tonnage has increased by 69 percent, while the average age of warships has 
decreased530.
Table 5-1: Naval Developments in the Maior Asian Countries
Classifications 1985 2 0 0 2 Remarks
China
M anpower (AF /  Total) 86 ,500 /  350 ,000 1 0 ,0 0 0 /2 5 0 ,0 0 0 -7 6 ,5 0 0 / - 1 00 ,000
Surface /  Sub /Air 5 6 /  1 1 0 /8 0 0 6 3 / 6 9 / 5 1 7 7 / - 4 1 / - 2 8 3
Indonesia
M anpower (AF /  Total) 1 2 ,0 0 0 /3 6 ,9 5 0 1 2 ,0 0 0 /4 0 ,0 0 0 0 /3 ,0 5 0
Surface /  Sub /  Air 1 3 / 2 / 4 3 1 7 / 2 / 1 7 4 / 0 / - 2 6
Japan
M anpower (N o AF) 4 4 ,000 44 ,400 400
Surface/ Sub /  Air 4 9 / 1 4 / 1 4 8 ■ 5 4 / 1 6 / 1 7 1 5 / 2 / 2 3
Malaysia
M anpower (AF /  Total) 2 Commandos /  9 ,000 1 Com m ando U nit/ 12,000 - 1  Com  U/  3 ,000
Surface /  Sub /  Air 3 / 0 / 0 4 / 0 / 6 1 / 0 / 6
Philippines
M anpower (AF /  Total) 9 ,600  / 28 ,000 7 ,500 /  24 ,000 -1 ,9 0 0 /  -4 ,000
Surface /  Sub /  Air 7 / 0 / 0 1 / 0 / 8 - 6 / 0 / 8
Taiwan
M anpower (AF /  Total) 39 ,000  /  77 ,000 30 ,000  /  62 ,000 -9 ,0 0 0 / - 1 5,000
Surface /  Sub /  Air 3 6 / 2 / 1 2 3 2 / 4 / 5 2 - 4 / 2 / 4 0
Thailand
Manpower (AF /  Total) 1 3 ,0 0 0 /3 2 ,2 0 0 1 8 ,0 0 0 /6 8 ,0 0 0 5 ,000 /  35 ,800
Surface /  Sub /  Air /  AC 1 3 / 0 / 3 0 / 0 1 3 / 0 / 5 2 / 1 0 / 0 / 2 2
Vietnam
M anpower (AF /  Total) N. R. /1 2 ,0 0 0 2 7 ,0 0 0 /4 2 ,0 0 0 N .R . /  30 ,000
Surface /  Sub /  Air 8 / 0 / 0 6 / 2 / 0 - 2 / 2 / 0
-Note: Surface (Principle Surface Combatants only), Sub (Strategic and Tactical Submarine), Air (Aircraft
and Helicopter), AF (Amphibious forces)
Sources: IISS, The Military Balance 1985-1986, pp. 111-137; 2002-2003, pp. 145-168.
To summarise, it appears that the Japan-US alliance still has regional maritime 
superiority in the event of the outbreak of war, despite the fact that the US naval forces
530 Eric Heginbotham (2002), p. 86.
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were withdrawn from Subic Naval Base and Cubi Point Naval Air Station in the
M 1 •Philippines by the end of 1992 . This arrangement may not work properly in
peacetime, because it is not easy for the Japan-US alliance to protect or intervene on 
each other’s behalf. The last course of action for minor powers is to build up their own 
naval power to fill the power vacuum formed by the US force reduction. So, the main 
reason for a naval arms race would be a combination of the end of the Cold War, the 
development of a regional multi-polarity, the importance of SLOC protection, and an 
insecure maritime environment, i.e., maritime piracy, including remote islands territorial 
disputes caused by the uncertainty of the law of the sea.
2. Independent Variables and Their Effects
A. USMC
(1) The US Interests/ Foreign Policy
With the concessions of Gorbachev, US foreign policy under President George Bush 
was changed to a relationship of relaxation with the USSR compared with that of 
Ronald Reagan. Moreover, with the ending of the Cold War, there was no overriding 
ideological challenge or preeminent rival like the USSR. This environment provided an
531 The Philippine Senate rejected the renewal of the Base agreement, and set in motion a total US 
withdrawal. However, the US-Philippine mutual defence treaty is still working. Most military 
personnel were disestablished, and 1,200 were transferred to Guam Base, which included VRC-50 (the 
airborne logistics support squadron for the US Seventh Fleet), Naval Special Warfare Unit One 
(SEALs), Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit Five, and personnel from a number of other units such as 
the Ship Repair Facility and the Naval Hospital. The high values of the Subic/ Cubi Point facility, as a 
US Asia-Pacific military “footprint”, were not only bridge bases of logistics and training between the 
Western Pacific (Guam and Hawaii) Fleet bases and Japan or South Korea (its geographical location), 
but also the availability of all major training and logistics functions at a single site. See, Global 
Security Organisation, “Subic Bay Naval Station”, in
<http://golbalsecuritv.org/militarv/facilities/subic bav.htm>. accessed: October 12,2004.
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opportunity for the US to shape a new global order, which was articulated by the 
Clinton administration centered on a traditional liberal worldview on the basis of the 
assumption that major international war was unlikely. US diplomatic and military 
powers assumed the status of unique superpower throughout the world for the first time 
in history, which meant that the US was urged to embrace its responsibilities throughout
MO
the world as a uniquely reliable country. Nonetheless, the US was unable to manage 
all regional challenges by itself, because of the dynamics of power politics. For example,
MO
as is seen in Kosovo , the support of allies and the UN Security Council were a critical 
precondition for US military intervention in the post-Cold War world, because the 
others, notably Russia, were deeply reluctant to accept any UN action in association 
with NATO attacks on Slavic forces.534
In this sense, it seems that the image of US global interests and objectives are entwined 
in the themes of the end of the Cold War and the putative New World Order. 
Consequently, the US inevitably took a step forward for world peace together with the 
rest of major world powers, as the statement of President Bush on Feb 13, 2001 shows 
when he declared that, “Transatlantic security and stability is a vital American interest, 
and our unity is essential for peace in the world... Nothing must ever divide us”. It 
meant that whatever identities, e.g., ‘free market’, ‘globalization’, ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ and ‘democracy promotion’ the US advocated, or whatever strong
532 The US National Security Strategy described this situation: “Never has American leadership been 
more essential to navigate the shoals of the world’s new dangers and to capitalize on its opportunities”, 
see The US White House, A National Security Strategy o f Engagement and Enlargement (February
1996), p. 1.
533 Regarding US responses to the New International System, refer, Karl K. Schonberg, “Paradigm 
Regained: The New Consensus in US Foreign Policy”, Security Dialogue 2001 PRIO, SAGE 
Publications, Vol. 32(4), p. 439-452.
534 Carl M. Cannon, “From Bosnia to Kosovo”, National Journal, Vol. 33, No. 14 (April 3, 1999), p. 880.
535 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remark by the President to the Troops and 
Personnel”, in <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/20010213-1 .html>. February 13, 2001.
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diplomatic or military power the US has, it was not easy to intervene in other countries’ 
domestic matters without firm support from the other major powers. In this regard, one 
of the central thrusts of US foreign policy objectives to perform the US national 
Security Strategy in the post-Cold War is to strengthen and adapt the security 
relationship, because it realized that it could not always accomplish its foreign policy 
goals unilaterally with the divergent interests of international actors. Consequently, 
there is no doubt that not only the North Atlantic Alliance and its original Cold War 
alliance in the Asia-Pacific region, but also that partnership with Russia and good 
relations with the PRC would play an important role in US foreign policy.
In the diplomatic and geo-strategic senses, the Asia-Pacific community is ranked second 
top among the strategic priorities set out by President Clinton in his 1997 State of the 
Union Address . It seemed that Soviet disintegration and its receding military powers 
marked the end of the de facto alliance’s military confrontation in the context of East 
versus West conflict, but it is difficult to completely disregard the historical 
relationships and geopolitical components of the Cold War order. The curiosity of this 
situation was the puzzle of why the US did not redefine the concept of the alliance 
despite the fact that it diplomatically employed the PRC as a potential friend against the 
Soviet threat. In stark contrast, the American interests emerged as the extension of the 
Cold War by the strengthening of the relationship with the old alliance. Here, there 
might be many reasons, as most politicians and US officials have observed, that: ©  the 
uncertain regional security environments including the Russians’ formidable nuclear 
arsenal as well as the possibility of the rise of a new potential enemy, most likely the
536 White House (1997), p. 5.
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PRC substituting the USSR, (2) economic engagements, (3) the importance of the 
Pacific Ocean which is a major commercial and strategic artery of the US as a maritime 
power, ®  the influence of the forward-deployed military presence, which enhanced its 
diplomatic influence , etc. In addition to the above interests, the increasing importance 
of low politics demanded the addition of some more categories such as the promotion of 
human rights and the threat of widespread dangerous technologies in relation to 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and also the protection of the environment.
Traditionally, Japan occupied the most important position in US national security 
interests in Asia, because, in strategic terms apart from being an economic ally, the US 
bases in Japan formed the linchpin of America’s forward military presence in Asia. It 
seems that the US wants Japan to play an active role as a security partner in the 
international arena by urging it to improve interoperability and intelligence sharing for 
future Japanese activities, particularly for PKO missions539 by dispatching Japanese 
forces abroad. The guidelines for Japan-US defence cooperation were passed by the 
Japanese Diet on May 24, 1999, in which it confirmed that the Japan-US security 
arrangements would continue to play a key role in achieving peace and stability in the 
region surrounding Japan. This made it possible for the JSDF to provide rear area 
support to the US forces operating pursuant to the alliance and for the US forces to 
continuously deploy or use the current bases in Japan, because it broadly confirmed the
537 Paul H. Kreisberg, “American Security in the Asia-Pacific”, in Dora Alves (ed.), New Perspectives for  
US-Asia Pacific Security Strategy: The 1991 Pacific Symposium (Washington, DC: National Defence 
University Press, 1992), pp. 29-33; School of Hawaiian Asian & Pacific Studies (SHAPS), “A Strategic 
Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, Report to the Congress 1992”, in 
<http://www.shaps.havaii.edu/security/report-92,html>. accessed: October 13, 2004.
538 The US White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (May 1997; December 1999), 
p p .1-3.
539 Patrick M Cronin & Michael J. Green, “Redefining the US-Japan Alliance”, McNair Paper 31, INSS 
(Washington, DC: NDU, November 1994), p. 3.
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US policy of maintaining some 100,000 military personnel in the Asia-Pacific region.540
Whilst the US is lingering in ratifying clear rules for operational cooperation including 
acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSA), base access, and host nation 
support541, it is hurrying to bind Japan as its closest ally in the Asia-Pacific region. It 
means that the grade of a future war in the Korean peninsula has been classified not as a 
confrontation between two opposite blocs, which might rapidly escalate into a global 
war but as a regional conflict. Put succinctly, the Korean peninsula is no longer the 
cornerstone of the defence of Japan. In other words, the strategic value of the Korean 
peninsula in US strategic interests is less important than it was during the Cold War. 
Instead, even though it is not publicly known what the US geo-strategic appraisals of 
each country in the region are, it might be true that Taiwan occupies a higher position 
than South Korea, just after Japan, considering the geopolitical environments (although 
there is no evidence), and supposing that history repeats itself (for example, Secretary of 
State Acheson’s “island defence line” in 1950). The threat caused by North Korea apart 
from its nuclear development programme is not particularly dangerous from the 
standpoint of the US. Consequently, dismantling North Korea’s nuclear programme has 
been taken into the top priority consideration, in which the US wants the regional major 
powers to help implement the ratification of an agreement aimed at a peaceful 
settlement.
540 The Japanese National Institute for Defence Studies (2000), pp. 119-138.
541 On July 24 2004, the US and South Korea finalized an agreement to redeploy all US troops located in 
camps, north of Seoul, to facilities in the Pyungtaek, some 50 miles south of Seoul, but a final decision 
will be decided by the respective national leaders at a later date. The relocation of the US forces in 
South Korea will proceed with the program as arranged by the new US doctrine, which seems that the 
US forces in the region will enlarge their operational range from not just the Korean peninsula, but to 
all the Asia-Pacific area as a stabilizer in the region. It seems, however, that the US strategic interests 
toward South Korea have not completely settled down even up to the present day. See, USINFO, “US 
Troop Relocation Shows Strength of US-Korean Alliance”, in 
<http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2004/Jul/28-373014.html>. accessed: August 19,2004.
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All in all, as the US national security strategy has stressed the importance of diplomacy, 
the strategic importance of each country to the US may be continuously changing
according to the reaction of each relevant country in the following categories:
Firstly, how much can it contribute as an ally to maintaining the US forward presence and 
preserving the balance of power in Asia?
Secondly, how much can it play a more active role in partnership with the US to address new 
threats, such as the non-proliferation of NBC weapons, contribute to the war on 
terrorism, PKO, SLOC defence, and even the protection of human rights and the 
preservation of the environment for the security of the world, not just of the region?542
The US will continuously pursue a security policy on the basis of its bilateral relations 
with each country separately, which means that its executive method may be completely 
different from that of the Cold War era.
(2) Military Strategy/ Policy
US defence policies have changed enormously reflecting the demise of the Cold War, as 
it no longer expects a confrontation between superpowers. In the European theatre, 
NATO has given up its nuclear strategic option, to use nuclear weapons first, which was 
a pragmatic course of action in deterring the Soviet and Warsaw Pact’s threatened 
invasion. Instead, the US developed the New Triad, in which it clearly announced that 
the purpose of the New Triad is “holding at risk an adversary’s assets and capabilities 
that cannot be countered through non-nuclear means”. It means that if any threat is 
countered by non-nuclear means, the US will not use its nuclear arsenals. Of course, this 
was always the case, even during the Cold War. Moreover, the strike capabilities, one of 
the elements of the New Triad, include both non-nuclear and nuclear bombs (refer
542 The National Security Strategy released in September 2002 describes that “Our new strategy will 
pursue an international partnership...this partnership will require the contributions of our allies...A 
continued willingness on the part of the US to act as a security partner and leader will be an important 
factor in sustaining cooperation in many areas”, <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/bur/partO 1 .htm>. 
accessed: August 30, 2004.
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Figure 5-1).
Figure 5-1: The New Triad
Non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities
E xisting Triad
C2, Intelligence & Planning
R esponsive InfrastructureDefences
Source: Donald H. Rumsfeld, Annual Report to the President and the Congress 2002, p. 85.
During the Cold War, apart from the European theatre, the US was heavily involved in 
Asian security problems. However, the US forces in Asia have been cut back543 and 
some bases have been eliminated, i.e., the Subic and Clark Air Bases in the Philippines. 
With these kinds of US force withdrawals, most Asian states felt that the strength of the 
remaining US forces would be nothing more than a stabilizing factor in the Asia-Pacific 
region in association with the regional potential causes of a future conflict.544 Hence, 
the US Defence Secretary reaffirmed to the US Asian allies in Tokyo on November 22, 
1991 that US security policy in Asia continues to be guided by the following six basic 
principles:545
543 About 12% of the total of permanently forward deployed personnel in Japan and Korea: 15,250 at the 
end of 1992, Phase I, were withdrawn as a part of the adjustment of the US force structure. Among the 
three phases, only the first was accomplished, after that the second and third were postponed due to the 
rise of North Korea’s nuclear threat. See, SHAPS (1992).
544 John R. Faust, “East Asia’s Emerging Security System”, in The Journal o f  East Asian Affairs, Vol. 
VIII, No. 1 (Winter/Spring 1994), pp. 85-86.
545 SHAPS (1992), p. 7.
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0  Assurance of American engagement in Asia and the Pacific,
0  A strong system of bilateral security arrangements,
(3) Maintenance of modest but capable forward-deployed US forces,
@ Sufficient overseas base structure to support those forces,
©  Our Asian allies should assume greater responsibility for their own defense,
©  Complementary defence cooperation.
The above principles are shaping the US’ post-Cold War security role in East Asia: at
the same time specifying the duties of the other allies based on the Nixon Doctrine.
The US perceives a clear need to structure its military forces to address less severe, but 
more disparate and numerous threats occurring throughout the World. In terms of the 
force package associated with a strategy and force requirement, in the context that there 
is no certain major threat to the US, it considered ‘rogue states’, such as Iraq and North 
Korea, as major opponents based on the Cold War military posture. In this regard, the 
US military strategic concepts have moved from a ‘global confrontation with the USSR 
to the identification of ‘regional’ threats to world peace.546 Accordingly, reorganizations 
of basic strategic concept and force structure were required. As a result, the US DoD 
proclaimed a reduction in its active duty Army force structure from 18 divisions to 12; 
Air Force from 36 fighter wing equivalents to about 26, Navy from 547 ships to only 
451; and also cutback reserves and civilian personnel, as well as cancelling 100 
weapons programmes.547
In the aftermath of President Clinton’s inauguration, the new US Secretary of Defence,
546 There was no certain enemy of the US capable of being a threat in terms of military strength and 
intention until the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. Some strategists regarded the PRC as a 
greater danger, but did not want it to be because of its economic interests. Hence, Ian Roxborough 
expressed as “A miasma of ambiguity shrouded American strategic debate”, see Ian Roxborough, 
“Globalization, Unreason and the Dilemmas of American Military Strategy”, International Sociology, 
Vol. 17(3), (London:SAGE, September. 2002), pp. 341-342.
547 Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: DoD, February 
1992), p. 1.
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Les Aspin, began to consider a new military strategy, a so called “Win-hold-Win” 
approach, that if the US was confronted with regional conflicts in the Persian Gulf and 
in the Korean peninsula simultaneously, it would prioritize winning in the Gulf and rely 
upon existing US force deployments and South Korean Forces to “hold” invading North 
Korean forces until it could shift forces previously engaged in another conflict to 
Northeast Asia. This, “Win-hold-Win” strategy, has been cancelled for two reasons: ©  
limited capability: engagement in a war does not allow one to defend its interests in 
another region, and ©  the difficulty in predicting precisely what threats it will 
confront in ten to twenty years time. In the long run, the US military force buildup 
strategy under the Clinton government was “Two Nearly Simultaneous Major Regional 
Conflicts” (refer Table 5-2). The latest setup for the US .military forces buildup under 
the George W. Bush administration is specified to react to every possible conflict in the 
world. As a result, even though, the forces requirement is not higher than that of the 
previous administration (refer Table 5-3), the US developed its new concept to the “1-4- 
2-1” principle, which is to defend its homeland, deter in four places, counter attack in
C A O
two, and if necessary, go to the enemy’s capital in one of the two.
With the above plan, the US is developing its strategic lift capability to deploy forces 
when and where it needs its forces reflecting the environment. It plans to deploy its 
forces abroad because of the antagonism of certain countries. It wants to improve its 
forces so that they are capable of being ‘dual tasked’, whilst enormously reducing its 
force levels compared with that of the Cold War549.
548 The US DoD, QDR 2001 (Washington, DC: US DoD, September 30, 2001), pp. 20-21.
549 Regarding force cuts, reductions, and cancellations in addition to those called for by the Bush 
Programme during FY 1995-FY 1999 as the result of the Bottom Up Review, see Anthony H 
Cordesman, “US Defence Policy: Resources and Capabilities”, Whitehall Paper Series 1993 (London: 
RUSI, 1994), p 42.
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Table 5-2: Major Regional Conflict (MRO Force Options
Forces Win 1 MRC
Win 1 MRC & 
Hold in 2nd
Win in 2 NS MRCs
Win in 2 NS MRCs 
With Reserve
Army
Active 8 divisions 10 divisions 10 divisions 12 divisions
Reserve 6 division equivalents
6 division 
equivalents
15 enhanced 
readiness brigades
8 division 
equivalents
Navy (Carrier battle 
groups) 8 10
11 (1 reserve/ 
training carrier) 12
Marine
Corps
Active 5 active brigades
Reserve 1 division
Air Force Active 10 fighter wings 13 13 14Reserve 6 7 7 10
Note: NS (Nearly Simultaneous)
Source: Anthony H Cordesman, “US Defence Policy: Resources and Capabilities”, Whitehall Paper
Series 1993 (London: RUSI, 1994), p. 38.
However, it is very doubtful whether this strategy could be successfully implemented if 
required. The US ability would be limited to the reduced forces level550, and the results 
of the impact of force cuts in reducing the US contingency capability have not been 
fully anticipated. It is, however, true that maintaining a two war’s force, the “Win-and- 
Win” strategy is helping to “ensure that the US will have sufficient military capabilities 
to deter or defeat aggression by a coalition of hostile powers or by a larger, more 
capable adversary than is expected today”551. By doing so, the US will be able to remain 
the military giant of the present world by keeping strategic arms and high quality 
conventional weapons and troops. Finally, it decided on the major elements of force 
structure in order to carry out its strategy, reflecting improvements in operational 
concepts and organizational arrangements to protect the full spectrum of combat 
capability to the maximum extent possible (see Table 5-3).
550 William T. Tow (1994), p. 99.
551 The US White House (1996), p. 15.
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Table 5-3: Major Elements of Force Structure (Active/Reserve)
Services FY 1997 FY 2003 QDR
Army
Active Divisions 10 10 10
Heavy Armored (Light) Cavalry Regt n. a n. a 1/1
Enhanced Separate Brigades n. a n. a 15
Navy
Aircraft Carriers 11/1 11/1 11/1
Air Wings 10/1 10/1 10/1
ARGs 12 12 12
Attack Submarines 73 52 55
Surface Combatants 128 131 116
Air Force
Active Fighter Wings 13 13 12+
Reserve Fighter Wings 7 7 8
Reserve Air Defense Squadrons 10 6 4
Bombers (Total) 202 187 187
Marine Corps MEF 3/1 3/1 3/1
Source: William S. Cohen, Report o f  the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: US DoD, May
1997), Section V: Forces and Manpower; Donald H. Rumsfeld, Annual Report to the President and the
Congress 2002, p. 55.
It appears that there is no change in the US military strategy toward East Asia compared 
with that of the Cold War as long as the current politico-strategic connection is not 
transformed, because the threat of North Korea is still the same, as well as the fact that 
the US declared ‘protecting critical bases of operations (US homeland, forces abroad, 
allies and friends)’ as the first priority among the Six Operational Goals in its defence 
policy552.
(3) Maritime Strategy/ Policy
With the shift in military strategy to focus on regional conflicts, the demand for naval 
power to prevent the outbreak of war and to maintain its maritime superiority553 in 
terms of the protection of SLOCs is even more complicated, because to answer the
552 Donald H. Rumsfeld (2002), pp. 17, 68-70.
553 Actually, this has two meanings in the US Navy: ®  the unimpeded use of the seas and (2) to deny 
an opponent the option of a single-theatre strategy, which means that the US Navy does not allow an 
opponent to attack the US Navy at a point of his choosing without moving to threaten him in areas 
where he may be more vulnerable. See, Carlisle A. H. Trust (admiral of the US Navy), “Maritime 
Strategy for the 1990s”, Proceedings, Vol. 116/5/1,047 (May 1990), p. 99.
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fundamental question of how much is enough in terms of military planning itself would 
also not be easy. It seems that the military planners are taking the naval composition of 
Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf War554 as a model to plan a future naval 
force options in the littoral area, where the US Navy could face threats from mines, 
supersonic cruise missiles, diesel submarines, or maritime terrorism. There were about 
547 total deployable battle force ships in FY 1990, which were reduced to 435 in FY 
1997 (refer Table 5-4), and even more at the present stage.
Table 5-4: Naval Force Structure (FY 1990/97) and Current Structure
Classifications 1990 1997 (Plan) 2001 (Real Strength)
Plan Dif % (Red.) No Dif %c
Strategic Forces 39 24 -15 38 18 -21 54
Aircraft Carriers 16 13 -3 19 12 -4 25
Surface Combatants 175 143 -32 20 118 -57 33
Attack Submarines 93 79 -14 15 72 -21 23
Amphibious Ships 60 49 -11 19 40 -20 33
Mine Warfare Ships 6 15 +9 +150 26 +20 +230
Other Support Ships 127 96 -31 25 125a -2 1.8
Mobilization Force Category A 31 16 -15 49 31b 0 0
Total Ship Battle Forces 547 435 -112 20 424 -105 23
Notes:a: The sum of the numbers of Combat Logistic Force (5) and Military Sealift Command (120)
b: The number of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships at readiness of 4 days. If all the RRF and 
National Defence Reserve Fleet (NDRF) are concerned, it reaches some 127.
Compared with the strength of 1990.
Sources: Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (February 1992), p. 75; IISS, 
The Military Balance 2002-2003, pp. 18-21 (US Part I ).
This naval force structure was established on the basis of President George Bush’s four 
basic guidelines of the new national military strategy (deterrence, forward presence555, 
crisis response and reconstitution) in his Aspen speech on August 2, 1990. Among them,
554 The US contributed 165 ships to the coalition fleet including six carrier battle groups with associated 
air wings among the total of 228 ships (21 from the UK, 42 from other allied states). The main tasks of 
the navy were sealift, mine sweeping, close air support for ground forces, and deception, see Jeffrey 
McCausland, “The Gulf Conflict: A Military Analysis”, Adelphi Papers No. 282 (November 1993), pp. 
36-40.
555 The concept of ‘forward defence’, as Soviet-focused, in the Cold War era has now changed to the 
regionally focused ‘forward presence’.
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the first three were closely related to the basic precepts of the Naval Force Structure for 
the 1990s556. In the context of the new national military strategy, ‘Win-and-Win (Two 
Nearly Simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts)’, the US Navy needed to consider naval 
strategy and forces in both structural and regional aspects. In the context of the former, 
there was no critical change, because the Navy continuously needed to keep command 
and control, support, and the traditional flexibility of naval forces in crisis response as 
well.
However, in the latter, naval power projection forces, especially carrier battle groups
c cn
and amphibious ready groups, are more valuable reflecting the changing 
characteristics of the security environments from ‘high politics’ to ‘low politics’. As 
Table 5-4 shows, the reduction percentage of the naval strategic force is relatively 
higher than the others, whilst the number of mine warfare vessels has increased by 20 
(230%), reflecting the lessons of the Gulf War. As US Navy Commander P. Kevin Peppe
f r o
recognized , the naval strategic force (nuclear-powered attack submarines) is 
continuously losing some areas of warfare employment. The SSBN fleet consists of 18 
Ohio-class submarines, and the last one, the USS Louisiana, was commissioned in 1997. 
In accordance with the START II treaty, four submarines will be retired, leaving 14 
SSBNs armed with D-5s (giving a total of 336 SLBMs)559. In addition to this, it is 
observed that the focus of naval force buildup has shifted from holding numerous active 
ships to mobilization posture for a crisis response at the level of a regional conflict.
556 For the specific meanings of these, refer Carlisle A. H. Trust (1990), pp. 95-98.
557 Stan Weeks, “Crafting a New Maritime Strategy”, Proceeding, (January 1992), pp. 30-36.
558 P. Kevin Peppe (Commander of US Navy), “Centurion: The Changing Future of the Force”,
Proceedings, Vol. 118/4/1,070 (April 1992).
559 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Annual Report to the President and the Congress 2002, pp. 90-92; William S.
Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (April 1997), pp. 208.
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With the challenge of specific regional balances instead of Soviet containment, there are
the following several highlighted implications560 for the US Navy buildup:
Firstly, to be better prepared to deal with humanitarian peacetime missions such as humanitarian 
assistance, disaster relief, maritime intercepts, capable of making a major contribution, 
Secondly, must lead the way in rethinking the role of global (as well as strictly regional) 
multinational military operations and formal coordinating mechanisms, that is, the US 
maritime forces must be prepared to rely upon joint and combined operations by providing 
a timely and powerful expeditionary response through the full range of combat operations 
as well as operating platforms for follow-on forces throughout the full spectrum of any 
conflict as a critical component of the joint force,
Thirdly, with the limits of the US military access to overseas bases, the US Navy must be prepared 
to deploy as a forward presence force by extending and developing its fundamental 
qualities of decisiveness, sustainability, responsibility, combat readiness and capability, 
and agility, under the concept of the Maritime Pre-positioning Forces (MPF),561 
Fourthly, must be tailored with an eye to the need for residual tailored forces for the US-Soviet 
context, in other words, the US Navy should be ready to activate if a global threat 
reemerges562.
With these implications, the Navy’s publication, Naval Warfare, defined its basic roles 
of promoting and defending the American interests by maintaining maritime superiority, 
contributing regional stability, conducting operations on and from the sea, seizing or 
defending advanced naval bases, and conducting such land operations on the basis of
560 Refer, Donald H. Rumsfeld (2002), pp. 127-137 (Report of the Secretary of the Navy); Carlisle A. H. 
Trust (1990), pp. 92-98; Stan Weeks (1992), pp. 35-36.
561 According to the latest news, the US Navy is trying to develop the next stage of the Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS) programme in order to meet the changing requirements for the vessel, which include 
maximum speed (objective value is 50 knots or greater), aviation capability, high-speed endurance 
(with a threshold range of 3,500nm and an objective of 4,300 nm). See, Jane’s, “Littoral Combat ship 
designs continue to evolve”, International Defense Review (IDR) (May 15, 2003); “US Navy Selects 
Three Finalists for Littoral Combat Ships”, IDR (August 21, 2003).
562 The Russian Navy still has the world’s largest submarine fleet equipped with nuclear-armed SLBMs, 
torpedoes, and ASW missiles. However, the US is worried about the breakdown of the established 
system, and is concerned to prevent rogue states from accessing former Soviet nuclear weapons rather 
than the reconstitution of an integrated Soviet naval capability of Cold War proportions; see, Robin 
Ranger and David G Wiencek, “Watching the Old Enemy”, Proceedings, Vol. 118/4/1,070, (April 
1992), pp. 48-53.
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warfighting readiness. Among these, the third is eminently highlighted under the 
concept of littoral warfare564 after the post-Cold War era, substituting for the concept of 
nuclear strategic deterrence. It seems that the role of nuclear weapons has been 
regressed to a last resort among the evolving instruments of US foreign policy 
objectives. Littoral warfare is, of course, not performed only by carrier battle groups or 
surface ships and amphibious forces. All branches of the navy are basically expected to 
participate in any kind of small conflict, whether their roles are smaller or larger in the 
phases of operation. Put simply, it means that the priority and operational demands of 
the US naval buildup have been changed.
From the standpoint of the US, which wants to ban the proliferation of atomic weapons, 
if it plans to deter a regional conflict or challenge with its nuclear arsenal, it provides a 
raison d ’etre for the non-nuclear countries in the world to obtain a nuclear arsenal. This 
would be the dilemma of US naval force construction. Consequently, it is implying that 
projecting power and engagement battles against shore-based land forces would be the 
basis of current and future navy missions. This represents a shift away from the navy’s 
usual emphasis on the control of the seas as a nation separated from the other continents 
by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Thus, not only must it procure forces to fight a war, 
it must still devote considerable resources for acquiring the means for sending troops 
and materials to a conflict. In this sense, the carrier battle groups and amphibious ready 
groups are the most suitable means for evolving foreign policy objectives abroad.
563 The US Department ofNavy, NDP1: Naval Warfare (March 28, 1994), p. 15.
564 With the demise of the USSR, the primary role of Navies has changed from Open Ocean Operations 
(Blue Water) to that of gaining access into and subsequently operating within the Littorals. It indicates 
that the main means of waging a naval war comes back to the level of conventional warfare as it 
existed as a form of limited war in the Cold War. Regarding the history of littoral warfare in the Cold 
War, see, Charles E. Myers, “Littoral Warfare: Back to the Future”, Proceedings, Vol. 116/11/1,053 
(November 1990), pp. 48-55.
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In November 1992, the US navy announced its vision of the role of US sea power in the 
post-Cold War era under the name of “ ...From the Sea” as a Navy and Marine Corps 
White Paper via Proceedings, in which it emphasized a fundamental shift from open- 
ocean warfighting on the sea towards joint operations on land conducted from the sea. It 
outlined that US naval power for the next century would be resized and reshaped to 
concentrate on crisis management and warfare in the world’s littoral regions reflecting 
the transition of the transoceanic National Security Strategy. 565 The following 
publication, “Forward...From the Sea” addressed the naval contribution to national 
security highlighting the unique capabilities inherent in naval expeditionary forces as 
evidenced by operations in Somalia, Haiti, Cuba, Bosnia and Iraq. It demonstrated its 
readiness to prepare for new challenges for the force—forward deployed, ready for 
combat, and engaged to preserve the peace as an instrument for American worldwide 
leadership. 566 As Admiral Jay L. Johnson (USN, CNO) articulated, the naval 
operational concept for the 21st century is “to carry out expeditionary operations by 
conducting forward naval operations both to ensure unimpeded use of the seas and to 
project American influence and power into the littoral areas of the world as a visible
Cf L H
tool of US foreign policy. In the long run, the priority of the naval operation has 
moved toward ‘expeditionary warfare’ operations in the littorals and away from large 
‘open ocean’ conflicts in order to align with the Navy’s new orientation.
565 Sean O’Keefe (Secretary of the Navy), Frank B. Kelso (CNO), Carl E. Mundy (CMC), “ ... From the 
Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century”, Proceedings, Vol. 118/11/1,077 (November
1992), p. 93; “ ... From the Sea” (Washington, DC: DoN, September 1992),
<http:www.nwdc.naw.mil/Librarv/documents/fts.asp>. accessed: April 3,2003.
566 J.M. Boorda (CNO) & Carl E. Mundy (CMC), “Forward...From the Sea” (Washington, DC: DoN, 
September 19, 1994).
567 Admiral. Jay L. Johnson, Forward...From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept (March 1997), 
<http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policv/fromsea/ffseanoc.html>. accessed: April 3, 2003.
568 William Y. Frentzel II, John M. Bryson and Barbara C. Crosby, “Strategic Planning in the Military:
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Despite the strain on its stretched naval bases, the US remains the paramount naval 
power in the Asia-Pacific region, and is the only naval power capable of achieving the 
forward deployment of substantial nuclear and conventional forces. Replacing the bases 
in the Philippines, in November 1990, it signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) with Singapore for increased port access by US warships, which was upgraded 
by President Bush’s visit in 1992 allowing the redeployment of 200 troops from the 
Philippines to coordinate the US Seventh Fleet’s supply ship logistics.569 In addition, it 
has agreed a Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) with Indonesia, Thailand, and 
the Philippines (the previous availability of Subic Bay, but not at the same level of the 
Cold War era), to disperse its naval assets in the theatre. Nonetheless, it is undeniable 
that with time, particularly if a stable security regime is shaped, the US Navy would 
find more difficulty in accessing allied ports and bases. In this regard, it is clear that 
the US naval facilities in Japan have become more critically important in terms of the 
geostrategic environment, considering the PRC’s ambition to have a modem powerful
S71 •navy, and the remnants of Russian naval power.
Even though the US-Soviet conflict has been replaced by regional contingencies as a 
central focus of national strategy, little change has occurred in the roles of the US naval
The US Naval Security Group Changes its Strategy, 1992-1998”, Long Range Planning 33 (2000), p. 
406.
569 William T. Tow, “Regional Constraints on the Role of Navies”, Hugh Smith and Anthony Bergin 
(eds.), Naval Power in the Pacific: Toward the Year 2000 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher,
1993), pp. 50-51.
570 With growing anti-nuclear movements, some countries are refusing to introduce nuclear weapons into 
their area, i.e., the 13-member South Pacific Forum, consisting of Australia, New Zealand, and a 
number of smaller islands states in Melanesia and Polynesia. As a result, the Bush administration 
declared in September 1991 that all sea-based tactical nuclear weapons would be removed from US 
naval surface ships, attack submarines and land-based naval aircraft. Ibid., pp. 44-47.
571 For example, the PRC Navy’s Project 094 nuclear-powered strategic missile submarine and the 
attempt to purchase a late-version Project 636 Kilo-class submarines as well as some surface combatant 
ships, i.e., Sovremennyy-class guided-missile destroyers.
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forces deployed in the Pacific areas despite the fact that the US naval strength had been 
severely reduced as a result of the changing security environment (see Table 5-5).
Table 5-5; The Changing Naval Strengths in the Pacific
Classification 1990 2002 Remarks
Pacific Fleet
8 SSBN, 3 SSGN, 37 SSN, 
3 SS, 7 CV/CVN, 100 PSC, 
44 Amph.
8 SSBN, 27 SSN, 6 
CV/CVN, 54 PSC, 20 
Amph+IAQ 62 MSC
-3 SSGN, -10 SSN, -3 SS, 
-1 CV/CVN, -46 PSC, - 
24 Amph
3rd Fleet 5 CVBGs, 1-2 BSAQ 4 URG, 1 ARG.
3 CVBGs, 4 URG, 1 ARG -2 CVBGs
7th Fleet 2 CVBGs, 0-1 BSAG, 1 URG, 1 ARG
1 CVBGt, 1 ARG -1 CVBGs
Sources: IISS, The Military Balance 1990-1991, pp. 19-20; 2002-2003, p. 26 US Part I.
Owing not only to the importance of this region for US security and prosperity, but also 
the absence of any substitute forward-stationed maritime presence as a stabilizer for the 
complex regional maritime security environment, it is imperative for the US Navy to 
play a substantial role until a new strategic environment favourable to the US and others 
is shaped. For example, the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) and USS Independence (CV-62) 
were dispatched to solve tensions in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996 as a flexible 
deterrent force.572 The roles and functions of the US Navy in the Pacific are still as 
broad as those of the Cold War era, and will not be diminished for a long while.
(4) The Development of the USMC
(A) General Rise and Fall
As Table 5-2 shows, there was no change in the active force structure of three MEFs, 
each comprising a command element, a division, an aircraft wing, and a service support 
group, which will be supported by one Reserve division/wing/service support group .
572 William S. Cohen (1997), pp. 255-257.
573 In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the USMC reactivated the 4th Marine Expeditionary 
Brigade (MEB) as an antiterrorism organization within Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic. Refer, The HQ
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The active strength of the USMC downsized to 173,031 in 1998 from 193,735 in the 
Cold War era as a result of President Bill Clinton’s “top-to-bottom” review of the armed 
forces. The reduction ratio of the USMC personnel including reservists was the lowest 
among the services. Put simply there was no serious reduction in the marines’ active 
force level from the Cold War. Given the transition of the attribute of a war from high- 
to low-intensity conflict, most threats to international insecurity occur on land. As such, 
the US, as the unique military power and an insular state surrounded mostly by oceans, 
which provide power projection routes, needs a powerful maritime projection force 
capable of seizing the initiative, not just by firepower, i.e., the PGMs, but by a human 
factor beyond the concept of ‘fleet to shore’, the ability to react to a political event in far 
distant areas beyond the seas, which the US political calculations deem essential to the 
defence of vital US interests. In other words, a demand for an operation on land rather 
than at sea has enormously increased due to the challenges and opportunities of a 
rapidly changing world as a result of the disappearance of the powerful enemy, the 
USSR. Consequently, even under the concept of “Two Nearly Simultaneous Major 
Regional Conflicts”, the USMC is an essential component of American military power.
Despite the revision of US maritime strategy, the employment of the USMC for an 
amphibious landing operation was seen as peripheral to the other services’ role and 
functions, because of its vulnerability in transit to a relevant theatre. In other words, it 
was not easy to manoeuvre there without being detected by the enemy, which was the 
critical factor in improving amphibious capability in a global war situation from the 
point of view of classical military strategic thinking. However, given the fact that
of the USMC, Concepts and Programs 2003, p. 41.
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amphibious operations are a kind of naval operation574, not only for the marines 
themselves, but the responsibility to keep full dimensional protections, such as 
information superiority, air and maritime superiority, theater air and missile defence, 
delivery of naval fire, and logistics for joint operations in the littorals, lays on the 
navy.575 From this perspective, the definition of the amphibious force is “the forces that 
are specially organized, trained, and equipped to deploy aboard, operate from, and 
sustain themselves from amphibious ships” . Put succinctly, they are specially 
designed to project land combat power ashore from the sea.
Nonetheless, given the new security environment, the role and functions of the USMC 
have greatly increased with the importance of the demand for expeditionary forces to 
manoeuvre via sea routes and being capable of reaching most strategic points in the 
world. The composition of the USMC comprising amphibious and air-landed forces 
coupled with the navy’s strategic manoeuverability can offer a self-contained capability 
with strategic and operational reach, which is seen as a highly significant political and 
military tool.577 As evidence of the enlargement of the USMC’s role and functions, in 
addition to the above marines’ leading role for the naval doctrinal developments and the 
minimum reduction of active personnel compared with the other branches of the Navy, 
the possibility is that the marine officer can command the entire forces regardless of
574 The NDP 1 stated, “The ability to engage the enemy at sea decisively will always remain paramount 
to naval forces” (NDP1, p. 29), and the MCDP 1-0 stated that there is a support relationship between 
the amphibious task force commander (Navy) and the LF commander (Marines or Army). As such, the 
JP 3-02 describes that the relationship between them will be decided on the basis of mission, nature 
and duration of the operation, force capabilities, Command & Control capabilities, battlespace assigned, 
and recommendations from subordinate commanders (JP 3-02, p. II-3). To conclude, usually the CATF 
has the responsibility to control the whole amphibious force before the LF establishes a command post.
575 In order to do this, the USN has embraced the concept of net-work centric warfare comprising 
networked sensors, command centers, and forces, which enables them to gain an advantage over the 
enemy in an amphibious landing operation.
576 MCDP 1-0, p. 2-6.
577 Robert Ross, “The Role of Amphibious forces in a Changing World”, RUS1 (April 1996), p. 21.
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naval task or landing force. Before this change, the relationship between the command 
of the amphibious task force (CATF) and the command of the landing force (CLF) was 
parallel; each had the responsibility to control its respective components. Nonetheless, 
the CATF, a Navy officer, was responsible for the operation and exercises over the
cn o
entire force necessary to ensure the success of the operation . However, even though 
the basic concept is the same as before, the new joint doctrine opens a way by which a 
Marine officer can control the entire force by defining several considering factors.579
In order to satisfy the national and naval expectations, the USMC has continuously 
developed the concept of the MAGTF to enhance its utility in a changing world by both 
remaining flexible and preparing to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of 
conflict. The USMC published the first MAGTF Master Plan (MMP) in 1989, and 
following the updated MMP in 1991, which identified its force deployment goals for the 
period 1990-2000 to enhance the FMF as a national instrument. Under these plans, the 
MEU (SOC) programme has made tremendous advances to be flawlessly organised into
tha MEB or MEF. One successful fruit of this effort was the assimilation of the 11 MEU
fL
(SOC) into 5 MEB, one of the units designated to conduct an amphibious assault into 
Kuwait, during the Gulf War.580 A MEU (SOC) was the most potent forward deployed 
asset, which trains, according to Marine Corps Order 3120.9A: Policy for MEU (SOC), 
to conduct 28 missions in four major operational areas-Amphibious Operations, Direct
f O  1
Action Operations, MOOTW, and Supporting Operations. On November 10, 2001,
578 Marine Corps Landing Force Manual 01 (1962), pp. 23-24.
579 MCDP 1-0 (2001), pp. 2-6 and 2-7.
580 Victor D. Lance, “MAGTF (SOC): Time to Make it Happen”, Marine Corps Gazette (July 1992), p. 
57. In this war, an actual large-scale landing operation was not executed, because the Iraqis deployed 6 
divisions to the coast of Kuwait and Iraq. Here, the USMC’s mission can be classified as a supporting 
role for the General Schwarzkopf’s left hook.
581 Darrin Denny & Daniel Q. Greenwood, “The MEU (SOC) Programme in Transition”, Marine Corps
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the Commandant signed the document establishing the new warfighting capstone 
concept of ‘Expeditionary Manoeuvre Warfare (EMW)’, which provides the foundation 
for the way that the Marine Corps will conduct operations within the complex 
environment of this new century. Here, it articulated the basic operational concept for 
the MAGTFs; MEF for major theatre war, MEB for smaller-scale contingencies, and 
MEU (SOC) for promoting peace and stability. In order to do that, it demands the each 
MAGTF have the ability to serve as a JTF headquarters or as a functional or service
co^
component commander of a JTF.
In order to have the ability as an EMW force, the USMC together with the Navy further 
developed its operational doctrines of the “Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea 
(OMFTS)”583 and “Ship-to Objective Manoeuvre (STOM)”. According to MCDP 1-0, 
the OMFTS applies manoeuvre warfare to expeditionary power projection in naval 
operations as part of a joint or multinational campaign. It is designed to allow the NEF 
(Naval Expeditionary Force including marines) to move up and down a littoral, and 
focuses on breaking the cohesion and integration of an enemy’s defences while avoiding 
attrition-style head-on attacks via creating the condition that the battlefields are not 
imposed by the enemy.584 The gist is to seek the enemy’s vulnerable points using the 
sea as manoeuvre space, which generates overwhelming tempo and momentum, to 
allow the landing force to build combat power ashore by making the relevant MAGTF
Gazette (June 2000), p. 60.
582 The HQ of the USMC, Expeditionary Manoeuvre Warfare: Marine Corps Capstone Concept 
(November 2001), p. 6-7.
583 This concept was introduced by the NDP-3, Naval Operations in the early 1990s as the common 
doctrine for both the Navy and Marine Corps. This attempts to create favourable situations to control or 
alter events.
584 Terry C. Pierces, “Taking Manoeuvre Warfare to Sea”, Proceedings, Vol. 121/4/1,106 (April 1995), p. 
75.
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free from the danger o f enemy attack.' In this sense, it is close to a purely naval 
operation, even though it is employed in amphibious warfare.
In striking contrast, the STOM is the tactical implementation o f the OMFTS to achieve 
the JFC ’s operational objectives by the MAGTF. The difference between the aims of 
“ship-to-shore m ovem ent'’ and the STOM is that the latter pushes the MAGTF into 
multiple objectives regardless o f  ashore or inland with sufficient strength minimizing 
the time consumption before the enemy is prepared to defend them (see Figure 5-2). 
The objectives are certainly the enem y’s centres o f gravity, but those are various 
according to the attack echelons or the enem y’s strength. In modern warfare, to win a 
war, war planners do not neglect efforts to identify the enem y’s centre o f gravity, which 
could be one or many. As the USM C’s basic operational concept o f the MAGTFs 
suggested, these objectives are likely to depend on the enem y’s strength and operational 
goal.
Figure 5-2: Operational Objectives
Ship-to-Shore Movement Ship-to-Objective Manoeuvre
Source: MCDP 1-0, p. 2-17
585 MCDP 1-0, p. 2-15.
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The STOM seems certainly to have enlarged the opportunities to access and destroy the 
enemy’s centre of gravity via taking the initiative in the operation by maximizing its 
flexibility and mobility of organization. The merit of this concept is to force the enemy 
to defend all its important points, which embodies the basic principles of war, 
concentration and dispersion. Whilst it constrains the enemy to be decentralized, the
r o z
USMC chooses the time and space that it wants to fight by keeping operational depth 
and flexibility in selecting the objectives and avoiding the sore spot at the water’s edge. 
Because, as George Armand Furse has pointed out, “the enemy’s (the attacker’s) great 
difficulty in amphibious operation is to land...we (the defender) should meet him as he
c o n
quits the transports, and prevent his landing” , the attacker has the great disadvantage 
at the water’s edge.
This operational manoeuvre concept development reflects the demise of the Cold War 
and the transition of the security environment. The demands of low-intensity conflicts, 
even though they are also applicable to medium- and high-density conflicts, increases 
the possibility of its employment in a context in which the enemies are relatively not 
strong enough. To practically use this, the USMC must possess enhanced capabilities in 
C4I, mobility, logistics, firepower and protection to overwhelmingly exceed those of the
c oo
enemy’s assets.
586 The USMC together with the Army projects the HIMARS programme to provide the MAGTF with 
deep-strike and organic indirect fire support by engaging targets at long range with high volumes of fire 
in all weather conditions, which will be capable of being airlifted by C-130 aircraft. See, Concepts and 
Programs 2003, p. 16.
587 Theodore L. Gatchel, At the Water’s Edge (Annapolis, ML: NIP, 1996), p. 4.
588 For the specific meanings, see Charles C. Krulak, “Operational Manoeuvre From the Sea”, 
Proceedings, Vol. 123/1/1,127 (January 1997), pp. 29-30; and for the efforts and progress of the 
procurement of the USMC, refer USMC Concepts & Issues 2000 and Concepts and Programs 2003, p. 
138. According to the latter, the procurement of the Osprey still remains the USMC’s number one 
aviation acquisition priority.
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(B) Amphibious Lift Capability
Despite the rebirth of the Navy and Marine Corps as the most suitable military means 
for foreign policy objectives, and their requirement for readiness, the most serious 
problem as in the previous period is the deficiency in the amphibious lift capability 
mainly derived from decreased defence spending. Despite the demise of the Cold War, 6 
of the Wasp-Class LHDs, 4 of the Whidbey-Class LSDs, and 4 of the new Harpers 
Ferry-class LSDs were commissioned between 1990 and 2001. With these additional
C O Q
commissions replacing the old ships such as the 5 LKAs and 18 LSTs , the whole 
amphibious lift capability remains almost at the same levels as the Cold War, less than
2.5 MEB AE590 by possessing almost 40 of the deployable amphibious ships.
Table 5-6: Deployment of the Deployable Amphibious Ships (20021
Classifications Quantity San Diego, CA
Sasebo,
Japan
Little 
Creek, VA
Norfolk,
VA
Gaeta,
Italy
LCC La Salle 1 1Coronado 1 1
LHA Wasp 7 2 1 4
Tarawa 5 3 2
LPD Austin 11 5 1 5
LSD
Harpers Ferry 4 2 2
Whidbey 8 2 2 4
Anchorage 3 2 1
Total 40 17 4 7 11 1
Source: The US Navy, Fact Files quoted from Progressive Management, Amphibious Warfare (CD:
ISBN 1-59248-119-1).
As Table 5-6 shows, the amphibious ships are deployed in the Pacific (21) and Atlantic 
(19) Oceans. Currently, the amphibious force planners hope to complete the 12-ship 
LPD-17 San Antonio-class and to replace the Tarawa (LHA) class with the LHA (R), 
which is intended to fully exploit the enhanced capabilities of MV-22, STOVL JSF, and
589 Among these, five decommissioned LKAs and four LSTs are kept in an inactive reduced maintenance 
(ROS), refer, Jane’s Fighting Ships 2003-2004, The US Amphibious Forces.
590 As Table 5-3 shows, the goal is to sealift 12 ARGs, which is almost the same as 3 MEBs.
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upgraded LCAC, to achieve at least the capability of 2.5 MEB AE.591 No additional 
change in the 3 MPSs is observed in terms of their main operational concept.
(C) The Marines in the Pacific
Reflecting the importance of the Asia-Pacific region in American foreign policy, two- 
thirds of the operational forces are basically assigned to this strategically critical theatre. 
However, it seems that there is no definite boundary between the Atlantic and Pacific 
Forces in the case of major war, as is seen in the “Operation Enduring Freedom”, in 
which the elements of I, II and III MEFs are conducting combat operations in the 
CENTCOM area of responsibility. However, in other cases the marines usually cover 
the areas of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. As a consequence of the demise of the Cold 
War, they are reacting to almost every conflict or regional issue and participating in 
exercises with Japan, Korea, Russia, and Thailand to measure and improve the 
interoperability of multinational forces. Furthermore, their functions in the region are 
more clearly highlighted in the following case studies in conjunction with American 
interests.
(D) Case Study 1: Peacekeeping Operation in East Timor 
Outline of Operation
The peacekeeping operation in East Timor underscored their importance as a stabilizer 
in keeping regional order and as a means of supporting American interests in the region. 
During the Cold War, the US skated over the issue of the massacre of the East Timorese
591 Concepts and Programs 2003 II, p. 16.
592 Refer, F.G. Hoffman, “The US Marine Corps in Review”, Proceedings, Vol. 123/5/1,131 (May 1997), 
pp. 92-94; Concepts and Programs 2003 II, pp. 88-99.
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even at the height of the genocide in the late 1970s, because it wanted to keep close and 
friendly relations with Indonesia. However, as one of the US foreign policy objectives, 
human rights, indicated, it began to support a successful resolution at the UN Human 
Rights Commission by conditioning major arms sales to Indonesia from the early 
1990s . But, Indonesia did not want to agree to the independence of East Timor
thconsidering it as its 27 province, because it is very valuable in economic and strategic 
terms.594 In the long run, the East Timorese conducted a referendum in August 1999 
under the UN authority, and voted overwhelmingly in favour of independence from 
Indonesia.
But, the result was opposed by armed militias and therefore East Timor descended into 
chaos. In order to solve this disorder, the UN authorized a peacekeeping operation 
forming an Australian-led coalition called International Forces East Timor (INTERFET) 
involving 18 participating countries. 595 The USMC was considered a means of 
diplomatic coercion and participated in the whole peacekeeping operation until the final 
day of operation, December 4, 2002.
US Goals for Military Intervention
The US considers conflict and instability throughout the world as threats to US 
economic welfare and security. Nonetheless, it has a basic principle to deal with a 
regional conflict originating in the Nixon Doctrine that the primary responsibility, as
593 “US Policy toward East Timor”, <http://www.etan.org/timor/uspolicv.htm>. accessed: December 10, 
2004.
594 It has offshore reserves of oil and natural gas worth billions of dollars, and offers a gateway for 
commercial, political, intelligence and military operations throughout the Indonesian islands.
595 Nick Beams, “Australia Prepares Military Intervention in East Timor: What are the Real Motives?” 
(September 8, 1999), in <www.wsws.org>.
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President Bill Clinton reaffirmed, lays with the regional countries. As such, it wanted to 
be involved at a minimum level by not taking the main responsibility for military 
activities in East Timor, so as not to make the relationship with Indonesia worse. The
US policy towards East Timor was very ambiguous as President Clinton said,
“I am especially encouraged that Asian nations will be taking the primary 
responsibility... (regarding Indonesia) the future is important to us not only because 
of its resources and its sea lanes, but for its potential as a leader in the 
region...(regarding East Timor) our fundamental values are also at stake...the 
violence is abhorrent (in terms of) human decency and democracy”.596
It seems that the Clinton administration was forced to dispatch its force by the Congress, 
not only because it is the only power to practically be able to do so, but also because the 
phenomenon in East Timor was contrary to its proclaimed foreign policy principle of
rQ7
supporting ‘human rights’ . Consequently, the US intention to dispatch its troops to 
the INTERFET had the following basic goals: ®  restoring order, (2) maintaining a 
minimal US military presence on the ground, ®  transferring the main responsibility to
C Q O
the UN authority as soon as possible.
Evaluations of US Marines Activities
In the light of the above goals, the US Marines explicitly and implicitly acted as a 
means of calming the chaotic situation throughout the whole process, before and after
596 Linda D. Kozaryn, “US Limits Assistance to East Timor”, Defence Link News (American Forces 
Information Services), <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep 1999/n09171999 9909162.html>.
597 As the only superpower, it seeks to spread its value to other states in order to make matters certain. In 
doing so, it has experienced many difficulties, i.e., the military intervention in Somalia. As such, it 
considers three broad approaches: participating in a multilateral intervention, unilaterally, and backing 
the other party to reestablish friendly leadership to its policy. Steven R. David, “The Necessity for 
American Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World”, in The Aspen Strategy Group, The 
United States and the Use o f Force in the Post-Cold War Era (Queenstown, ML: The Aspen Institute, 
1995), p. 49-58.
598 Brigadier General Philip M. Mattox and Lieutenant Colonel William A. Guinn, “Contingency 
Contracting in East Timor”, <http://www.almc.armv.mil/ALOG/issues/JulAugOO/MS565.htm>. 
accessed: October 12, 2004.
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the referendum. Firstly, they might have a readiness to react to any Indonesian 
intervention which might disrupt the referendum proceeding satisfactorily, judging from 
the American intention to have a substantial military involvement including the marines. 
The logic of the plan was that the relevant countries or the regional community in 
general have not demonstrated an ability to successfully manage this kind of military 
intervention. However, it was rejected by the Australian authority so as not to offend the 
Indonesian military, which seemed more likely to accept ‘culturally akin’ troops formed 
with ground troops from Pacific and Asian countries.599 It is not easy to judge how 
much the US plan contributed to preventing Indonesian military intervention in the 
referendum. Even so, it is conceived that the US plan itself representing its will 
implicitly influenced the Indonesian decision not to use its military during the process 
of the referendum. As the force-in-readiness, the FMF in the Pacific Fleet and the 
marines in Okinawa formed the major part of the military force in the US plan600. 
Consequently, the US plan demonstrated the marines’ utility as a crisis response force in 
terms of compellence among the other roles of its armed forces by keeping its readiness 
to be dispatched at any time.
Secondly, it proved its utility in a limited way under the second goal of being a 
minimum presence on the ground using its air component and maritime characteristics. 
Owing to the lack of an existing road network, heavy-lift helicopter support was the 
most critical item. The four Ch-53 Sea Stallion helicopters from MARFORPAC’s 31st
t l iMEU, later replaced by those from the 11 MEU, were deployed not only to assist with
599 Mike Head, “US Pushes for Military Involvement in East Timor (August 7, 1999)” and “Plan to Send 
15,000 US Marines to East Timor (August 12, 1999)”, in World Socialist Web Site 
<http://www.wsws.org>. accessed: December 10, 2004.
600 In the planning stage, the US established US Forces INTERFET (USFI), which was commanded by a 
Marine Corps Brigadier General, and which included personnel from mainly USPACOM.
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transportation of supplies, logistics, civilians and planners, but also to search for 
evacuees601. In this operation, the mother ships of the helicopters, the USS Peleliu and 
Belleau Wood, functioned as forward operation bases without adding to the US presence
f\09  •on the ground. In addition, in the transition from the Australian-led INTERFET to 
the UN Transitional Administration East Timor (UNTAET), a portion of the 31st MEU 
deployed to East Timor in January 2000 to assist rebuilding the war-torn area, moving 
tons of construction supplies. Here, a large commercial hotel barge moored in Dili 
Harbour was employed to provide billeting, food, and water for the troops. Even though 
it was not an ideal situation for a long-term operation, it proved that the marines 
supported by the Navy would be a very useful component as a limited military presence 
on the ground.
Lastly, we consider its function in the process of the reconstruction of East Timor under 
the UNTAET, which of course includes the 31st MEU’s assistance mentioned above. 
According to BBC News, about 70% of the country’s infrastructure was destroyed 
during the violence after the referendum and thousands of people lacked proper housing 
and essential amenities.604 As such, the US supported East Timor in every possible way 
to help it achieve statehood via the USGET. In this process, the USMC was sent as part 
of the whole support programme, in which humanitarian assistance projects were 
conducted mainly by visiting US military units. In this process, one of the remarkable 
episodes was the three days, from November 17th to 19th 2002, when humanitarian
601 Steve Nelson, “11th MEU (SOC) Marines Assist in Repatriation of East Timorese”, sourced from The
US DoD (November 29, 1999) in <http://www.reliefweb.int>. accessed: October 12, 2004.
602 Philip M. Mattox and William A. Guinn (2000), p. 2.
603 Bryce R. Piper (31st MEU), “Intense, Rewarding Year Closes for 31st MEU”,
<http://www.c7f.naw.mil/news/2000/12/13.html>. posted on December 22, 2000.
604 BBC News, “US Promises East Timor Support”, May 17, 2001.
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assistance projects to provide relief focusing on the repair and renovation of village 
schoolhouses and medical facilities were undertaken by nearly 500 sailors and marines 
of the USS Belleau Wood (LHA 3) ARG and 11th MEU (SOC) as a part of the USGET 
took place . They provided assistance with interior and exterior painting, installing 
insect and security screening on windows, assembling school desks and chairs and 
constructing doors and awnings. This was, as Sgt Brian J. Griffin wrote, the softer side 
of a ‘Warrior’ as a means of supporting the state’s peacetime interests by keeping a 
“force-in-readiness”. The marines are well organized to react in any kind of mission 
even if it is a nonmilitary operation as in this case.
(E) Case Study 2: The Operational Plan for the Korean Peninsula 
Background o f  a Future Korean War
Despite the fact of the dissolution of the Cold War international system, the Korean 
peninsula still remains divided. Thus the amount of armaments is at its highest level 
ever in terms of allocation of resources in comparison with national income not just the 
number of military forces and their firepower. The two Koreas occupied the lower end 
of the international and alliance hierarchy as the spearhead of the eastern front during 
the Cold War. Their international or regional influence was absolutely limited because 
of their confrontation. Furthermore, the two superpowers were determined to maintain 
hegemonic control over the two Koreas, since, if they failed, it would have resulted in 
an enlargement of their adversary’s influence. As a result, their vital interests were
605 Carrie Batson, “Marines, Sailors Complete Humanitarian Assistance in East Timor”, Navy Newsstand, 
Story No. NNS021206-06 (December 6, 2002). In <http://www.news.navv.mil>. accessed: October 12,
2004.
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restricted, as medium or small states, by the limiting factors606 such as their existence 
as political entities or their territorial integrity, or their unification in an appropriate way 
whether by peaceful or forceful means.
Despite the very considerable military pow er.of South Korea, it always feels its 
insecurity, not only because the Seoul metropolitan area is so close to the frontier that it 
is located within the range of North Korean long range shells and guns, but also because 
North Korea still has unacceptable ambitions, i.e., the seeking of nuclear weapons, 
which may cause nuclear proliferation to the other regional countries, such as Japan. 
Regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons, most sources have claimed that they 
are a unique means for the right of defence of North Korea, strictly speaking from a 
surveillance of the current political system led by NDC Chairman Kim Chong-il. This is, 
as previously mentioned, a result of the collapse of the Communist alliance system, the 
northern triangular relationship which comprised North Korea, the PRC and USSR 
during the Cold War. Nonetheless, it is difficult to say, whether North Korea could 
expect any support from the old alliance in the event of any future war judging from the 
strategic configuration of Northeast Asia and the attitudes and interests of the 
participating countries in the ‘six-parties talks’ to solve North Korea’s nuclear 
development issue. It may be dependent on the characteristics of a war, how it is 
initiated and for what kind of purpose, or whether it has been agreed by all the parties.
606 J. R. Hill, Rear Admiral, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 9- 
11.
607 For example, the Chosun Central Communication of North Korea reviewed on June 9 2003,, “Our 
nuclear deterrent capability is not a means of threatening, but is a unique way”, and the Chosun Central 
Broadcasting Station commented on June 25 2003, “We will further accelerate to establish a self- 
defensive nuclear deterrent capability as a complementary measure against the American strategy of 
isolating and squeezing us”. Refer “a collection of North Korean statements in association with nuclear 
weapons”, Dongailbo, July 14, 2003.
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In this situation, in early 2003, when the North Korean nuclear matter reached a climax 
in international politics, the US Marines operational plan for a future war in the Korean 
peninsula as part of the introduction of OPLAN 5027 Major Theatre War, which is the 
US-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) basic war plan, was leaked by an internet 
service provider, the global security organization, labeling the top of each plan or 
appendix “secret for training only” for the purpose of militarily compelling North
ZAO
Korea. This exposure of its secret military plan would be interpreted as a compelling 
action by thus notifying North Koreans that if they continued along this path, it would 
result in disaster, though it did not threaten the real use of force.
Considering the unfeasibility of this goal which is North Korea’s abandonment of its 
nuclear weapon development programme, on account of the irrational behaviour of the 
North Korean leadership, makes the American leadership feel that the four or six party 
talks are less effective and even irrelevant than the policy of showing the possibility of 
the real use of force, which would therefore be seriously considered as a more viable 
option by the US. Consequently, as the regional strategic configuration has suggested, 
the possibility of a future outbreak of war in the Korean peninsula could be dependent 
on a pre-emptive strike on suspected nuclear or biochemical weapons facilities by the 
US. The great difficulty experienced by North Korea in maintaining their current ruling 
system is derived from both a hardline posture of containment or punishment by the 
surrounding countries, notably Japan, the South Korea, and the US, as well as the 
possibility of an insurrection from the inside. In either case, North Korea would almost 
certainly initiate an offensive action against South Korea.
608 See, “OPLAN 5027 Major Theater War”, in <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan- 
5027.htm>. accessed: March 5, 2003.
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The Origin of the Likelihood of a Future Korean War
However, the fundamental root of the North Korean threat is their reliance on an 
aggressive national security policy toward South Korea on the basis of an unchangeable 
ideology. North Korea still dreams of unifying the Korean peninsula under its rule 
(Kim’s control) 609 by any (forceful) means; it has been the prime national goal from 
the very birth of the regime. In order to achieve this goal, it established in 1962 the four 
pillars of its military policy, the militarisation of all the people610, fortification of all 
territory, officialisation of all troops, and modernization of all equipment. On these 
basic principles, it continuously tries to upgrade its military power as a revolutionary 
force armed with Kim’s Juche (self-reliance) thought. However, given the change in the 
strategic configuration and the severe economic decline since at least the mid-1990s, it 
seems that North Korea realizes that it is no longer possible to reunify through the 
conquest of South Korea.611
As a corollary, the defence of its territory including the current ruling system against 
foreign invasion by, in its own terms, “the imperialist aggressors (the US) and their
£19
lackey running dog (South Korea)” has become the equally important goal at the 
present time. In this regard, it began to diversify its diplomatic relationships with the
609 Its military strategy/ policy is based on the ideological tenet of Kim, II Sung’s Juche (self-reliance) 
and the strengthening of the three revolutionary capacities, in North and South Korea, and relationships 
with international revolutionary power). As such, the KPA is a means for the communisation of the 
Korean peninsula. Gang-Nyung, Kim, ^3*1 -$1 iS-fHAn Essay on North and South Koreas’
Politics and Diplomacy] (Seoul: DaeWangsa, 2000, 2nd ed.), pp. 203-206.
610 According to the DPRK’s detailed rules of activities in wartime, which was distributed in April 2004, 
it can mobilize and unify all resources including the Labour Party, military, civilians and their assets 
within 24 hours after the outbreak of a war. Hankookilbo, January 6, 2005.
611 Homer T. Hodge, “North Korea’s Military Strategy” (US Army College, Spring 2003).
612 Chong-sun Kim, “Military-First is Road to Victory of Anti-Imperialist, Independent Cause”, Nodong 
Sinmun [Labor Newspaper], June 19 2002, p. 6. The DPRK is continuously pursuing the breaking of 
the US-ROK alliance. In order to do that, as a part of the revolutionary strategy toward South Korea, it 
frequently employs this term via its media to influence the South Korean people.
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f%\“\ •Western countries including Japan and the US from the early 1990s, in order to keep 
its current political system and escape from economic poverty. Nonetheless, as long as it 
does not give up its first primary goal, the main feature of its military force build up is 
certainly offensive for the purpose of performing the permanent task of revolutionary 
warfare. The offensive propensity of its military strategy614 based on conventional 
forces615 including the missiles capable of threatening the neighbouring countries (refer 
Figure 5-3), is one of the main causes of why the six parties talks are not flowing 
smoothly.
Figure 5-3: North Korean Missile Threat
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(): Weight of A Warhead
SCUD-B
300Km(800Kg) .
DPRK JAPAN
TOKYOPRC
SCUD-C
500Km(600Kg)
Source: Chosunilbo, February 15, 2005.
The other may be, as mentioned above, the particular and associated interests of the
6,3 Regarding the changing attitude of its diplomacy, refer Gye-Dong, Kim (2002), pp. 119-152.
614 It seems that North Korea considers that this is the last resort to ensure regime survival and achieve 
reunification on its terms, despite the reorganization of the international political order.
615 For the details of its supposed conventional attack plans, see “OPLAN 5027 Major Theatre War-West: 
Phase 1-DPRK Attack”, in <http://www.globalsecuritv.org/military/ops/oplan-5027-1 .htm>: Centre for 
Korean Affairs, North Korea’s War Plan Against the US (April 22, 2003).
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participating countries. It is not clear whether North Korea possesses 1-2 nuclear bombs 
or not, despite the fact that most experts have estimated that this is the case, and that 
some North Korean officials have approved proceeding to the last stage of extracting 
plutonium from 8000 nuclear fuel rods. However, according to the ROK Defence White 
Paper 2004, it had extracted some 10-14 kg of plutonium616 before 1992, when the 
IAEA began to investigate. No other country officially approves of North Korea’s 
efforts to possess its own nuclear bombs. Judging from the strategic configuration in the 
region and the strengths of ROK-US military power, it would be difficult to imagine 
another Korean War, if Jung-il Kim is a rational leader. Nevertheless, owing to its
• A ] 7  * * A I R #massive conventional forces and missile capability , it is natural that the alliance
takes up a strong defence posture.
Defensive Posture of the ROK-US Alliance
The prime attribute of the ROK defence policy is a defensive attitude. As the cease-fire 
agreement implies, the Korean War is not completely over. Despite this, it seems that 
the South Koreans do not feel that they are in an ongoing war. On the contrary, as the 
current president Rho said in Los Angeles when he visited the US for the ROK-US 
summit talks, they think that competition between the two Koreas is over. On the basis 
of this awareness, the goals of the “Participatory Government” are to achieve 
“Democracy with the People”, “A Society with Balanced Development”, and an “Era of
616 “White Paper 2004, North Korea added about 1000 field artilleries”, Chosunilbo, February 5, 2005.
617 Most of its conventional forces including massive numbers of artillery pieces, particularly its longer- 
range systems, have been positioned close to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates the two 
Koreas.
618 According to the latest information, North Korea has developed the newest Scud missile (namely 
Scud-ER, estimated range 600-1000km), which can threaten Japanese territory and the US bases in the 
region. However, Daepodong I (2500km) and II (6700Km), which can reach Japan and a part of the US, 
are not yet deployed even though they completed test-firing a few years ago. Chosunilbo, February 15,
2005. Considering the term, ‘tolerance of casualties’ in a war or crisis, this missile capability makes it 
difficult for the countries in the Six-Parties Talks to take only a forceful line.
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Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia”.619 Under these national goals, the goal of its 
defence policy is to “firmly establish a defence posture to ensure peace” . As a result, 
the concept of a ‘main enemy’, which mainly pointed to the Korean People’s Army 
(KPA) and Kim’s political system, not the innocent people, and which had been
f\) 1formally declared in previous ROK Defence White Papers for about the last 10 years , 
was abolished in the Defence White Paper 2004.
However, unlike these public statements, the defence system is not simple. As most 
strategists and military commentators have analysed, the combat strength of the ROK 
armed forces still remains at a level of about 70 per cent compared with that of the 
KPA. Nobody says that this strength is sufficient as a defensive military power, 
because the cost of a future war will be inestimable considering the geopolitical 
structure and the infrastructure of South Korea. Hence, the aim of the ROK forces 
buildup is to possess a sufficient deterrent power to avoid an outbreak of war.
Nonetheless, the ROK armed forces are not able to perform independent operations, 
because the US-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC)/ the UN Forces Command
619 The ROK Ministry of National Defence, Participatory Government Defence Policy 2003 (p. 34), in 
<http://www.mnd.go.kr>. accessed: February 25, 2005.
620 Ibid.
621 North Korea and some South Koreans have criticized the term as an obsolete way of thinking. Hence, 
it disappeared from the book, Defence White Paper 2004, after the heated controversy of the last 4 
years.
622 The war potential capacity of the ROK armed forces compared with that of the KPA reached 65 % in 
1988, and 75% in 1997. Generally, it still remains around 70%, even though a recent study said that it 
has reached the level of 90 %. But, the latter did not consider North Korea’s NBC capabilities. Refer, 
Taig-Young. Ham, '2‘t3l ^  *<§ ^  7f[the Present State of Arms Race between
North and South Korea, and an Evaluation of their Military Powers]”, in
^  [South and North Koreas’ Military Strength Evaluation and an Appropriate Level of
Military Power]. The 26th Scientific and Civilian Forum for South and North Koreas’ Military 
Strengths (April 23, 1999), p. 7.
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(UFC) , which was created in November 1978, has the operational authority in 
wartime. In this regard, it is sufficient to say that the US holds the key to deter an 
invasion by North Korea on the basis of the ROK-US Mutual Defence Agreement in 
November 1954. As a corollary, the USFK has remained a symbol of the ROK-US 
alliance and continues to contribute to the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula 
(refer Figure 5-4). In addition, the US will augment its forces including the Army, Navy, 
Air Force and Marines, to approximately 690,000 troops in wartime.624
Figure 5-4: Organisation of the USFK
US Naval 
Forces Korea
US Marine 
Forces Korea
US Air 
Forces Korea
US Special Operations 
Command Korea
USFK
Source: The ROK MND, Participatory Government Defence Policy 2003, p. 56.
The basic concept of the alliance’s wartime plan625, the OPLAN 5027, comprises at 
least the following three phases: Phase 1-DPRK Attack, Phase 2-ROK Defence, and 
Phase 3-the Alliance’s Counterattack. It seems that this plan has slightly changed with 
time, according to the buildup of the ROK armed forces and the transition of the 
security environment. For example, on the one hand, as the posture of both parties and 
the combat strength ratio suggests, it does not plan to defend the present line of the
623 The commanding general of the USFK in South Korea commands both organisations.
624 Participatory Government Defence Policy 2003, p. 57. However, this number is, as most strategists 
have pointed out, a sum of available forces, because it is possible only when there is no any other 
conflict in the other region. Refer, ‘tT3l ^ ‘°1 ^  3] p|-[The US Military
Strategy toward East Asia and Korea’s Dilemma]”, in <http://www.donga.com>. accessed: July 10, 
2004.
625 The following statements are summarized from the globalsecurity.org for study purposes. As such, it 
is possible that these do not represent the real plans. For the details, refer 
<http ://www. globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5027.htm>.
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DMZ in the first phase. Given the gradual buildup of ROK military power, it is possible 
to defend against a North Korean invasion at FEB A Bravo (20-30 miles below the 
DMZ), which is reflected in the OPLAN 1994. On the other hand, the updated Japan- 
US defence cooperation guidelines in 1996, which reflected the nuclear crisis of 1994 in 
North Korea, allows the US to prepare for a Korean war by stationing its military forces 
in Japan.
Before this agreement, the Japanese hesitated to allow US forces unconditional access 
to the US bases in Japan for a Korean war, i.e., the Japanese Diet’s refusal to ratify the 
conclusion concerning the Korean clause agreed at the Nixon-Sato summit in November 
1969. In fact, despite the fact that the ROK has not ratified a mutual defence treaty with 
Japan up to the present day, de facto security ties have been formed from the 1950s by 
the triangular relationship with the US. With the update, the OPLAN became more 
clearly focused on offensive operations into. North Korea. With this, the OPLAN 
1998 included a preemptive attack; hence it considered an activity prior to Phase I (a 
North Korean attack). As a result, it comprises four phases: activities prior to a North 
Korean attack, halting the initial North Korean assault, regrouping for a counter-attack, 
and finally a full scale invasion of North Korea to seize Pyongyang. After all, the 
OPLAN seems to be changed annually, and is decided in the light of all available 
resources and the transitions of the security environment.
626 This plan reflected the US antagonism against the DPRK, because Pyongyang seemed to walk away 
from the Geneva agreement in 1994. Thus, the Clinton government and the Congress slowly began to 
lose confidence that North Korea would abide by the agreement. For a pre-emptive strike, the planners 
pinpoint targets including Pyongyang and beyond. Of course, the target of high priority was the North 
Korean artillery corps, which could hit Seoul to inflict severe damage. As geographical factors show, 
Seoul is a kind of hostage to the DPRK being threatened by massive artillery pieces. Richard Halloran, 
“New Warplan Calls for Invasion of North Korea (November 14, 1998)”,
<http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/asia/Halloranl 11498.html>. accessed: March 5,2003.
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Missions and Tasks of the USMC
Considering the geography of the Korean peninsula and the history of the allied forces 
in the Korean War who conducted two major amphibious operations, one on each coast, 
Inchon (west) and Wonsan (east), the wartime functions of the USMC are not to be 
discounted in the above defence concept. In this regard, the alliance created the 
Combined Marine Forces Command (CMFC) in the early 1990s as in the case of the 
Japan-US alliance. In peacetime, the USMC maintains a headquarters in Seoul under 
the name of USMARFORK to provide immediate command representation to 
COMUSFK, UNC/CFC, COMCMFC, and the Commandant, ROKMC. The 
Commander of the USMARFORK functions as the deputy Commander of the CMFC in 
peacetime. However, as the UNC/CFC has the operational authority in wartime, 
COMMARFORPAC would be designated as Commander of the CMFC in order to 
command the Marine Forces Component. Currently, according to the sources provided 
by the globalsecurity.org, the function of the USMC in wartime is to plan to launch an 
overland offensive north toward Wonsan from the east coast by a US MEF (in division 
strength) and the 82nd Air Assault Division along with ROKMC divisions.
However, according to Richard Halloran’s study, it is natural that the entire resources of 
the USMC would flow into the Korean peninsula. Of course, this may be possible when 
there is no conflict in any other region. Even so, judging from the entire US Navy’s 
amphibious lift capability (2.5 MEB) and the US force structure and its deployment 
plan, the USMC would react in serial order with its available troops considering their 
geographical locations. The order may be as follows: the 31st MAU, the 3rd Marine
627 Refer, US Marine Corps Forces Korea (USMARFORK) and Combined Marine Forces Command 
(CMFC) in <http://www.globalsecuritv.org/militarv/agencv/usmc/usmarfork.htm>. accessed: August 30, 
2004.
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Division in Okinawa, the MEB in Hawaii, the MPS in Guam and the 1st Marine 
Division in California, and if possible or needed, the 2nd Marine Division in North 
Carolina. Given the forward deployment of the KPA near the DMZ and the development 
of the covert military movements, the warning time has been shortened to about three 
days or less.
From this perspective, the functions of each echelon would be defined considering both 
Figure 2-2 (the Relationships among the Roles, MOOTW and War), and the US force 
availability over time , in the case of a war being started by a North Korean attack. 
Firstly, the function of the 31st MAU would be deployment to South Korea in the 
escalation stage as a deterrent or compelling force to stop an anticipated North Korean 
attack. Secondly, the 3rd Division would be deployed at Phase I within C+30 days629, 
and participate in the operations to halt and contain the enemy offensive by seizing key 
terrain, inflicting additional casualties, and rebuffing further attacks. Thirdly, the MEB 
in Hawaii and the 1st Division will be deployed in Phase II between C+30 and 60 days 
as build up forces to participate in Phase III (Counteroffensive operation). Here, the 3rd 
Marine Division is, for example, a forward presence force in Japan, and can be 
considered as a crisis response force to tackle any conflict in the Korean peninsula. In 
this way, according to the location of the crisis, their functions may vary in terms of 
their nominal responsiveness to contingency needs. In line with this plan, the related 
USMC staff and troops periodically participate in the ROK-US Combined Exercises
628 For study purposes, the force availability over time refers to the study by the RAND. See, Fred Frostic 
and Christopher J. Bowie, “Conventional Campaign Analysis of Major Regional Conflicts”, Paul K. 
Davis (1994), p. 367.
629 ‘C day’ is the time at which US forces deploy. This will be decided by the US President or other 
commanding authority; thus it could be before or after the outbreak of a war.
630 Refer, Bernard D. Rostker, Bruce W. Don, and Kennedy Watman, “Assessing the Structure and Mix of 
Future Active and Reserve Army Forces: A Classic Problem in Defence Analysis Revisited”, in Paul K. 
Davis (1994), pp. 638-646.
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such as the Ulchi-Focus Lens (UFL), Foal Eagle (FE), and Team Spirit (T/S).631
Evaluations o f the USMC’s Role and Functions
It seems that the OPLAN, particularly the plan to employ the USMC, was specified 
after the end of the Cold War and facilitated by the North Korean nuclear crisis 
reflecting the transitions of the new security environment. The basic concept of the 
OPLAN 5027 in the Cold War might have been the same as this, but it would have been 
difficult for the USMC to be employed in a similar way to the above specific mission 
and tasks considering US interests regarding Japan. This is because North Korea might 
have started a war with certain support from the USSR not just from the PRC. In this 
case, the USSR might have contained the US action by threatening Japan in order to 
help North Korea. If so, it is really doubtful whether the US would commit the 3rd 
Marine Division in a Korean War in a global war situation like the 1st Division in the 
last Korean War. Generally speaking, there is a great disharmony between the plan and 
the real forces availability, as the US forces buildup has never met its planned 
requirements. Nonetheless, it is true that it became a more realistic plan with the 
changes in US interests (banning the proliferation of nuclear weapons and support for 
human rights), and the strategic configuration in the post-Cold War period.
As the function of each set of forces indicates, it seems that the USMC is well organized 
and situated to react to a Korean war. However, there is a great possibility that a Korean 
war would not escalate into a regional war. Although it might become a regional war, it 
is plain that the plan may not be executed as planned due to both the difficulty of 
amphibious landing operations against a relatively strong military force line of the KPA
631 For the details of the exercises, refer, “Military Exercises”, in the ROK MND’s homepage.
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as in the Gulf War, and the lack of amphibious lift capability. The realization of this 
amphibious landing operation depends on how rapidly the US achieves both the 
activation of the RRF and the mobilization of commercial sealift, and the 
establishment of air and maritime superiority by neutralizing the DPRK’s defence forces 
and the PGMs. The latter is an indispensable precondition for the use of its new 
manoeuvre doctrine, the OMFTS and STOP. In case these preconditions are not satisfied, 
its mission will remain as a grand scale deception to support the speedup of the ground 
components’ advancement by locating in one or several optimum positions.
For all that, the USMC is one of the main components of the alliance forces regardless 
of defensive or offensive operations. At the same time it is a means of diplomatic 
coercion by deploying it adjacent to North Korea’s coastal area, when the US wants to 
actively compel North Korea’s negative behaviour, such as the continuous projection of 
its nuclear programme and the suppression of human rights. However, real military 
action is, in fact, not easy because of the convoluted interests of the surrounding 
countries. Moreover, the effects of military action are also unpredictable because of the 
considerable military strength of the DPRK, which is in contrast with the Third World 
countries.
632 The US holds about 78 ships under the RRF, which can be activated by the date of scheduled 
activations of 4, 5, 10, and 20 days. In addition, there are about 315 ships, US-flag (198) and effective 
US-controlled (EUSC) ships, which are potentially available to augment military sealift. Refer IISS, 
The Military Balance 2002-2003, p. United States 21.
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(1) The Russian Interests/ Foreign Policy
A turning point in the aggressive Soviet foreign policy was the 27th Soviet Communist 
Party Congress presided over by Mikhail Gorbachev, promising major changes in Soviet 
policy. Here, he made significant progress towards consolidating power by changing the 
members of the Politburo and Secretariat, and outlining a new direction of its priorities 
focusing on domestic growth and modernization rather than foreign policy objectives at
ATTthat time. After that, he made major progress in the relaxation of the tension between 
the East and West by pursuing a cooperative Soviet foreign policy.634 However, the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union was a political earthquake, which meant the end of 
the rivalry of the two superpowers and their opposing ideologies. Moreover, Russia 
joined NATO’s PFP on June 24, 1994 and entered into an economic partnership with the 
EU. It meant that the aggressive Soviet foreign policy objectives were also completely 
terminated, despite the fact that there were some stalemates on key problems such as the
A T  ^NATO expansion programme . Russia succeeded to the prestige of the USSR in 
international relations, but it has had to come to terms with a great deal of change, both 
in reality and in self-perception.
It is not surprising that the supreme priority of Russia’s foreign policy course is the
633 Francis T. Miko, “The 27th Soviet Party Congress and the West”, Survival (July/August 1986), pp. 
291-304.
634 Paul Marantz, “From Lenin to Gorbachev: Changing Soviet Perspectives on East-West Relations”, 
Occasional Papers, No. 4 (CUPS, 1988), pp. 81-83.
635 Basically, Russia had two negative points of view: ®  use of force, deployment of conventional and 
nuclear weapons in the territories of the new members, (2) NATO’s new strategic concept to use the 
forces outside of the NATO area applied by the Washington Treaty without the sanction of the UN 
Security Council. Refer, “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, approved by the 
President of the RF, V. Putin (June 28, 2000), <http://www.mid.ru/mid/eng/econcept.htm>. accessed: 
April 23,2001.
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AT A •  •protection of the interests of the individual, the society and the state. For a while, it 
perceived the US as a threat, and was worried by the strengthening of the tendency to 
establish a unipolar world structure under American economic and force domination 
throughout the world. Russia’s security concept vis-a-vis the West has clearly changed, 
particularly in respect of the US. Alexei Arbatov, a member of the Russian Duma, said, 
“whereas in the past... Russia had no opponents or enemies in the world, now... one of 
the primary possible threats to Russian security and foreign policy interests is the policy
AT7
of the US” . However, judging from its declaration of strong support for international 
organisations and the rule of international law, Russia has shown pragmatism by 
recognizing its strength relative to that of the US today. It means that it is no longer in a 
position to militarily challenge the US, that is, it may not compete with the US by 
placing itself as a curb on US military hegemony in the international community. Even 
so, as it recognized that the weakening of its political, economic and military influence 
in the world is a fundamental threat, its foreign policy objective is to preserve its 
sovereignty and strengthen its position as a great power and as one of the influential 
centres of a multipolar system. In addition, it may have aspirations to regain control 
over most of the successor states of the former Soviet Union, notably Georgia, Abkhazia
AT© # #
and Belarus, into a single political system. However, it is a complex process, because 
it has to take into account the interests of both sides, Russia and the others.
636 “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, <http://www.In.mid.ru>. accessed: March 
24, 2004; The priority tasks formulated by the minister of foreign affairs, E.M. Primakov, included the 
creation of favorable external conditions for strengthening the territorial integrity of Russia, the 
settlement of regional conflicts, and the development of fruitful intergovernmental relations, and the 
distribution of weapons of mass destruction, refer Press conference of the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of RF, E.M. Primakov, “Press Centre MFA RF (January 12)”, Diplomatic Bulletin MAFRF, No. 2 
(February 1996), C.3.
637 C.P. Bleek, “Russia adopts New Security Concept; “Appears to Lower Nuclear Threshold”, Arms 
Control Today (January/February 2000), in <http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/janfebOO/rujfOO.htm>. 
accessed: April 20, 2001.
638 “Putin on Russia’s Foreign Policy Priorities”, CD1 Russia Weekly, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/287- 
4.cfin>. accessed: November 23, 2004.
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Consequently, it is not easy to adopt an aggressive foreign policy objective like that of 
the Soviets in the Cold War within the near future.
In line with this, Russia has undergone an enforced change of emphasis in its foreign 
policy. It no longer has any great influence in Africa or Southeast/west Asia because it
ATQhas dropped its commitments to non-democratic allies in the Third World . However, 
it has not given up its influence in the Middle East, and is seeking to build its 
relationship with Iran640 for broad economic reasons not just for arms sales. 
Nonetheless, it is not easy to uphold its influence as in the days of the USSR, since the 
countries in the Middle East have become strongly tied to the West both politically and 
economically. Currently, the uncertain security environment raised by the War on Terror 
could provide a chance for Russia. But it is unlikely to stand in opposition to the US, 
because its economic and political ability to do that is critically limited.
The Asia-Pacific perspectives of Russian foreign policy are more complex, reflecting 
the longstanding historic relations with China, Japan, and the two Koreas. There are 
four central features of the RF foreign policy641: 0 the normalization of the Sino- 
Soviet conflict, and the enhancement of economic trade, particularly in the field of arms 
exports,642 (2) broadening its economic relations with East Asian states, particularly
639 P. Shearman (ed.), Russian Foreign Policy since 1990 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), p. 130.
640 Russia had been closely involved in the completion of a nuclear reactor at Bushehr in Iran, which was 
suspected by the US as leading to Iran acquiring nuclear weapon technology. Refer, E. Blanche, 
“Russia Steps up Mid-East Arms Drive in”, The Middle East (July/August 2001).
641 Robert Legvold, “Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle”, Michael Mandelbaum (1995), pp. 32-46; 
Raj an Menon & Henri J. Barkey, “The Transformation of Central Asia: Implications for Regional and 
International Security, Survival, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 68-89; V.I. Denisov, “Russia and 
the Problem of Korean Unification”, Tae-Hwan Kwak (1997), pp. 38-41.
642 It seems that mutual trust between the two states has become firmly established by ratifying the Treaty 
of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation on July 16, 2001, in which both state that the 
sides have no territorial claims on each other. In 2003 trade reached around the 15 billion dollars. Igor 
Ivanov, “Russia in Asia and Asia in Russia”, Daily News Bulletin (MFA RF Information and Press,
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with Japan and South Korea643, (3) admitting the status quo of the existing balance of 
power system, that is, regional stability644 and ®  keeping its influence in Central Asia 
and Southeast Asia by limiting the enlargement of Chinese influence. Russia actually 
wants to preserve its influence throughout the region as a pole of economic power not as 
a military behemoth, but its economic weakness and the uncertainty of its domestic 
political situation constrains it. With regard to its internal economic weakness, Russia 
would fundamentally have a strong interest in drawing support from the Asia-Pacific 
countries rather than keeping a confrontational attitude like the USSR in the Cold War, 
not only because it does not consider any of the other three major powers to be an 
adversary, but also because it has given greater emphasis to the development of the Far 
East as a modem high-tech industrial area in order to improve its gross economic 
capability.
(2) Military Strategy/ Policy
Given the transition of the foreign policy objectives and the domestic demand to reduce 
its military burden, Gorbachev introduced the concept of ‘reasonable sufficiency’ as a 
guidance for the military buildup to maintain adequate levels of defence. This concept 
was militarily articulated by the Berlin declaration of the WTO in May 1987 that “the 
alliance’s military doctrine would henceforth be defensive, guided by the principle of 
reasonable sufficiency”645. The subsequent withdrawals of Soviet forces amounting to
January 28, 2004), in <http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/fp/russia/2004/200401 -r-in-asia.html>. accessed: 
October 13, 2004.
643 In some aspects, Russia’s choice of South Korea over North Korea would mean its turn toward a pro- 
Westem-centric Asia-Pacific policy, but now it tries to keep its influence by participating in the Six- 
party talks aimed at ending North Korea’s nuclear programme.
644 It seems that Russia considers the US military presence as an indispensable factor of stability, a 
constraint on Japanese militarization and a counterbalance to Chinese military power as well as a threat.
645 Elaine M. Holoboff, The Crisis in Soviet Military Reform (London: Brassey’s, 1991), p. 2; Pravda, 
May 30, 1987.
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700,000 including families from Eastern Europe caused some fundamental problems, 
such as the lack of houses and the psychological turmoil of the troops caused by losing 
the justification of their defending communist values. Furthermore, the Soviet Union 
itself began to disintegrate into a number of separate republics, which asserted their 
right to establish national military forces. Given these situations, there were many 
debates about the direction of military reform and reductions including the emergence 
of republican forces, and the creation of the CIS in 1991, but this principle, ‘reasonable 
sufficiency’ has been taken for granted from that time as the basis of Russian military 
reform646.
The goal of the reform concept was, according to General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, Chief 
of the General Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defence in 1991, “to create a 
mechanism for safeguarding the country’s security, ensuring effective military 
organisational development, and bringing the USSR armed forces into line with the 
level of the real military threat and the new political, economic and social conditions, 
which covered all spheres of defense organisational development”.647 In addition, the 
CFE Treaty also limits the numbers of the principal combat systems available to the
f . A O
successor states of the former Soviet Union . This military reform was planned to be 
completed in three stages: ®  the first stage (up to 1994): to implement and take 
measures to cut nuclear and conventional arms as well as to complete troop withdrawals 
from overseas, (2) the second stage (1994-1995), to complete the cuts in the armed
646 Whilst Gorbachev imposed doctrinal changes as well as budget and force cuts, the Yeltsin government 
more vigorously pursued these policies. See, Brian D. Taylor, “Russian Civil-Military Relations After 
the October Uprising”, Survival, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 5.
647 William H.J. Manthorpe, “The Soviet View”, Proceedings, Vol. 117/2/1,056 (February 1991), p. 104.
648 The CFE treaty is limited only to the ATTU zone. Russia received 48 % of the tanks (6,400), 48 % of 
artillery systems (11,480), 67 % of the combat aircraft (3,450) and 57 % of the strike helicopters (890) 
among the overall quotas for the European part of the former USSR.
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forces and the formation of a strategic armed forces grouped on Soviet territory, (3) the 
third stage (1996-2000), to complete the 50% cuts in strategic arms and the technical 
reequipping of army and naval forces.
In March 1992, the RF decided to create its own independent armed forces taking 
control of most of the former Soviet military establishment, and appointing a Russian 
Federation Minister of Defence (Pavel Grachev) in May as well as Russian commanders 
for the services in August.649 By doing this, Russia emerged as a strong military 
superpower instead of the USSR, accepting the basic plan of the military reform. 
Considering the preconditions for creating its own military forces such as Russian 
budget allocation, material and technical support650, it is natural that the reduction in 
their military strength was no longer in doubt, regardless of nuclear and conventional 
forces. It is clear that the dramatic collapse of the Soviet military system has profoundly 
changed the global strategic balance.
The revision of Soviet military strategy under the conditions of Soviet-American 
strategic parity created the idea of ‘nuclear sufficiency’, which proclaimed that it would 
be meaningless to possess a nuclear arsenal beyond the capability of Mutual Assured 
Destruction. In other words, it realized that a much lower level of nuclear weapons 
would diminish the danger of an accidental nuclear strike and increase the security of 
the world.651 From this perspective and its limited ability to afford the maintaintenance
649 Roy Allison, “Military Forces in the Soviet Successor States”, Adelphi Papers No, 280 (October 
1993), p. 18.
650 In September 1992, the ceiling for military manpower (1% of the state’s population) was set in the 
Russian Law on Defence. Considering the population of Russia at that time (148,041,000), it means 
that it must cut down to 1.5m. Grachev started to implement the plan to reduce to 1.5 military men by 
the year 2000. IISS, Strategic Survey 1992-1993, p. 73.
651 Seweryn Bialer, “New Thinking and Soviet Foreign Policy”, Survival, Vol. 30, No. 4 (July/August
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of its nuclear arsenal, Russia has projected a number of cooperative security 
programmes with the US such as ‘Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination’, ‘Nuclear 
Weapons Storage Security’ in which they have focused on containing the threat of 
nuclear proliferation from Russia and other former Soviet republics.
The nuclear stance of the RF has been clarified by the Russian Federation Military 
Doctrine of April 21, 2000 replacing the Presidential Decree no. 1833 of November 2, 
1993 , in which the political nature of nuclear weapons was stressed. Whereas the
version of 1993 allowed the first use of nuclear arms only in the case of aggression by a 
nuclear-weapons power or a non-nuclear power with a nuclear-armed ally or 
collaborating with a nuclear state, under the 2000 doctrine it is allowed in the cases of 
both large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons and all weapons of mass 
destruction attacks.654 The long-term goal would be a ‘minimal deterrence, eventually, 
total nuclear disarmament’. In this connection, Russia has reacted positively to the 
reduction of strategic offensive nuclear arsenals, because it needs the support of the US 
in reducing its nuclear weapons and in maintaining its security systems to prevent 
nuclear materials from being stolen.
However, it has strongly disagreed with the US on the matter of large-scale missile 
defence. Russia has openly opposed this, and declared its readiness to compete with the
1988), p. 297.
652 Kenneth N. Luongo, “The Uncertain Future of US-Russian Cooperative Security”, Arms Control 
Today (January/February 2001), in <http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/janfebO 1/luongojanfebO 1 ,htm>. 
accessed: April 25, 2001.
653 Brigitte Sauerwein, “Russia’s Military Doctrine: Addressing New Security Requirements”, 
International Defence Review, Vol. 027/001 (Jan 1, 1994), pp. 5-7.
654 Arms Control Association, “Russia’s Military Doctrine”, Arms Control Today (May 2000).
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US in the field of any new missile defence technology.655 In this sense, it seems that 
Russia considers nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip. To summarize, as widely 
recognized, Russia’s economic conditions are currently very uncertain and difficult, so 
that the new national security concept places a great reliance upon nuclear weaponry. To 
make sure of its deterrence capability, Russia still places the top priority on the 
development of offensive and defensive strategic components. For example, it has 
deployed a regiment of modernized (SS-27) Topol-M ICBM656 by January 1999, which 
has enhanced its combat potential. It appears that there are no alternatives to nuclear 
weapons in order to maintain its position in the international community considering the 
poor state of its conventional forces.
Military reform is the major preoccupation of the RF conventional armed forces, which
f.cn  ^
continue to be in a state of deep crisis . According to a source provided by IISS, it has
(LCQ
reduced its manpower and its armaments abiding by TLE ceilings in the ATTU zone . 
Some military reform tasks have been accomplished. Firstly, there are four services in 
the RF armed forces unlike five in the USSR, not only by merging the former Strategic 
Rocket Forces, the Military Space Forces, and the Missile and Space Defence Forces 
into a new service, the Strategic Missile Troops, but also by integrating the former Air 
Force and Air Defence Forces into a new air force branch of the armed forces.659
655 Yuri Karash, “Russia says Leave ABM Treaty Alone, Missile Defence will not Work”, 
<http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/missions/russia_abm_010212,html>. accessed: April 15, 2001.
656 IISS, The Military Balance 2003-2004, p. 88-89.
657 They are in disarray because of a lack of funds, the country’s decade-long economic crisis, with 
ground troops rarely going on field exercises, warplanes grounded and navy ships stuck in harbours. 
For example, the annual flying time of Russian pilots is 15-20 hours annually compared to 150-180 
hours in many NATO countries and more than 40 percent of Russian helicopters are unserviceable. 
Refer, Stanislav Lunev, “Russian Military Reform -  One Step Toward Dictatorship” (December 1, 
2000), in <http://www.newsmax.com/scripts>. accessed: December 01, 2004.
658 Refer, IISS, The Military Balance 2003-2004, p. 231.
659 Walter Parchomenko, “The State of Russia’s Armed Forces and Military Reform”, Parameters: US 
Army War College Quarterly (Winter 1999-2000), pp. 99-102.
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Secondly, it has reduced the MoD forces to 960,600 by 2003, and will continuously 
reduce this even more.660 Thirdly, it has reshuffled the top echelons of the military 
establishment, the TVD, and reduced the number of military districts to six (Leningrad, 
Moscow, Volga-Ural, North Caucasus, Siberian, and Far East MD), and given them the 
enhanced status of operational-strategic commands.661 Put succinctly, there is no doubt 
that the strength of the RF armed forces will continuously be reduced, and the RF will 
largely rely upon its nuclear forces rather than conventional power in pursuing its 
interests abroad. As the nature of the military doctrine is clearly defensive, the RF has 
been obliged to look inwards much more than outwards with the complexity of its 
military-economic relations.
(3) Maritime Strategy/ Policy
Despite the continental nature of Soviet interests and strategy, the Soviet Navy under 
Gorshkov had developed the capability of supporting Soviet foreign policy in the Third 
World by constructing numerous surface ships and amphibious capability during the 
Cold War era. In order to do that, the USSR invested the largest share of defence 
resources into its naval buildup. However, with the adoption of ‘defensive doctrine’ and 
acceptance of the ‘reasonable sufficiency’ principle, the Soviet Defence Council reached
f\f\ 9consensus on cutting naval resources , which was not appropriate under the defensive
660 The Russian armed forces consist of MoD and non-MoD security forces (paramilitary forces or 
shadow armies, i.e., Interior Troops, Railway Troops, the Border Guards Service, etc.), which are 
attached to 15 government agencies. All are under the control of the RF Armed Forces General Staff, 
which is the main organ of operational command coordinating and organizing the collaboration of both 
in performing missions in the defence sphere. Refer, Arms Control Association (May 2000), 
“Leadership of the State’s Military Organisation” part. The ultimate goal of manpower varies according 
to the sources, i.e., the deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Dmitry Trenin (350,000, 
Dmitry Trenin, “Russia’s Military in Crisis”, Briefing Papers, Vol. 2, Issue 9 (September 2000)), BBC 
News (900,000, August 23, 2000, 21:17 UK), Col. Stanislav Lunev (2.5 million of both by reducing 
600,000).
661 Walter Parchomenko (1999); IISS, The Military Balance 2003-2004, pp. 93-94.
662 William H.J. Manthorpe, “Why is Gorbachev Pushing Naval Arms Control?”, Proceedings, Vol.
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doctrine. However, as naval armaments were excluded from the TLE, the USSR or CIS 
did not expect to reduce them at the initial stages, and planned, according to the words 
of General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, to “maintain at a level of ‘defence sufficiency’ 
comparable to the real threat to its interests through the qualitative renewal and 
improvement of system and means for command, control, and all kinds of support” . 
The demand to reduce the naval armaments in the RF came not only from its domestic 
situation, i.e., a declining economy, the cost of operating large older ships, and the 
decline in the defence budget, but also from the bids of relative republics for 
geographical reasons, i.e., the Ukraine’s bid to take the whole Black Sea Fleet and 
Lithuania’s bid for the Baltic Fleet. Apart from the latter, the former is currently 
influencing the structure of the Russian Navy.
In fact, it is still true that the Russian Navy is second only to the US Navy in terms of 
numbers of ships, armaments, and manpower. It is a nuclear superpower at sea keeping 
20 operational and non-operational SSBNs with 332 missiles, at the level of the START 
I declaration on Jan 31 2002.664 However, it is true that the Russian Navy has 
dramatically declined as the CinC Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov said, “it is just over a 
quarter of the Soviet Navy in size”665. In addition, in July 2002, Russia closed its last 
overseas naval base, Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam.666 In this way, owing to the economic 
conditions, it is almost impossible not only to operate, maintain, and train the current 
naval power, but also to build an additional shipbuilding programme except for a
115/1/1031 (January 1989), p. 76.
663 William H.J. Manthorpe (1991), p. 104.
664 IISS, The Military Balance 2003-2004, p. 89.
665 Mikhail Tsypkin, “Rudderless in a Storm: The Russian Navy, 1992-2000”, Anne C. Aldis & Roger N. 
McDermott, Russian Military Reform 1992-2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 163.
666 Ibid.
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strategic deterrence capability. For example, in December 2000, Russian government 
funds were released to continue construction of the 19,400-ton SSBN (the Bulava 
SLBM), which is a development of the Topol-M (SS-27) ICBM.667 In addition to this, 
there was a new commission of a surface ship, the heavy nuclear missile cruiser the
(LfLQ
Gepard, which joined the Navy in 2002 after 11 years at the shipyard . It means that 
the priority for its strategic capability enhancements remains the development of 
offensive and defensive components focusing on a minimum level of nuclear submarine 
forces sufficient to defend its interests. However, their activities and exercises are 
unable to meet regular levels compared with those of the US Navy (only 13 Russian 
SSBNs are operational).
Despite its economic difficulties, Russia certainly requires a navy considering its 
international position as a military power as well as its lengthy maritime border. The 
roles and functions of the Russian Navy will not be changed very much, even though it 
is natural to reduce the whole strength of the navy regardless of nuclear and 
conventional forces or peacetime and wartime missions. In other words, the priority of 
the fundamental missions would be changed in the orders of Coastal Defence, Strategic 
Deterrence, and others.669 Not surprisingly, the role of the navy as a peacetime 
instrument of foreign policy has disappeared with the withdrawal from blue-water 
operations and a forward presence . It is unlikely to invest money to procure
667 For the details, refer, A. D. Baker, III, “World Navies in Review”, Proceedings, Vol. 127/3/1,177 
(March 2001), pp. 35.
668 Mikhail Tsypkin (2003), p. 180.
669 Norman Polmar, “Russia’s Navy Will Remain Strong Beyond 2000”, Proceedings, Vol. 123/3/1,128 
(March 1997), pp. 64-65.
670 No new surface ships have been laid down since 1991 and, apparently, no new starts are anticipated 
before 2005. Currently, one of the most important interests of RF regarding surface ships is how to sail 
them abroad. Refer, A.D. Baker III, “World Navies in Review”, Proceedings, Vol. 123/3/1,128 (March 
1997), p. 88.
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additional naval weapons and to enlarge the composition of the Russian Navy in terms 
of organization and combat power to match its only potential rival, the US.
In relation to the decline of the whole Russian armed forces, the Pacific fleet is also in 
transition. In fact, there have been visible symptoms of the reduction in the naval power 
of the Pacific fleet. For example, constraining naval forces in the Pacific was the 
primary goal of a series of Gorbachev’s arms control proposals, his speeches in 
Vladivostok (1986) and in Murmansk (1987), his interview with the Indonesian 
newspaper Merdeka (1987), and the seven Soviet peace proposals carried by the Soviet 
news agency TASS. It means that the USSR did not have sufficient economic 
resources at least to pursue an arms race anymore. Reflecting the lack of necessary 
funds resulting from Russia’s severe economic conditions, the Pacific fleet has also 
continuously reduced its strength in quantitative terms and its activities since 1992 
(refer Table 5-7).
Table 5-7: The Changes in Strengths of the Russian Pacific Fleet
Classification 92 02 Remarks
Submarines 86(21 SSBN) 8 (3 SSBN) -78
PSC 54 (1 Carrier, 13 cruisers) 8 (1 Carrier, 5 DDG, 2 FFG) -46
OSC 55 (Patrol and Coastal Combatants) 30 -25
MCMV 78 8 -70
Amphibious 21 4 -17
Auxiliaries 225 57 -168
Sources: IISS, The Military Balance 1992-1993, p. 97; 2002-2003, p. 92
Its total strength is less than the Northern fleet, where Russia deploys 10 SSBNs, 10 
PSC including 1 carrier. After all, the mission of the fleet would be limited purely to the
671 Refer, Peter Sutcliffe and Chris Hill, “An Economic Analysis of Russian Military Reform Proposals: 
Ambition and Reality”, Anne C. Aldis & Roger N. McDermott (2003), pp. 278-295.
672 A number of these proposals included: limitation of additional deployment of nuclear weapons, an 
invitation to consult on holding the line on naval force strength, mutual withdrawals from the 
Philippines (US) and Cam Ranh Bay (USSR), prevention of incidents in the open seas and air space, 
and an international conference on making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. William H.J. Manthorpe, 
“The Soviet View”, Proceedings, Vol. 114/11/1029 (November 1988), p. 137.
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defence of its homeland with the relaxed military tensions with the PRC and US. 
Nonetheless, it is considered that SSBNs are maintaining their readiness posture, while 
the others have become less active as a whole. Any future development is hypothetical, 
because of the unstable and inconsistent domestic political and economic conditions in 
Russia. The greatest attention has been given to the keeping of only adequate numbers 
of SSBNs capable of deterring any kind of attack against Russia.
Reflecting the relaxation of tension among the countries in the region, Russia is 
strengthening its co-operative maritime policy with its old foes, Japan, South Korea, the 
PRC, and the US by signing agreements such as defence protocols. There have been 
increased port visits to Boston (US), Pusan (South Korea), Qingdao (China) and Tokyo 
(Japan) since 1993. In addition to this, as a part of maritime co-operative measures, the 
Russian naval officers joined the British and Americans in a joint peace game-RUKUS 
94-held at the US Naval War College for the sake of advancing mutual understanding in 
co-operative security concepts. After that, the Russian Pacific fleet participated in a 
number of search and rescue operations with the US Pacific fleet in 1994 and 1996, and 
the Japanese MSDF in 1994 in the East China Sea or the East Sea (Sea of Japan).674
(4) The Transition of the RN1
(A) General Rise and Fall
During the 1990s, the RNI participation in a number of the joint US-Russian and Russo- 
Japanese amphibious exercises to practice disaster-relief techniques and search and
673 Barry Coombs & Les Sim, “The Russians Are Here”, Proceedings, Vol. 121/3/1,105 (March 1995), pp. 
68-69.
674 Duk-Ki Kim, Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 120-121.
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rescue operations were observed. The RNI was functioning as a means of the co­
operative Russian maritime security policy rather than as a force for power projection 
from the sea to the enemy’s shore. As Norman Polmar has written, however, there is 
plenty of possibility of giving up the naval infantry (an offensive function) in the 
interests of maintaining other naval functions , the RNI had significantly decreased in 
terms of manpower, organisation, and amphibious lift capability compared with that of 
the USSR (see Table 5-8).
Table 5-8: Reductions of the SNI/RNI and Amphibious Lift capability
Classification 1990 (SNI) 1992 (RNI) 2002 (RNI) Remark
Total
Manpower 15,000 12,000 7,500 -7,500
Organisation 1 inf div, 4 indep bde (1 reserve), 4 fleet SF bde
1 inf div, 3 indep bde, 
3 fleet SF bde
Amphi Ships 77: 3 LPD,38 LST, 36 LSM
80: 3 LPD, 41 LST, 
36 LSM
22: 1 LPD, 20 LST, 
1 LSM -58
Pacific
Fleet
Manpower 7,000 2,500 -4,500
Organisation 1 div HQ, 3 inf, 1 tk and 1 arty regt 1 div HQ, 3 inf, 1 tk, larty bn
regt—*
bn
Amphi Ships 21 4 -17
Notes: arty (artillery), bde (brigade), div (division), indep (independent), inf (infantry), tk (tank).
Sources: IISS, The Military Balance 1990-1991, pp.37-43; 1992-1993, pp.95-97; 2002-2003, pp.90-93.
(B) The RNI in the Pacific
It appears that the main mission of the RNI is the defence of its homeland as they are 
under the operational control of the relevant MD. As Table 5-8 shows, Russia retains a 
minimum capability of the RNI in its Pacific fleet in the form of the least organized 
division, under the operational control of the Far Eastern MD, but subordinated to the 
Pacific fleet , for the purposes of both actual operations and a basis for possible future 
rebuilding.
675 Norman Plomar (1997), p. 65.
676 IISS, The Military Balance 2002-2003, p. 93.
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The possibility of an actual amphibious landing operation relates to the maritime 
territorial dispute with Japan. Russia is considering its territorial claims against the RF, 
i.e., the northern islands dispute with Japan, and interference in Russian internal affairs 
as a prime external threat by putting it in first place in its military doctrine. In this sense, 
it may not be merged into the Coastal defence units as was the case after WWII. Within 
the next decade, Russia will not again build up its amphibious forces as it did in the 
Cold War era since it has moderate and non-aggressive foreign policy goals. A 
reemergence of the RNI will depend on the changing characteristics of Russian foreign 
policy interests and resources in the region. To conclude, the abandonment of an 
aggressive foreign policy, the disappearance of its overseas interests coupled with the 
miserable economic conditions caused the decline of the RNI.
3. Conclusions
With time, the US policy has shifted from ‘containment’ of the USSR to ‘strategic 
engagement’ with Russia. As Robert Art has written, the American strategy in the post- 
Cold War could be elaborated, formalized under the rubric of “selective engagement” by 
aiming to continuously preserve its hegemonic global position, which greatly depends 
on its military power. As the legal successor state of the USSR, the RF showed for a 
while a realistic perception by approaching the West by way of nonmilitary means, i.e., 
economic cooperation, but with the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and 
Chechnya, it changed the priority of its national security by deciding to use military 
assets, particularly nuclear arms, as the unique means for conflict resolution as well as
677 Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of US Hegemony”, 
International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003), p. 5.
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for deterring external threat. In the meantime, Russian nuclear policy manifested two 
different approaches. On the one hand, the weakening economic situation resulted in 
striving for more US help and agreement to dismantle their nuclear arms including those 
in the other states of the former USSR, i.e., START and the CTR programmes. On the 
other hand, its policy is characterized not only by straining the US policy of the SMD in 
order not to relatively weaken its nuclear status compared with that of the US, but also 
by keeping a nuclear arsenal sufficient to deter any kind of external threat under the 
principle of ‘reasonable sufficiency’ as a defensive means to maintain its status as a 
great power. Nonetheless, a future nuclear war between the two nuclear superpowers 
seems too far away to be taken into a realistic consideration in international politics. 
Furthermore, the RF took a pro-American course after the terrorist attacks of September
{.no
11 2001 , even though it is difficult to say that they have completely ruled out the
possibility that the other will become a potential adversary in the future.
Despite the end of the Cold War, there are longstanding rivalries in the Asia-Pacific 
region, for example explicitly, India and China, India and Pakistan, Vietnam and China, 
Russia and Japan, and implicitly China and Korea, Korea and Japan, except for the 
tensions in the divided countries China and Korea as well as certain unstable factors, i.e., 
territorial disputes. Given their geographical positions and possible causes of conflicts, 
any conflict in the region as well as their dependence on the SLOCs for trade, a future 
conflict would be in the maritime dimension. It is inconceivable that force will be used 
for territorial integration purposes like the annexations before the Cold War. The US 
would play a pivotal role in ensuring regional stability as the world’s only superpower,
678 Marcel de Haas, “The Development o f Russia’s Security Policy, 1992-2002”, in Anne C. Aldis and 
Roger N. McDermott (2003), p. 17.
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but it is difficult to intervene without a legal basis i.e., the UN Charter. With time, the 
interests of countries will be increasingly determined by economic relations rather than
A7Qmilitary. In addition, in the post-Cold War era, as seen in the American foreign policy 
objectives, defending its own interests becomes the most important foreign policy 
objective rather than defending its allies. For example, according to a result of polls on 
North Korean matters, the American public gives more support to a US intervention in 
order to preempt a North Korea nuclear threat than to the defence of South Korea from
/ t o a
North Korean aggression, thus reflecting the priority of the US interests. Nonetheless,
it seems that military forces having bureaucratic characteristics are the unique means for 
politicians to be able to use any kind of international political event even in low- 
intensity and nonmilitary conflicts as a means of diplomatic coercion as well as of direct 
conflict solution.
Whilst the non-aggressive foreign policy and the fundamental changes of the military 
and maritime strategies/policies have caused the reduction of power projection forces in 
Russia, the responsibility of the US for the stability of the world and its geo-strategic 
location demands the active employment of the USMC under the cooperative maritime 
policy in the post-Cold War era for the purpose of protecting possible conflicts ranging 
from the MOOTW and low-intensity conflicts via a medium regional war to a 
potentially high-density major war. The most significant change in the role and 
functions of the USMC is its utility for American foreign policy objectives originating
679 As Lawrence Freedman has discussed, “We are all becoming part of an increasingly homogeneous 
global economy sharing the same cultural experience and normative values, with international 
institutions available to sort out our residual difference”, it seems that economic values are superior to 
military ones. Lawrence Freedman (1998), p. 764.
680 Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, “The People, the Press, and the Use of Force”, the Aspen Strategy 
Group (1995), pp. 153-154.
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from the US geo-strategic location and its responsibility in the international community
/:o |
as the most dominant military power in the world. In order to overcome its remote 
geo-strategic location, the US has ratified many agreements with regional powers, i.e., 
the MOUs, for the Navy and Marines in order to access additional bases worldwide 
substituting for the closed bases with the effects of the demise of the Cold War or the 
antagonism against the US presence by the relevant regional population, i.e., Subic Bay. 
Furthermore, it continuously keeps not only a marine presence, but also the MPSs, three 
brigades’ worth of unit equipment and supplies, in the key three regions to reduce the 
reaction time in order to respond to regional contingencies, and it develops its sealift 
capability682.
The most important point of the USMC as a means of achieving foreign policy 
objectives lies in its structural flexibility consisting of ground, air and supporting 
components, which are able to reorganize into a suitable size, ranging from MEU to 
MEF size, in order to meet any kind of conflict and operation regardless of military or 
nonmilitary demands to dispatch it. Consequently, it is certain that the Navy-Marine 
Corps team reemerges as one of the most important ingredients of pursuing US
681 Nonetheless, as seen in the Persian Gulf War, it is not easy to drive an international political issue in 
any region merely by its own military power, even though it possesses larger military forces equipped 
with the newest war-machines to perform a war in any area regardless of space, open sea and ground 
than any other military power in the world. Hence, legal justifications to intervene in regional politics 
rather than a calculation to avoid escalation into a major war are extremely necessary in the post-Cold 
War era in order to get military or political support from other world or regional major powers. In this 
sense, it is difficult to see the current international political system as purely a ‘unipolar era’. This 
results in the development of WMD and the divergence of the international-political dynamic 
relationship between different entities by pursuing their own interests first.
682 During Desert Shield, the airlift capacity, only 2300 tons a day during the first 56 days of operations, 
did not meet the expectation that it could deliver nearly 6,000 tons a day because o f the limitation of 
airfield capacity. Consequently, the US has developed maritime pre-positioning for Army unit 
equipment as a new element in its mobility posture. Refer, David Kassing, “Strategic Mobility in the 
post-Cold War Era”, in Paul K. Davis (1994), pp. 668-677.
683 Instead of this term, the USN began to use the term “Naval Expeditionary Forces” from 1992 to 
express the overall combat organization of the Navy-Marine Corps team. Given the movement of the
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foreign policy abroad in the post-Cold War era. This is because most cases of conflicts 
demand joint (together with the other services) or combined (together with military
f . O Aforces of the other countries) operations . Thus, the current goal of the USMC 
construction, as the Concepts and Programs 2003 II describes, is not just to focus on 
modernizing and upgrading the legacy of its military systems and platform, but also to 
prepare for executing joint and combined operations in a dramatically enhanced 
network environment.
Nonetheless, there is a possibility that the USMC may not fulfill a large-scale 
amphibious landing operation like the case of the 5th MEB in the Persian Gulf War. 
However, as Clausewitz pointed out, the importance of the combination of all armed
/•Of •
services or branches, full participation of all available services and branches can 
promote combat efficiency in modem war and can provide operational flexibility to the 
commander. The function of the USMC in the Persian Gulf War could be described as 
grand scale deception686. The Marines were located in optimum positions to draw the 
Iraqi forces to the coast of Kuwait; hence they could contribute to speeding up the main 
forces’ advancement, Schwarzkopf’s ground components. If there had been no marines, 
it might have resulted in a crippled offensive posture by not using the maritime
main naval battlefield from the high seas to ashore, it seems that the relationship between the USN and 
USMC has been strengthened.
684 Currently, the term, Multinational Operations, is commonly employed to describe military actions 
conducted by forces of two or more nations usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or 
alliance.
685 Even though the services and branches in his era were not developed like those of modem armed 
forces, he highlighted that a lack of branches could cause a disadvantage. For example, as he wrote, “an 
army consisting only of infantry and artillery would find itself at a disadvantage when faced with one 
composed of all three (Infantry, Artillery and Cavalry)”, in this case the army would essentially lack 
maneuverability compared with the other’s ability. However, he did not provide an answer to the 
question, “what the optimum proportions would be”, because as he recognized, it is almost impossible 
to answer. Refer, On War, pp. 285-291.
686 RUSI, “Command in War: Gulf Operations”, Whitehall Paper Series (1992), p. 34.
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manoeuvre route. In this regard, there is a great possibility that the function of the 
USMC in a future Korean War or any other region, will also remain the same, a large- 
scale deception. However, as seen in case study 2, it will certainly contribute to delaying 
both the speed of the North Korean Armed forces’ southward advance and culmination 
of combat power at the front line.
In order to perform a combined or joint operation, it is necessary to achieve consistency 
in doctrines between services or countries. A good example of this is the US Navy’s 
effort to develop appropriate doctrine in accordance with the Marines doctrinal 
advancement. The new doctrinal concept of the OMFTS is focused on sustained 
operations of forces on land, but it needs stable support from the sea. To support the 
Marines land operation, the USN developed the concept of network-centric warfare 
(NCW), which is more a technological advancement to the data links connecting all 
battlefield functions, i.e., C4ISR, than just a concept for maximizing firepower in the
C.QHlittorals. Nonetheless, given the development of the ship-to-objective manoeuvre 
concept, it is necessary for the USN to develop various measures to support the Marines 
land operation at a great distance from the shore in order to provide timely support 
including intelligence. Without this kind of effort from other branches in the field of
• z o odoctrine and equipment , no matter how excellent the combat capabilities of the 
Marines may be, it will be of no use. This is because the Marines themselves,
687 Sam J. Tangredi (Captain, USN), “Who’s Afraid of the NETF?”, Proceedings, Vol. 125/11/1,161 
(November 1999), p. 44.
688 An international effort to improve the ability of multinational operations in the field of equipment is 
the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) adopted in April 1999 by mainly the members of NATO. If 
there is not this kind of effort, the UN or a leading country will have to select the most suitable services 
or branches or countries to participate in a certain operation. This will be the most important factor that 
must be prepared for a future multinational combat operation. Refer, Richard Smith, “The Requirement 
for the United Nations to Develop an Internationally Recognized Doctrine for the Use of Force in Intra- 
State Conflict”, Occasional Paper No. 10 (SCSI, 1994), p. 28.
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considering the complexity and divergence of the modem battlefield and international 
security environment, may not be able to complete most missions.
It is meaningless to compare the role, functions, and abilities of both amphibious forces 
like those in the previous two chapters. Instead, it is worthwhile discussing the gist of 
the STOM concept in terms of the principles of war. Basically, this doctrine, as 
mentioned above, traces its background to the changing characteristics of the 
international security system. During the Cold War, an amphibious landing operation 
was planned against a relatively strong and prepared force understanding that the 
presence of mechanized, highly mobile enemy ground forces could thwart the landing 
forces’ manoeuvring on shore. With the decrease of the enemy’s combat power on shore, 
it is possible for the USMC to plan a direct manoeuvre to the objectives as in the case of 
the USMC operation in Somalia689. Whilst the previous amphibious manoeuvre doctrine 
focused on the culmination of combat power at the enemy’s shore, where the enemy is 
relatively less prepared to defend, in order not only to create a beachhead as a base for 
successive operations inland, but also to take the initiative by creating a turning point, 
this concept embodies directly taking the main objective, the centre of the enemy’s 
gravity. In this sense, it appears that the former greatly focused on the war principle of 
‘concentration’, whereas the latter gave priority to the principle of ‘objective’ by 
directly mastering the visible enemy. The gist of the STOM is understood as an effort to 
minimize the operational period by bringing the enemy under an authorized
689 For example, in Operation Continue Hope in Somalia in March 1994, the US marines (two of MEUs) 
were dispatched to cover the evacuation of US military forces. In that operation, the forces were pulled 
out under the protection of the naval task standing off shore, which was on standby to manoeuvre from 
the ship to the objectives. This kind of operation was possible because of the poorer armed condition of 
the Somali civilian forces. Frank G. Hoffman, “The US Marine Corps in Review”, Proceedings, Vol. 
121/5/1,107 (May 1995), p. 131.
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organisation’s control as soon as possible. Nonetheless, it is not applicable beyond a 
regional major war situation such as a war in the Korean peninsula. Consequently, to 
meet the main purpose, it must be capable of combining new ideas with proven war 
principles. Ultimately, it is no exaggeration to say that the new security environment 
revitalizes the STOM concept.
As the fundamental raison d ’etre of amphibious forces buildup relied on the amphibious 
landing operation itself, many basic conditions for a traditional amphibious assault690 
such as the achievement of naval and air superiority, the isolation of the amphibious 
objective area, and the culmination of combat power ashore, were seemingly 
unattainable. This raised the most serious doubts whether a nation needs to keep 
amphibious forces even in the US. However, the new security environment, a series of 
conceptual developments of doctrine, and the US Navy’s espousal to bring the USMC 
into the centre of naval operations highlighted the Marines ability to perform its mission 
as the most economic force-in-readiness to meet operational demands overseas as a 
means of fulfilling foreign policy. Accordingly, it seems that now the core of the US 
naval activity is no longer the carrier battle group or the strategic nuclear forces 
(SSBNs), but the USMC. Here, it is, of course, undeniable that their utility in previously 
surpassing the enemy’s military capabilities including intelligence, defence 
infrastructure and troops as well as of im(ex)plicitly deterred major nuclear power’s 
challenges.
However, the US interests in the post-Cold War era, such as the prevention of nuclear 
proliferation due to the destructiveness of nuclear weapons capable of threatening the
690 William S. Lind, Manoeuvre Warfare Handbook (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 36.
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mainland of America and the current international order, and the protection of human 
rights, transferred the core of military operational objective from ‘deterrent’ to the 
‘exclusion’ of anti-American interests governments or organisations in pursuit of 
creating amicable ones. Given this objective, it needs armed forces to decisively be able 
to fight and vanquish the troops holding them. In this situation, its strategic nuclear 
forces, as the US nuclear strategy has indicated, and the CVBGs are not suitable means 
to solve or deter these kinds of challenges. Put simply, the USMC compared with the 
other branches of Navy and services, is the most efficacious economic force, capable of 
fulfilling the military and nonmilitary demands of the US, which is the country, which 
has to dispatch forces to meet military operational demands through sea-routes. This is 
the worth of the USMC in the post-Cold War nuclear era, and at the same time the 
reason that it had the minimum reduction ratio in terms of the number of personnel in 
the QDRs.
After all, it is unsurprisingly true that the USMC rules in another golden age after WWII. 
However, it is also true that it cannot control those conflicts by itself, thus its role and 
functions have been significantly changed by way of embodying the joint operational 
aims as a part of the USN as well as of the total American armed forces. In this regard, 
it needs to change Clausewitz’s words ‘war is merely the continuation of policy by other 
means’ to ‘armed forces are the most suitable political instruments to keep the current 
international order’, since the roles of armed forces themselves have been transferred 
with the emergence of nuclear weapons and the dependence on the interrelationship 
between countries.
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Chapter VI. Conclusions
This study has so far discussed the conditioning factors of three general and three 
independent variables derived from not only the US National Strategic Direction but 
also the strategists’ theories, and their effects on amphibious forces construction, 
examining two cases: the USMC and S(R)NI. They are the most militarily powerful of 
the world’s amphibious forces and show extremely contradictory rises and falls 
according to the transitions of the independent variables. Nonetheless, there is no clear- 
cut factor to decide why a nation should possess an amphibious force. Their positions in 
their military hierarchies have always been threatened by the other services or even the 
other branches of navies, because their role and functions seem to duplicate the other 
services, Army, Navy and Air Force, as previously examined.
1. Amphibious Forces, War and National Power
Given that the raisons d ’etre of the other services are the creatures of human efforts to 
overcome natural obstacles reflecting the development of technology in order to win a 
war, that of amphibious force buildup also, as its history suggests, rests on the same 
grounds of the justification for attacking an enemy across a gap of water, in order to 
achieve the ultimate goal of a war, the neutralization of the adversary’s political will. 
However, as their wartime functions and organisations suggest, amphibious forces are, 
in some aspects, seen as nothing more than an amalgamation of the other services. 
Despite this fact, the reason why the nations who possess amphibious forces, created 
them as a part of their navy instead of embarking their ground forces on ship, is beyond
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the main scope of this thesis, and it is a matter of past history. In this regard, it is no 
exaggeration to say that it has had critical limitations as an independent service from its 
very origins. This original limitation is the key reason why the USMC and S(R)NI were 
threatened by others including nonmilitary experts in terms of their usefulness in times 
of war.
Given the fact that over 70 per cent of the total area of the Earth’s surface is sea, the 
human presence is still thin on the ground, and around 90 per cent of the world’s 
population lives on 10 per cent of the land691 and most of this is close to the sea. A war 
is, as most strategists have observed, just the struggle between two different political 
entities to compel one’s will to submit to the other. The most decisive factor in winning 
a war is to neutralize the roots of the enemy’s power, in military terms the ‘centre of 
gravity’, which is usually on land. As such, in order to pursue a rapid victory, the 
shortcut is to approach directly and destroy the centre of the other’s power. More than 
two thirds of all countries, have their own territorial sea and coastline, which can 
provide an attack route both for themselves and their enemies. One of the attempts to 
appropriately use this route involves the creation of an amphibious force, and most 
amphibious forces in the world are well organized and trained to fulfill this requirement. 
This is the main value of an amphibious force. In this connection, any suspicions 
regarding the debate about the use of necessary force in the nuclear age are quite 
irrelevant. It is also part of the purpose of military forces, a means of politics, to project 
a nation’s power overseas in modem terms as a coercive or deterrent tool. It is 
preferable to leave the final authority to decide how much it is needed, to the relevant 
nation’s politicians, who will decide it in the light of several factors. There is a degree of
691 J. P. Cole (1974), p. 22.
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uncertainty about how much a nation will possess amphibious forces, whether the name 
of the organization is ‘amphibious force’ or not (a specific force to perform amphibious 
landing operations under the Army’s command); it mainly depends on one’s foreign 
policy objectives, and on geographical location as well as economic budget.
Power is relative and one needs to compare with it that of the opposition. If one’s 
physical (visible) power is absolutely greater than that of the other side, it will easily 
achieve its ultimate goal within the shortest period of time. In stark contrast, even 
though one’s power is less than the opposition, it may achieve its goal if it has excellent 
abstract factors such as military arts (tactics, strategies), and doctrines. Figure 6-1 
displays the relationship between time demands and relative power until it achieves its 
goal.
Figure 6-1: Relative Power Strength and Time Consumption
The Role of Invisible 
Factors fDoctrine)
<3£
oeu<D.>
03<L>P4
Time Consumption
The vertical axis denotes one’s relative power whilst the horizontal axis denotes time. 
The line is a collection of the points which represent how long it takes according to the 
relative power. As the figure shows, the role of invisible factors influences the location 
of the point, which can be in the inner or outer triangle formed by the diagonal line,
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according to the degree of their comparative excellence. As the figure shows, good 
doctrine essentially acts as a force-multiplier, enabling a country to use its military 
capabilities to greater effect, and thereby reducing the time needed to achieve strategic 
objectives. As the doctrinal development of the USMC has proved, according to the 
degree of the enemy’s power, these invisible factors could also more actively achieve 
relative superiority. In this sense, it appears that there is a close relationship between 
environmental variables and the development of a nation’s military power. Apart from a 
specific discussion about the ingredients of the visible and invisible combat powers, the 
amphibious force organisation itself contributes to the relative power strength as a 
component of a nation’s overall force structure. Doctrinal development as in the case of 
the USMC, shortens the time demanded for achieving the desired end state of a war or a 
battle. In addition to this, the employment of amphibious forces to be deployed and 
sustained at long distances across the world’s seas, such as the use of the USMC by the 
US and the SNI in the Cold War era by the USSR, can be a key attribute of a nation’s 
superpower status as a means of coercive diplomacy.
2. Major Principles for Amphibious Forces Construction
A. Independent Variables and Their Effects
(1) International/ Regional Security Environments
Apart from discussing the influence of general facts in a security environment, from 
now on the debating points are mainly focused on the relationship with nuclear weapons 
and conventional forces construction. As Michael Sheehan has discussed, “The
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existence of nuclear weapons strongly influenced the way in which the great powers 
behaved towards each other”, the international/ regional security environment, in 
association with the construction of the conventional armed forces, during the period 
that this thesis covers, when nuclear parity was achieved, was influenced mainly by the 
nuclear strategy of each country. The major powers did not want to use their nuclear 
arsenals as a direct confrontational tool against each other. Accordingly, the security 
environment was influenced by how to use them and for what purpose. Given the 
gradual comprehensive understanding of the destructive power of nuclear weapons, 
their nuclear strategies slowly changed from the concept of real use in a war to a means 
of deterring the others’ attack by a declaratory policy, i.e., the option of “first use of 
nuclear weapons”. Thus, they tried to limit the number of nuclear weapons via mutual 
arms control or the reduction agreements in the Cold War era. In the nuclear parity era, 
they realized that an additional nuclear arsenal does not have any political significance, 
even though it is not easy to define a criteria for how much is enough, which may be 
defined as a military strength capable of destroying the potential enemy.
However, the role of military forces was undeniable in a situation where the two 
political and military confederations directly confronted each other. As such, military 
power was still one of the most useful means for pursuing their national interests in 
some places, i.e., in the Third World. In other words, as long as there was no threat of a 
nuclear war, nuclear powers did not directly conflict with each other, but armed forces 
had a critical value as a political means. It means that they were the sub-means of 
diplomacy to achieve national interests. Nevertheless the practical use of military forces 
was constrained by the balance of terror system arising from the parity of nuclear forces.
692 Michael Sheehan (1996), 172.
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After the dissolution of the confrontational alliance system, it appeared that the ultimate 
goal of possessing nuclear weapons had been reduced to purely defending the homeland 
and deterring the opposition’s challenging behaviour on the basis of nuclear power 
rather than as a means of intimidation or blackmail against others, or of real use in a war. 
With this declining influence of nuclear weapons, the role and functions of conventional 
forces has relatively been upgraded. In accordance with this change, the priority of 
armed forces buildup has also slowly moved towards the construction of conventional 
forces. It is, of course, true that the attempt to occupy a relatively superior position in 
the nuclear competition, i.e., the Reagan administration’s SDI programme, was 
continued as much in an attempt to control the opponent’s nuclear capability.
From the above perspectives, it is sufficient to say that the main cause of the transitions 
in the international/ regional security environments from high politics to low politics 
resulted in, though not completely, the attempts to reduce the possibility of a major war 
between the nuclear powers. In this awkward situation, a desire by the minor powers to 
possess nuclear weapons for the purpose of, according to their justification, defending 
themselves as a deterrent against superpower interference in their internal affairs, 
particularly by the rogue states referred to by George W. Bush, has frequently become a 
source of discord in international politics. From their viewpoint, nuclear weapons are 
still desirable instruments, because without nuclear weapons they are psychologically 
and physically forced to invest in the construction of conventional forces, which still do 
not guarantee their security. Nonetheless, it is natural for a nation, regardless of nuclear 
or non-nuclear powers, to want to possess an appropriate level of armed forces to 
guarantee its security considering the force level of potential enemies or the 
international/ regional security environment. In this sense, the buildup of conventional
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forces could be an alternative to a nuclear arsenal; thus it is not easy to conclude that the 
declining usefulness of nuclear weapons became a prime cause of .amphibious forces 
(AF) construction. The buildup of AF by the two superpowers in the second Cold War 
era was no more than a processional result derived from their conventional forces 
construction. Likewise, the security environment, particularly the alleviation of nuclear 
war tension, is a factor necessary to be taken into significant consideration, and the 
construction of the AF depends on the relevant country’s other variables.
(2) Maritime Dominance/ Geographical Factors
The question of how the Marines and the other services, notably the Navy, should be 
combined into a coherent force structure has been a classic problem from the first 
moment of their creation. To meet the crisis response requirements, of course, including 
contingencies and a war situation, the fundamental condition for the Marines 
deployment or dispatch as quickly as the situation permits, is the amount of the Navy’s 
amphibious lift capability, which is able to provide manoeuverability via a sea route. 
Usually, this is not a force subordinated to the Marines, but to the Navy under the 
heading of naval amphibious forces. In addition to this, the manoeuvres and operations 
of the Marines would be dependent on the degree of threat at sea. When a country 
achieves maritime superiority against the adversary in terms of sea control, it is easy to 
manoeuvre safely and to perform operations by maintaining its combat power at its 
maximum level. Hence, naval amphibious forces themselves do not lift the marines in 
most of the cases that demand naval protection forces, i.e., submarines, surface combat 
ships. This action is also interpreted as an effort to assert maritime dominance. In this 
regard, maritime dominance is not connected with the raison d ’etre of amphibious 
forces, but it is a condition demanded in the process of performing an amphibious
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landing operation after its possession.
As mentioned in Chapter III, even though the law of the sea is concerned with a war 
situation, the states that are fighting each other may try to obey this law. In addition, it is 
possible to make an arrangement between the two parties lest they attack ships that are 
not employed for military purposes in a specific case when they are fighting with 
limited political goals. However, once a party notices the other’s breach of their 
temporary engagement rule in that war, their promise might not be continued any longer. 
However, I was unable to find any evidence to prove the relationship between a nation’s 
amphibious force buildup and the law of the sea. Despite this fact, it is true that the 
international endeavours to regulate the law of the sea, particularly the right of access to 
ports and other international waters in peacetime has implicitly and explicitly influenced 
the developments of the maritime powers, i.e., the Soviet ships’ port visits.
Nowadays, contribution to the control of the sea has been included as one of the USMC 
missions reflecting the worldwide deployments of American naval forces. This may be a 
unique mission for the USMC that others do not have. Despite the fact that the 
importance of advanced bases has declined with the development of submarines, air 
transportation and the PGMs, the number of bases overseas is still an indispensable 
ingredient for the control of the sea. The USMC is not a branch of the Navy. 
Nonetheless, as a purpose of its creation was the protection of overseas naval bases, it is 
deployed in most of the US naval bases, as seen in Figure 4-5, controlled by the relevant 
fleet commander. As the terms, the Naval Expeditionary Task Force (NETF) and the 
Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) indicate, they are indispensable adjuncts of the US 
Navy, as a subordinate service of the DoN. Whether this influenced the enlargement of
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the USMC or not is not carefully examined in this thesis. This is also applicable to the 
deployments of the SNI in the Soviet bases far away from the mainland, i.e., a regiment 
in Petropavlovsk. In this regard, it is not difficult to conclude from the foregoing 
account that the number of a state’s bases overseas could be a cause of the buildup of 
AF. As long as a state does not deploy its amphibious forces at advanced bases (this 
mission is able to be performed by sailors or army troops), the independent variable, 
maritime dominance from the above perspectives, cannot be a principle of general 
amphibious forces buildup.
(3) National Interests/ Foreign Policy
The competition between the two blocs based on their ideologies in the nuclear parity 
era formed a firm land border from Europe to the Far East. In addition, owing to the 
antagonism between the PRC and USSR, the latter’s interests rapidly moved toward the 
Third World using mainly the sea routes in order to enlarge its political and ideological 
influence. The priority of US interests was to defend its alliance/ free world and to 
decrease the Soviet influence throughout the world as identified by the NSC-68. Both 
blocs identified the others by their own image, for example, the US (individualism: 
collectivism) and the USSR (equality: rule of rich). In this situation, it was not 
surprising that the two superpowers’ interests naturally met in the Third World such as 
the nations in Southeast/west Asia and Africa. Here, the role of the AF as a component 
of a nation’s military forces was to support each state’s foreign policy objectives.
With the demise of the Cold War, considering the relative concept of ‘use of force’, it 
seems to be more difficult to meddle in other countries’ affairs due to the divergence of 
the international political power system and the legitimacy or agreements between
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political entities demanded in order to do it, i.e., the US forces in the matter of East 
Timor. Regarding the American security role in the region, the contradictory interests of 
countries would by and large make it become more complex. In particular, the major 
powers apparently seem to maintain the current status quo in the Asia-Pacific region, 
where their antagonism has been reduced, i.e. between Russia and the US, and China 
and the US. In the nuclear age, the main interests of the major powers are defensive in 
terms of national interest and foreign policy objectives. As a result, the fundamental 
stance of the US force presence in the region will be dramatically changed by way of 
reacting to a contingency, rather than by pursuing a permanent presence, according to 
the developments of the new US security concept and its military doctrine as well as the 
dynamic power relationship between the major powers. This is because their presence 
would create suspicions among others. Thus it is natural for the US to withdraw its 
presence step by step in order to reduce suspicion. Nonetheless, it is nonsense to 
imagine that the Marines presence in Japan and elsewhere will also go the same way 
considering its interests, the geo-strategic location and the uncertain future of the 
strategic configuration as well as the nature of conflict in the post-Cold War era. In this 
sense, it could be said that the conditioning factor of the US Marine presence in Japan 
mainly results from the changing characteristics of US interests and foreign policy 
toward Japan. In the event of it having to withdraw its presence from Japan, the US may 
invent another form of military presence considering the importance of Japan to its 
interests. The NETF capable of effectively reacting to any level of conflict is one of the 
most adequate alternatives compared with the other services because of the ingredients 
of its marines ground combat capability and the navy’s manoeuverability to reach Japan 
from its Pacific bases such as Guam and Hawaii.
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The deployments of the USMC in the Asia-Pacific area coincided with American 
interests and foreign policy objectives, i.e., the 3rd Marine Division in Japan and the use 
of the USMC in the Vietnam War. Likewise, the SNI also enlarged its role in the second 
Cold War era together with its mother service, the Soviet Navy, by constantly deploying 
at advanced bases, i.e., Cam Ranh Bay, and embarking on naval ships. In this regard, 
their overseas interests positively influenced the rise of their amphibious forces. This 
phenomenon continued in the US in the post-Cold War era in that the unchangeable 
interests toward Asia-Pacific area, even though the specific subject realms had changed, 
made the US keep its marines at almost the same level as the Cold War era. On the other 
hand, the diminishing interests of the RF overseas negatively influenced the size of the 
RNI. It has been downsized to the level of an extremely limited strength, suitable to 
defend its homeland and to be employed for an amphibious landing in a contingency 
situation because of its remaining foreign policy objective to defend its territory such as 
the northern islands dispute with Japan. To conclude, it could be said that there is a 
close interrelationship between a state’s interests in an overseas country and the rise and 
fall of the AF.
(4) Military Strategy/ Policy
As seen in the colourful histories of the two amphibious forces, the status of amphibious 
forces is easily threatened by the other services who are in competition for the budget in 
peacetime and for missions in wartime. Any change in the independent variables 
discussed here-which might in turn be precipitated by the changing characteristics of the 
security environment- could have a profound effect on the development of the 
amphibious forces. A state’s military strategy/ policy decides the basic guidelines for the 
amphibious forces buildup by allocating it to each theatre or border according to the
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result of evaluating the requirement of the AF to defend against each external threat in 
the protection of its own interests. Fundamentally, it is a very important procedure for 
the relevant AF to present its combat power requirements in the process of deciding the 
requirement of a state’s total force construction by the national command authority, i.e., 
the decision making process of the USJCS, regardless of the process of either a ‘top-to- 
bottom’ or ‘bottom-up’ review. As such, the designation of the Commandant of the 
USMC as a full member of the USJCS in 1978 has a great significance in reflecting its 
own developmental plan for future forces construction.
However, as most politico-strategic commentators have pointed out, the hypothesis 
needs to be recognized that increases in certain categories of military power do not 
necessarily increase political strength. In the nuclear age, the security of a country is 
guaranteed not just by its own military power, but by the whole of its alliance or the 
international community, particularly in the post-Cold war era. As a result, it needs to 
devote a certain contribution to international security in any way whether by military or 
nonmilitary means. Nonetheless, as provided by certain evidence in the Soviet security 
policy, an upper limited existence of military power afforded by the national command 
authority did not maximize its political significance. In striking contrast, it became a 
cause of the demise of the national system. Consequently, it is necessary to reflect on 
force requirements after the relevant services take all available information and 
variables into full consideration and the national command authority decides on a total 
force construction plan.
It is not clear whether the USSR had a total force construction or an operational plan, 
particularly the Far Eastern TVD’s, to employ all its armed forces unlike those of the
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US (Table 3-2/ 3 and 5-2). However, it is not difficult to imagine that the rise and fall of 
the SNI was decided in the same way, because the commander of each TVD had the 
authority to command all the forces deployed in theatre by the reorganization of the 
theatre of military operations geographical concept. Given this concept and the geo­
strategic configuration of the Far Eastern TVD, it was natural to reinforce the SNI from 
Brigade to Division. Despite this, it is unclear whether the force requirement of the 
USMC was decided by a full consideration or not, because the fundamental structure of 
the USMC per se had been guaranteed by constitutional regulation. However, generally 
speaking, a state’s military strategy/policy is a cornerstone for deciding its amphibious 
force size and equipment.
(5) Maritime Strategy/ Policy
A state’s naval policy to construct its navy is nowadays largely divided into two 
categories: underwater or surface. In addition, if there is a necessity to project power to 
another country across the sea, it may consider the buildup of amphibious force. With 
time, the main aspects of the two superpowers’ naval power construction roughly 
showed a symmetrical direction from the strategic submarines forces at the initial stage 
of the nuclear era to the surface fleet forces after they realized that a nuclear war might 
be avoidable. It seems, however, that the scope of the prime goals theoretically never 
coincided, because Gorshkov’s maritime theory focused on the political use of naval 
forces, whilst American thought remained at the deterrent role of naval forces. 
Nonetheless, the effects of their practical employments of naval powers were almost the 
same in the context of political use rather than real engagement, the US dispatch of the 
task force 77 in the Pueblo incident and the Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean 
and the Indian Ocean from the late 1960s, for example. Consequently, it could be said
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that their priorities to construct naval forces took on almost the same order according to 
the transitions of their relative naval combat powers and maritime strategy.
At the initial stage of the nuclear era, the usefulness of amphibious forces in a future 
war was certainly doubtful. One of the fundamental questions regarding amphibious 
forces to have been endlessly argued is whether amphibious assault has validity in 
modem warfare in terms of efficiency. However, with the achievement of nuclear 
restraint, particularly by the strategic nuclear submarine forces, and the beginning of the 
struggle for influence in the Third World, both superpowers began to pay attention to 
the value of amphibious forces. Of course, their original intentions were to use them for 
amphibious landing operations in a war, but with the two superpowers’ seeking to avoid 
a direct military engagement, its utility for a low-intensity conflict in the Third World 
rather than a major war between the two blocs became more prominent. Even so, the 
strategic value of nuclear submarines was not disregarded due to their possible use in 
surveillance in terms of a withholding strategy until the end of the Cold War, when the 
possibility of major war was almost unimaginable. After that, the validity of amphibious 
forces in the US, the sole country acting as the world’s policeman, began to be 
highlighted compared with the other branches, whereas that of submarine forces became 
the last resort of Russian homeland defence.
Even though the priority in naval force buildup could be no more than an attempt to get 
more of the defence budget, it certainly reflected the transition of the enemy’s condition. 
From the above perspectives, it is not difficult to find some fundamental relationships 
between amphibious forces and the other branches buildup within the navy under the
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prerequisite that they need to project naval power . Firstly, if the enemy is too/ 
relatively strong or not very weak, and it is capable of greatly threatening it, there is a 
tendency for a state to focus on the construction of an underwater navy as a deterrent 
force, in order to make sure the enemy suffers lasting damage. Secondly, if the enemy is 
comparatively weak, a state may focus on the construction of an amphibious force. 
After all, the priority of the maritime policy/ strategy of a state is in which branch it will 
invest its resources. In this sense, it is definitely true that the prioritisation of a state’s 
naval policy/strategy is very important in the rise and fall of amphibious forces.
B. Additional Conditioning Variables
(1) Economic Strength
As previously mentioned, it seems that this factor was not important, judging from the 
fact that both the superpowers kept and abolished/ recreated their amphibious forces in 
the early stages of the Cold War according to the other factors, i.e., political support in 
the US, the transitions of military strategy without any significant economic 
considerations. However, it was possible because their existence was more important 
than economizing on the defence budget considering the anticipated unlimited 
competition in enlarging or defending their influence throughout the world. In the light 
of the delays in the procurement of amphibious lift ships in the US and USSR, it can be 
seen that the development of the naval component of an amphibious force depends on 
the relevant country’s economic strength.
Strictly assessing the amphibious lift capability of the Russian Federation in the post-
693 This prerequisite may include the possibility of participating in a war as a member of alliance.
3 3 9 -3 0 6
Cold War era, it might not have been above the level of regimental size in the Pacific 
fleet, although theoretically they were capable of delivering all the component parts of 
the SNI. This is because the amphibious ships, except for the ships of Ivan Rogov class, 
were not sufficient to perform an amphibious landing operation at a place (across the 
high seas) far from its homeland in the missile age. In reality, that of the US also 
remained at around 3 MEBs, 2.5 MEBs in the post-Cold War era, and a third of total 
combat troops and equipment. In addition to this, the air component in the USMC 
demands a vast amount of defence budget to procure new aircraft, i.e., the continuous 
delay of the procurement of the Osprey. With technical developments, and the 
deterioration of equipment and means of manoeuvre, it is necessary to replace them 
with new ones. In this regard, the economic strength of a state must be considered as 
being the most likely influential factor in the buildup of an amphibious force.
However, it appears that this did not significantly influence the ground component of 
amphibious forces during the Cold War, when a state found it absolutely necessary to 
have minimum armed forces sufficient to defend itself, as almost the same sub­
organisations compared with those of the army demonstrated. In spite of this fact, as the 
demise of the RNI indicated, in the situation of a total economic collapse so that a state 
could not afford to keep its armed forces because of lack of ability to supply homes or 
salaries for military personnel, it could be the greatest influential constraining factor in 
deciding the existence of the amphibious force. Certainly, there is an interaction 
between economic strength and the goal of national interest in the modem international 
economic system. In some aspects, the latter could be revised by the limits of the former, 
i.e., the decrease of the RNI in the post-Cold War in the circumstances that the RF has a 
territorial dispute with Japan. The importance of this principle is definitely applicable to
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most other countries in the world, except for autocratic countries such as North Korea694.
(2) Relationship with Political Leaders and Legal Safeguards
At first glance, it would seem that the crisis of the USMC under the Eisenhower 
administration arose from economic considerations. However, as it was superceded with 
the inauguration of Kennedy, it is more rational to think that that came from the 
relationship with the political leadership in the process of allocating the available 
defence budget rooted in the struggle between the services. The will and intention of the 
highest policy maker, usually the president or prime minister of a state, cannot help but 
influence the rise and fall of amphibious forces, as the last policy decision maker.
With the development of the principle for the respective independence of the three 
powers of administration, legislation and judicature in a democratic society, the 
Congress (Parliament) can restrain an independent decision by the highest decision 
maker. A good example of this is the survival of the USMC in the defence unification 
dispute of 1944-1947. After that, the fundamental organisation of the USMC was 
guaranteed by the National Security Act 1947, which is the driving force behind the 
current existence of the USMC. It is true, as defined in Chapter II, that most amphibious 
forces in the present world might be based on legal regulations, even though there is 
difference between their levels of legal protection, according to how easy they are to 
revise. For example, a state’s amphibious force is created by the CNO’s order, which 
can be more easily dissolved than if it is created by a presidential decree. Hence, it 
could be said that an amphibious force created by the supreme law, such as the
694 According to the comparison of defence budgets between the two Koreas in 1997, whilst South Korea 
allocated about 3.2 % of its GNP for the national defence expenditures, North Korea invested 24.8 % of 
the GDP (Gross Domestic Product). Dongailbo, January 21, 1998.
3 3 9 -3 0 8
constitution, is relatively safer in terms of its surveillance from political containment 
and threats from the other services like the USMC. Considering the duplication of the 
roles and functions of amphibious forces, it is necessary to be guaranteed its existence 
by the legal protection as higher as possible. It appears that this is an undeniably 
important factor.
(3) Doctrinal / Technical Development
Generally, there is a close interaction between the development of doctrine and 
technical development. Usually, one of them in turn attracts the other. For example, the 
use of Landing Craft, Air Cushions (LCACs) in a amphibious landing operation is a 
case in which the latter draws the former. On the contrary, the Ship-to Objective 
Manoeuvre (STOM) and the Operational Manoeuvre From the Sea (OMFTS) doctrines 
of the USMC are facilitating the development of new equipment to bring them into 
force. These independent variables are not less important than the others. The 
emergence of newer, larger, faster and more modem landing ships and craft equipped 
with anti-missile, -air, and -NBC weapon systems have increased the possibility of 
successful amphibious landing operations. Nonetheless, it is true that suspicion about 
the validity of amphibious landing operations was, in fact, continued until the end of the 
Cold War.
The Gorshkov theory regarding the peacetime functions of the Navy as a foreign policy 
tool initiated the embarkation of the SNI on Soviet battleships, although on examination 
it is not clear whether the USSR increased the size of the SNI for its peacetime 
deployment. At the initial stage of the SNI recreation in the early 1960s, the Soviet 
military strategists advocated the necessity of amphibious forces after carefully
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examining the uses of the USMC in WWII, the Korean War and the US Marines landing 
in Lebanon in 1958. Furthermore, the USMC is involved in the Navy’s doctrinal 
development in the post-Cold War period such as the doctrine for the NETF.
In this sense, the doctrinal and theoretical development for amphibious forces could 
certainly be a conditioning factor. In other words, it is certainly true that the existence of 
amphibious forces would, as the duplication of roles and functions implies, 
continuously be threatened by the other services without doctrinal / technical 
development for successful amphibious landing operations. The US Marines effort to 
develop new doctrines and to provide, as defined in the DoD Directive, its amphibious 
landing doctrine for the joint force could be understood in this context. The effort to 
explain to the other services the complexity of amphibious landing operations is a way 
of highlighting its validity to the others.
C. Summary
From the above perspectives, a new set of principal conditioning factors affecting the 
rise and fall of the AF can be summarized as follows:
1. General Environmental Factors:
a. Security Environment: the relationship with allies, international and regional political and 
(non)military agreements,
b. Maritime Dominion: a number of advanced bases (the control of the SLOC) and the law of 
the sea
2. Major Policing Factors from the National Strategic Direction:
a. National Interests/ Foreign Policy Objectives: to decide necessity overseas regardless of
de(of)fensive and (non)military purposes
b. Military Strategy / Policy: to provide a basic guideline for the size of amphibious forces
demanded
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c. Maritime Strategy/ Policy: to decide how to divide allocated resources (defence budget), 
and the priority of the components
3. Constraining Factors
a. Economic Strength: important for the naval and air components of AF
b. Relationship with Political Leader: important, but it is possible to be contained by the 
Congress
c. Legal Safeguard: guarantee its surveillance
d. Doctrinal and Technical Development: an ingredient to maintain its organisation in the 
competition for the defence budget
e. Geographical Location695, etc.
Here, the factors of the second category should be decided considering the factors of the 
first and third categories. In the modem era, putting the above theory into the military/ 
maritime strategists’ theories regarding the major principles of conditioning a state’s 
armed forces, the direction of a national strategy has already included all the other 
environmental and constraining factors in the development of a policy decision-making 
system. In other words, even though an increasing number of divisions is determined by 
the national strategic decision considering all the environmental and constraining factors 
at that time, there is a possibility of it not being formed because of changes in both 
policies and the other factors in the process of execution, which is represented as the 
budgeting stage in the PPBS. This is the key reason why the difference between the 
plans to construct an amphibious lift capability and their results in the US and USSR 
occurred.
In addition to this, a state’s military force buildup planning depends upon those of both 
allies and friendly states, and the trends of the current direction of the potential enemy
695 As continuously conceived throughout the thesis, a country that has great interest in overseas regions, 
has inevitably more reason to possess amphibious forces than others. This geographical factor must be 
reflected in the government’s national strategic direction or in the policy-decision making system.
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by taking the historic experiences into consideration to some extent. The essence of 
such planning lies in the achievement of coordination, coherence, and consistency in 
analyzing the utilization in an integrated fashion all the elements of statecraft-security 
environments, foreign policy, military (and maritime in this case) strategy, economic 
strength, technology, political will and leadership to achieve its vitally important goals. 
From this perspective, there was a great difference between the Nixon and Brezhnev 
doctrines. Whilst the US began to lessen its defence responsibilities for its allies with 
the development of their own national power, the USSR became more deeply engaged 
in its allies’ defence in pursuit of both the strengthening of the relationships with its 
allies and maintaining its influence within the bloc. The effect of this factor on the rise 
and fall of the USMC and SNI is not clearly estimated in quantitative terms. 
Nonetheless, as found in the increase of the exercises, i.e., the USMC/SNI and its 
European allies, and reinforced deployments in the second Cold War era, it appears that 
this was an undeniably important factor influencing the rise and fall of the amphibious 
forces.
Despite the fact that most independent variables were carefully discussed, it appears that 
it was not easy to explain the phenomenon of amphibious force construction throughout 
the period with just these discussed variables. This may come from the complexity of 
subject per se as well as the limitation of sources and research methods. Even so, it was 
possible to gather that a state’s military force buildup planning was closely rooted in an 
understanding of the relationship between the major policing principles. Of course, it is 
not difficult to find a close connection between the planning and the output, and 
between the upper and lower independent variables. Except for the independent 
variables discussed and additionally summarized in conclusions, there may be many
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variables such as a state’s scientific levels, public opinion, psychological-moral aspects, 
etc. In order to reflect all of these, the organization of the modem government (policy 
making system) is more and more fractionalized with time. It is believed that each 
department or section is doing its best to produce a sound policy decision.
However, it is sometimes distorted by the powers of each department/decision 
maker/service and miscalculation of the other conditioning factors. In this sense, the 
factor of legal protection as in the case of the USMC is probably the most important, so 
as to maximize the utility and combat power of amphibious forces as a political means 
to manage the international order, considering the duplication of the roles and functions 
with the other services. All in all, the most critical factor is its necessity, whether it is 
crucial to defend a state’s national goals and interests, and its foreign policy objectives. 
It does not matter whether this organisation is positioned under the Army or Navy, or 
exists as an independent service, which may depend on the socio-political culture and 
the historic development of the armed forces.
The framework for analysis used in this study appears to have been effective for the 
purpose of assessing the American and Soviet/Russian amphibious experience during 
the time period covered by the dissertation. One point that should be stressed here is 
that there were some additionally important factors in each independent variables whilst 
the other background factors in the international and domestic context, such as security 
environment and economic strength, have been integrated into the policy making 
process as background factors, which have been considered by the policy makers. The 
additional factors identified in this study are indicated inside of the dotted circles in 
Figure 6-2.
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Figure 6-2 : Additional Factors for AF Construction
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In the modem era, it seems that the attitude toward amphibious force of the key national 
decision maker (President or Prime Minister of a state, Commander of Naval Operation, 
Commander of Marine Corps) is the most important factor, not only because of their 
place as the final decision maker in each process, but also because only this individual 
is in a position to consider all aspects of the conditioning factors on the basis of their 
perspective as a representative of the population or the supreme commander of each 
organisation positioned by the legal authority. In addition to this, the efforts of members 
of the amphibious force is also very important in promoting its own prestige, as for 
example, the lead taken by the USMC in the field of doctrinal development for the US
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Navy.
This framework of analysis may not work appropriately in the undeveloped countries, 
because of their deficiency of information or resources and differences in the policy 
making process, but may have a broader relevance for some countries. Looking back 
upon the construction of the Republic Of Korea Marine Corps for example, Korean 
Marine Corps demands to improve combat strength were always distorted by the Navy 
or the Ministry of Defense, particularly in the buildup of amphibious lift capability. As a 
peninsula country confronting North Korea, the utility of marines capable of attacking 
from the sea to the rear area of the North Korea clearly appears to be very useful. 
Nonetheless, South Korean amphibious lift capability is still limited at the level of a 
regiment, compared with the manpower strength of almost 3 ground divisions.
Perhaps the issue is that in the nuclear era a genius in the field of military force 
construction would be more useful and important than that of the battlefield genius 
posited by Clausewitz!
3. Roles and Functions of Amphibious Force
The fundamental role of amphibious forces is to embody a state’s national security 
policy in supporting its interests and foreign policy objectives by deploying overseas or 
waging a war or showing the possibility of using amphibious forces in a war or 
contingency situation. The original purpose of amphibious force organisation was its
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necessity for attacking the enemy overseas. With the openings of overseas naval bases 
like the USN, to defend and protect overseas naval personnel and facilities also became 
a raison d ’etre of amphibious forces. However, passing through the nuclear and missile 
age, its roles and functions also enlarged into the general roles and functions of armed 
forces covering various spectrums of the use of military forces by performing missions 
allocated by the supreme national command authority. Nonetheless, it is absolutely true 
that its usefulness for amphibious landing operations is the fundamental raison d ’etre of 
an amphibious force. It is inconceivable for any reason to think of the existence of 
amphibious forces without considering their usefulness in wartime. The others are 
supplementary values derived from the possession of an amphibious force. Owing to its 
value for amphibious landing operations, amphibious forces are firmly positioned as an 
indispensable branch or an independent service of the state, i.e., the USMC, although its 
position is different according to the relevant state’s defence posture, i.e., the RNI under 
the coastal defence units.
As seen in Figure 2-2, the general roles, such as defence, deterrence, compellence, of 
armed forces as defined by the military strategists are divided by the intensities of the 
course of military actions; how a state can influence the other’s unfavourable actions 
using its armed forces according to the degree of the escalation of a conflict. In this 
regard, military forces are a means of a state’s foreign policy, and therefore their role is 
mainly determined by the supreme national command authority considering diplomatic 
relationships with others or allies. Likewise, the roles of amphibious forces basically do 
not lie beyond these basic realms. In the process of undertaking an allocated role, the 
role could be changed according to the opponent’s reaction and the order of the supreme 
national command authority. A good example of this is the role of the 3rd Marines in
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Japan. Its basic role is to defend its allies, Japan and South Korea, by deterring any kind 
of external threat. If they deploy on the adjacent sea to the Korean peninsula as a 
reaction against North Korea’s aggressive behaviour, the role is upgraded into 
compellence, but is still a deterrent against other possible threats. Consequently, there is 
no a clear point of divergence between the roles even in a single troop, thus the effects 
of deployment or employment of armed forces imply a varied spectrum of their roles at 
the same time.
In the process of performing the above roles, the functions of amphibious forces could 
be summarized as in the contents of Table 2-5. They could also be classified into two 
categories according to the time: peacetime and wartime functions. However, strictly 
speaking, it is not easy to divide them according to peacetime or wartime functions as 
Figure 2-2 suggests. As such, the most important thing is what kind of mission is 
allocated to an amphibious force by the national command authority. In order to 
accomplish this, the various capabilities, such as mobility, versatility, sustained reach, 
resilience, and lift capacity, of the naval and amphibious forces allows the team to 
function as a state’s ready force like the US NETF by making a substantial contribution 
to any kind of mission. Particularly, the attribute of a ground component of the Navy- 
Marines Team in the post-Cold War era is critically important in taking and holding the 
human factor of an opponent’s power or territory.696 In the contemporary era, the 
capability to perform the MOOTW, which includes the stability operation to establish a 
legitimate government, gradually becomes more and more important than that in a war. 
With the movement of the enemy’s centre of gravity from the sea to land, the ground
696 It appears that if there is a territorial dispute, like the Russo-Japanese case, in the seas adjacent to the 
territory, it will be more critical than the other case. This could be the reason that the fundamental 
function of amphibious landing operations for the RNI has not been completely disbanded in the RF.
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forces are the main force to establish the ultimate aims of an operation, and they can 
simultaneously function as an international police force to control the population in a 
operational area. Consequently, it could be said that the ground force of the naval and 
amphibious team is at the root of the team power and at the same time it is the most 
important resource for completing the operational aims.
Another important point is its contribution to strengthening the diplomatic relationships 
with an alliance by ratifying bilateral military-to-military relations. As military affairs 
(in modem terms it is referred to as the defence) of the state is of vital importance to the 
state as a matter of life and death in terms of Sun Tzu, military diplomacy cannot help 
occupying a very appropriate proportion of the state’s diplomatic sphere, although it is 
clearly nothing but a part of national diplomacy. Even so, with the increased importance 
of multinational or combined operations, the peacetime connection between the same 
services or branches of countries, i.e., the creation of the CMFC between the US and 
ROK Marines, is a tool in pursuing the strengthening of their military and cultural 
affinity by performing combined exercises and exchanging their personnel and by 
upgrading mutual understanding. This would be classified as one of the peacetime 
functions.
To sum up, the USMC is the main force of American naval operations in the post-Cold 
War era considering the transitions of the international security system. It also 
experienced many difficulties in surviving the disputes as to whether it was a necessary 
force or not in the nuclear and missile age posited by the other services and civilian 
experts. In this way, the other amphibious forces might experience the same dispute, so 
they may tend to rely on their ontological foundation to survive by pursuing what their
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roles and functions are in peacetime and wartime. However, it seems that those attempts 
are no longer necessary, because they have existed as a component of the total national 
force in light of carefully examining the above conditioning factors for the AF buildup. 
As such, whatever roles and functions they have found, it would not be their raison 
d ’etre in case they do not receive an appropriate mission from the supreme national 
command authority. In this context, the most important thing is their readiness to react 
to any kind of mission necessary to defend their national interests and support their 
foreign policy objectives.
With time and the development of organisation and equipment as a result of the RMA, 
the original concept of the operational realm of each service is continually vague. 
Instead, how to contribute to a joint or combined operation as a component of a nation’s 
total force will become more and more the focus. As long as the geographical and geo­
strategic politico environment has not changed, the wartime function of amphibious 
forces as a fighting instrument of a navy will not easily lose its value. However, it is 
also true that it is impossible for every military organisation to survive without its own 
revolutionary effort to adjust to the changing international security environment like a 
chameleon.
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